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Abstract	Successive	“National	Care	of	the	Dying	Audit	for	Hospitals”	record	that	Health	Care	Professionals	(HCPs),	are	recognising	that	patients	are	dying	only	days	before	their	death,	 reducing	 opportunities	 for	 patient	 involvement	 in	 decision-making.	 This	PhD,	 utilizing	 a	mixed	 and	 iterative	methodology,	 addresses	how	 senior	HCPs	 in	one	 hospital	 recognise	 dying,	 and	 negotiate	 decision-making	 with	 patients	 and	families	in	this	process.		In	 Study	 One	 thirteen	 senior	 HCPS	 undertook	 a	 Critical	 Incident	 Review.	 These	involved	 the	 ward	 based	 senior	 HCP	 who	 identified	 dying,	 and	 the	 Hospital	
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Palliative	 Care	Team	 (HPCT)	HCP(s)	 subsequently	 involved	 in	 the	 patient’s	 care.		Interviews	 were	 recorded,	 transcribed	 and	 themed.	 In	 Study	 Two	 senior	 HCPs	across	the	hospital	were	invited	to	four	consecutive	Participatory	Action	Research	(PAR)	 workshops	 to	 critically	 reflect	 on	 the	 themed	 data	 from	 Study	 One.	 	 Ten	HCPs	took	part	(three	HPCT	HCPs	were	involved	in	both	studies).	The	workshops	were	similarly	recorded,	transcribed	and	themed.	The	themed	analysis	yielded	a	model	for	decision-making	but	did	not	explain	why	dying	was	identified	so	late.	A	psychoanalytically	informed	psychosocial	approach	was	taken	to	examine	anomalies	and	contradictions	in	the	data	that	pointed	to	less	conscious	 undercurrents	 in	 the	 personal,	 professional,	 educational	 and	institutional	dynamics	involved	in	the	care	of	patients	who	are	dying.		Through	this	analysis,	it	is	clear	that	identifying	dying,	and	negotiating	decision-making	with	the	patient	and	their	family	at	this	time,	is	extremely	anxiety	provoking.	Individual	and	social	psychological	defence	mechanisms	that	avoid	the	recognition	of	dying	come	into	 play.	 	 HCPs’	 experience	 of	 learning	 to	 care	 for	 the	 dying	 patient	 and	 their	family	 is	 “chaotic”	 and	 anxiety	 provoking	 and	 leaves	 them	 ill-equipped.	Complicating	matters,	at	the	point	of	recognition	of	dying,	the	institution	devolves	its	responsibility	 for	care	(requirement	 for	space	and	time	 for	patient	and	 family	conversations,	and	emotional	support	for	HCPs	who	sometimes	have	to	deal	with	angry	 families)	 to	 individual	 HCPs.	 The	 argument	 is	 put	 forward	 that	 the	 HPCT	have	become	part	of	modern	NHS	social	defence	mechanisms.		Sensitively	facilitated	PAR	workshops	allow	interested	HCPs	to	mutually	consider	how	 to	 identify	 dying	 earlier;	 implications	 of	 this	 for	 the	 patient,	 family	 and	themselves;	 the	 organisational	 resources	 available;	 and	 the	 role	 of	 education.		Attention	 is	 paid	 to	 the	 HCPs	 emotional	 experience	 and	 psychological	 defences,	and	over	time	there	is	opportunity	to	negotiate	sustainable	practice	change.										
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Chapter	One	-	An	Introduction	And	Orientation	To	The	Thesis	I	came	to	this	PhD	in	2011	with	a	longing	to	be	able	to	improve	both	my	own,	and	other	Health	Care	Professionals	(HCPs),	clinical	care	of	the	dying	patient	and	their	family.		My	experience,	as	a	Consultant	Nurse	(Palliative	Care),	of	leading	change	in	ward-based	clinical	practice	is	that	ward	doctors,	nurses	and	therapists	wanted	to	care	 well	 for	 the	 dying	 patient	 and	 their	 family,	 and	 got	 pleasure	 from	 seeing	patients	 having	 their	 symptoms	well	 managed	 and	 comfortable.	 	 However,	 they	often	needed	assistance	to	recognise	that	patients	were	dying	and	to	work	with	the	patient	and	their	family	subsequent	to	that	decision.	Between	 2008	 and	 2014	 I	 based	myself	 for	 extended	 periods	 firstly	 in	 Accident	and	Emergency	and	the	Acute	Medical	Unit,	and	then	on	the	respiratory	ward	at	a	District	General	Hospital1.		In	this	time,	I	worked	with	clinicians	in	those	specialties	and	 together	 we	 increased	 access	 to	 palliative	 and	 end	 of	 life	 care,	 and	 jointly	published	results	at	local	and	international	conferences.		The	practice	development	used	 service	 quality	 improvement	 methodology	 (Maher,	 Gustafson,	 &	 Evans,	2007),	 and	nationally	 recommended	 care	 plans.	 	 This	was	 initially	 the	 Liverpool	Care	Pathway	(Ellershaw	&	Wilkinson,	2003)	to	care	for	the	patient	in	the	last	days	of	 life	 and	 latterly	 the	AMBER	care	bundle	 (Guy's	&	St	Thomas'	NHS	Foundation	Trust,	2012),	 	 to	care	for	the	patient	who	was	 likely	 in	their	 last	six	weeks	of	 life	and	 with	 an	 uncertain	 recovery.	 	 The	 understanding	 though	 was	 that	 this	paperwork	 was	 only	 to	 prompt	 and	 record	 (and	 it	 was	 ultimately	 used	 for	analysing	the	intervention);	it’s	the	clinician	working	with	the	patient	and	family	to	achieve	meaningful	outcomes	that	is	key	(Sleeman,	Koffman,	Bristowe,	&	Rumble,	2015).		Every	time	I	left	the	clinical	area	for	annual	leave,	the	amount	of	dying	that	was	recognised	dropped,	but	not	the	number	of	deaths.		When	this	was	presented	to	clinicians	they	were	shocked	and	could	not	explain	the	data.	Through	this	PhD	I	have	become	more	acutely	aware	of	the	anxiety	–	both	my	own	and	 others	 -	 engendered	 by	 caring	 for	 dying	 patients	 and	 their	 families.	 	 I	 have	been	 introduced	 to	 psychosocial	 studies	 (Frost	 &	 McClean,	 2014)	 and	psychoanalytically	 informed	ways	of	 thinking	about	 research	 (Walkerdine,	Lucey																																																									1	Name	not	used	to	promote	anonymity	of	participants	in	study.	
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and	 Melody	 2001)	 and	 the	 analysis	 of	 research	 data	 (Clarke	 &	 Hoggett	 2009)	(Hollway	and	Jefferson	2013).	 	Psychosocial	thinking	places	the	individual	HCP	at	the	 heart	 of	 the	 study	 and	 considers	 the	 interconnectedness	 between	 the	 HCP’s	individual	 lives	–	personal	(the	individual	as	part	of	their	family	and	community)	and	 professional	 -	 and	 the	 external	 social	 relationships	 they	 maintain	 with	patients,	families	and	colleagues,	sited	within	the	hospital	as	part	of	the	economic	and	political	order	 that	 largely	governs	and	shapes	the	context	 in	which	the	HCP	functions.		The	pulse	of	this	inter-connectivity	is	anxiety	(Menzies,	1970)	(Hoggett,	2009).		The	psychosocial	analysis	of	data	collected	in	the	course	of	this	PhD	will	be	presented	in	the	later	chapters	but	not	immediately	introduced.		The	need	to	take	a	radical	 subversive	 thought	 (Bibby,	 2011),	 and	 dive	 into	 the	 consideration	 of	 the	irrational,	 psychologically	 defended	 HCP,	 will	 be	 considered	 as	 the	 positivist	options	for	practice	change	are	shown	to	run	dry.			The	marginalised	discourse	of	the	lived	experience	of	the	HCP	in	this	aspect	of	clinical	care	needs	to	be	factored	in.		In	 Chapter	 Two	 the	 necessity	 for	 the	 research	 is	 argued.	 The	 increasing	demographics	of	an	aging	and	multiply	co-morbid	population	make	the	care	of	the	dying	patient	an	ever-increasing	occurrence	in	a	hospital	system	whose	outcomes	are	 focused	 on	 restoration	 to	 health	 and	 function,	 and	 cautioned	 against	 early	mortality.		The	positive	national	policy	drives	for	“good	end	of	life	care”,	with	“care	closer	 to	 home”,	 make	 it	 difficult	 to	 think	 about	 less	 rational	 influences	 on	identifying	 dying,	 and	 working	 with	 patients	 and	 families.	 Yet	 the	 evidence	 has	long	been	present	that	clinicians	are	not	good	at	prognosticating,	and	patients	are	even	worse.	 This	 chapter	 considers	why	 identifying	 dying	 is	 clinically	 important	for	 both	 the	 patient	 and	 for	 preparing	 the	 family	 for	 bereavement.	 	 It	 considers	previous	 research	 that	 has	 begun	 to	 illuminate	 the	 challenge	 of	 this	 topic,	 and	considers	what	was	known	from	the	literature	ahead	of	the	start	of	this	research.	It	presents	 the	 evidence	 in	 a	 clinically	 relevant	 way	 for	 what	 was	 known	 about	recognising	dying	and	negotiating	decision-making	for	adults	with	mental	capacity,	adults	without	mental	capacity	due	to	a	long	term	condition	and	adults	who	have	temporarily	 lost	mental	 capacity	due	 to	an	acute	event.	 	 It	 considers	 the	 family’s	role	and	experience	in	the	decision-making	and	then	thinks	about	the	rapidity	and	
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intensity	of	the	clinical	care	and	decision-making	in	areas	such	as	the	Emergency	Department	(ED).		It	shows	that	identifying	dying	and	negotiating	decision-making	with	 patients	 and	 families	 is	 skilled	 and	 emotionally	 taxing	work.	 Since	 starting	this	study,	other	researchers	are	interested	in	the	same	question,	and	this	chapter	considers	their	research	and	implications.		It	then	clearly	charts	how	the	research	question	 under-pinning	 this	 study,	 has	 been	 re-focused	 from	 “How	 senior	HCPs,	identify	 dying	 and	 negotiate	 decision-making	 to	 improve	 the	 patient	 and	 family	experience.	Participatory	Action	Research	explored	as	a	means	to	develop	clinical	practice”;	 to	 “A	mixed-method,	 psychosocial	 analysis	 of	 how	 senior	 Health	 Care	Professionals	recognise	dying	and	engage	patients	and	families	in	the	negotiation	of	key	decisions”	as	findings	from	this	study	have	emerged.	It	articulates	how	the	refocused	question	addresses	the	gaps	in	the	literature	and	in	clinical	practice.			In	Chapter	Three	 the	 two-stage	methodology	and	method	are	 introduced.	Whilst	writing	up	this	PhD,	I	knew	that	the	 initial	 themed	analysis	of	the	Study	One	and	Study	 Two	 transcripts	 did	 not	 fully	 answer	 the	 research	 question,	 and	 I	 did	 not	have	 a	 language	 to	 articulate	 what	 might	 be	 happening.	 	 The	 need	 for	 a	psychosocial	 enquiry	 to	 illuminate	 less	 rational	 decision-making,	 and	 more	psychologically	 defended	 possibilities	 at	 an	 individual,	 social	 and	 organisation	level	is	articulated.		The	psychosocial	literature	review	is	covered	in	this	chapter.	Chapter	 Four	 introduces	 the	 reader	 to	 the	 pen	 portraits	 of	 the	 six	 patients	 as	described	 by	 the	 13	 HCPs	 in	 the	 Critical	 Incident	 Review	 (Study	 One),	 and	 a	summary	of	 the	HCPs	role	 in	 the	patient’s	 care,	 to	help	ground	 the	reader	 in	 the	realities	 of	 clinical	 practice	 and	 assist	 with	 a	 “sense	 of	 the	 whole”	 ahead	 of	 the	themed	and	psychosocial	analysis.			Chapter	Five	describes	the	themed	results	of	the	Critical	Incident	Reviews	(Study	One),	as	they	were	presented	to	the	(mainly)	different	HCPs	who	took	part	in	the	four	Participatory	Action	Workshops	(PAR)	of	Study	Two.		The	themed	data	from	the	 PAR	 workshops	 (Study	 Two)	 is	 also	 presented.	 	 A	 four-stage	 model	 of	recognising	 dying	 and	 engaging	 with	 patients	 is	 initially	 described.	 	 There	 was	positive	 evaluation	 of	 PAR	 workshops	 as	 a	 means	 to	 facilitate	 practice	development,	and	so	a	 fifth	stage	of	clinical	supervision	was	added	to	 the	model.	
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What	the	themed	analysis	did	not	facilitate	was	to	explain	why	the	model	was	not	always	used,	why	recognising	dying	could	be	avoided,	or	why	there	was	“blending”	between	 stages	 or	 unawareness	 of	 stages.	 	 With	 this	 is	 mind	 a	 psychosocial	analysis	was	 undertaken	 of	 the	workshop	 transcripts,	 and	 two	 aspects	 of	 this	 –	“Families”,	 and	 “How	HCPs	 learn	 to	 care	 for	 the	 dying	 patient	 and	 family”	 –	 are	considered	 in	Chapters	Seven	and	Eight.	 	 I	 then	considered	study	one	transcripts	and	 this	 is	 presented	 in	 Chapter	 Six	 –	 “The	 primary	 task	 of	 the	 NHS	 and	 social	defences”.	Chapter	 Six	 draws	 on	 Menzies-Lyth’s	 (Menzies,	 1970)	 psychoanalytic	 study	 of	nurses	in	a	London	teaching	hospital	in	the	1950s.	 	In	this	chapter	it	is	suggested	that	caring	for	the	dying	is	both	consciously	and	unconsciously	extremely	anxiety	provoking.	 	 In	 response	 to	 this	challenge	 to	HCP’s	psychological	well	being	 there	are	 co-created	 social	 defence	mechanisms	 specifically	 related	 to	dying	 and	 these	are	 produced	 and	 supported	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 personal,	 the	 group	 and	 the	institution.	 	There	was	evidence	of	HCPs	defending	against	 the	anxiety	provoked	by	 the	 task	 of	 identifying	 dying	 by	 working	 to	 achieve	 a	 “cast	 iron	 decision”,	utilising	 second	opinions	 and	multiple	 tests.	 	 It	 is	 no	wonder	dying	 is	 ultimately	recognised	 so	 late.	 	We	 saw	minimising	 of	 anxiety	 by	 denial	 and	 detachment	 of	feelings.	 There	 is	 evidence	 of	 HCPs	 avoiding	 the	 work	 of	 identifying	 dying	 and	subsequent	patient	and	family	engagement,	by	dressing	dying	up	as	a	treatment	–	for	example	“re-x-ray	to	see	if	the	stent	is	in	place”	or	leaving	the	emotional	work	to	 other	 HCPs	 –	 writing	 in	 the	 clinical	 notes	 “consider	 Do	 Not	 Attempt	 Cardio-Pulmonary	Resuscitation”.	 	 It	 argues	 that	Hospital	 Palliative	 Care	 Teams	 (HPCT)	are	the	new,	but	not	infallible,	social	defence	mechanism	of	the	modern	NHS	that	relieve	others	of	their	anxiety	of	caring	for	the	dying.	Chapter	Seven	draws	on	the	concepts	of	liminality	and	affectivity	to	open	a	space	to	consider	 the	HCP	and	patient	and	 family	relationships,	as	news	about	dying	 is	broken.	 	 Dying	 is	 a	 liminal	 experience	 for	 the	 patient,	 but	 the	 loss	 of	 mental	capacity	to	take	part	in	decision-making	can	and	is	 likely	to	occur	ahead	of	death	and	 withdraws	 the	 patient	 from	 the	 decision-making	 process.	 The	 formal	introduction	 of	 the	 family,	 in	 a	 best	 interests	 decision-making	 scenario,	 is	considered.	The	chapters	proposes	 that	 recognising	dying	and	engaging	with	 the	
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family	 about	 this	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 jettison	 the	 family	 into	 an	 experience	 of	liminality	where	the	reality	of	 the	death	of	 their	 family	member	and	the	possible	personal	 impact	 of	 this	 upon	 them	 becomes	 a	 reality.	 The	 engagement	with	 the	family	may	also	be	a	liminal	experience	for	the	HCP	as	their	protective	phantasies	of	being	right	and	in	control	can	be	undermined	when	their	skills	to	cure	or	make	better	have	reached	an	end	and	they	meet	the	family	in	a	human-being	to	human-being	relationship.	This	chapter	considers	anthropological	researchers	advice	that	liminal	events	be	structured	by	ritual	for	the	emotional	safety	and	containment	of	strong	emotions	and	for	people	to	understand	the	behaviours	of	the	role.		Chapter	Eight	presents	the	current	context	for	medical	and	nursing	education	and	the	importance	of	the	“supervised	learning	opportunity	with	reflective	debrief”	in	both	 the	 development	 and	 assessment	 of	 medical	 and	 nursing	 HCPs	 for	professional	 practice.	 	 It	 evaluates	 the	 literature	 that	 shows	 that	 despite	 a	nationally	articulated	focus	on	end	of	life	care,	some	junior	doctors	and	nurses	feel	unprepared	for	 this	work	upon	qualification	and	unsupported	by	their	seniors	 in	their	on-going	clinical	practice	(Bowden,	Dempsey,	Boyd,	Fallon,	&	Murray,	2013;	Price	 &	 Schofield,	 2015).	 	 It	 draws	 on	 current	 psychoanalytic	 approaches	 to	learning	and	 the	data	 from	the	workshops	 to	help	us	understand	why.	 	Allowing	thought,	 thinking	 and	 moving	 to	 learning	 is	 inherently	 dangerous	 and	 anxiety	provoking,	and	never	more	so	than	when	thinking	and	learning	about	death.		The	learning	is	not	just	about	the	clinical	situation,	but	HCPs’	own	lives	and	self.		From	the	 workshop	 data	 there	 was	 evidence	 that	 senior	 HCPs	 once	 they	 are	 in	 a	psychologically	 safe	 environment	 “discuss	 the	 un-discussable”.	 	 Instead	 of	 the	responses	 from	the	 interviews	 in	Study	One,	where	they	expressed	the	 impact	of	caring	for	the	dying	as	“part	of	the	job”,	they	expressed	feelings	of	uselessness	and	frustration	when	faced	with	the	reality	of	a	patient	whose	dying	takes	time.	They	thought	 of	 their	 families	 and	 imagined	 their	 own	 loss.	 They	 had	 their	 own	phantasies	 of	 mastery	 of	 death	 by	 clinical	 care	 and	 usefulness	 undermined.		Exploring	what	 is	un-discussable	gives	 some	clues	as	 to	why	senior	doctors	may	avoid	the	“supervised	learning	opportunity”	for	HCPs.		Senior	doctors	in	this	study	did	endeavour	to	offer	junior	doctors	experiences	of	watching	family	meetings	take	place,	 but	 expressed	unease	 at	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 junior	 doctor	 in	 the	meeting.		
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There	was	not	 evidence	 that	 these	 learning	 events	were	debriefed.	 	 The	 chapter	considers	how	HCPs	regulate	their	own	learning	by	seeing	and	doing	and	considers	that	some	nurses	are	the	route	to	safely	contain	doctors	so	that	they	can	learn.		It	was	 suggested	 that	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 General	 Medical	 Council	 “Standards	 and	Education	 for	 Training”	 guidance	 (General	 Medical	 Council,	 2016)	 that	organisations	 should	provide	a	good	 learning	environment,	 that	 the	organisation	contributed	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 learning	 by	 lack	 of	 time	 and	 opportunity	 for	 skilled	emotional	containment	of	senior	doctors	to	help	them	process	their	own	learning	and	 thus	better	 support	 junior	doctors.	 	 The	national	 commitment	 to	mandating	reflection	 for	 judgement	 and	 assessment	 through	 appraisal	 and	 revalidation	 is	unlikely	to	be	helpful.		Nurses	(apart	from	palliative	care	nurses)	are	educationally	unprepared	 to	 be	 the	 emotional	 container	 for	 doctors	 at	 patient	 and	 family	meeting,	or	to	assist	with	a	reflective	debrief	in	a	skilled	manner.		In	this	way	it	is	easy	 to	 see	 how	 troubling	 experiences	 and	 thoughts	 about	 dying	 could	 be	repressed	or	projected	elsewhere	and	dying	patients	and	families	avoided.	The	final	chapter	discusses	the	nine	unique	contributions	that	this	PhD	makes.		The	first	is	to	keep	the	subject	of	the	HCP	at	the	centre	of	the	research	question	(Frost,	2015),	and	 to	 introduce	 the	 language	of	 the	psychoanalytic	psychosocial	 into	 the	care	of	the	dying.	I	propose	it	is	helpful	to	name	that	death	and	caring	for	the	dying	is	 extremely	 anxiety	 provoking	 and	 to	 stop	 repeating	 the	 national	 rhetoric	 that	“end	of	life	care	is	everyone’s	business”.	The	purpose	of	this	naming	would	be	to	let	us	pause	and	stop	passing	the	“emotional	hot	potato”	round	long	enough	to	think	creatively	 together	about	how	we	might	progress	 this	 clinical	 aspect	of	 care	 in	a	humane	and	kind	way	 that	 is	 respectful	of	HCP’s	personal	histories,	professional	development,	 the	 organisational	 resource	 and	 complexity,	 and	 the	 contribution	our	educators	can	make.			The	second	novel	contribution	 is	 the	use	of	a	 five-staged,	 rather	 than	two-staged	(Lamont	and	Christakis	cited	in	Krawczyk	&	Gallagher,	2016),	model	to	recognising	dying,	and	then	communicate	this	to	the	patient	and	family.		HCPs	in	this	study	had	not	previously	considered	the	detail	of	the	process	of	recognising	dying	and	found	it	 helpful	 to	 consider	 each	 stage.	 Giving	 the	 process	 of	 recognising	 dying	 and	negotiating	decision	making	a	framework	means	HCPs	attention	in	clinical	practice	
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and	teaching	can	be	 focused	on	the	detail	of	each	of	 the	stages	 in	a	timely	rather	than	rushed	manner	and	there	can	be	pacing	of	each	stage,	with	spaces	open	 for	thought,	both	 for	 the	patient,	 their	 family	and	the	HCP,	dependent	on	the	clinical	situation.		Clinical	supervision	is	added	as	a	fifth	stage	in	the	model	as	HCPs	valued	reflective	 space	 to	 both	 address	 the	 emotional	 component	 of	 their	 learning,	 and	learn	 from	 other	 HCP’s	 experiences.	 The	 addition	 of	 this	 stage	 allows	 for	 future	negotiation	for	organisational	support	for	this	aspect	of	clinical	care.	Despite	 the	 work	 of	 Menzies-Lyth,	 there	 is	 still	 no	 language	 in	 the	 NHS	 for	 the	consideration	of	co-constructed	social	defence	mechanisms.		She	herself	lamented	that	her	work	on	social	defences	had	not	had	more	effect	(Dartington,	2008).	The	third	and	fourth	novel	contributions	are	to	describe	the	social	defence	mechanisms	associated	with	the	conscious	and	unconscious	anxiety	provoked	by	the	care	of	the	dying	and	to	name	palliative	care	teams	as	the	new	social	defence	of	the	NHS.	My	 fifth	 novel	 contribution	 is	 the	 detailed	 consideration	 of	 the	 contribution	 of	families	 to	 the	 raising	 of	 the	 tone	 of	 the	 anxiety	 and	 the	 avoidance	 of	 the	recognition	of	dying.	 	Families	who	are	mistrusting,	disbelieving	and	angry	at	the	medical	decision-making	about	dying	are	particularly	challenging.	HCPs	identified	that	they	felt	educationally	poorly	prepared	for	family	meetings,	that	the	meetings	take	 a	 long	 time	 and	 that	 this	 work	 is	 not	 adequately	 resourced	within	 current	clinical	care.		My	sixth	novel	contribution	is	to	highlight	that	getting	the	prognostication	wrong	is	hugely	 impactful	 for	HCPs	–	 this	 is	especially	so	 if	 the	 treatment	 is	changed	 to	comfort	 focused.	 The	 experience	 of	 HCPs,	 patients	 and	 family	 of	 surviving	 a	prognosis	 warrants	 further	 study.	 	 In	 this	 study	 HCPs	 described	 hours	 of	 work	getting	 relationships	 with	 patients	 and	 families	 back	 on	 track.	 How	 HCPs	 learn	from	their	mistakes	has	been	described	as	a	“marginalised	professional	discourse”	(Vetere,	 2007)	 and	 the	 	 discourse	 of	 “learning	 from	 getting	 it	 wrong”,	 and	“relationship	repair’”	is	worthy	of	further	study.		The	introduction	of	the	psychoanalytic	psychosocial	allows	new	insights	about	the	“supervised	 learning	 opportunity”.	 	 Whilst	 the	 literature	 highlights	 that	 junior	doctors	and	nurses	are	left	to	manage	dying	patients	and	families	alone	(Bowden,	
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Introduction		This	 research	 study,	 which	 started	 in	 2011,	 has	 always	 focussed	 on	 addressing	how	senior	Health	Care	Professionals	 (HCPs)	 in	one	UK	District	General	Hospital	recognise	 dying	 and	 engage	 patients	 and	 families	 in	 the	 negotiation	 of	 key	decisions	at	this	time.	It	is	important	to	note	that	my	intention	with	this	PhD	was	to	better	understand	clinical	practice	and	articulate	suggestions	to	improve	this	area	of	clinical	practice.	Subsequent	to	the	first	literature	review,	the	research	plan	was	to	evaluate	Participatory	Action	Research	(PAR)	workshops	as	a	means	to	develop	this	 aspect	 of	 clinical	 practice.	 	 Once	 the	 first	 themed	 data	 analysis	 of	 the	workshops	was	complete,	it	was	clear	that	on	one	level	the	research	question	was	answered	and	I	could	evaluate	the	workshops.		However,	on	another	level	I	could	not	 suggest	 any	 novel	 solutions	 for	 clinical	 practice	 and	 the	 suggestions	 for	practice	 development	 would	 have	 been	 “do	 more	 of	 the	 same”.	 	 This	 was	unsatisfactory	for	me.	Thus,	from	the	autumn	of	2015,	I	undertook	a	psychosocial	analysis	 of	 the	 data.	 	 The	 research	 question	 has	 thus	 evolved	 from	 “How	 senior	health	 care	 professionals	 recognise	 dying	 and	 engage	 patients	 and	 families	 to	negotiate	key	decisions	to	improve	the	patient	and	carer	experience.	Participatory	action-research	 explored	 as	 a	 means	 to	 develop	 clinical	 practice”,	 to	 “A	 mixed-method,	psychosocial	 analysis	of	how	senior	Health	Care	Professionals	 recognise	dying	 and	 engage	 patients	 and	 families	 in	 the	 negotiation	 of	 key	 decisions”.	 	 In	order	 to	 undertake	 the	 psychosocial	 analysis	 I	 undertook	 a	 second	 literature	review,	which	will	be	 introduced	 in	Chapter	Three	–	 “Methodology	and	Method”,	and	specifically	focused	in	Chapter	Six	–	“The	Task	of	the	NHS	and	Social	Defences,	Chapter	Seven	–	“Families”	and	Chapter	Eight	–	 “How	Senior	HCPs	Learn	 to	Care	for	the	Dying	Patient	and	Family”.	The	chapter	below	sets	out	why	“how	HCPs	recognise	dying	and	engage	patients	and	families	in	the	negotiation	of	key	decisions”	is	such	an	important	question.		It	sets	 out	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 evaluation	 of	 other’s	 interventions	 to	 develop	 this	
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area	of	 clinical	 practice,	 and	how	both	 research	questions	 addressed	 the	 gaps	 in	the	established	research.		
Why	is	the	care	of	the	patient	who	is	dying	in	hospital	important?	The	 care	 of	 the	 dying	 is	 hugely	 important	 because	 this	 is	 numerically	 no	 small	issue.		There	are	460,000	deaths	per	year	in	England.		Two	thirds	of	those	who	die	are	 above	 the	 age	of	 75	 (National	End	of	 Life	Care	 Intelligence	Network,	 2012a)	and	89.6%	of	all	who	die	have	some	hospital	care	in	their	last	year	of	life	(National	End	of	 life	 Intelligence	Network,	2013).	On	average	an	 individual	will	experience	2.1	admissions	in	the	last	year	of	life	and	53%	of	people	die	in	hospital	(National	End	of	Life	Care	Intelligence	Network,	2012a).	The	notion	of	achieving	a	good	death	 is	strongly	embedded	as	an	aim	of	hospital	services.		Smith	(Smith,	2000)	names	some	of	the	factors	that	may	be	important	to	individuals	 about	 a	 good	death.	 	 These	 are	having	 an	 awareness	of	death	 and	 to	understand	what	 can	 be	 expected;	 to	 retain	 control;	 to	 be	 afforded	 privacy	 and	dignity;	to	choose	the	place	of	death;	to	have	access	to	information	and	expertise;	to	be	comfortable,	and	have	access	to	hospice	care	in	hospital;	to	have	control	over	who	is	present	at	the	death;	to	issue	advance	statement	of	wishes;	to	be	able	to	say	“goodbye”;	as	well	as	have	some	control	over	other	aspects	of	dying.		Certainly,	this	is	a	westernized	concept	of	a	good	death,	and	much	work	still	needs	to	take	place	to	 understand	 the	 end	 of	 life	 care	 needs	 of	 our	 black	 and	 ethnic	 minority	communities	 in	 the	 UK,	 and	 to	 develop	 culturally	 competent	 staff	 (Calanzani,	Koffman,	&	Higginson,	2013).		
Current	policy	drivers	There	 are	 several	 drivers	 currently	 influencing	 clinical	 practice.	 	 There	 is	 an	increasing	demographic	of	a	population	that	is	living	to	a	much	older	age	but	with	multiple	 long	 term	 conditions	 (Gomes	&	Higginson,	 2008)	 and	 these	 two	 factors	alone	 are	 estimated	 to	 lead	 to	 a	 1.7%	 growth	 per	 annum	 in	 demand	 for	 NHS	hospital	services	(Monitor,	2015)	in	a	financially	restricted	climate.		UK	premature	mortality	is	persistently	and	significantly	below	the	mean	of	the	European	Union,	Australia,	 Canada,	 Norway	 and	 the	 USA	 (Murray	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 	 Thus	 it	 is	unsurprising	 that	 the	 five	 primary	 aims	 of	 the	NHS	 are	 to	 prevent	 people	 dying	
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prematurely,	 enhancing	 quality	 of	 life,	 helping	 people	 to	 recover,	 ensuring	 a	positive	experience	of	care,	treating	and	protecting	patients	from	avoidable	harm	(Department	of	Health,	2016).		End	of	Life	Care	constitutes	only	one	sub	-	outcome	under	the	above-mentioned	aim	of	“ensuring	people	have	a	positive	experience	of	care”.	Surveys	previously	undertaken	in	this	area	have	focused	on	bereaved	carers	experience	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 the	 patient’s	 voice,	 and	 to	 assesses	 carers	 experience	rather	than	survey	the	dying	patient	(Colvin,	2016).			There	is	a	drive	within	NHS	policy	to	deliver	“care	that	is	closer	to	home”	(Monitor,	2015),	 to	ensure	hospital	beds	are	available	 for	 those	who	clinically	 (rather	 than	socially)	 need	 them,	 and	 for	 whom	 what	 constitutes	 hospital	 care,	 cannot	 be	provided	anywhere	else.		This	policy	aligns	with	Health	and	Social	Care	policy	that	has	consistently	promoted	patient	choice	and	autonomy	in	decision-making	since	2000	(Froggatt,	2005).		Choice	about	preferred	place	of	care	and	death	have	been	strongly	articulated	and	deaths	in	the	usual	place	of	residence	is	now	being	a	key	performance	 indicator	 and	 used	 as	 a	 marker	 of	 quality	 around	 patient	 choice	(Public	Health	England,	2013).		This	means	there	is	a	constant	drive	in	hospitals	to	discharge	patients	quickly,	and	the	idea	that	if	patients	are	in	their	usual	place	of	residence	 that	 this	 is	 a	 good	 thing.	 Choice	 in	 end	 of	 life	 care	 is	 beginning	 to	 be	recognised	as	“vacuous”	p104	(Borgstrom	&	Walter,	2015).	Choice	is	limited	by	the	person’s	body	and	mind,	supportive	familial	relationships,	the	ability	to	negotiate	the	 NHS	 to	 access	 care,	 and	 the	 disjuncture	 between	 physical	 care	 being	organisationally	delivered	as	part	of	the	NHS	market	place,	rather	than	delivering	compassionate	 care	 for	 each	 individual	 (Borgstrom	 &	 Walter,	 2015).	 	 We	 also	know	that	the	dying	patient’s	health	and	social	care	needs	may	not	always	be	able	to	be	met	in	their	choice	of	usual	place	of	residence,	and	this	is	another	of	the	social	losses	faced	in	the	run	up	to	death.		There	is	policy	pressure	on	General	Practitioners	(GP)	by	national	charities	funded	by	NHS	England	to	identify	the	1%	of	their	population	likely	to	be	in	the	last	year	of	life	 (Dying	 Matters,	 2017),	 and	 by	 the	 GP	 contract	 to	 identify	 the	 2%	 of	 their	population	 who	 are	 frail	 and	 for	 whom	 it	 is	 in	 their	 best	 interests	 to	 assist	 in	avoiding	admission	 to	hospital	 (NHS	England,	2015).	 	This	work	 is	 supported	by	the	Royal	College	of	GPs	 (Royal	College	of	General	Practitioners,	Royal	College	of	
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Nursing,	2012).	 	The	aim	of	 this	clinical	work	 is	 to	progress	conversations	about	preferences	 for	 care,	 treatment	 plans,	 end	 of	 life	 care	 and	 what	 patients	 would	want	 to	 occur	 –	 this	 is	 not	 legally	 binding	 and	 is	 called	 advance	 care	 planning	(ACP).	 A	 competent	 patient	 can	 recognise	 they	 are	 dying	 and	 both	 initiate	conversations	 about	 relevant	 decisions	 and	 make	 their	 own	 decisions	 to	 refuse	specific	treatments.		This	is	called	an	advance	decision	to	refuse	treatment	(ADRT),	and	 is	 legally	binding	 (National	End	of	Life	Programme,	2012).	 	Patients,	 though,	tend	to	discuss	their	preferences	more	with	family	members	than	HCPs,	and	expect	HCPs	to	 initiate	 the	conversation	(Almack,	Cox,	Moghaddam,	Pollock,	&	Seymour,	2012).	However	highly	experienced	clinicians	speak	of	ACP	and	of	being	willing	to	do	 this	 with	 patients,	 there	 are	 almost	 always	 reasons	 not	 to	 initiate	 this	conversation.		For	example	clinicians	feel	the	patients	are	not	ready,	that	they	are	not	the	right	person	to	initiate	the	conversation	(Kelley,	Mehta,	&	Reid,	2009),	they	fear	taking	away	hope	(Almack	et	al.,	2012),	or	that	the	correct	sequence	of	events	has	not	occurred	(all	treatment	options	had	not	yet	been	tried)	(Drought	&	Koenig,	2002).	 	In	this	manner	the	anticipated	hope	of	the	outcome	of	ACP	-	that	patients	and	 their	 relatives	are	prepared	and	 their	choices	can	be	actualised	 if	 they	come	into	 hospital	 –	 is	 rarely	 materialised.	 	 HCPs	 in	 hospitals	 are	 left	 initiating	conversations	 with	 patients	 and	 /	 or	 their	 families	 (dependent	 on	 the	 patient’s	mental	 capacity)	 about	 their	 wishes	 and	 preferences.	 A	 time	 of	 acute	 clinical	deterioration	is	the	least	preferable	time	to	start	this	conversation	as	patients	are	too	unwell	to	recall	them	(Seamark	et	al.,	2012).			Despite	a	publicised	focus	on	 improving	the	care	of	 the	dying	since	the	 launch	of	the	End	of	 Life	Care	 strategy	 in	2008	 (Department	of	Health,	 2008),	 and	 several	further	 publications	 (NICE,	 2013)	 (Leadership	 Alliance	 for	 the	 Care	 of	 Dying	People,	 2014)	 (National	 Palliative	 and	 End	 of	 Life	 Care	 Partnership,	 2015),	successive	national	audits	of	the	care	of	the	dying	in	hospitals	identify	that	the	care	of	the	dying	patient	and	their	family	is	still	not	adequately	resourced.		Only	21%	of	hospital	sites	surveyed	had	access	to	face	to	face	palliative	care	services	seven	days	a	week,	despite	this	being	a	long	standing	recommendation	(NICE,	2004),	and	most	only	 provided	 face	 to	 face	 services	 on	 weekdays	 only.	 	 	 The	 audits	 have	 also	identified	 that	 HCPs	 are	 still	 only	 identifying	 that	 patients	 are	 dying	 just	 days	
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before	death	and	this	has	been	consistently	resistant	to	improvement	(Health	and	Social	 Care	 Information	 Centre,	 Academy	 of	 Medical	 Royal	 Colleges,	 Marie	 Care	Cancer	Care,	2014).	Identifying	 the	 dying	 patient	 has	 recently	 been	 complicated	 by	 the	 national	context,	 where	 the	 quality	 of	 care	 offered	 to	 seriously	 ill	 people	 in	 hospital	 has	been	the	subject	of	two	national	reports	(Mid	Staffordshire	NHS	Foundation	Trust	Public	 Inquiry,	 2013)	 (Keogh,	 2013),	 as	 has	 the	 care	 of	 the	 dying	 person	(Neuberger,	 2013).	 The	 possibility	 of	 poor	 care	 of	 the	 dying	 and	 its	 high	media	profile	 means	 patients	 and	 families	 can	 be	 worried	 about	 the	 care	 they	 might	receive	and	may	be	more	inclined	to	challenge	clinical	opinion.	Thus	HCPs	working	in	hospitals	face	both	a	pressure	to	identify	the	dying	patient	and	care	well	for	them,	but	a	simultaneous	pressure	to	prevent	premature	death	or	cause	avoidable	harm.	 	There	 is	 a	 lack	of	 advance	 care	planning,	 and	 so	hospital	HCPs	are	left	working	out	the	decision-making	from	scratch.		They	also	have	to	face	the	 potential	 for	 families	 to	 challenge	 their	 decision-making	 and	 know	 that	 the	family’s	 voice	 is	 prioritised	 -	 the	 bereaved	 relatives	 perspective	 of	 the	 care	 is	evidence	of	the	quality	care	given	to	dying	patients.		HCPs	are	faced	with	a	constant	pressure	 to	 discharge	 patients	 to	 care	 outside	 of	 the	 hospital,	 as	 soon	 as	 this	 is	possible,	 to	 free	 access	 to	 beds	 for	 patients	 in	 Accident	 and	 Emergency.	 If	 they	recognise	 that	a	patient	 is	dying,	 there	may	not	be	access	 to	a	seven	day	a	week,	specialist	 palliative	 care	 support	 for	 assistance	 with	 complex	 symptom	management,	 psychological	 distress	 or	 family	 support	 (Health	 and	 Social	 Care	Information	Centre,	Academy	of	Medical	Royal	Colleges,	Marie	Care	Cancer	Care,	2014).		
Let’s	address	the	confusion	-	definitions	of	end	of	life	care,	palliative	care,	
death	and	dying.	Confusion	 exists	 about	 definitions	 of	 end	 of	 life	 care,	 palliative	 care,	 death	 and	dying	(Neuberger,	2013).	 	 ‘End	of	life’	has	been	defined	nationally	as	being	in	the	last	 year	 of	 life	 (Department	 of	 Health,	 2008).	 	 The	 difficulty	 in	 identifying	 in	advance	if	someone	is	in	their	last	year	of	life	is	shown	in	a	retrospective	study	of	all	 in-patient	 deaths	 in	 a	 District	 General	 Hospital	 between	 June	 2006	 and	May	
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2007.	 	 This	 identified	 that	 56%	 of	 patients	 were	 not	 assessed	 as	 meeting	 the	criteria	for	being	in	the	last	year	of	life,	at	the	point	of	death.	Of	the	remaining	44%	only	26%	were	clearly	in	the	last	year	of	life	(Abel,	Rich,	Griffin,	&	Purdy,	2009).		Palliative	 care	 “is	 an	approach	which	 improves	 the	quality	of	 life	of	patients	and	their	families	facing	problems	associated	with	life-threatening	illness	through	the	prevention	and	relief	of	suffering	by	means	of	early	identification	and	impeccable	assessment	and	treatment	of	pain	and	other	problems,	physical,	psychosocial	and	spiritual…it	 affirms	 dying	 as	 a	 normal	 process	 and	 intends	 neither	 to	 hasten	 or	postpone	 death”	 (Ellershaw	 &	 Wilkinson,	 2003,	 P.xi).	 Palliative	 Care	 Teams	 in	hospitals	help	ward	medical,	nursing,	therapy	and	social	work	teams	with	complex	symptom	 management,	 psychological	 distress	 and	 care	 of	 families,	 and	 whilst	palliative	 care	 is	 applicable	 early	 in	 the	 disease	 process,	 in	 hospital	 care	 a	 large	proportion	of	the	patients	have	the	potential	to	be	in	the	last	months	of	their	lives	and	many	imminently	approaching	the	end	of	their	life.	Death	 has	 been	well	 defined	 physiologically	 as	 the	 absence	 of	 cardio-pulmonary	and	 neurological	 function	 (Academy	 of	 Medical	 Royal	 Colleges,	 2008),	 yet	 the	concept	of	dying	is	not	well	defined.		It	is	acknowledged	as	a	process	rather	than	an	event	(Academy	of	Medical	Royal	Colleges,	2008).	 	For	cancer	patients,	 it	 is	often	thought	of	as	being	the	last	hours	and	days	of	 life,	when	the	patient	is	bedbound,	semi-comatose,	no	 longer	able	 to	 take	 tablets	and	only	sips	of	 fluid	(Ellershaw	&	Wilkinson,	 2003).	 	 For	 patients	 with	 non-malignant	 disease	 it	 is	 less	 clearly	defined,	 it	 is	 usually	 when	 the	 patient	 is	 not	 improving	 despite	 best	 clinical	management,	and	it	is	recognised	when	the	whole	multidisciplinary	team	identify	the	patient	as	dying	(Ellershaw	&	Wilkinson,	2003).		Others	define	it	as	being	in	a	state	of	uncertain	recovery	despite	active	treatment	and	at	risk	of	dying	(Guy's	&	St	Thomas'	NHS	Foundation	Trust,	2012).		
Why	identifying	that	a	patient	is	dying	is	clinically	important	for	the	patient	Identifying	 that	 the	 patient	 is	 dying,	 or	 is	 sick	 enough	 to	 die	 (Krawczyk	 &	Gallagher,	2016)	is	clinically	important.		The	reason	for	this	is	that	when	a	patient	is	 likely	 to	 benefit	 from	 treatment	 and	 improve	 both	 clinically	 and	 functionally	then	 the	aims	of	 care	are	 three	 fold.	 	The	 first	 is	 to	 increase	survival	and	reduce	
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hospitalisation.			The	second	is	provide	a	level	of	symptom	management,	but	in	this	case	more	discomfort	is	tolerated	to	minimise	any	complications	from	side	effects	e.g.	 if	analgesia	made	a	patient	very	sleepy	and	 likely	 to	 fall	post	a	hip	operation	then	the	analgesia	would	be	changed	to	one	that	made	the	patient	less	sleepy	even	though	 they	may	be	slightly	more	uncomfortable.	 	The	 third	 is	 the	restoration	of	independence	 and	 function.	 The	 role	 of	 families	 in	 the	 care	 of	 patients	 whose	condition	will	improve	as	a	consequence	of	treatment	is	limited	and	is	usually	one	in	 which	 information	 is	 imparted	 either	 about	 the	 patient’s	 condition,	 or	 an	assessment	of	their	role	in	the	discharge	plan.	When	 the	 patient	 is	 recognised	 as	 dying	 then	 the	 aims	 of	 care	 are	 reorganised.		Firstly	the	aim	is	to	achieve	the	patient’s	wishes	e.g.	preferred	place	of	death.	The	second	is	to	provide	expert	symptom	management,	but	in	this	case	side	effects	of	medicines	 are	 tolerated	 and	 sometimes	 the	drugs	 are	used	because	of	 their	 side	effects	 e.g.	 if	 a	 patient	 is	 nauseated	 and	 agitated	 then	 an	 anti-emetic	 drug	 that	sedates	 would	 be	 the	 drug	 of	 choice.	 	 The	 third	 is	 to	 provide	 holistic	 care	 that	includes	spiritual	support,	 financial	and	legal	preparation	for	death.	 	Families	are	involved	 in	 the	care	and	there	 is	pre-bereavement	support	 for	 family	and	carers,	and	potential	preparation	 for	organ	and	tissue	donation	and	for	care	of	 the	body	after	death.		The	length	of	survival	time	has	the	potential	to	become	less	important	and	may	be	traded	to	achieve	patient	wishes	e.g.	a	patient	with	a	new	untreatable	cancer,	 and	 with	 long	 standing	 renal	 failure	 needing	 dialysis,	 may	 decide	 that	travelling	three	times	a	week	for	dialysis	is	not	how	they	wish	to	spend	their	time	and	so	may	choose	to	stop	this	treatment	knowing	their	life	will	be	shortened.	Within	 the	 district	 general	 hospital	 where	 this	 research	 took	 place	 there	 were	approximately	1,500	admissions	per	week,	and	there	were	approximately	twenty	two	deaths	per	week		(55%	of	all	deaths	in	the	locality)	(National	End	of	Life	Care	Intelligence	Network,	2012b).	Ward	based	medical	 and	nursing	 teams	were	 thus	required	 to	 identify,	 in	 amongst	 a	 large	 number	 of	 patients	moving	 through	 the	hospital	services	(from	Accident	and	Emergency,	to	the	Acute	Medical	or	Surgical	Unit,	to	the	wards	and	then	to	discharge)	(Karakusevic	&	Edwards,	2016),	which	of	the	 patients	 may	 be	 dying	 and	 then	 manage	 the	 patient	 and	 the	 family	appropriately.	This	is	very	skilled	work.	In	the	District	General	Hospital	where	this	
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research	 took	place	 there	was	 access	 to	 seven	day	 a	week	 face-to-face	 palliative	care	support.	
Who	can	recognise	dying	and	initiate	decision-making?		There	are	multiple	categories	of	people	who	can	recognise	end	of	life,	and	that	the	patient	is	likely	dying.		These	might	be	the	patient,	their	family,	registered	nurses	and	 allied	 health	 care	 professionals,	 social	 workers	 and	 carers,	 and	 the	medical	team	including	the	consultant.		Whilst	nurses	regularly	recognise	dying	and	“plant	the	 seed”	 of	 thought	 with	 consultants	 (McMillen	 2008,	 p.254),	 and	 they	 also	facilitate	 communication,	 and	 co-ordinate	 meetings	 to	 negotiate	 end	 of	 life	decisions	 (Long-Sutehall	 et	 al.,	 2011),	 it	 is	 though	 the	 consultants’	 medico-legal	responsibility	 to	 recognise	 end	 of	 life,	 in	 conjunction	with	 the	multi-disciplinary	team	and	facilitate	appropriate	decision-making	and	clinical	care	(General	Medical	Council,	2010).		There	 are	 three	 broad	 categories	 of	 decisions	 that	 doctors	 and	 patients	 are	required	to	make	at	the	end	of	life.		The	first	is	what	treatment	options	are	and	are	not	 in	 the	 patient’s	 best	 interests	 and	where	 those	 treatment	 options	 can	 occur.	The	 second	 is	whether	 cardio-pulmonary	 resuscitation	 is	 now	 likely	 to	 be	 futile	and	 a	 “Do	 Not	 Attempt	 Cardio-Pulmonary	 Resuscitation”	 decision	 needs	 to	 be	made	and	communicated	by	the	Consultant.	 	The	third	 is	 the	patient’s	wishes	 for	their	care	including	where	they	would	prefer	that	care	to	take	place.	
Trajectories	of	dying	Murray	et	al	described	three	trajectories	of	dying	(Murray,	Kendall,	Boyd	&	Sheik	2005).		Firstly,	they	desribed	the	cancer	trajectory	where	function	is	maintained	at	a	high	level	and	then	there	is	a	rapid,	predictable	and	steady	decline	and	death	is	easy	to	predict.		Secondly		they	described	the	long	term	condition	trajectory	where	there	 are	 rapid	 dips	 in	 function	 at	 an	 acute	 illness;	 and	where	 there	 is	 recovery	with	treatment,	but	the	former	function	is	never	regained.		The	third	trajectory	is	the	dementia	trajectory.		This	is	one	of	slow	decline,	where	baseline	function	is	low	and	 there	 are	 slight	 dips	 and	 slight	 recovery	 and	death	 is	 hard	 to	predict	 as	 the	person	is	so	close	to	death	at	any	time.		The	sudden	death	trajectory	is	not	included	in	 Murray	 et	 al’s	 work,	 and	 for	 a	 quarter	 of	 our	 population	 death,	 occurs	 as	 a	
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“surprise	 and	 unplanned	 for	 event”	 (National	 End	 of	 Life	 Intelligence	 Network,	2011).	 	 People	 are	 living	 longer	 and	 with	 multiple	 co-morbidities	 and	 so	trajectories	can	combine.	
How	good	are	doctors	and	nurses	at	predicting	dying?	HCPs	are	not	accurate	when	predicting	dying.		In	a	prospective	cohort	study	of	504	terminally	 ill	 patients	 (the	majority	 of	 patients	 had	 cancer	 or	 AIDS)	 admitted	 to	five	 out-patient	 hospice	 programmes	 in	 the	 USA,	 and	 their	 365	 doctors,	 it	 was	found	 that	 only	 20%	 of	 the	 doctor’s	 predictions	were	 accurate:	 63%	were	 over	optimistic	 and	 17%	 over	 pessimistic.	 	 The	 prognosis	 was	 only	 given	 to	 the	researcher	not	the	patient.		This	is	important	as	there	is	the	desire	to	prognosticate	to	make	good	clinical	decisions,	 and	 the	decision	 to	 tell	 the	patient	–	 “foretelling	and	 forewarning”	 (Lamont	 and	 Christakis	 cited	 in	 Krawczyk	&	Gallagher,	 2016).		These	are	two	different	things.	 	Multivariate	modeling	showed	that	most	types	of	doctors	are	prone	to	error	in	most	types	of	patients.		The	greater	the	experience	of	the	 doctor	 the	 greater	 the	 prognostic	 accuracy,	 but	 a	 stronger	 doctor-patient	relationship	 is	 associated	with	 lower	 prognostic	 accuracy	 (Christakis	 &	 Lamont,	2000).	In	 the	 UK,	 a	 prospective	 cohort	 study	 in	 four	 multi-professional	 palliative	 care	teams	 in	 England	 collected	 data	 on	 275	 consecutive	 cancer	 referrals	 who	 died.		They	 found	 that	 offering	 a	 prognosis	 range	 had	 higher	 levels	 of	 accuracy	 (about	double)	than	traditional	estimates,	but	was	still	very	often	inaccurate,	except	when	the	patient	was	very	close	to	death	(less	than	two	weeks)	(Higginson	&	Costantini,	2002).	In	 a	 UK	 study	 that	 focused	 on	 cancer	 patients,	 the	 ability	 of	 multidisciplinary	teams,	doctors	and	nurses	to	predict	life	expectancy	were	compared.	 	On	average	all	 practitioners	 were	 correct	 in	 a	 little	 over	 50%	 of	 cases.	 	 Nurses	 were	 less	accurate	than	the	Multi-Disciplinary	Team	(MDT),	but	were	no	worse	than	doctors.		Estimates	 of	 clinicians	 and	 patients	 were	 more	 optimistic,	 than	 pessimistic.		Nurses’	accuracy	increased	if	they	had	reviewed	the	patient	within	24	hours.	Most	patients	(61.4%)	wanted	to	know	their	prognosis,	but	only	37.1%	were	willing	to	offer	an	estimate	regarding	their	own	survival.	Patients’	prognostic	estimates	were	
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less	accurate	than	health	care	professionals’	(Gwilliam	et	al.,	2013).	It	should	be	noted	though	that	there	is	evidence	that	ethnicity,	faith	and	culture	of	healthcare	professionals	affect	both	prognostication	and	decision-making	at	end	of	life	 (Seale,	 2010).	 In	 a	 prospective	 observational	 pan-Europe	 study	 in	 Intensive	Care	Units	 it	was	found	that	a	“withholding	treatment”	decision	occurred	more	if	the	doctor	was	Jewish,	Greek	Orthodox	or	Muslim	and	a	“withdrawing	treatment”	decision	 occurred	 more	 often	 if	 the	 doctor	 was	 Catholic,	 Protestant	 or	 had	 no	religious	 affiliation.	 A	 possible	 cultural	 influence	 was	 noted	 as	 Jewish	 doctors	withdrew	 care	 in	 36%	 instances	 in	 the	 north	 as	 opposed	 to	 6%	 in	 the	 south	 of	Europe.	 	 Interestingly,	 religion	 appears	 to	 affect	 how	 decisions	 were	 discussed	with	 families.	 	 There	 were	 more	 discussions	 with	 families	 if	 the	 doctor	 was	Protestant,	 Catholic,	 had	 no	 religious	 affiliation	 or	 were	 Jewish	 (Sprung	 et	 al.,	2007)	The	 ability	 to	 prognosticate	 accurately	 remains	 a	 concern	 for	 clinicians	 and	 in	specific	 non-malignant	 disease	 groups	 clinicians	 have	 worked	 hard	 to	 generate	identifiers	of	dying	(Murphy,	Mydin,	Fatah,	&	Antunes,	2010).		HCPs	retain	a	desire	to	be	able	to	be	accurate,	and	are	still	pursuing	a	statistical	approach	to	this	topic	(White,	Reid,	Harris,	Harries,	&	Stone,	2016)	(Taylor,	2012).	
Patients	and	the	introduction	of	their	families	
People	 mainly	 approach	 their	 dying	 period	 as	 part	 of	 a	 network	 of	 family	 and	friends.	Patients	vary,	but	many	do	not	approach	 their	dying	period	with	mental	capacity	 to	 take	 part	 in	 decision-making	 and	 their	 care	 is	 underpinned	 by	 the	Mental	Capacity	Act	2005	(British	Medical	Association,	2008).	Patients	may	have	lost	mental	 capacity	 as	part	 of	 a	 long-term	condition,	 or	 temporarily	 lost	mental	capacity	as	part	of	an	acute	deterioration.		Families	 can	 have	 a	 formal	 role	 in	 decision-making	when	 a	 person	 has	 a	 lasting	power	of	attorney	(LPA),	particularly	for	health	(but	it	can	be	for	placement	issues	when	the	attorney	is	 for	 finance),	as	they	are	responsible	 for	decision-making	on	behalf	of	the	person	when	they	lose	capacity.	 	The	Consultant	responsible	for	the	medical	 decision-making	 can	 only	 formally	 challenge	 the	 decision-making	 of	 the	
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LPA	on	behalf	of	the	patient	in	the	Court	of	Protection.	However,	patients	can	lose	mental	 capacity	 to	 take	 part	 in	 decisions,	without	 having	 established	 an	 LPA.	 In	those	circumstance	families	are	consulted	–	in	a	best	interests	manner	about	what	they	 think	 the	 patient	 would	 have	 wanted	 had	 they	 been	 able	 to	 express	 their	wishes.		The	Consultant	legally	retains	control	of	decision–making.	Ethnicity,	faith	and	culture	of	patients	and	families	affect	decision-making.		Deaths	in	 hospital	 are	 larger	 for	 non-white	 groups	 (even	when	 controlling	 the	 data	 for	other	 factors	 (age,	 gender,	 socio-economic	 group)	 (National	 End	 of	 Life	 Care	Intelligence	Network,	2012a).		This	may	be	because	there	is	a	more	frequent	desire	for	 active	 intervention	 and	 life	 sustaining	 treatments	 in	 African	 American	 and	Asian	groups	(Connolly,	Sampson,	&	Purandare,	2012);	there	are	barriers	both	in	terms	 of	 relevance	 and	 access	 of	 community	 palliative	 care	 services	 to	 Sikh	 and	Muslim	 patients	 and	 their	 families,	 but	 also	 Sikh	 and	Muslim	 patient	 and	 family	barriers	e.g.	a	reluctance	to	discuss	end	of	life	care	and	a	reluctance	to	ask	for	help	(Worth	 et	 al.,	 2009);	 and	 larger	 extended	 networks	 of	 families	 lead	 to	 less	 co-ordinated	 help	 and	 a	 fear	 of	 dying	 (Bowling,	 Iliffe,	 Kessel,	 &	 Higginson,	 2010).	Families	can	control	information	being	given	to	patients	for	fear	of	them	giving	up	hope		-	this	can	be	explicitly	done	through	not	translating	accurately	(Worth	et	al.,	2009)	or	through	asking	professionals	not	to	tell	the	patient	everything.	In	 the	 current	 health	 and	 social	 care	 system,	 patients	 and	 families	 are	 mainly	interdependent	 if	 the	patient	wishes	to	die	at	home	(or	has	previously	expressed	this	wish)	(Gomes,	2006).	 	Health	and	social	care	agencies	can	rarely	provide	24-hour	care	at	home	in	a	patient’s	home	that	can	meet	the	dying	patient’s	care	needs.	Whilst	most	patients	express	a	preference	to	die	at	home	and	80%	do	not	change	their	mind	(Gomes,	Calanzani,	Gysels,	Hall,	&	Higginson,	2013)	(Grande,	Ewing,	on	behalf	of	 the	National	Forum	for	Hospice	at	Home,	2009)	care	needs	 to	be	 taken	about	a	discharge	decision.			The	reason	for	this	is	that	there	is	a	balance	between	achieving	the	patient’s	preference	and	the	impact	of	this	decision	for	the	carer.	It	is	acknowledged	that	families	can	decide	to	care	for	someone	at	home	without	really	understanding	 the	 implication	 (Gomes	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 	 Carers	mental	 and	 physical	well-being	 in	 bereavement	was	 less	 determined	 by	 the	 achievement	 of	 death	 at	home,	than	by	the	provision	of	psychological	support	to	the	carer	during	this	time	
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(Grande	et	al.,	2009).	 	 If	a	patient	 loses	capacity,	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	 that	 the	tendency	 is	 for	 institutional	rather	than	home	death,	with	the	relative	 feeling	the	patient	 died	 in	 the	 appropriate	 place	 of	 care	 (Brazil,	Howell,	 Bedard,	Krueger,	&	Heidebrecht,	2005).			In	the	sections	below	I	will	consider	what	is	known	about	the	recognition	of	dying	and	the	negotiation	of	decision-making	about	the	three	patient	groups	mentioned	above;	 those	who	have	capacity	 to	 take	part	 in	decision	making,	 those	who	have	lost	mental	capacity	due	to	a	long	term	condition,	and	those	who	have	lost	capacity	due	to	an	acute	deterioration.	
What	 the	 literature	 tells	 us	 about	 HCP	 decision-making	 with	 patients	 who	 have	
capacity.	Research	into	the	experience	of	the	older	person	who	has	capacity	has	started	to	formally	articulate	what	it	is	like	living	through	repeated	hospital	admissions.		This	has	 relevance	 for	 those	 who	 are	 unwell	 with	 cancer	 or	 a	 long-term	 condition	where	 treatment	 options	 are	 becoming	 limited.	 	 There	 is	 description	 of	 “Living	betwixt	 and	between”	 –	 a	 state	 of	 imbalance	between	 active	 living	 and	 clinically	recognized	 dying	 (Nicholson,	 Meyer,	 Flatley,	 Holman,	 &	 Lowton,	 2012	 p.	 1426)	where	people	work	hard	to	remain	socially	connected	within	and	outside	of	their	homes.	 There	 is	 a	 description	 of	 feeling	 “let	 down”	 by	 the	 hospital	 system	 that	sometimes	cannot	offer	a	treatment	 in	their	best	 interest,	because	it	would	make	the	clinical	situation	worse,	and	thus	the	person	is	left	with	a	mind	that	is	able	and	a	body	 that	 is	 increasingly	unable.	 	Sometimes	 though,	 it	 is	 the	 lack	of	 treatment	options	 that	 can	 prompt	 patients	 and	 families	 to	 think	 that	 end	 of	 life	might	 be	approaching	(Fried	&	O’Leary,	2008).		It	is	also	described	as	focusing	on	“trying	to	keep	 going”,	 unable	 to	 decide	 about	 preferences	 for	 death	 as	 they	 have	 no	 idea	what	the	dying	will	look	like	(Nicholson	et	al.,	2012),	and	of	not	wanting	to	discuss	decisions	 e.g.	 Do	 Not	 Attempt	 Cardio-Pulmonary	 Resuscitation	 (DNACPR)	 yet	wanting	to	be	involved	in	the	end	of	life	decision-making	process,	and	of	personal	beliefs	 and	 values	 affecting	 how	 decisions	 such	 as	 DNACPR	 can	 be	 made	(Laakkonen,	Pitkala,	Strandberg,	Berglind,	&	Tilvis,	2005).		There	are	descriptions	of	people	wanting	to	live	hopefully	(Cook,	Damato,	Marshall,	&	Salmon,	2011)	but	
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acquiescing	 previously	 strongly	 held	wishes	 at	 physical	 crisis	 points	 (Drought	&	Koenig,	2002)	when	they	are	staring	death	in	the	face.	Lowson	has	described	 the	older	person’s	view	of	 the	role	of	 the	 family.	They	are	usually	the	spouse	or	daughter,	and	are	seen	as	hugely	important	and	described	as	the	 “orchestrators”	 of	 care	 in	 the	 patient’s	 home	 setting	 (Lowson	 et	 al.,	 2013).		Patients	are	reliant	on	them	and	value	them	as	they	manage	and	support	everyone	who	 is	 involved	 in	 the	 older	 person’s	 care.	 They	 are	 also	 able	 to	 persuade	 the	patient	 to	 accept	 assistance	 when	 they	 might	 have	 been	 resisting	 such	intervention.	 	 Lowson	 has	 also	 described	 families	 as	 being	 relegated	 to	 “second	fiddle”	when	the	person	comes	into	hospital	as	their	access	to	the	older	person	is	restricted	by	visiting	times	and	by	other	paid	professionals	taking	over	the	care	e.g.	helping	the	patient	with	meals	(Lowson	et	al.,	2013).	 	 It	appears	 from	Hanratty’s	study,	 that	 simultaneously,	 having	 taken	 the	 responsibility	 away	 from	 family	members,	 that	HCPs	 do	not	 treat	 the	 patient	with	 the	 same	 amount	 of	 listening,	detail	 and	 care,	 leading	 to	 unhappiness	 and	 dissatisfaction	 with	 care	 when	 the	patient	 is	 transferred	 out	 of	 the	 hospital	 as	 the	 handover	 does	 not	 match	 the	patient’s	needs	(Hanratty	et	al.,	2012).	Neither	Lowson’s	nor	Hanratty’s	 research	 identified	conflict	within	 families.	 	 	All	patients	were	 positive	 about	 their	 families	 as	 carers.	 	 Fried	 has	 highlighted	 that	some	 patients	 and	 care-givers	 do	 not	 communicate	well	 and	 that	 this	 can	 cause	tension	 (Fried	 &	 O’Leary,	 2008).	 From	 the	 experience	 of	 clinical	 practice,	 it	 is	known	that	there	is	the	need	to	remain	vigilant	to	the	patient	voice	separately	to	the	 family	voice,	and	a	 time	 in	hospital	 can	be	a	 time	 to	hear	 the	patient’s	views	and	wishes	alone.	 	This	 is	particularly	relevant	when	carers	who	love	the	patient	may	have	reached	 the	brink	of	 their	caring	ability	and	need	support	 to	continue.		Sometimes	 a	 carer	 only	 becomes	 known	 as	 a	 carer	 when	 their	 ability	 to	 care	breaks	down	and	the	patient	is	admitted	to	hospital	(Joyce,	2006).		Patients	can	be	reluctant	to	burden	other	family	members	(Winter	&	Parks,	2012)	and	unless	the	person	 is	carefully	heard	the	relatives	can	want	more	 treatment	 than	the	patient	wants.	Patients	do	not	always	want	the	treatment	options	available	to	them	–	they	can	be	tired	of	living	(Fried	&	O’Leary,	2008).	
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Patients	 can	 make	 brave	 decisions	 about	 their	 dying	 care	 and	 face	 their	 dying	where	 it	 is	 known	 and	 expected	 (Clinch	 &	 Le,	 2011).	 	 This	 can	 be	 helped	 by	mutually	 informing	the	patient	and	family	of	 the	patient’s	prognosis	and	the	way	forward	(Heyland	et	al.,	2009).	 	However,	 there	 is	evidence	 that	patient’s	wishes	can	be	abrogated	when	they	ultimately	become	unconscious.		This	is	because	it	is	hard	to	watch	someone	who	has	chosen	that	they	do	not	want	life	prolongation	at	the	 point	 when	 they	 deteriorate	 to	 unconsciousness,	 and	 especially	 if	 there	 are	treatment	escalation	options	open	to	them	(Abadir,	Finucane,	&	McNabney,	2011).		The	importance	of	this	is	that	professionals	can	negotiate	and	stand	for	a	patient’s	wishes	 against	 the	 family	 if	 the	 professional	 knows	 the	patient	 and	 their	wishes	well.	This	 is	 further	 complicated	as	 there	 is	evidence	 that	patients	 can	subjugate	their	 previous	 wishes	 for	 end	 of	 life	 care,	 when	 their	 families	 long	 for	 life	prolongation	(Abadir	et	al.,	2011).	Patients,	who	are	competent	but	cannot	communicate	verbally,	form	a	particularly	vulnerable	 group	with	 respect	 to	 decision-making.	 	 In	 an	 ethnographic	 study	 in	ITU,	 Sorensen	 found	 that	 doctors	 avoided	 talking	 to	 competent	 dying	 patients	because	 it	was	 time	 consuming,	 and	 a	 very	 difficult	 conversation	 for	 the	 doctor,	especially	if	the	patient	is	not	ready	to	die.	There	was	evidence	that	when	doctors	speak	with	family	members	and	ignore	patients	 it	does	affect	nurses	and	doctors	working	 relationships.	 	 Sorensen	 describes	 professionals	 as	 living	 with	 “guilty	knowledge”	(Sorensen	&	Iedema,	2011,	p.13)	.	
What	 the	 literature	 tells	 us	 about	 decision-making	 with	 patients	 who	 have	 lost	
capacity	through	long	term	illness	
Decision-making	in	the	context	of	the	patient	who	has	dementia	is	always	complex.	Mental	capacity	is	decision	specific	–	clearly	the	requirement	for	capacity	to	decide	whether	 sugar	 is	 wanted	 in	 a	 cup	 of	 tea	 is	 different	 to	 the	 capacity	 required	 to	make	an	informed	decision	about	place	of	care.	 	The	question	then	remains	as	to	whether	 the	 person’s	wishes	 are	 as	 they	were	when	 they	were	 competent	 or	 as	they	are	currently.			It	is	argued	that	the	decision	making	for	the	person	with	dementia	is	not	a	one	off	event	but	a	continual	and	on-going	process	evidenced	within	the	interaction	of	the	
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patient	 with	 their	 physical	 care	 environment	 and	 through	 the	 relationships	 the	patient	has	with	their	clinician,	family	and	carers	(Muramoto,	2011).		Some	family	members	have	made	decisions	with	and	for	the	patient	(and	sometimes	despite	the	patient,	when	 the	 person	with	 dementia	 cannot	 safely	manage	 at	 home	 and	 has	required	 placement	 in	 a	 care	 setting	 which	 not	 have	 been	 their	 choice).	 	 These	decisions	may	have	been	about	access	to	dementia	related	health	and	social	care,	legal	 and	 financial	 matters,	 and	 non-dementia	 related	 health	 care.	 	 End	 of	 life	decision-making	can	thus	be	the	last	of	many	decisions	a	families	will	have	to	make	and	it	is	identified	as	being	“very	difficult”	(Livingston	et	al.,	2010,	p.8).	Families	 of	 patients	 with	 advanced	 dementia	 identify	 being	 unprepared	 for	decision-making	at	end	of	life	–	they	did	not	know	what	was	expected	of	them,	they	were	not	given	any	explanation	of	their	role	by	the	medical	team,	but	they	did	very	much	want	to	be	involved	in	the	decision-making	(Caron,	Griffith,	&	Arcand,	2005).		Families	 have	 described	 five	 different	 ways	 they	 make	 decisions	 (they	 are	 not	mutually	 exclusive).	 	 These	 are	 previous	 conversations,	 reliance	 on	 written	documents,	 shared	 experience	 and	 life	 values,	 family’s	 own	 beliefs,	 values	 and	preferences	and	involvement	of	other	family	members	(Vig,	Taylor,	Starks,	Hopley,	&	Fryer	Edwards,	2006).	It	is	important	to	recognise	that	not	all	families	work	harmoniously	together,	and	family	conflict	is	identified	as	an	impediment	to	decision-making	(Livingston	et	al.,	2010)	 (Klager,	 Duckett,	 Sandler,	 &	 Moskowitz,	 2008).	 	 It	 is	 also	 noted	 that	generically	 solving	 family	 conflict	 is	 unhelpful	 but	 giving	 families	 resources	 to	address	 specific	 challenges	 is	 useful	 (Selwood,	 Johnston,	 Katona,	 Lyketsos,	 &	Livingston,	2007).	
What	 the	 literature	 tells	 us	 about	 decision-making	 with	 patients	 who	 have	 lost	
capacity	through	acute	illness	
The	key	role	of	the	family	in	decision-making	about	the	care	of	the	acutely	unwell	patient	 is	 recognised	 (Truog	et	 al.,	 2008).	Usually	 this	 takes	place	 in	 the	 form	of	formally	 organized	 “family	 meetings”	 once	 it	 is	 recognised	 that	 significant	decisions	 need	 to	 be	 made.	 These	 meetings	 are	 usually	 only	 instigated	 about	treatment	 withdrawal	 or	 withholding	 and	 rarely	 about	 the	 decision	 to	 escalate	
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dying?		The	 process	 of	 becoming	 physically	 unwell	 enough	 to	 require	 admission	 to	hospital	 can	 mean	 that	 patients	 can	 give	 up	 their	 wish	 or	 their	 choice	 to	 be	 at	home.	 	 At	 the	 point	where	 the	 patient	 comes	 into	 hospital	 (usually	 through	 the	Emergency	Department	(ED))	they	will	likely	not	be	known	to	HCPs	there,	and	an	immediate	 clinical	 decision	will	 need	 to	 be	made	 about	whether	 the	 patient	 is	 a	candidate	 for	 life	 prolonging	 treatment;	 life	 prolonging	 treatment,	 but	 with	acknowledgement	the	patient	 is	 likely	dying	and	there	will	be	a	 low	threshold	to	care	 for	 the	 dying	 patient;	 or	 the	 patient	 is	 dying	 immediately	 and	 needs	 all	comfort.	 It	 may	 not	 initially	 be	 possible	 to	 decide	 whether	 this	 admission	represents	an	admission	for	end	of	life	care	and	this	might	only	become	clear	if	the	patient	does	not	recover	despite	the	medical	treatment	offered.				The	 trajectories	 of	 dying	 identified	 by	 Murray	 et	 al	 (Murray	 et	 al,	 2005)	 are	unhelpful	 in	the	ED	as	they	are	over	too	 long	a	time	frame	and	do	not	 illuminate	the	 complexities	 of	 decision	 making	 that	 have	 to	 be	 made	 very	 rapidly	 at	 an	imminent	 “end	of	 life”	decision-point.	 	Trajectories	of	dying	have	been	described	specifically	 for	 Emergency	Departments	 (ED)	 to	 help	HCPs	 recognise	 the	 clinical	situation	 and	 initiate	 conversations	 with	 patients	 (if	 possible),	 the	 family	 and	wider	healthcare	team	(Chan,	2011).	 	The	trajectories	described	by	Chan	are	that	the	patient	 is	dead	on	arrival;	 the	patient	 is	admitted	 to	 the	ED	with	subsequent	death	 there;	 the	 patient	 has	 a	 pre-hospital	 resuscitation	 with	 survival	 until	admission	and	death	pronounced	in	the	ED;	the	patient	is	terminally	ill	and	comes	to	ED;	the	patient	is	frail	and	hovering	near	death;	the	patient	is	alive	but	arrests	in	the	ED;	or	the	patient	has	a	potentially	reversible	death	by	omission	or	commission	The	categories	related	to	the	patient	who	is	terminally	ill	or	frail	and	hovering	near	death	 in	 the	 ED	 are	 particularly	 relevant.	 	 These	 dying	 periods	 and	 deaths	 have	been	 described	 as	 “subtacular”,	 and	 contrasted	 with	 the	 “spectacular”	 dying	periods	 and	 deaths	 where	 all	 staff	 efforts	 are	 concentrated	 on	 resuscitation	
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(Bailey,	Murphy,	&	Porock,	2011)		(the	majority	of	ED	deaths).		In	a	year-long	study	which	involved	ethnographic	observation	of	care	within	a	UK	ED	department	and	interviews	with	staff,	patients	and	carers,	Bailey	identified	that	staff	within	the	ED	department	segregate	those	dying	“subtacular	deaths”	to	different	areas	of	the	ED,	and	 offer	 them	 lesser	 standards	 of	 care.	 	 Bailey	 suggests	 that	 the	 relatives	 of	patients	 who	 are	 dying	 the	 “subtacular	 deaths”	 are	 present	 for	 much	 longer	periods	than	the	spectacular	deaths	and	thus	require	information	and	support	for	a	 longer	 period.	 	 	 She	 observed	 staff	 protecting	 themselves	 from	 building	 a	therapeutic	 relationship,	 and	 suggested	 they	 did	 this	 in	 order	 that	 they	 did	 not	experience	loss	themselves	(Bailey	et	al.,	2011).	
Previous	research	to	develop	clinical	practice		
At	the	start	of	this	PhD	There	 had	 been	 three	 research	 projects	 (Curtis	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Jacobowski,	 Girard,	Mulder,	&	Ely,	2010;	Quenot	et	al.,	2011),	which	have	trialled	an	intervention	to	see	whether	end	of	life	practice	can	be	developed	by	that	intervention.		Curtis	targeted	clinicians	 in	 ITU	 in	 twelve	 hospitals	 and	 introduced	 education,	 local	 champions,	academic	 support,	 and	 feedback	 of	 clinical	 data.	 	 Outcomes	 were	 assessed	 for	patients	within	30	hours	of	death	and	their	families	were	surveyed	too.		There	was	no	measurable	change	in	the	quality	of	dying	or	family	satisfaction	with	the	care.			The	 authors	 proposed	 that	 future	 work	 should	 focus	 on	 direct	 contact	 with	patients	 and	 families	 (Curtis	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 	 Jacobowski	 evaluated	 the	 outcome	of	allowing	the	family	to	be	present	for	consultant	ward	rounds	on	ITU.		For	families	who	were	bereaved	on	ITU	the	inclusion	on	the	ward	round	did	not	improve	their	satisfaction	with	 care	 and	 it	was	 found	 that	 some	 families	 felt	 rushed	 to	make	 a	decision	 (Jacobowski	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 	 Neither	 study	 evaluated	 the	 effect	 of	 the	intervention	on	the	well	being	of	staff.	One	 research	 project	 (Quenot	 et	 al.,	 2011)	 trialled	 a	 range	 of	 supportive	interventions	 for	 staff	 who	 cared	 for	 patients	 in	 ITU	 over	 a	 two	 year	 period	(integrating	 palliative	 care	 into	 ITU,	 focusing	 on	 communication,	 psychological	support	of	staff,	teaching	about	ethical	decision-making,	promoting	staff	meetings)	and	 the	 incident	 of	 staff	 ‘burn	 out’.	 Depression	 in	 staff	 was	 markedly	 reduced	
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indicating	 that	 facilitating	 communication	 on	 a	 unit	 that	 cares	 for	 patients	 has	 a	positive	 effect	 on	 staff	 well	 being.	 	 This	 study	 did	 not	 evaluate	 the	 impact	 for	patients	and	carers.	
Current	research	Since	 starting	 this	 PhD	 the	 interest	 in	 recognising	 dying	 and	 sustaining	 practice	change	 has	 continued	 to	 appear	 in	 the	 literature.	 	 Professor	 Kennedy	 has	undertaken	a	literature	review,	following	a	PRISMA	standard	for	reporting	(Moher,	2010),	about	how	dying	is	recognised	(Kennedy	et	al.,	2014)	–	the	very	question	I	am	 interested	 in	 answering.	 	 She,	 in	 collaboration	with	 eight	 other	 researchers,	surveyed	576	papers	 from	2001	 to	2012	 and	ultimately	 included	23	papers	 and	following	a	themed	analysis	generated	a	conceptual	map	which	she	suggests	needs	further	testing.	 	The	concept	map	highlighted	the	uncertainty	of	decision-making,	and	factors	that	affected	the	decision–making.		These	included	professional	factors	such	as	fear,	and	doing	the	wrong	thing,	the	local	context	and	the	patient’s	illness	trajectory.	 	 These	 have	 similarities	 with	 the	 findings	 of	 this	 PhD.	 	 She	 suggests	strategies	 to	help	decision-making.	 	These	are	education,	 integration	of	palliative	care,	 and	 defining	 roles	 and	 responsibilities,	 and	 have	 parallels	 with	 where	 I	anticipated	at	the	start	of	the	PhD	that	I	would	have	answers.		In	 another	 evaluation	 of	 practice	 development	 in	 end	 of	 life	 care,	 Dr	McConnell	interviewed	 twenty	 HCPs	 and	 two	 policy	 makers	 about	 their	 experience	 of	implementing	 the	 Liverpool	 Care	 Pathway	 (LCP)2	in	 an	 acute	 trust	 (McConnell,	O'Halloran,	 Donnelly,	 &	 Porter,	 2014).	 	 The	 results	 of	 the	 first	 set	 of	 interviews	were	themed	and	 integrated	with	the	 literature	review	to	present	 theories	about	how	to	implement	and	sustain	change	in	good	clinical	care	of	the	dying	patient,	and	these	 and	 were	 re-presented	 to	 the	 same	 participants.	 	 This	 is	 a	 similar	methodology	to	that	which	I	initially	used.		She	identified	that	facilitation	of	the	use	of	the	pathway	was	important	and	when	the	funding	for	the	facilitator	had	stopped	the	recognition	of	dying	and	use	of	 the	paperwork	decreased	too.	 	This	had	been	my	own	experience	of	clinical	practice.	 	The	methodology	used	to	 investigate	the																																																									2	The	LCP	was	designed	by	Dr	Ellershaw	to	transfer	best	practice	in	the	care	of	the	dying	from	a	hospice	setting	to	the	hospital	setting.		It	required	that	dying	was	identified	so	the	care	pathway	paperwork	could	be	used.	
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question	was	similar	to	my	own.		She	identified	that	key	enablers	were:	consistent	senior	management	support;	on-going	education	and	training	that	was	profession	dependent;	audit;	and	an	organisational	change	in	the	hospital	to	embrace	end	of	life	care.		The	findings	of	her	study	resonated	with	Dr	Susi	Lund’s	literature	review	which	 identified	 that	 the	 ability	 of	 HCPs	 to	 engage	 patients	 in	 advance	 care	planning	is	impeded	by	competing	demands	of	other	work,	the	emotional	nature	of	the	HCP-patient	work	and	challenges	in	sharing	decisions	and	preferences	within	and	 between	 health	 care	 organizations	 (Lund,	 Richardson,	 &	 May,	 2015).	 	 Both	studies	 identify	 that	 a	 clinical	 facilitator,	 with	 responsibility	 for	 practice	development	about	the	end	of	life	care	initiative	(advance	care	planning	or	end	of	life	 care),	 is	 essential	 to	 sustained	 practice	 change.	 	 Whilst	 acknowledging	 the	practical	 resource	 and	 the	 physical	 presence	 of	 a	 skilled	 HCP	 to	 drive	 change,	neither	 author	 has	 a	 language	 to	 explain	 why,	 when	 the	 role	 disappears,	 that	engagement	with	the	care	of	the	dying	also	disappears.	The	concept	of	working	with	uncertainty	around	the	recognition	of	dying	has	been	more	 firmly	 introduced	 (Krawczyk	 &	 Gallagher,	 2016),	 with	 evidence	 from	working	with	 bereaved	 family	members	 that	 they	would	have	preferred	 to	 have	known	 the	 prognosis	 was	 uncertain,	 even	 if	 they	 would	 have	 resisted	 this	information	at	the	time.		The	challenge	here	is	that	the	group	surveyed	had	all	been	bereaved,	and	patients	had	not	survived	the	prognosis	of	dying.	Other	 researchers	 have	 identified	 that	 lead	 HCPs	 (not	 palliative	 care)	 are	recognizing	their	own	lack	of	skills	at	being	able	to	prognosticate	for	patients	who	have	diseases	that	particularly	affect	low	socio-economic	groups	e.g.	liver	cirrhosis	(Low,	 Vickerstaff,	 Davis,	 &	 Bichard,	 2015).	 Other	 researchers	 (Parry,	 2016)	 are	endeavoring	to	understand	how	experienced	palliative	care	specialists	 talk	about	end	of	life	in	a	sensitive	manner,	in	order	that	this	can	be	taught.		Interestingly	this	has	echoes	of	what	I	had	initially	hoped	to	achieve	through	this	PhD,	namely	that	best	practice	could	be	embedded	into	teaching	practice.		In	the	time	since	the	PhD	has	started	there	is	a	renewed	interest	in	the	well	being	of	HCPs’	emotional	 functioning	with	NHS	organisations.	 	The	 relevance	of	 this	 to	this	PhD	is	 that	the	spoken	and	unspoken	anxiety	of	 the	NHS	has	been	publically	
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Recognizing	 that	 a	 patient	 is	 dying	 is	 vitally	 important	 to	 ensure	 that	 there	 is	potential	for	a	“good	death”,	the	patient	can	be	involved	in	decision-making	if	they	can	 and	 wish	 to	 be,	 that	 the	 patient	 is	 not	 subjected	 to	 futile	 and	 painful	investigations	 or	 treatments,	 and	 there	 is	 some	 potential	 to	 think	 about	 care	outside	of	a	hospital	setting,	putting	affairs	in	order,	and	preparing	the	family.			Whilst	 there	 is	 a	 national	 strategy	 for	 excellent	 end	of	 life	 care,	 this	 chapter	 has	covered	 the	many	policy	drivers	 that	 in	hospitals	have	 the	potential	 to	 confound	this.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 District	 General	 Hospital	where	 this	 study	 took	 place,	HCPs	are	required	 to	 identify	dying	 in	 the	enormous	volume	of	patient	care,	and	where	the	number	of	deaths	is	only	1.5%	of	the	patients	admitted	in	a	week.		Also,	in	 the	 hospital	 there	 is	 the	 policy	 drive	 to	 rapidly	 discharge	 patients	 for	 “care	closer	to	home”	to	ensure	flow	of	patients	through	the	hospital	and	availability	of	beds	 for	other	patients.	 	Even	 if	GPs	made	advance	care	plans	with	all	 the	1%	of	their	population	who	they	anticipated	being	in	the	last	year	of	life,	this	would	still	be	a	small	percentage	of	those	who	die	in	hospital	every	year,	and	so	hospital	HCPs	bear	the	responsibility	for	decision-making	and	care.			It	 appears	 from	 the	 literature	 on	 prognostication	 and	 disease	 trajectories	 that	HCPs	have	been	interested	in	accurately	prognosticating,	and	recognising	dying	for	many	years,	but	 it	 continues	 to	be	a	very	 challenging	area	of	 clinical	 care	 that	 is	resistant	to	accuracy.		It	appears	from	the	literature	on	advance	care	planning	that	HCPs	are	supportive	of	the	idea	of	introducing	conversations	about	the	future	with	patients	 and	 yet	 these	 are	 difficult	 to	 realise.	 	We	 know	 from	 repeated	 national	audits	 that	HCPs	 in	 hospitals	 are	 identifying	 dying	 in	 a	 range	 of	 only	 hours	 to	 a	short	number	of	days	pre-death	and	this	is	resistant	to	change.		This	is	challenging	clinical	work	worthy	of	a	through	understanding.	The	care	of	the	dying	patient	 is	under-pinned	by	the	Mental	Capacity	Act	(2005).	Since	patients	 rarely	 retain	 capacity	 to	 engage	 in	decision-making	until	 they	die,	this	 introduces	 the	 family	 in	 a	 formal	 way	 into	 the	 decision-making	 regarding	dying	 either	 as	 a	 Lasting	 Power	 of	 Attorney	 or	 in	 a	 best	 interests	manner.	 	 The	literature	 review	 indicated	 that	 even	when	 the	 patient	 retained	 capacity	 to	 take	
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part	in	decision-making,	they	may	not	wish	or	be	ready	to	do	this,	they	might	have	complicated	 feelings	 about	 their	 experiences	 of	 care	 that	 could	 affect	 the	conversation,	 but	 some	could	make	decisions.	 	There	was	evidence	 that	 the	HCP	could	avoid	discussing	dying	with	the	patient,	preferring	to	speak	with	the	family.		The	 literature	 about	 HCPs	 experience	 of	 working	 with	 families	 is	 limited.	 	 The	literature	indicates	that	patients	view	their	families’	role	in	their	care	in	a	positive	manner,	and	that	the	NHS	marginalises	families	from	the	patient’s	care	whilst	they	are	 in	 hospital.	 	 There	were	 hints	 from	 a	 number	 of	 papers	 that	 families	 do	 not	always	agree,	or	support	patient	wishes,	and	that	they	could	influence	HCPs	to	not	follow	 what	 the	 patient	 previously	 wished.	 	 Also	 this	 work	 with	 patients	 and	families	could	occur	 in	a	very	time	compressed	manner	 in	such	places	as	the	ED,	and	 that	 those	patients	who	were	dying	 from	 frailty	or	 terminal	 illness	 could	be	segregated	and	they	and	their	family	receive	a	poorer	standard	of	care.	 	Thus	the	interaction	of	the	HCP	with	the	patient	and	family	is	challenging	clinical	work	and	worthy	of	study.	It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 decision-making	 about	 dying	 and	 care	 is	 affected	 by	culture,	faith	and	ethnicity,	both	on	the	part	of	the	HCP	and	the	patient	and	family.		This	study	was	mindful	of	this	but	the	intention	was	not	to	focus	on	this.	Thus	in	this	study	I	specifically	wanted	to	ascertain:	How	senior	HCPs	actually	recognise	dying.		This	includes	what	underpinned	their	decision	 that	 the	 patient	 was	 dying	 and	 their	 personal	 response	 to	 this.	 	 Also	whether	 the	 dying	 was	 initially	 recognised	 by	 the	 healthcare	 professional	 or	pointed	out	by	another	member	of	the	team,	patient	or	family.	How	senior	HCPs	engaged	with	patients	and	families	to	progress	decision-making.	How	 senior	 HCPs	 continued	 to	maintain	 the	 relationship	with	 the	 dying	 patient	and	their	family.	How	senior	HCPs	learnt	to	identify	dying	and	support	patient	and	family	care	Whether	 senior	 HCPs	 could	 identify	 any	 gaps	 in	 service	 provision,	 training	 and	support	that	impede	the	identification	of	dying.		
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Introduction	and	reminder	of	research	question	In	 Chapter	 Two	 the	 necessity	 for	 the	 research	 was	 clarified.	 The	 increasing	demographics	of	an	aging	and	multiply	co-morbid	population	mean	the	care	of	the	dying	 patient	 is	 an	 ever-increasing	 occurrence	 in	 a	 hospital	 system	 whose	outcomes	are	focused	on	restoration	to	health	and	function,	and	cautioned	against	early	mortality.		The	positive	national	policy	drives	for	“good	end	of	life	care”,	with	“care	 closer	 to	home”,	make	 it	 difficult	 to	 think	 about	 less	 rational	 influences	on	identifying	dying,	and	working	with	patients	and	 families.	 	The	evidence	showed	that	clinicians	are	not	good	at	prognosticating.	The	chapter	considered	what	was	known	 about	 recognising	 dying	 and	 negotiating	 decision-making	 for	 adults	with	mental	 capacity	 to	 take	 part	 in	 decision-making,	 adults	without	mental	 capacity	due	to	a	long-term	condition	and	adults	who	have	temporarily	lost	mental	capacity	due	to	an	acute	event.	 	It	considered	the	family’s	role	in	the	decision-making,	and	then	highlighted	the	rapidity	and	intensity	of	the	clinical	care	and	decision-making	in	areas	such	as	the	Emergency	Department.	The	chapter	articulated	how	the	first	part	 of	 the	 research	 question	 had	 not	 changed	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 research.		Thus	in	this	study	I	specifically	wanted	to	ascertain:	How	senior	HCPs	actually	recognised	dying.		This	included	what	underpinned	their	decision	 that	 the	 patient	 was	 dying	 and	 their	 personal	 response	 to	 this.	 	 Also	whether	the	dying	was	initially	recognised	by	the	Health	Care	Professional	(HCP)	or	pointed	out	by	another	member	of	the	team,	patient	or	family.		How	senior	HCPs	engaged	with	patients	and	families	to	progress	decision-making,	and	how	 they	 continued	 to	maintain	 the	 relationship	with	 the	dying	patient	 and	their	family.		How	senior	HCPs	learnt	to	identify	dying	and	support	patient	and	family	care,	and	finally,	whether	senior	HCPs	could	identify	any	gaps	in	service	provision,	training	and	support	that	impede	the	identification	of	dying.		Chapter	Two	then	considered	the	research	that	previously	endeavoured	to	develop	clinical	practice.		In	response	to	the	gaps	in	the	literature	I	initially	researched	how	
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senior	 HCPs	 utilised	 and	 evaluated	 Participatory	 Action	 Research	 (PAR)	 as	 a	means	to	develop	clinical	practice.		Then	when	the	themed	analysis	yielded	a	result	that	left	clinical	practice	doing	more	of	the	same,	a	psychosocial	enquiry	approach	was	taken	to	the	data.	
Research	Paradigm	




Ahead	 of	 explaining	 the	methodology	 and	method	 in	 detail,	 the	 overall	 research	process	 is	 introduced	 for	 the	 orientation	 of	 the	 reader.	 In	 Study	 One,	 thirteen	senior	HCPs	undertook	a	critical	 incident	review.	These	 involved	the	ward	based	senior	HCP	who	 identified	 dying,	 and	 the	Hospital	 Palliative	 Care	 Team	 (HPCT),	who	 are	 the	HCPs	 subsequently	 involved	 in	 the	 patient’s	 care.	 	 Interviews	were	recorded,	 transcribed	and	 themed.	 In	Study	Two	senior	HCPs	across	 the	hospital	were	invited	to	four	consecutive	PAR	workshops	to	critically	reflect	on	the	themed	data	from	Study	One.		Ten	HCPs	took	part	(three	HPCT	HCPs	were	involved	in	both	studies).	The	interviews	were	similarly	recorded,	transcribed	and	themed.	The	themed	analysis	yielded	a	model	for	decision-making	but	did	not	explain	why	dying	was	identified	so	late.	A	psychoanalytically	informed	psychosocial	approach	was	taken	to	examine	anomalies	and	contradictions	in	the	data	that	pointed	to	less	conscious	 undercurrents	 in	 the	 personal,	 professional,	 educational	 and	institutional	dynamics	involved	in	the	care	of	patients	who	are	dying.		The	 consent	 forms,	 participant	 information,	 interview	 schedule	 for	 (Study	 One),	and	sample	of	posters	as	they	went	to	the	ethics	department	in	the	hospital	are	all	located	Appendix	2.		A	copy	of	the	poster	is	included	in	Appendix	3.		A	copy	of	the	participant	feedback	form	is	included	in	Appendix	4.	
Why	Qualitative	Research?	
It	 is	 known	 from	 repeated	 national	 audits	 of	 clinical	 practice	 in	 the	 care	 of	 the	dying	 in	 hospitals,	 that	 dying	 is	 being	 recognised	 less	 than	 two	days	 from	death	(Health	 and	 Social	 Care	 Information	 Centre,	 Academy	 of	Medical	 Royal	 Colleges,	Marie	 Care	 Cancer	 Care,	 2014;	 Marie	 Curie	 Palliative	 Care	 Institute	 Liverpool	Health	 and	 Social	 Care	 Information	 Centre,	 Academy	 of	 Medical	 Royal	 Colleges,	2011).	In	the	2011	audit	it	was	29	hours	from	death,	and	in	the	2014	audit	it	was	35.5	 hours	 from	 death.	 From	 quantitative	 research	 we	 know	 the	 HCPs	 are	inaccurate	 at	 prognosticating	 (Christakis	 &	 Lamont,	 2000),	 although	 it	 does	become	 more	 accurate	 nearer	 to	 death	 (Higginson	 &	 Costantini,	 2002)	 and	 we	have	 statistical	 evidence	 about	 the	 relative	 strengths	 of	 the	 accuracy	 of	 doctors,	
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nurses	and	even	patients	(Gwilliam	et	al.,	2013).	We	have	statistical	evidence	that	the	 better	 a	 doctor	 knows	 their	 patient,	 the	 more	 inaccurate	 the	 prognosis	(Christakis	&	Lamont,	2000).		There	is	also	evidence	that	doctors’	prognosticating	that	the	patient	is	dying	and	how	they	interact	with	the	patient’s	family	is	affected	by	religious	affiliation	and	culture	(Sprung	et	al.,	2007).	Doctors	 continue	 to	 want	 to	 hone	 their	 prognostic	 skills.	 	 Recent	 quantitative	research	has	looked	at	physiological	parameters	e.g.	blood	results	to	see	if	they	can	assist	 in	predicting	dying	more	accurately,	but	the	researcher	still	concluded	that	“the	fluid,	iterative	and	on-going	nature	of	the	decision	and	use	of	intuition	are	key	factors	 influencing	 the	 recognition	 of	 dying”	 (Taylor,	 2012,	 p.3).	 	 So	 quantitative	data	tells	us	some	of	the	answers,	but	it	cannot	answer,	“how	do	clinicians	identify	the	 dying”	 in	 order	 to	 begin	 conversations	with	 patients	 and	 families	 or	 help	 us	understand	how	HCPs	 learn	 to	undertake	 this	aspect	of	 care,	or	progress	clinical	practice.			
Why	a	Critical	Incident	Review?	
A	‘critical	incident	review’	is	“one	which	causes	a	person	to	pause	and	contemplate	the	events	that	occurred	to	try	and	give	them	some	meaning”	(Elliott,	2004).		It	is	a	widely	used	exploratory	research	tool.		It	was	originally	developed	by	Flanagan	in	1954	to	analyse	people’s	jobs	with	the	aim	of	identifying	the	critical	factors	for	job	success	 and	 is	 recognised	 to	 be	 the	 start	 of	 a	 qualitative	 approach	 to	 a	 research	question	in	a	time	in	the	social	sciences	that	was	inherently	positivist	(Chell	1998	cited	in	Spencer-Oatey,	2012).	A	critical	incident	review	is	a	process	that	clinicians	are	 familiar	 with	 (Mahajan,	 2010)	 (General	 Medical	 Council,	 2012)	 and	 I	anticipated	this	would	aid	recruitment	to	the	study.			The	incident	was	the	care	of	a	patient	referred	to	the	HPCT	by	ward	based	HCPs,	and	the	HPCT’s	assessment	and	understanding	of	 the	same	clinical	situation.	The	plan	was	to	have	a	sample	of	six	incidents	(patient	referrals)	and	thus	twelve	HCP	interviews.		The	aim	was	to	draw	senior	HCPs	back	to	“how	they	made	the	decision	in	that	circumstance	about	the	recognition	of	dying”	rather	than	talking	generically	about	how	they	identified	dying.	The	link	between	a	referral	to	the	HPCT	and	the	identification	 of	 dying	 was	 based	 on	 the	 commonly	 misheld	 perception	 by	 a	
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majority	of	generalist	HCPs	that	palliative	care	teams	see	all	dying	patients.		Please	note	that	HPCTs	see	all	patients	referred	to	them	with	palliative	care	needs	and	not	all	 patients	 with	 palliative	 care	 needs	 are	 at	 end	 of	 life,	 they	 can	 occur	 pre	diagnosis	onwards	(World	Health	Organisation,	2013).	For	each	 incident	(patient	referral),	 I	 invited	 the	HCPs	 to	be	 interviewed	by	me,	and	aimed	to	complete	 the	interview	 in	 seven	days,	with	 the	 clinical	notes	present	 to	prompt	 their	memory	recollection3.	 	 Since,	 I	 identified	 the	 incident	 I	 anticipated	 that	 it	 would	 not	necessarily	 have	 the	 emotional	 impact	 or	 personal	 meaning	 for	 the	 HCP	 as	 per	some	definitions	(Kirby,	2010).	
Study	one	-	critical	incident	review	
The	 aim	 of	 the	 ‘critical	 incident	 review	 was	 ensure	 a)	 there	 was	 analysed	 data	about	 the	 research	 question	 for	 the	 PAR	 workshops	 to	 reflect	 on.	 	 Also	 it	 was	anticipated	 that	 HCPs	 were	 used	 to	 attending	 workshops	 with	 an	 element	 of	didactic	 learning	 and	having	 evidence	 to	 critique	would	 be	 familiar	 to	 them	and	reduce	 anxiety.	 b)	 As	 researcher	 and	 facilitator	 I	 was	 informed	 ahead	 of	 PAR	workshop	 of	 factors	 that	 were	 relevant	 and	 could	 refine	 facilitation	 of	 the	workshops.	 c)	 I	 was	 also	 keen	 to	 ensure	 my	 unconscious	 unknowing,	 or	 any	unconscious	 biases	were	 exposed.	 	 Please	 note	 that	 at	 this	 stage	 this	was	 not	 a	psychosocial	knowing	but	a	more	mainstream	psychological	way	of	knowing	such	as	in	the	notion	of	fast	clinical	practice	that	becomes	unconscious,	and	needs	to	be	reconsidered	(Stratton	&	Hanks,	2016).		
Participants		The	study	was	open	to	all	senior	HCPs	employed	in	one	district	general	hospital4.		For	 this	 study	 a	 senior	 HCP	 was	 defined	 as	 nurses,	 therapists,	 chaplains	 above	band	6	(agenda	for	change5)	and	doctors	who	were	in	core	and	specialty	training,																																																									3	When	considering	the	interview	schedule	for	Study	One	in	Appendix	2	–	section	one,	question	one	-	please	recall	the	HCP	had	made	the	referral	to	palliative	care	and	consideration	was	requested	in	the	interview	to	“this	specific	case”.	4	This	was	my	place	of	employment	5	Agenda	for	Change	(AfC)	is	the	current	National	Health	Service	(NHS)	grading	and	pay	system	for	NHS	staff,	with	the	exception	of	doctors,	dentists,	apprentices	and	some	senior	managers. 
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and	 consultants.	 Based	 on	 the	 literature	 that	 data	 saturation	 occurs	 at	 about	twelve	 interviews	 I	 anticipated	 interviewing	 the	 six	 senior	HCPs	 responsible	 for	the	referral	of	the	six	patients	and	also	the	corresponding	palliative	care	specialist	who	contributed	 to	 the	on-going	patient	 and	 family	 care	 for	 each	patient	 (Guest,	Bunce,	&	Johnson,	2006).	 	 In	reality	I	 interviewed	thirteen	HCPs	as	two	palliative	care	HCPs	contributed	to	the	care	and	decision-making	of	one	patient.		Participants	were	 asked	 for	basic	demographic	data	 including	 the	 length	of	 time	since	qualification	on	the	professional	register	(GMC,	NMC),	role,	band	of	role,	area	of	clinical	practice,	and	frequency	of	exposure	to	dying.		HCPs	were	also	asked	for	a	perception	 of	 their	 comfortableness	 with	 caring	 for	 the	 dying.	 The	 aim	 was	 to	match	 staff	 to	 the	 workforce	 groups	 identified	 in	 the	 National	 End	 of	 Life	 Care	Strategy	 (National	 End	 of	 Life	 Care	 Programme,	 Skills	 for	Health,	 Skills	 for	 care,	Department	 of	 Health,	 2009)	 i.e.	 Group	 A	 staff	 -	 working	 in	 Specialist	 Palliative	Care,	Group	B	–	staff	who	frequently	deal	with	end	of	life	care	and	Group	C	–	Staff	who	infrequently	deal	with	end	of	life	care.	







1		 26	 Group	A	 At	ease	2		 Didn’t	answer	 Group	A	 At	ease	3		 22	 Group	B	 At	ease	4		 3	 Group	B	 At	ease	5		 31	 Group	A	 At	ease	6		 Didn’t	answer	 Group	B	 Moderately	at	ease	7		 13	 Group	B	 At	ease	8		 23	 Group	A	 At	ease	9		 6	 Group	A	 At	ease	
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10		 15	 Group	A	 At	ease	11		 14	 Group	B	 Moderately	at	ease	12		 27	 Group	A	 At	ease	13	 Not	returned	 Group	B/C	 Not	returned	
 It	can	be	seen	that	for	those	HCPs	who	answered,	that	the	staff	had	been	in	clinical	practice	 for	an	average	of	18	years	(range	3-31).	 	Seven	described	themselves	as	working	in	palliative	care,	5	described	themselves	as	frequently	dealing	with	end	of	life	care,	and	1	did	not	return	their	form,	but	from	my	knowledge	of	their	clinical	practice	would	have	been	working	between	frequently	and	rarely	dealing	with	end	of	 life	 care.	All	working	 in	palliative	 care	described	 themselves	 as	 “at	 ease”	with	dying.	Of	the	5	who	rated	themselves	as	frequently	working	with	end	of	life	care	3	were	“at	ease”	with	dying,	and	2	were	“moderately	at	ease”.	
Inclusion	and	exclusion	criteria		The	inclusion	criteria	for	the	study	related	to	the	staff	who	initiated	the	referral	to	the	HPCT,	(rather	than	the	person	who	completed	the	referral	form	as	this	can	be	delegated	 to	 a	 junior	 member	 of	 staff),	 and	 the	 HPCT	 HCP	 who	 subsequently	reviewed	 the	 patient.	 	 HCPs	 from	 outside	 the	 District	 General	 Hospital	 were	excluded	because	 this	 research	was	about	developing	clinical	practice	within	 the	hospital.	Families	who	called	the	team	for	help	with	a	patient	were	excluded	as	the	research	question	pertained	to	how	HCPs	undertook	this	clinical	work.			
Recruitment	A	 poster	 containing	 study	 information	 was	 posted	 on	 the	 intranet,	 in	 strategic	places	 in	 corridors	 in	 the	 District	 General	 Hospital,	 and	 the	 HPCT	 intranet	 site.	Senior	 HCPs	were	 informed	 about	 the	 study	 via	 e-mail,	 with	 the	 support	 of	 the	Director	 of	Medicine	 and	 the	Director	 of	Nursing.	 	When	 referrals	 came	 into	 the	HPCT,	I	reviewed	the	patient’s	medical	notes	to	see	who	initiated	the	referral.		The	referrer	and	the	HPCT	HCP	were	approached	and	e-mailed	an	invitation	pack	that	included	an	information	sheet,	consent	form	and	demographic	questionnaire	about	
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Issues	with	recruitment	and	sampling	Study	one	opened	on	2nd	April	2014	and	closed	on	the	16th	June	2014	and	between	these	 dates	 the	 HPCT	 received	 217	 referrals.	 On	 discussion	 with	 the	 PhD	supervisors	it	was	agreed	that	successive	referrals	would	not	be	interviewed	as	it	was	not	possible	 to	 combine	 this	 level	 of	 interviewing	and	 clinical	 commitments	without	 compromising	 patient	 and	 family	 care.	 	 It	 was	 decided	 to	 purposefully	sample	across	different	specialties	and	patient	conditions.	Thus,	HCPs	who	cared	for	patients	with	a	range	of	malignant	and	non-malignant	conditions	were	sampled	from	 surgical	 and	medical	 wards,	 and	 from	 areas	 of	 extremely	 high	 intensity	 of	care,	namely	the	acute	stroke	unit	and	intensive	care.	Several	 recruitment	 and	 practical	 issues	 were	 experienced.	 	 Firstly,	 once	 the	decision	was	made	 to	 sample	 across	 specialties,	 it	 took	 time	 to	wait	 for	 a	 dying	surgical	 patient	 to	 be	 referred	 to	 the	 palliative	 care	 team.	 	 Secondly,	 some	participants	required	more	time	and	chasing,	after	they	had	consented	to	take	part	in	 the	 study	 to	 agree	 a	 mutually	 convenient	 interview	 date.	 A	 potential	 pair	 of	interviews	was	omitted	from	the	study,	as	there	was	no	mutually	convenient	time	to	 interview	 the	 referring	 HCP,	 due	 to	 leave,	 within	 a	 reasonable	 timescale.	Repeated	 attempts	 had	 been	 made	 to	 set	 up	 the	 interview,	 and	 a	 point	 had	occurred,	 that	 despite	 verbal	 consent,	 that	 it	 felt	 more	 respectful	 to	 let	 the	interview	 lapse.	 A	 different	 decision	 was	 made	 to	 proceed	 with	 interviewing	referring	HCP	11	after	7	days.	This	participant	was	proactive	about	 re-arranging	the	 interview,	 the	doctor	had	 the	notes	 available,	 and	 the	participant	was	 aware	from	the	start	that	they	would	be	interviewed	about	decision-making	with	respect	to	this	patient.		I	did	this	to	ensure	that	the	time	and	data	from	the	palliative	care	interview	that	had	already	been	undertaken,	was	fully	utilised.			
Consent	Participation	was	voluntary.	This	was	made	explicit	on	the	recruitment	poster	and	in	 the	 accompanying	 information.	 	 All	 participants	 were	 given	 the	 relevant	participant	information	sheet	and	consent	form	which	the	Trust	and	University	of	
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Bath	approved.	 	Participants	were	 free	to	withdraw	any	time	but	 I	could	use	any	data	up	to	this	point.		
Data	Collection	The	 interviews	 were	 recorded	 via	 Dictaphone	 onto	 an	 encrypted	 disc	 and	transcribed.	 	The	original	recording	was	stored	in	a	protected	electronic	 file	on	a	password-protected	computer	in	a	locked	office.		The	files	were	then	transferred	to	the	University	database	for	safe	storage	and	will	be	disposed	of	in	three	years	i.e.	the	end	of	2017.	 	Prior	 to	 the	recording	the	participant	was	reminded	not	 to	use	patient	identifiable	information	and	transcripts	are	anonymised	so	that	the	HCP	is	unidentifiable.		




Braun	and	Clarke	summarise	ten	benefits	of	a	themed	analysis,	and	three	stood	out	as	 particularly	 relevant.	 	 The	 first	 was	 that	 thematic	 analysis	 can	 usefully	summarise	key	 features	of	a	 large	body	of	data	and	offer	a	 “thick	description”	of	the	data	set	–	this	is	one	that	can	explain	behaviour	and	context.		The	second	is	that	it	 can	generate	unanticipated	 insights,	and	 the	 third	 is	 that	 it	allows	 for	social	as	well	as	psychological	interpretation	(Braun	&	Clarke,	2006).		Through	the	themed	analysis	the	data	was	organised	and	this	allowed	the	description	of	the	interviews	for	consideration	by	HCPs	in	the	PAR	workshops.		Reicher	and	Taylor	caution	that	thematic	 analysis	 needs	 to	 be	 clear	 and	 explicit,	 and	 rigorous	 in	 devising	 a	systematic	method	(Reicher	and	Taylor,	2005	cited	in	Braun	&	Clarke,	2006).		This	will	be	attended	to	in	the	sections	below.	
Themed	analysis	
Coding	decisions	The	transcripts	were	read	and	re-read.	Iteratively,	and	inductively	from	the	data	an	excel	spreadsheet	was	built	with	codes	and	the	quote	associated	with	this.	These	were	 ultimately	 subsections	 of	 themes	 (see	 Appendix	 5	 and	 6).	 	 When	 in	 a	subsequent	 reading	 a	 new	 code	 was	 found,	 that	 was	 undiscovered	 in	 other	transcripts,	this	was	taken	as	a	prompt	to	return	to	the	beginning	of	the	transcripts	and	 re-read	 them	 to	 see	 if	 the	 code	was	present	 or	not.	 	 	 Inductive	 analysis	 is	 a	process	of	coding	the	data	without	fitting	it	 into	a	pre-existing	coding	framework	(Braun	&	Clarke,	2006),	but	as	a	clinician	and	researcher	I	recognise	I	had	an	active	role	in	identifying	patterns	and	identifying	them	as	themes,	which	were	informed	by	my	experience	of	clinical	practice	 (Braun	&	Clarke,	2006)).	 	Braun	and	Clarke	(Braun	&	 Clarke,	 2006)	 state	 that	 an	 important	 question	 to	 address	 in	 terms	 of	coding	 is	 what	 counts	 as	 a	 theme?	 	 As	 an	 example	 from	 this	 study,	 the	 theme	“recognising	 the	 potential	 for	 dying”	was	made	 up	 of	 the	 codes,	 “HCP	 has	 a	 gut	feeling	the	patient	is	dying”,	“HCP	did	not	recognise	the	patient	as	dying”,	“patient	raises	the	topic	of	dying”,	“family	raises	the	topic	of	dying”	and	“other	members	of	the	health	care	team	recognise	dying”.	 	HCPs	described	a	mixture	of	 the	codes	 in	
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each	 individual	case,	but	across	the	13	 interviews	there	were	codes	attributed	 in	this	 theme	 for	each	 individual	 case.	 	The	analysis	of	 the	data	and	 thinking	about	how	 best	 to	 describe	 this	 for	 fellow	 HCPs	 in	 Study	 Two	 was	 undertaken	 in	discussion	with	PhD	supervisors	and	clinical	supervisor.		The	level	of	the	theming	in	Study	One	is	broadly	semantic	(descriptive)	rather	than	latent	(interpretist)	(Boyatziz	1998	cited	in	Braun	&	Clarke,	2006))	as	the	plan	was	to	present	the	whole	data	set	for	participants	in	study	two	for	their	consideration.	It	is	recognised	this	is	important	when	a	subject	is	under-researched	and	when	the	views	of	participants	are	unknown	(Braun	&	Clarke,	2006).			





Diagramming	In	line	with	others	(Charmaz,	2006)	diagrams	have	regularly	been	generated	as	a	concrete	 image	 of	 researcher	 ideas.	 They	 have	 been	 useful	 in	 the	workshops	 to	succinctly	describe	the	findings	of	Study	One	and	to	prompt	discussion	with	others.	
Negative	Cases	Whilst	 the	 patient’s	 clinical	 record	was	 available	 for	 all	 HCPs	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	interview	in	order	that	they	could	remind	themselves	of	the	patient’s	care	if	they	needed,	as	a	researcher	I	did	not	examine	these	notes.		I	was	only	interested	in	the	HCP’s	narrative.	 	The	scenario	of	Patient	2	 (HCP	2	and	3)	 caused	me	 further	on-going	 reflection.	 	 The	 dying	was	missed	 in	 this	 patient’s	 care	 by	 one	 HCP	 and	 I	wanted	to	look	at	the	clinical	notes	to	try	and	understand	the	decision-making,	but	discussed	this	in	supervision.		It	was	strongly	recommended	that	the	clinical	notes	were	 not	 accessed	 as	 other	 patient	 case	 notes	 had	 not	 been	 similarly	 accessed.	With	hindsight	this	was	a	wise	decision	as	instead	of	judging	the	HCP	and	decision-making	in	this	case,	it	moved	me	to	really	engage	with	the	data	and	consider	why	the	recognition	of	dying	might	be	missed.	
2nd	March	2015	
Title:	 How	 senior	 HCP	 recognise	 dying	 and	 engage	 patients	 and	 families	 to	
negotiate	 key	 decisions	 to	 improve	 the	 patient	 and	 carer	 experience.	 	 PAR	
explored	as	a	means	to	develop	practice.	
How	Senior	HCP	recognise	dying	–	Duty	/	Gut	feeling;		





Action	 research	 is	 described	 as	 a	 “participatory,	 democratic	 process	 concerned	with	developing	practical	knowledge,	which	brings	together	action	and	reflection,	theory	and	practice	in	participation	with	others,	in	the	pursuit	of	practice	issues	of	pressing	 concern	 to	 people	 and	 to	 the	 flourishing	 of	 individuals	 and	 their	communities”	 (Heron	 &	 Reason,	 2006).	 	 Action	 research	 recognises	 that	 the	inquiry	 and	 the	 change	 are	 not	 separate	 moments	 but	 the	 inquiry	 is	 the	intervention	 (Ludema	 et	 al.,	 2006)	 and	 ethically	 this	 was	 important,	 as	 the	intervention	needed	to	be	helpful	for	clinical	practice.		Action	research,	as	a	method,	was	planned	to	articulate	the	knowledge	gained	from	study	one	and	to	allow	others	to	jointly	reflect	on	it,	balance	it	with	known	theory,	and	their	experience	of	clinical	practice.	It	was	to	facilitate	co-operative	generation	of	an	action	to	test	out	and	reflect	on	in	clinical	practice	in	the	intervening	weeks	between	 workshops	 and	 evaluate	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 action.	 	 This	 could	 be	“psychological”	action,	rather	than	physical	action	(Baldwin,	2006).	
Study	two	–	PAR	workshops.	
The	overall	aim	of	the	four	PAR	workshops,	held	monthly	for	four	months,	was	for	senior	 HCPs	 to	 co-operatively	 generate	 new	 knowledge	 by	 considering	 the	 data	from	Study	One,	commenting	about	whether	they	recognised	the	narratives	I	had	determined,	 and	 adding	 detail	 to	 how	 they	 recognise	 dying,	 negotiate	 decision-making,	and	cope	with	the	physical	and	emotional	 fall	out	of	decision-making.	At	the	end	of	each	workshop	 the	group	was	challenged	 to	document	what	 they	had	learnt	from	the	workshop	and	over	the	next	two	weeks	to	reflect	on	influences	on	decision-making	 to	 bring	 these	 back	 to	 the	 next	workshop	 for	 discussion	 and	 to	evaluate	the	workshops	as	a	route	to	 learning	 i.e.	a	“psychological	action”.	 	 I	also	wanted	to	ensure	that	any	biases	I	had	and	may	have	inadvertently	bought	into	the	research	process	were	also	exposed.		
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Participants		As	per	Study	One,	this	study	was	open	to	all	senior	HCPs	employed	in	one	District	General	Hospital.		The	study	was	voluntary	and	3	HCPs	who	took	part	in	study	one	also	 took	part	 in	study	 two.	 	PAR	group	participants	were	asked	 to	complete	 the	same	short	demographic	questionnaire	that	was	requested	in	Study	one.	
Table	 3.	 Summary	 of	 study	 two	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 participant’s	 length	 of	 time	 in	clinical	practice,	their	experience	of	end	of	life	care	and	self	rated	comfortableness	with	dying			
Participant	 Years	in	practice	 Experience	 Comfortableness	 with	
dying	1		 32	 Group	A	 At	ease	2		 6	 Group	A	 At	ease	3		 15	 Group	B	 Moderately	at	ease	4		 20	 Group	B	 At	ease	5		 24	 Group	B	 At	ease	6		 30	 Group	B	 Moderately	at	ease	7		 19	 Group	B	 Moderately	at	ease	8		 27	 Group	B	 At	ease	9		 15	 Group	B	 Moderately	at	ease	10		 30	 Group	A	 At	ease		
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HCPs	had	been	in	clinical	practice	for	an	average	of	22	years	(range	6-32).		Three	described	themselves	as	working	in	palliative	care,	and	7	described	themselves	as	frequently	 dealing	with	 end	 of	 life	 care.	 All	 working	 in	 palliative	 care	 described	themselves	as	 “at	 ease”	with	dying.	Of	 the	7	who	 rated	 themselves	as	 frequently	working	with	end	of	life	care,	3	were	at	ease	with	dying,	and	4	were	moderately	at	ease.	
Inclusion	and	exclusion	criteria	As	per	study	one.	








13.05.2015	 10	 Engaging	with	 the	 family	to	negotiate	decisions	
03.06.2015	 8	 Coping	 with	 the	 fall	 out	decisions	
15.07.2015	 8	 Evaluation	 of	 the	workshops	as	a	means	to	practice	development	
	
Forward	planning	of	workshops	and	plan	for	safe	containment	Ahead	of	 every	PAR	workshop	 I	went	 through	 the	presentation	with	 a	 colleague	who	was	present	in	the	group	(not	a	participant).	The	role	of	the	colleague	was	to	keep	 me	 on	 track	 with	 timing,	 as	 I	 knew	 it	 would	 be	 challenging	 to	 bring	 the	discussions	together	within	one	hour,	and	all	HCPs	would	need	to	return	promptly	to	clinical	practice.		I	also	knew	that	they	would	be	able	to	assist	if	anyone	became	distressed.	 	 This	 is	 a	 common	 practice	 for	 educators	 in	 palliative	 care	 as	unexpected	distress	is	common	(Lillyman,	Gutteridge,	&	Berridge,	2011).			
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Privacy	and	Anonymity	A	working	agreement	was	negotiated	at	the	start	of	the	first	PAR	workshop,	which	clearly	 identified	 expectations	 of	 group	 behaviour,	 and	 the	 roles	 the	 group	members	could	take	e.g.	that	they	could	challenge	each	other.		This	was	in	line	with	other	 working	 agreements	 for	 groups	 that	 some	 participants	 will	 have	 been	familiar	 with	 i.e.	 the	 National	 Cancer	 Action	 Team	 Connected	 Advanced	Communications	 Course.	 	 As	 part	 of	 this,	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 patient	 and	 family	confidentiality,	 they	were	 asked	 not	 to	 use	 patient	 names	 or	 patient	 identifiable	information;	 they	were	 also	 asked	 to	 agree	 that	 information	 about	 a	 colleague’s	practice	 also	 be	 kept	 confidential	 to	 the	 PAR	 group.	 	 They	 were	 also	 asked	 to	commit	to	full	attendance	if	possible.	All	transcripts	were	anonymised	so	the	HCP	was	not	identifiable.			
My	own	learning	from	reflection	owned	and	presented	Every	session,	the	same	slide	on	reflection	was	presented,	and	I	briefly	stated	what	I	had	learnt	from	the	HCPs’	contribution	as	I	transcribed	the	workshop	recording.	I	was	 very	mindful	 from	 Study	 One,	 and	my	 own	 clinical	 practice,	 how	much	we	learn	 from	 others	 (Perry,	 2009),	 and	 I	 wanted	 to	 role	 model	 an	 open	 minded,	reflective	approach	to	clinical	practice,	and	thank	the	participants	 for	helping	me	learn.	
Data	capture 
PAR	workshop	data	was	recorded,	transcribed,	as	per	Study	One.		
Feedback	 from	 group	 regarding	 relevance,	 quality	 and	 effectiveness	 of	





Workshop	 Relevance	(Average)	 Quality	(Average)	 Effectiveness	(Average)	
One	 5	 4.8	 4.7	
Two	 4.7	 4.3	 4.6	
Three	 5	 4.75	 4.6	
Four	 5	 4.8	 4.7		
Why	an	initial	thematic	analysis	of	Study	Two?	
Initially	the	transcripts	of	the	workshops	were	themed	for	the	same	reasons	and	in	the	same	manner	as	undertaken	for	Study	One.	
Negative	cases	During	the	workshops	the	group	highlighted	what	Study	One	had	missed,	namely	the	patient	that	survived	the	prognostication	of	dying,	and	the	subsequent	impact	that	 had	 on	 the	 relationship	 of	 the	 HCP	 with	 the	 patients	 and	 their	 families	subsequently	had	with	HCPs.		However,	rather	than	negative	cases,	the	workshops	greatly	added	 to	 the	depth	and	understanding	of	 the	 themes	generated	 from	 the	themed	analysis	of	the	Critical	Incident	Review	(Study	One).		
A	study	in	transition	
Without	describing	the	results	here,	the	themed	analysis	facilitated	articulation	of	a	 four-stage	 model	 for	 recognising	 dying	 and	 negotiating	 decision	 making	 with	patients	 and	 families.	 	 It	 also	 allowed	 description	 of	 how	 HCPs	 have	 learnt	 to	deliver	 this	 aspect	 of	 care,	 and	 their	 positive	 evaluation	 of	 PAR	workshops	 as	 a	means	 to	 facilitate	 practice	 development.	 	 Following	 consideration	 of	 this	
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evaluation	 a	 five-stage	 model	 was	 ultimately	 developed	 that	 includes	 clinical	supervision	of	this	aspect	of	care.		The	themed	analysis	is	presented	in	Chapter	5.			What	the	methodology	did	not	allow	to	happen	was	to	explain	why	the	model	for	decision-making	was	not	always	used,	why	dying	could	be	avoided,	or	why	there	was	 “blending”	 between	 stages	 or	 unawareness	 of	 stages.	 	 For	 example,	HCP	 11	(Study	 One)	 was	 able	 to	 state	 that	 after	 recognising	 dying	 she	 would	 normally	engage	 with	 the	 family,	 but	 in	 this	 instance	 she	 had	 not.	 She	 could	 not	 explain	further	why,	 but	 her	 impression	was	 that	 palliative	 care	 team	were	 going	 to	 be	involved	 and	 that	 they	 would	 do	 that.	 Through	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 data	 I	 have	become	more	acutely	aware	of	the	anxiety	–	my	own	and	others	–	engendered	by	caring	 for	 dying	 patients	 and	 their	 families	 and	 have	 been	 introduced	 to	psychosocial	 studies	 (Frost	 &	 McClean	 2014),	 and	 psychoanalytically	psychosocially	 informed	 ways	 of	 thinking	 about	 research	 and	 research	 data	(Clarke	&	Hoggett,	2009;	Frost,	2015;	Hollway	&	Jefferson,	2013;	Walkerdine,	et	al	2001).			At	this	point	here,	I	want	to	highlight	that	I	have	considered	whether	death	anxiety,	and	terror	management	theory	(TMT)	would	be	a	helpful	framework	with	which	to	consider	the	data	from	this	study.		Death	anxiety	–	a	concept	generated	by	Ernest	Becker	in	1973		–	is	identified	as	the	basic	motivation	for	human	behaviour.		In	his	Pulitzer	Prize	winning	book	he	describes	how	 contemplating	 one’s	 own	death	 is	inherently	 anxiety	 provoking.	 He	 argues	 that	 management	 of	 this	 anxiety	 is	 so	crucial	 to	our	own	well	being	 that	 it	 is	mainly	controlled	at	an	unconscious	 level	(Becker	1973).	Terror	Management	Theory	(TMT)	was	generated	in	1986	by	three	social	 scientists,	 Jeff	 Greenberg,	 Tom	Pyszczynski,	 and	 Sheldon	 Solomon,	 based	on	Becker’s	work	(Greenberg	and	Arndt	2011).	 	TMT	suggests	that	humans	are	unique	 in	 their	 ability	 to	 realize	 that	 death	 is	 inevitable	 and	 can	 occur	 at	 any	time,	 and	 that	 this	 awareness	 engenders	 a	debilitating	 terror	 that	 is	 contained	by	the	development	and	maintenance	of	cultural	worldviews.		These	worldviews	may	 be	 through,	 for	 example,	 constructing	 a	 life	 that	 offers	 symbolic	immortality.	 	 This	 is	 the	 sense	 that	 we	 are	 part	 of	 something	 greater	 than	ourselves	that	will	continue	after	our	death	e.g.	our	intellectual	or	physical	work.		Similarly,	but	not	necessarily	separately,	it	may	be	through	the	comfort	of	a	faith	
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that	 guarantees	 immortality	 in	 some	 form	 after	 death.	 	 There	 are	 two	 central	tenants	of	TMT.		The	first	is	our	need	to	maintain	faith	in	our	cultural	worldview.		This	 is	 an	 act	 of	work	 as	 our	worldview	 is	 a	 fragile	 construction,	which	 takes	time	and	energy	to	maintain	and	defend.		The	second	is	the	drive	for	self-esteem,	and	personal	 significance	 (Solomon,	Greenberg	&	Pyszczynski	 2015).	 	Multiple	tools	to	measure	death	anxiety	have	been	generated:	death	anxiety	is	viewed	as	an	internal	 construct	 that	 can	 be	 quantitatively	 captured.	 	 Greenberg	 and	 Arndt	 in	the	Handbook	of	Theories	of	Social	Psychology	(2011)	cite	how	over	400	studies	in	 16	 countries	 provide	 empirical	 support	 for	 TMT.	 	 Recent	 researchers	interested	in	end	of	life	care	have	started	to	use	TMT	as	a	route	to	explain	cultural	and	moral	disagreements	in	end	of	life	care	(Johnstone	2012),	and	death	avoidance	strategies	in	health	care	workers	(Mckenzie,	Brown,	Mak	&	Chamberlain	2016).		Initially	TMT	was	an	appealing	theory	with	which	to	consider	the	data	from	this	study,	as	this	PhD	is	about	identifying	dying,	and	therefore	there	is	a	definite	link	to	contemplating	death.		As	I	reflected	on	the	data	in	supervision,	it	became	clear	that	the	anxieties	expressed	by	HCPs	were	much	more	complex	than	an	anxiety	purely	about	the	death	of	the	patient,	or	the	HCP	being	forced	to	consider	their	own	 mortality.	 	 There	 was	 fear	 of	 “getting	 the	 recognition	 of	 dying	 wrong”,	survivor	 guilt,	 the	 impact	 of	 other	 colleagues	 on	 the	 HCP	 and	 patient	relationship,	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 family	 on	 the	HCP	 and	 patient	 relationship,	 the	lack	 of	 organisational	 resource	 to	 undertake	 patient	 and	 family	 meetings	 and	lack	of	educational	preparation	for	these	meetings.		My	assessment	is	that	death	anxiety	 in	 the	 context	 of	 healthcare	 is	 not	 something	 that	 can	 be	 individually	measured,	 but	 is	 influenced	by	 interactional	 relationships	 and	 the	 complicated	organisational	contexts	of	both	health	care	and	the	educational	preparation	for	the	HCP	roles.	Psychosocial	thinking	then	places	the	HCP	at	the	heart	of	the	study	and	considers	the	inter-connectedness	between	the	HCP’s	individual	lives	-	the	intra-psychic,	the	individual	 in	 relationship	with	 their	 family	 and	 community	 -	 and	professional.	 It	involves	considering	the	external	social	relationships	HCPs	maintain	with	patients,	families	 and	 colleagues,	 sited	 within	 the	 hospital,	 which	 are	 governed	 by	 the	economics	and	policies	of	NHS	England.	It	 involves	consideration	of	the	influence	
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of	Higher	Education	Institutes	educating	future	HCPs	for	whom	the	individual	HCP	bear	responsibility	for	practice	placements.	With	 this	 is	 mind	 a	 psychosocial	 analysis	 was	 undertaken	 of	 the	 workshop	transcripts,	 and	 two	aspects	of	 this	–	 families,	 and	education	–	are	considered	 in	Chapters	 Seven	 and	 Eight.	 	 I	 then	 considered	 Study	 One	 transcripts	 and	 this	 is	presented	in	Chapter	Six.	I	would	describe	this	secondary	analysis	of	the	data	as	a	“light	psychosocial	analysis”.	I	use	the	term	“light”	to	describe	the	analysis,	as	this	research	 did	 not	 start	 off	 with	 a	 psychosocial	 ontology	 and	 epistemology.	 	 The	analysis	though	was	systematic	and	thorough.		
Psychosocial	analysis	
What	it	means	to	take	a	psychosocial	approach	to	the	research?	I	am	going	to	briefly	describe	some	of	the	key	ideas	and	concepts	that	underpin	a	psychoanalytically	informed	psychosocial	approach.		In	the	UK	different	disciplines	have	 attempted	 to	 engage	 with	 this	 approach	 –	 notably	 psychology,	 especially	social	 psychology,	 psychoanalysis,	 sociology	 and	 cultural	 studies	 (Woodward	2015).		It	needs	to	be	said	that	psychoanalysis	is	a	complex	field,	with	a	specialist	language,	 and	 its	 own	academic	history,	 development	 and	politics.	 	 I	 have	 found	the	 language	challenging	 to	understand,	 the	 concepts	 slightly	 terrifying	 to	 site	 in	the	field	of	health	care	(as	 it	 fundamentally	challenges	the	dominant	discourse	of	rationality	which	somehow	I	have	absorbed	over	my	life	and	career),	and	yet	when	reframed,	 and	 contextualised	 within	 this	 study	 gives	 an	 alternative	 lens	 and	possible	new	ways	of	thinking.	Broadly	speaking	I	have	worked	with	a	theory	that	accepts:	
• We	 possess	 a	 dynamic	 unconscious	 that	 we	 can	 never	 access	 directly	 or	know	completely.	





• As	 psychosocial	 beings	 we	 are	 affected	 by,	 and	 affect	 the	 wider	 social	“milieu”.		This	is	not	just	teams	and	professional	groups,	but	the	institutions	that	 HCPs	 work	 in,	 and	 the	 economic	 and	 policy	 drives	 that	 affect	 these	institutions.		It	 is	 recognised	 that	 psychosocial	 research	 is	 “more	 an	 attitude,	 or	 position	towards	a	subject,	rather	than	a	methodology”	(Clarke	&	Hoggett,	2009,	p.2),	and	in	our	shared	humanness	I	am	not	immune	to	my	own	“self	deceit”	(Alexandrov	cited	in	S.	Clarke	&	Hoggett,	2009,	p.43),	and	need	for	external	challenge.		This	analysis	has	been	regularly	supervised.	
The	dynamic	unconscious	The	concept	that	our	mind	is	split	into	the	part	that	is	conscious	of	ourselves	and	the	part	that	we	are	unaware	of,	is	described	as	“the	radical	suggestion	at	the	heart	of	 all	 psychoanalysis”	 (Bibby,	 2011,	 p.6).	 	 Other	 people	 may	 get	 glimpses	 of	 it	through	 our	 mood	 /	 affect	 /	 slips	 of	 the	 tongue;	 I	 may	 be	 aware	 of	 my	 own	unconscious	 through	 my	 forgetting	 and	 remembering	 (Trustram,	 2016),	 of	 my	dreams.	 	 Freud	 separates	 the	pre-conscious,	 that	which	 is	 “latent	 and	 capable	 of	becoming	 conscious”	 (Freud	 1923	 cited	 in	 Bibby,	 2011),	 from	 the	 unconscious,	repressed	and	properly	unknowable.		The	unconscious	though	is	dynamic.		It	is	like	our	 psychological	 immune	 system.	 	 It	 represses,	 “holds	 back”	 that	 which	 is	 too	dangerous	to	know,	and	is	generative	in	terms	of	dreams,	wishes	and	aspirations.		It	 can	 be	 known	 in	 part	 through	 observing	 its	 effects	 in	 analysis,	 although	 this	changes	it.		
Anxiety	and	individual	psychological	defences.		The	 concept	 of	 anxiety,	 as	 is	 understood	 by	 psychoanalysts,	 is	 not	 necessarily	 a	conscious	 anxiety	 as	 defined	 by	 the	 Cambridge	 Dictionary	 “an	 uncomfortable	feeling	 of	 nervousness	 or	 worry	 about	 something	 that	 is	 happening	 or	 might	happen	 in	the	 future”	(Cambridge	Dictionary,	2016),	nor	the	pathological	anxiety	described	 in	 the	 ICD	 10	 codes	 (World	 Health	 Organisation,	 2016)	 requiring	
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medical	psychological	intervention,	but	rather	the	tone	of	our	psychic	life.		Melanie	Klein	 argued	 that	we	 are	 born	with	 this,	 and	 as	we	 are	 usually	 unaware	 of	 our	heartbeat,	so	we	are	usually	unaware	of	our	anxiety.		This	anxiety	is	the	provider	of	the	 impetus	 to	engage	and	 to	 learn,	but	when	 that	 “tenor”	 cannot	be	managed	 it	escalates	into	distress.	Thus	“at	the	conscious	level”,	anxieties	may	be	named	and	talked	about.	 	But	at	 the	 level	of	 the	unconscious,	rather	than	being	“out	of	sight,	out	 of	 mind”,	 anxieties	 continue	 to	 wield	 their	 considerable	 power	 beyond	 the	rationalising	influence	of	language”	(Walkerdine	et	al.,	2001,	p.89).	Our	 range	 of	 psychological	 defences	 develop	 as	 a	 way	 to	 manage	 the	 anxieties	provoked	 both	 by	 life	 and	 by	 the	 challenges	 of	 managing	 our	 conscious	 and	unconscious	 lives.	 Klein,	 in	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century,	 described	 how	psychological	 defences	 operate	 in	 detail	 to	 protect	 the	 self	 from	 all	 that	 is	unbearable	to	our	psyche.		It	should	be	noted	however	that	whilst	Klein	formulated	her	 theories	 of	 mental	 functioning	 in	 terms	 of	 child	 development,	 “most	contemporary	 Kleinians	 use	 them	 to	 understand	mental	 functioning	 in	 the	 child	and	adult”	(Roth	in	Riesenberg-Malcolm,	1999,	p.3).	From	 the	 perspective	 of	 this	 study,	 it	 is	 helpful	 to	 understand	 Klein’s	 “object	relations”	 theory,	 as	 I	 have	 drawn	 on	 the	 research	 of	 Isabelle	 Menzies-Lyth	 (a	Kleinian	psychoanalyst)	(Menzies,	1970)	to	underpin	the	psychosocial	analysis	of	Study	One.	Klein	developed	“object	relations	theory”	from	her	observations	of	how	children	play	 and	 their	 preoccupation	with	what	went	 on	 inside	 themselves	 and	their	 experience	 of	 the	 world.	 	 She	 described	 an	 “internal	 object”	 as	 a	 term	 to	represent	 an	 inner	 mental	 or	 emotional	 image	 of	 an	 external	 figure	 (external	object),	 and	 she	 saw	 the	 inner	 world	 as	 populated	 by	 these.	 	 The	 state	 of	 an	internal	object	is	linked	to	the	development	of	the	mental	health	of	the	individual	and	she	argued	that	the	introjection	of	and	identification	with	a	stable	good	object	is	 crucial	 to	 the	 ability	 to	 psychologically	 integrate	 an	 experience,	 and	 that	damaged	or	dead	internal	objects	cause	enormous	anxiety.	It	should	be	noted	that	internal	 objects	 can	 be	 more	 or	 less	 unconscious	 and	 more	 or	 less	 primitive.		Infantile	internal	objects	–	the	mother’s	breast	is	widely	quoted		(Frost,	&	McClean	2014)	 -	 are	 experienced	 initially	 concretely	 within	 the	 body	 and	 mind.	 	 Klein	postulated	that	early	childhood	experiences	of	care,	relationship	and	vulnerability,	
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“constitute	 a	 primitive	 level	 of	 the	 adult	 psyche,	 adding	 emotional	 influence	 and	force	 to	 later	 perceptions,	 feelings	 and	 thoughts.	 	 Internal	 objects	 may	 be	represented	to	the	self	in	dreams,	phantasies	and	language”	(Melanie	Klein	Trust,	2016,	 p.1).	 	 This	 concept	 is	 linked	 to	 Klein’s	 theory	 of	 life	 and	 death	 instincts	(developed	 from	Freud),	 her	 ideas	of	unconscious	phantasy	 and	her	 ideas	of	 the	infant’s	development	from	part	object	to	whole	object	functioning,	which	is	linked	to	 a	 movement	 from	 the	 paranoid-schizoid	 position	 to	 the	 depressive	 position	(Melanie	Klein	Trust,	2016).	I	will	consider	this	below.	Klein	postulated	that	we	have	unconscious	defence	mechanisms,	which	allow	the	individual	 to	 ‘down	 regulate’	 anxiety.	 This	 is	 often	 accompanied	 by	 splitting.		Splitting	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 way	 of	 protecting	 what	 is	 experienced	 as	 good	 (loving,	affirming	etc.),	from	that	which	is	seen	as	bad	(anger,	hate	etc.)	(Bibby,	2011).		We	can	split	and	project	 the	good	onto	 the	other	e.g.	 in	 the	 form	of	envy	and	“safely	experience	 our	 own	 negative	 emotions”	 (Bibby,	 2011);	 or	 project	 the	 bad	 on	 to	others	and	“can	deny	the	 feelings	are	 inside	us	and	 instead	assert	 they	belong	to	the	other	person”	(Walkerdine	et	al.,	2001,	p.91).	Denial	is	defined	as	“a	refusal	to	recognise	or	appreciate	the	inner	significance	of	an	experience”	(Walkerdine	et	al.,	2001,	 p.91).	 	 However,	 splitting	 and	 projection	 are	 not	 unidirectional,	 and	unconscious	communication	(like	conscious	communication)	is	received.		We	take	in,	sometimes	gladly,	other’s	projections	onto	us.		In	Kleinian	psychoanalytic	terms	this	process	of	splitting	and	projection	may	lead	to	the	paranoid-schizoid	position	whereby	 the	good	and	bad,	 in	others	 and	ourselves,	must	be	kept	 separate.	 	 For	example,	 in	 this	 study,	 medical	 HCPs	 repeatedly	 named	 “surgeons”	 as	 a	 group	(accompanied	either	with	an	emotional	response	of	anger	or	with	laughter),	when	they	talked	about	other	HCPs	who	did	not	want	to	address	dying.		The	medical	HCP	was	 seen	 as	 “good”	 and	 surgeons	 as	 “bad”.	 	 Klein	 described	 a	 less	 defended	psychological	 position	 called	 “depressive”.	 	 This	 is	 where	 the	 person	 is	 able	 to	accommodate	the	good	and	the	bad	within	themselves.		This	occurred	in	the	fourth	workshop	 when	 the	 medical	 HCPs	 acknowledged	 they	 could	 not	 physically	undertake	a	surgical	 job,	and	saw	their	previous	view	of	surgeons	being	“bad”	at	recognising	 dying	 in	 a	 new,	 and	more	 tolerant	 light.	 	 The	 positions	 of	 paranoid-
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schizoid	 or	 depressive	 are	 not	 “final”,	 and	 we	 move	 between	 the	 positions	throughout	our	lives.	
Anxiety	and	social	psychological	defences		Bibby	describes	how	in	everyday	life,	there	is	a	tendency	to	split	the	internal	and	individual	 from	 the	 external	 and	 social	much	 in	 the	way	 one	 could	 specialise	 in	psychology	or	 sociology.	 	 In	 this	manner	 splitting	misses	 the	 “ways	 in	which	 the	internal	and	external,	 the	private	and	public,	 the	 individual	and	social	are	deeply	and	mutually	 implicated”	 (Bibby,	 2011,	 p.9).	 This	 concept	 of	 a	 deep	 and	mutual	implication	 for	 the	 personal	 and	 social	 is	 not	 just	 at	 a	 conscious	 level,	 but	unconscious	 too.	 	 Walkerdine,	 Lucey	 and	 Melody	 describe	 a	 	 “collective	unconscious,	 intertwined	 with	 the	 collective	 conscious	 having	 the	 ability	 to	profoundly	 influence	the	structures	of	 life,	state,	education,	 family	and	work;	and	the	 lived	experiences	of	class,	race,	 femininity”	(Walkerdine	et	al.,	2001,	p.84).	 In	this	manner	we	can	recognise	the	collective	unconscious,	alongside	the	conscious	potential	 to	 affect	 the	 healthcare	 system	 and	 roles.	 	 Anxiety	 is	 named	 as	 the	“psychological	currency”	not	only	of	the	individual,	but	also	of	society	seeping	into	the	 “foundations,	 of	 social,	 economic	 and	 political	 life”	 (Hoggett,	 2009).	 	We	 are	psychosocial	beings	and	others	have	proposed	ways	 that	 culture	 is	acquired	and	non-verbally	conveyed	(Egyed,	Kiraly,	&	Gergely,	2013).	Isabelle	 Menzies-Lyth	 in	 the	 late	 1950s	 undertook	 the	 seminal	 psycho-analytic	study	of	nurses	working	in	a	large	London	teaching	hospital	(Menzies,	1970).	She	was	invited	into	the	hospital	because	the	morale	of	the	nursing	workforce	was	low,	and	the	hospital	was	having	trouble	retaining	nurses.	Menzies-Lyth	observed	and	described	the	primary	task	of	the	NHS.		She	felt	that	this	was	to	care	for	those	with	ill	health	that	could	not	be	nursed	at	home.		She	proposed	that	anxieties	(conscious	and	unconscious)	–	linked	to	nurses	earliest	experience	of	care	and	vulnerability	-	were	raised	in	response	to	the	primary	task	of	caring	and	she	felt	that	nurses	(not	nurse	managers)	took	the	stress	of	providing	this	care	(Menzies,	1970).	Menzies-Lyth	 noted	 that	 the	 nurse’s	 own	 personal	 biography	 added	 another	 layer	 of	complexity,	 and	 that	 nurses	 projected	 their	 own	 childhood	 phantasies	 into	 the	clinical	situation,	and	when	it	was	not	“too	close	to	home”	they	achieved	a	sense	of	
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conquering	 their	 fear.	 	When	 the	 clinical	 situation	 resonated	 too	 closely	 then	 it	could	prompt	nurses	to	leave	the	profession.	She	witnessed	what	she	called	unconscious	social	defence	mechanisms	being	used	to	 down-regulate	 anxiety.	 A	 social	 defence	 mechanism	 describes	 a	 process	 and	gives	a	visible	representation	of	how	we	unconsciously	or	consciously	place	part	of	our	emotional	life	outside	of	our	self	and	into	the	life	of	the	group,	and	in	this	case,	of	 the	 institution,	 to	 alleviate	 anxiety.	 The	 social	 defence	 mechanisms	 she	identified	 were	 the	 splitting	 up	 of	 the	 nurse-patient	 relationship,	depersonalisation,	 detachment	 and	 denial	 of	 feelings,	 eliminating	 decisions	through	 ritual	 task	 performance,	 checking	 and	 counter	 checking	 to	 alleviate	individual	 responsibility,	 obscurity	 in	 the	 allocation	 of	 final	 responsibility,	reduction	of	personal	impact	by	delegating	upwards,	and	avoidance	of	change.		In	this	study	she	specifically	built	on	the	work	of	Elliott	 Jacques	–	a	“social	scientist	who	was	the	first	to	use	the	term	social	defence	in	a	scholarly	publication”	(Bain,	1998	cited	in	Kraemer	(2015),	p.148).	Jacques	had	formulated7	that	social	defences	were	 imported	 into	 the	 organisation	 from	 the	 outside,	 specifically	 from	 the	psychological	 states	 of	 its	members.	 To	 take	 this	 one	 step	 further,	 nurses	 “make	the	 defended	 organisation”	 subsequent	 to	 their	 individual	 psychotic	 anxieties	(Armstrong	and	Rustin	2015).	 	Menzies-Lyth	 formulated	 that	 the	 social	defences	were	in	response	specifically	to	the	nursing	task.	Taking	this	one	step	further,	she	formulated	that	nurses	do	not	import	the	defensive	structure	of	the	organisation,	but	that	the	social	defences	are	generated	within	the	organisation.	Social	defence	mechanisms	are	 “bittersweet”.	 	Menzies-Lyth	recognised	 that	splitting	 the	nurse-patient	relationship	into	“tasks”	allowed	down-regulation	of	anxiety	from	the	total	responsibility	for	patient	care.		However,	it	also	meant	that	nurses	were	deprived	of	knowing	patients	and	gaining	pleasure	 from	taking	responsibility	 for	care	and	building	 therapeutic	 relationships.	 	 Social	 defence	 mechanisms	 are	 often	unconscious,	 and	become	embedded	as	organisational	 culture.	 	New	members	of	staff	 are	 required	 to	 sign	up	 to	 the	 culture	when	 they	 join	 the	 organisation	 and,	they	“have	to	swallow	the	systems	of	defences	already	present”	(Auestad,	2011,	p.																																																									7	To	formulate	is	a	theoretically	based	explanation	obtained	from	a	clinical	assessment.		 	
		
 68	
400).	 	 In	 this	 manner	 embedded	 social	 defence	 mechanisms	 can	 add	 to	 an	individual’s	 anxiety,	 rather	 than	 alleviating	 it	 when	 they	 contradict	 the	 new	recruit’s	own	personal	methods	of	containing	anxiety.		Whilst	more	recent	researchers	consider	that	Menzies-Lyth’s	work	has	“stood	the	test	of	time”	(Lawlor	2009,	p.529),	it	has	both	been	heavily	critiqued,	and	yet	still	built	 upon.	 It	 is	 to	 this	 literature	 that	 I	 wish	 to	 pay	 attention	 to	 now.	 	 Modern	authors	 consider	 her	 research	 would	 not	 meet	 “current	 theoretical	 frameworks	that	guide	good	qualitative	research”	(Tutton	and	Langstaff	2015,	p.113);	that	the	focus	of	her	report	is	clearly	about	her	findings,	with	only	basic	information	about	her	observations	and	interviews	(Whittaker	2011)	and	that	she	focused	very	much	on	 nursing	 rather	 than	 medical	 or	 lay	 subsystems.	 	 Whittaker	 highlights	 how	Menzies-Lyth	 latterly	 critiqued	 her	 own	 methodology	 and	 recognised	 a	 serious	limitation	 to	her	study	was	 that	 she	had	only	been	able	 to	gain	access	 to	nurses,	rather	 than	 doctors	 and	 the	 administrative	 and	 support	 sections	 of	 the	 hospital	(Menzies-Lyth	cited	in	Whittaker	2011).		The	importance	of	this	is	that	it	gives	rise	to	the	second	critique	which	claims	that	Menzies-Lyth’s	study	is	an	“under	socialised	account”	(Hoggett	2015)	that	focuses	the	 attention	 on	 the	 individual	 nurse’s	 psychological	 defences,	 rather	 than	consider	 wider	 societal	 factors,	 or	 organisational	 and	 cultural	 factors.	 	 Let’s	consider	what	authors	have	said.		Paul	Hoggett	(2015)	argues	that	Menzies-Lyth’s	focus	on	the	“task”	of	 the	organisation,	and	the	definition	of	 this	 “task”	being	 the	direct	clinical	care	 that	nurses	offered	patients,	 ignored	 the	role	of	society	 in	 the	making	 of	 that	 task.	 	 For	 instance	 there	was	 a	 gendered	 split	 at	 that	 time,	with	nursing	 a	 predominantly	 female	 profession,	 and	 medicine	 predominantly	 male.		Hoggett	argues	that	therefore	there	can	be	no	such	thing	as	the	“primary	task”	that	stands	as	a	definable	phenomenon.		The	task	can	only	be	seen	in	the	context	of	the	time	period,	with	its	concomitant	social	and	cultural	milieu.	 	Hoggett	uses	Ronald	Britton’s	development	of	Bion’s	 thinking	 (that	 if	 an	experience	cannot	be	held	 in	the	mind,	then	it	is	somaticized	and	embodied,	hallucinated,	projected	or	enabled)	to	 consider	how	nursing	was	 trapped	 in	a	 rigid,	 tight	and	anxious	organisational	body.		In	this	manner	nurses	denied	the	emotional	impact	of	their	work,	and	thus	at	 this	 hospital	 nursing	was	 organised	 to	 create	 a	 “thick	 skin”	 through	 its	 rules,	
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systems	 and	procedures	 (Hoggett	 2015,	 p.55).	 	He	 then	 argues	 that	whilst	 some	feelings	 are	 pertinent	 to	 the	 individual	 (this	 would	 be	 in	 line	 with	 Jacques’	formulations),	 societal	 anxieties	 are	 taken	 from	 society	 and	 lodged	 in	 the	organisation.		In	the	research	that	constitutes	this	study,	I	argue	that	currently,	we	can	 see	 that	 the	 public	 fear	 of	 dying	 has	 leaked	 into	 current	 NHS	 organisations	through	 the	 media	 outcry	 and	 the	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 Liverpool	 Care	 Pathway	(Neuberger	 2013).	 	 Participants	 in	 this	 study	 (Chapter	 Five)	 identified	 that	 the	introduction	of	the	Liverpool	Care	Pathway	through	national	policy	introduced	an	unrealistic	 expectation	 that	 death	 could	 be	 accurately	 prognosticated	 and	communicated	to	patients	and	families.		In	line	with	other	clinicians	(Roeland	et	al	2014)	HCPs	have	started	 to	question	whether	 the	change	 from	paternalistic	care	early	in	their	career,	to	patient	and	family	involved	care	later	in	their	career,	had	been	a	helpful	one	for	themselves,	patients	or	families.	Papadopoulous	 (2015)	 too	 considers	 that	 Menzies-Lyth’s	 study	 is	 an	 under-	socialised	 account	 and	 that	 an	 organization’s	 strategy,	 culture	 and	 leadership	culture	 limit	 the	opportunities	and	constraints	on	 individuals	working	within	the	organization.	 	He	 argues	 that	 because	Menzies-Lyth	 confined	her	 study	 to	 junior	nurses	 she	 sidestepped	 the	 larger	 challenge	 of	 seeing	 how	 the	 wider	 hospital	structure	 contributed	 to	 the	design	of	 the	nursing	 service	and	 the	drop	out	 rate.		Like	 Hoggett	 he	 recognises	 that	 anxieties	 and	 defences	 were	 due	 to	 wider	pressures	 in	 the	nursing	service	 rather	 than	 just	 clinical	 care.	 	 Indeed,	 like	other	authors,	he	argues	that	the	modern	NHS	creates	anxieties	all	of	its	own,	separate	to	the	many	anxieties	generated	by	direct	patient	care.		Boxer	(2015)	argues	that	the	turbulence	of	the	modern	NHS,	with	its	demand	for	constant	improvement,	and	the	fact	 that	 good	 individual	 patient	 care	 can	 only	 now	 be	 delivered	 by	 multiple	partner	 organizations,	 means	 that	 clinical	 staff	 working	 the	 transition	 between	organisations,	 on	 behalf	 of	 patients,	 are	 caught	 between	 different	 organisational	cultures	and	with	expectation	of	service	improvement	which	can	leave	them	with	a	vague	 existential	 anxiety.	 Tutton	 and	 Langstaff	 (2015)	 argue	 that	 the	 ever-increasing	 volume	 of	 patient	 care	 leaves	 staff	 feeling	 constantly	 in	 crisis.	 	 Evans	(2015)	 argues	 that	 the	 current	 climate	 of	 cuts,	 doing	 more	 for	 less,	 alongside	outcome	 measures	 and	 targets,	 mean	 that	 senior	 managers	 are	 themselves	 so	
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anxious	and	insecure	that	they	cannot	provide	the	“containment	and	reverie”	that	clinical	 staff	 need	 (Evans	 2015,	 p.137).	 	 Evans	 claims	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 empathy	shown	by	managers	 for	 clinical	 staff	may	be	one	of	 the	 reasons	nurses	display	a	lack	of	empathy	for	their	patients.	Menzies-Lyth	continued	over	her	career	to	express	empathy	and	support	for	junior	nurses	 and	 her	 frustration	 with	 nurse	 managers	 (Menzies-Lyth,	 1999)	 who	 she	identified	as	 responsible	 for	 the	 inability	 to	 change	 the	culture	of	 care	 to	benefit	patients	and	nurses.	 	She	was	disappointed	that	so	little	progress	had	been	made	despite	her	papers	(Barnett,	2008).		Latterly,	she	was	strong	in	her	viewpoint	that	nurse	managers	did	not	effectively	manage,	and	 left	situations	unmanaged	to	 the	detriment	 of	 patients	 and	 nurses	 (Menzies-Lyth,	 1999).	 	 In	 a	more	modern	NHS	she	observed	that	nurse	managers	practiced	“denial	and	deception”	(Menzies-Lyth,	1999,	 p.208),	 splitting	 the	 elements	 of	 “good	 caring	 nurse”	 and	 “hard	manager”	causing	 themselves	 internal	 conflict,	 but	 also	 damaging	 relationships	when	 they	retained	 the	 “good	 caring	 nurse”	 and	 projected	 the	 “hard	 manager”	 onto	 other	colleagues.	Armstrong	and	Rustin	argue	that	giving	inadequate	recognition	to	social	forces	can	explain	why	 psychoanalytic	 interventions	 such	 as	Menzies-Lyth’s	 fail.	 	 Her	 hope	was	that	naming	the	social	defences	meant	that	nurses	could	begin	to	change	the	organisation	 through	 changing	 themselves	 and	 how	 they	 organised	 patient	 care.		Indeed	this	was	seen	in	the	development	of	the	Nursing	Development	Units	in	the	late	1980s.		Alistair	Bain	(1998)	though	explains	how	organisational	defences	can	be	so	embedded	that	any	new	change	is	short	lived	as	defensive	structures	return	to	swallow	the	new	initiative	that	is	perceived	as	threatening	and	therefore	anxiety	provoking.	Despite	 the	 limitations	 of	 Menzies-Lyth’s	 work	 and	 later	 critiques	 of	 it,	 she	 has	nevertheless	 contributed	 extremely	 important	 ideas.	 These	 ideas	 developed	existing	research	and	triggered	critical	thinking	and	reflections	about	the	internal	life	of	organisations	that	are	still	on	going	half	a	century	later	(Obholzer	&	Roberts	1994),	Armstrong	(2005)	and	Armstrong	&	Rustin	(2015).	From	the	perspective	of	this	 study,	 the	 ideas	of	 value	 that	Menzies-Lyth	have	offered	 to	 this	 study	are	 to	
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really	consider	the	humanness	and	psychological	strengths	and	vulnerability	of	all	working	within	 the	NHS;	 to	have	 captured	and	benchmarked	 the	 “essence	of	 the	NHS”	in	the	1950s	in	order	that	a	comparison	can	be	drawn	with	today’s	NHS;	to	consider	what	 of	 the	 clinical	 role	may	 be	 consciously	 and	 unconsciously	 anxiety	provoking	 given	 the	 task	 of	 caring	 for	 the	 dying	 patient	 and	 their	 family,	 in	 an	organisation	 charged	 with	 preventing	 people	 from	 dying	 prematurely	(Department	of	Health	2014);	and	the	detailed	consideration	of	social	defences	to	protect	clinicians	from	unbearable	anxiety.	
Method	To	undertake	this	approach	I	initially	read	key	texts	and	discussed	them	with	my	supervisors.	 	 I	 then	 took	 three	 key	 texts	 in	 psychosocial	 analysis	 to	 ground	my	analysis.	 	They	were	 “Doing	Qualitative	Research	differently”(Hollway	&	 Jefferson,	2013);	 “Researching	Beneath	the	Surface”	 (Clarke	&	Hoggett,	2009)	and	 “Growing	
up	Girl”	 (Walkerdine	et	al.,	2001).	From	closely	reading	 “Researching	Beneath	the	














“Clinicians	 interpret	 into	 the	encounter,	 whereas	 researchers	save	 their	 interpretations	 for	later”(Hollway	 &	 Jefferson,	2013,	p.72)	
Look	 at	 where	 I	interpreted	 into	the	interviews.	 I	 clarify	 the	 degree	 of	ethical	 principle	 that	allows	 negotiation	 of	treatment	 to	 broker	psychological	 adaptation:	INT	 JW	 so	 there	 is	 a	balance	between	not	doing	harm	 and	 doing	 good.		Group	 agrees;	 INT	 JW	 So	the	 fluids	 aren’t	 doing	good	but	they	have	to	stop	when	they	are	doing	harm.		Is	 that	what	I	am	hearing?	Group	 yes"	 (L538-542	Workshop	Three)	“The	 leader	 of	 the	 team	 viewed	this	 exchange	 as	 an	 example	 of	an	 undefended,	 courageous	researcher,	but	more	than	that	I	was	 conscious	 of	 wanting	 to	explore	 issues	 for	 my	 own	satisfaction,	and	was	saved	from	myself	 by…”(Clarke	 &	 Hoggett,	2009,	p.113)	
Am	 I	 a	courageous	undefended	researcher	 or	wanting	 to	explore	 issues	for	my	 satisfaction.		How	do	 I	manage	the	 boundaries?		When	 do	 I	 feel	fear?	







Klein	 –	 we	 spilt	 objects	 into	good/bad…paranoid/schizoid	position…can	 be	 past	 /present	or	 us	 /them…(Hollway	 &	Jefferson,	2013,	p.18)	
Look	 for	 splitting	/	 Look	 for	accommodation.	 Surgeons	 being	 seen	 as	“crappy”	 with	 regards	 to	communication…"PART	 7	yeah	 that	 very	 much	strikes	 chords	 with	 how	 I	recognise;	 your	 taught	very	 factual	 stuff	 on	 how	to	 do	 this	 and	 processes;	the	 softer	 aspects	 –	 and	 I	think	 that	 is	 quite	 a	 nice	term	 –	 are	 learnt	 from	seeing	people	do	it	poorly,	badly	but	 also	 recognising	people	 who	 are	 skilled;	and	 we	 are	 fortunate	enough	to	be	attached	to	a	palliative	 care	 team	 and	you	 come	 away	 and	 feel	that	 was	 done	 well;	 its	quite	 difficult	 when	 you	are	 a	 junior	 to	 put	 your	finger	 on	 why	 but	 it	 just	felt	 better	 than	 a	 crappy	old	 surgeon	 standing	 at	the	 end	 of	 the	 bed	 (L177-184"	Workshop	Four)	“Respondents	 frequently	 played	down	 or	 laughed	 off	 distressing	losses	 they	 sustained”(Clarke	 &	Hoggett,	2009,	p.155)		





“To	 understand	 why	 the	 “hard	man”	 discourse	 (and	 not	 some	other	 way	 of	 acting	 out	invincibility)	 comes	 to	 be	 the	vehicle	 of	 his	 unconscious	investment”...	 (Hollway	 &	Jefferson,	2013,	p.129)	
Are	 some	discourses	 more	available	 to	 some	than	others?	
Nurses	 feel	silenced	and	it	is	 personally	difficult…"PART	 1	 Think	the	 difficulty	 can	 be	personally	 that	 you	 see	 it	yourself	 but	 nobody	 is	seeing	 it	 with	 you,	 and	that’s	 quite	 hard	 as	 you	think	“they	are	dying”	and	no	 one	 can	 hear	 me"	(L226-228	 Workshop	One)	
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“Interpretive	 knowledge	 is	synthetic	and	integrative,	rather	than	 analytic	 and	 reductive”	(Park	 2001,	 p83	 cited	 in	 S.	Clarke	&	Hoggett,	2009)	
Look	for	this.	 I	 am	 learning	 and	 this	 in	turn	 affects	 my	 questions	as	 I	do	go	on	 to	ask	about	impact…INT	 JW	 "I	 think	my	 learning	 was	 that,	actually,	 the	 emotional	work	we	do	 is	 really	 large	and	 that	 we	 don’t	 really	get	trained	for	this,	 its	not	anything	we	 are	 prepared	for	 or	 trained	 how	 to	manage;	 um	 and	 that	 all	patients	 in	Study	One	 that	I	interviewed	people	about	had	 died;	 patients	 had	 all	died	 and	 that	 you	 raised	the	 consequences	 of	predicting	 dying	 and	 then	what	 meant	 for	 you	 if	patients	 lived,	 survived	your	 predication	 of	 dying	and	 what	 some	 of	 the	consequences	 were	 for	both	 patients	 and	 families	(you’d	 mentioned	 a	 bit	about	 sometimes	 anger	or)	 and	 then	 what	 the	consequences	 are	 for	 us.		Those	were	the	things	that	really	 stuck	 out	 for	 me	from	last	time	as	an	initial	thing	 and	 that	 made	 me	think	 more	 over	 the	 last	two	 weeks.	 One	 of	 the	things	I	wanted	to	ask	you	is	 how	 you	 manage	 the	impact	 of	 the	 patient	surviving	 the	 identifying	dying.	 	 So	 when	 we	 get	 it	wrong	(I	don’t	know	there	is	a	right	and	a	wrong	‘cos	we	are	doing	it,	we	are	just	doing	the	best	that	we	can	to	 predict	 something	 that	is	 uncertain);	 but	 when	the	 patients	 survives	 it	how	 do	 you	 manage	 the	impact	 on	 yourselves	 and	the	 relationship	 with	 the	patient?”	 (L38-49,	Workshop	Two)		Looking	at	 the	excel	spread	sheet	was	 like	 looking	at	a	contour	Ordnance	Survey	map.	 	 It	 gave	 a	physical	 representation	of	 the	 volume	and	depth	of	 emotion	 and	
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experience,	 and	 the	 areas	 these	 pertained	 to.	 In	 line	 with	 Hollway	 (2013)	 it	 is	importance	to	note	that	a)	I	cannot	tell	a	story	of	all	HCPs,	but	I	can	tell	individual	stories	 and	 b)	 I	 can	 note	 themes	 that	 re-occurred.	 The	 narrative	 is	 set	 in	 the	context	of	the	workshops	and	research	question.		This	psychosocial	analysis	is	my	endeavour	 to	 not	 compromise	 the	 truth	 by	 my	 motivations	 (to	 only	 research	according	 to	 methods	 I	 am	 familiar	 with,	 with	 previously	 acquired	 knowledge	(rather	than	new	knowledge),	or	memory	(the	transcripts	were	typed	reliably	and	conscientiously).	 	 For	 the	 PhD	 write	 up	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 focus	 on	 significant	aspects	 of	 the	 data,	 and	 I	 have	 chosen	 key	 topics	 pertinent	 to	 the	 research	question.			After	 I	 had	 undertaken	 the	 psychosocial	 analysis	 of	 the	 workshops,	 I	 wrote	 an	initial	chapter	considering	the	data	about	families,	and	how	HCPs	learnt	to	care	for	the	dying	and	their	family,	and	presented	this	at	the	2nd	Association	of	Psychosocial	Studies	Conference.	 	Writing	 is	a	way	of	knowing	(Richardson	&	St.	Pierre	2005)	and	 of	 analysis	 and	 synthesis	 (Rolfe,	 2000).	 Reading	 work	 from	 a	 related	 field	(Harvey,	 2010),	 (Bibby,	 2011)	 and	 undertaking	 a	 written	 reflection	 on	 the	“negative	case”	where	the	recognition	of	dying	was	missed,	enabled	me	to	return	to	 with	 some	 distance	 from	 the	 data:	 it	 levered	 me	 into	 a	 different	 place.	Richardson	 describes	 that	 validity	 is	 not	 triangulation	 of	 data,	 but	 the	 central	imagery	is	the	“crystal,	which	combines	symmetry	and	substance	with	an	infinite	variety	of…angles	of	approach”	(Richardson	&	St	Pierre,	2005,	p.963).		












“It	 can	 be	 argued,	 that	 by	asking	 the	 questions,	 we	ask,	notably	by	asking	about	anxiety,	 we	 produce	 the	anxiety	 we	 are	 seeking	 to	produce	 empirically	(Hollway	 &	 Jefferson,	 2013,	p.35)		
Did	 my	 questions	provoke	anxiety?	 INT	JW	So	thank	you.		Did	you	meet	them	[family]	on	the	ward?		Did	you	set	up	a	meeting	or	did	it	just	happen	because	it	was	part	of	the	assessment?		Where	did	it	take	place?	“Can’t	remember"…HCP	13 [My	 note]	 -	 Interesting	 as	he	 could	 remember	 detail	of	patient	but	not	family…	“There	 were	 constant	invitations	 to	 explain	actions	 &	 feelings,	motivated	by	our	pursuit	 of	contradictions,	inconsistencies	 and	 the	“irrational	 explanation”.	(Hollway	 &	 Jefferson,	 2013,	p.25)	
Look	 at	 how	 I	question…am	 I	bothered	 by	irrational	explanations…or	 my	agenda	/	blind	spots?	
I	did	explore	inconsistencies	-"	I	realise	that	I	have	missed	one	thing;	um	can	I	go	back	to	it	and	then	go	to	section	5	I	am	really	sorry	HCP2	yes		INT	JW	you	know	when	we	talked	about	the	decision	that	you	made	that	when	you	went	to	assess	the	patient	and	um	you	had	made	the	decision	that	he	was	not	dying	at	this	time	and	he	was	being	appropriately	acutely	managed	and	it	was	not	a	rapid	decline	it	was	a	gradual	decline;	HCP2	yes		INT	JW	can	I	ask	what	is	the	emotional	impact	on	you	of	that	kind	of	decision-making?	HCP2		Ok	so	–	pause	–	so	-	pause-	in	his	case	it	wasn’t	so	 in	 this	 patient’s	 case	 it	wasn’t	particularly	difficult	as	 I	 felt	 that	 the	 treatment	he	 was	 receiving	 felt	justifiable.	 Um	 (pause)	 so	that	 was	 ok	 –	 the	emotional,	 what	 impacts	on	 me	 much	 more	dramatically	emotionally	is	when	 I	 am	 faced	 with																																																									9	Structure	of	analysis	underpinned	by	understanding	Chapter	4	–	“Working	with	emotions”	(Walkerdine	et	al.,	2001)	
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Look	for	how	anxiety	is	managed	within	an	organisation	 Takes	a	nurse	in	for	family	meetings.	Is	the	nurse	part	of	 emotional	 safety?	"When	 I	 am	 speaking	 to	patient	 families	 I	 tend	 to	have	a	nurse	with	me	and	I	tend	to	ask	them	you	know	how	they	think	it	went	and	whether	 they	 thought	 you	know	 and	 if	 they	 had	 any	suggestions	 for	improvement"	L200-203.			“As	 I	 was	 carrying	 out	 the	interviews…	 I	 became	intrigued	 by	 the	 use	 of	metaphors…”	 (Clarke	 &	Hoggett,	2009,	p.244)	





Concepts	 of	 recognition	 &	containment”	 (Hollway	 &	Jefferson,	 2013,	 p.45)…also	a	 becoming	 through	 the	process	(in	part	what	action	research	 is…a	 psychological	becoming	 rather	 than	 a	physical	 doing	 /	 becoming).		(Hollway	 &	 Jefferson,	 2013,	p.49)	
Look	 at	 evidence	 of	becoming	 HCP	 starts	 to	 reflect	 on	actions…"I	am	thinking,	if	I	just	 think	 about	 it	 now;	 I	didn’t	ask	anyone	what	his	wishes	were,	or	did	anyone	know	 what	 the	 family	wishes	 were	 or	expectations;	 erm	 you	know	 because	 we	 always	pick	 up	 a	 lot	 non	 verbally	don’t	 we	 about	 the	situation	and	I	think	we	all	thought	that	it	was	clear	to	everyone	 that	 this	 person	was	 not	 going	 to	 live	 and	survive	 this	 and	 so	probably	 a	 lot	 of	 that	 kind	of	 stuff	 I	 had	 thought	 that	maybe	 that	 was	 already	done.	 	 I	 don’t	 know,	 just	thinking	about	 it	now	why	didn’t	 I	 stop	 and	 think	about	those	things;	but	it	is	easy	 to	 forget	 to	do	 things	like	 that	 so	 maybe	 that	 is	something	 that	 we	 can	definitely	 improve	 on	 is,	erm	 thinking	 about	 the	patients	 wishes	 and	relatives.	 	 But	 usually,	especially	 on	 our	 own	ward	we	know	we	are	kind	of	 thinking	 behind	 it".	
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L248-259	“Interpretive	 knowledge	 is	synthetic	 &	 integrative,	rather	 than	 analytic	 &	reductive”…its	 also	transformative.	 (S.	 Clarke	&	Hoggett,	2009,	p.36)		
Look	for	this.			 She	 starts	 to	 recognise	dying	 and	 communication	with	 family	 as	 a	 series	 of	steps…needn’t	 all	 be	 done	by	 one	 person	 …"and	 I	haven’t	 really	 thought	about	 it	 like	 this	but	when	I	think	about	it	that’s	what	we	 were	 doing	 the	 nurses	had	 done	 step	 one	 –	 they	had	stood	at	the	end	of	the	bed	and	gone	“oh	you	look	really	sick”	and	come	to	me	for	 step	 two,	 that	 what	they	 had	 done,	 and	 then	we	 had	 set	 up	 the	 stroke	consultant	 for	 step	 3	 we	then	 came	 down	 and	finished	 the	work	 and	 had	the	 conversation	 with	 the	family	 and	 out	 of	 that	conversation	 was	 quite	interesting;	 it	 was	 not	possible	 to	 remove	 the	TPN	 at	 that	 point;	 they	weren’t	 ready	 it	 was	 too;	so	 the	 pace	 at	 which	 we	withdraw	 treatment	 and	take	 an	 end	 of	 life	approaches	 it	 depends	where	 the	 family	 are	 and	where	the	patient	is".		HCP	8	L266-276		
The	psychologically	defended	researcher	The	 focus	on	researcher	subjectivity	and	 its	place	 in	 the	research	process	can	be	traced	back	to	Jennifer	Hunt	(1998)	-	“The	psychoanalytic	aspects	of	fieldwork”.		The	work	of	Valerie	Walkerdine,	Helen	Lucey,	and	June	Melody	(2001),	and	particularly	Chapter	 4	 of	 “Growing	 up	 girl”	 is	 recognised	 as	 one	 of	 the	most	 pioneering	 and	most	influential	pieces	of	work	with	respect	to	the	concept	of	the	psychologically	defended	 researcher.	 Dr	 Helen	 Lucey,	 who	 co-supervised	 this	 PhD	 in	 its	 latter	stage,	and	her	colleagues	were	among	the	pioneers	who	generated	a	methodology	for	 considering	 how	 the	 researcher	 may	 be	 affecting	 the	 research	 process	 and	accounting	 for	 this	 (Lucey,	 Melody	 and	 Walkerdine	 2003).	 	 Examining	 how	researchers	work	with	their	own	and	others’	conscious	and	unconscious	processes	
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	Supervision	notes14th	Jan	2015:	Is	it	braveness?		Is	there	a	link	to	anxiety?	Is	there	a	link	to	defensiveness?		Black	and	white	thinking	instead	of	grey…	“black	and	 white	 moments	 are	 few	 and	 far	 between	 –	 don’t	 get	 stuck	 with	 binary	arguments”.	 	Think	 through	why	 I	had	 introduced	 the	 concept	of	bravery	and	why?	 	 It’s	 not	 a	 good	 enough	 concept.	 	 Consider	 institutionally	 how	practices	and	 position	 are	 supported.	 	 Insider	 research	 –	 can’t	 ignore	 my	 perspective.		Need	to	critique	what	is	important	to	my	thinking.		Reflexive	diary:	“felt	upset”	was	told	–	“if	you	do	not	move	beyond	diagram	to	academic	debate	its	not	more	than	a	 third	year	project”.	 	 I	have	been	working	so	hard;	still	have	to	 face	 it	 is	not	 enough.	 	 I	 have	 to	 stop	 (my	 early	 interpretation	 of	 the	 data	 and	 model	making)	and	allow	myself	to	immerse	myself	in	the	themes”.		
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Despite,	my	supervisors	intention	to	provide	supervision	in	a	supportive	manner,	and	 to	hold	 a	 space	where	we	 could	 all	 enter	 the	 irrational	 and	 think	 about	 our	thoughts	 (Doyle	 2012),	 it	 is	 clear	 in	 this	 diary	 entry	 that	 I	 was	 upset	 by	supervision.	 	 Indeed	 the	 subsequent	 diary	 entries	 on	 the	 19th	 Jan	 indicate	 that	 I	shared	the	model,	and	my	upset,	with	my	clinical	supervisor	who	was	encouraging	and	 I	 note,	 “Gave	me	 the	 inspiration	 to	 keep	 going”.	 	 Over	 the	 next	month	 until	supervision	 on	 the	 25th	 February	 2015	 I	 specifically	 recorded	 the	 hours	 that	 I	worked	on	 the	PhD.	 	 For	 example,	 on	 the	 7th	 February	2015	 I	 have	written	 “did	good	one	and	half	hours	yesterday.	 	Did	two	hours	today”.	 	Working	hard	when	I	am	psychologically	challenged	is	one	of	my	defence	mechanisms.		It	also	allows	me	to	read	which	allows	me	to	process	new	information	in	a	manner	that	is	controlled.					There	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 supervision	 should	 not	 be	 a	 place	 for	 the	intersection	of	university	norms	and	protocols,	and	the	messiness	of	human	beings	working	 together	 (Lucey	and	Rogers	2007).	 	What	 I	perceived	as	a	disregard	 for	model	making	as	my	route	to	learning	and	the	PhD	supervisors’	drive	for	written	academic	debate	 floored	me,	and	 I	was	on-goingly	angry	at	 times.	Without	being	able	 to	 make	 a	 model	 I	 temporarily	 lost	 my	 coping	 strategy	 for	 independent	thinking	and	discussion.		My	anger	has	been	contained	by	many	people	e.g.	friends	in,	or	with	experience	of	higher	education,	and	colleagues.	My	clinical	supervisor	helped	 me	 re-frame	 my	 thinking,	 and	 suggested	 I	 try	 a	 cognitive	 strategy	 of	thinking	 about	 writing	 differently.	 	 The	 challenge	 to	 myself	 was	 to	 make	 my	thoughts	understandable	in	words	instead	of	pictures.	While	others	have	engaged	in	therapy	and	found	it	helpful	for	their	research	(Walkerdine,	Lucey	and	Melody	2001)	I	have	valued	clinical	supervision	to	process	the	impact	of	the	PhD	on	my	life	and	its	impact	on	my	clinical	practice.			The	 need	 to	 produce	 my	 learning	 in	 a	 written	 manner	 that	 is	 considered	academically	acceptable	has	consistently	 rattled	my	defences,	and	 left	me	 feeling	really	 vulnerable.	 	As	Bibby	 (2011)	highlights,	 learning	 in	 and	of	 itself	 is	 anxiety	provoking	and	difficult	and	tied	to	feelings	of	frustration.		It	is	only	by	surviving	the	frustration,	 and	 learning	 to	 live	 with	 “not	 knowing”	 that	 we	 can	 develop	 our	knowledge.	 It	 is	 impossible	 to	 say	whether	 I	 project	 and	 blame	 the	 “writing”	 to	defend	 myself	 against	 the	 anxiety	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 about	 psychosocial	
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thinking,	 or	 the	 critique	 of	 the	 accuracy	 of	my	model	making,	 or	 the	 removal	 of	model	 making,	 and	 the	 replacement	 of	 this	 with	 writing	 as	 a	 way	 to	 think	(Richardson	2000).	 	 At	 the	 end	of	 supervision	 I	 often	 feel	 really	 alone,	 and	 I	 am	mindful	that	this	aggravates	personal	feelings	of	aloneness	from	bereavement	and	divorce.		I	have	no	desire	to	project	blame	onto	the	supervisors.		Our	personal	lives	play	 out	 in	 all	 relationships	 including	 those	 within	 the	 PhD	 supervisory	relationship	 (Lucey	 and	Rogers	 2007).	 I	 have	 psychologically	moved	myself	 to	 a	position	where	I,	mostly	now,	value	the	personal	time	and	work	it	takes	to	produce	knowledge	 in	 a	 written	 manner	 that	 is	 acceptable	 to	 the	 University.	 	 How	 the	anger,	 frustration	 and	 sometimes	 depression	 about	 the	 time	 and	 work	 it	 takes,	subsequent	to	this	psychological	shift,	ebbs	and	flows	in	my	life.		Reflecting	on	why	I	did	not	strongly	express	my	anger	in	supervision,	I	think	it	is	in	part	personal,	as	I	do	 not	 like	 to	 express	 anger.	 However,	 I	 also	 recognise	 that	 the	 feedback	 from	supervision	 represents	 something	 more	 than	 the	 supervisors	 themselves,	 and	represents	the	power	of	the	university	to	judge	my	academic	work	through	written	text	alone	(Bell	and	Birch	2007).	 	 I	want	to	pass	the	PhD.	 	Since	February	2015	I	have	been	learning	how	to	write	 in	order	to	convey	my	learning,	and	find	it	very	anxiety	provoking,	as	I	am	never	sure	how	the	analysis	or	the	writing	of	it	will	be	received.		The	diary	entry	on	the	2nd	March	2015	states,	“I	have	written	out	fall	out	decisions	and	emailed	Paula	(Dr	Smith)	and	Helen	(Dr	Lucey).		Fingers	crossed	re	response”.	 	 What	 has	 been	 really	 helpful	 for	 me,	 to	 contain	 my	 distress	 about	learning	to	write	is	the	prompt	written	feedback	from	Dr	Lucey	and	the	repeated	correction	 of	 my	 grammar	 and	 text,	 and	 prompts	 to	 take	 time	 to	 explain	 my	thinking.	Through	this	on-going	containment	I	am	learning	to	write.	Additionally,	through	PhD	supervision,	I	have	had	a	dawning	realisation	that	I	am	at	the	crux	of	a	clash	of	cultures	–	the	NHS,	academic	life,	and	my	life.		Being	on	this	crux	has	left	me	always	with	a	vague	feeling	of	anxiety.		Examining	this	vagueness	(Boxer	 2015)	 has	 made	 me	 realise	 that	 model	 making	 is	 a	 social	 defence	 in	medicine	and	nursing	 to	make	 complex,	 anxiety	provoking	 situations	 simple	and	teachable.	 	 This	 is	 evident	 in	 the	 generation	 of	 the	 “map	 of	 medicine”,	 and	 it’s	pathways	of	care	(Brennan	2011)	and	is	evident	in	Kennedy’s	paper	about	decision	making	 in	end	of	 life	care	(2014).	 	As	clinicians	we	use	models,	and	pathways	 to	
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think	about	our	thoughts,	and	to	discuss	them.		It	may	be	that	I	am	so	comfortable	in	clinical	practice	as	my	way	of	learning	lines	up	with	others	around	me	-	thinking	in	pictures	and	colours	 is	mainly	how	 I	 learn	 (See	mind	map	 in	Appendix	12).	 It	was	 through	 categorising	 the	 literature	 using	 this	 mind	 map	 that	 I	 was	 able	 to	gauge	the	gap	in	the	literature	that	this	study	addressed.		Model	making	also	allows	clinicians	 to	 think	 quickly	 and	 recognise	 the	 gaps	 in	 models,	 and	 thus	 clinical	practice.	Reflecting	on	this	I	realise	that	the	pace	of	clinical	and	academic	life	is	also	a	clash	of	cultures.		The	time	needed	to	think	about	my	thoughts,	and	the	slowness,	and	learning	through	a	written	explanation	(Richardson	2005)	has	also	challenged	both	my	understanding	of	myself	 and	has	 challenged	my	self	worth.	 	 I	 recognise	the	speed	at	which	I	think	and	act	in	the	clinical	situation	(and	my	ability	to	pace	this	 to	 the	 clinical	 situation)	 is	 valued	professionally	by	others	 and	myself.	 	 This	speed	 though	 is	 acquired	 through	 years	 of	 clinical	 practice	 and	 study,	 and	 is	required	for	the	professional	grade	I	am	appointed	to.		Translating	the	speed	I	have	in	clinical	practice	(where	I	am	expert),	to	an	expectation	for	the	PhD	study	(where	I	am	a	novice),	alongside	the	fact	that	University	life	anticipates	that	thinking	can	take	 time,	discussion	and	safe	containment,	has	bought	me	 to	my	knees.	For	 this	research	the	ability	to	sit	with	the	data,	and	allow	a	range	of	thoughts,	rather	than	proceed	with	the	first	thought	(which	is	also	often	an	ill	informed	thought	as	I	have	been	learning	about	psychosocial	studies)	has	been	critical.	I	have	had	to	manage	the	conscious	anxiety	as	best	I	can	about	the	slowness	of	progress	of	the	PhD,	and	live	 with	 the	 experience	 of	 irrational	 thoughts	 bubbling	 up,	 and	 feeling	 out	 of	control.	PhD	supervision	has	been	part	of	this	painful	process.		Through	the	PhD	I	have	 more	 learnt	 to	 understand	 the	 differing	 socio-cultural	 expectations	 of	personal	 fluency	 and	 functioning	 by	 the	 university	 and	 NHS,	 and	 from	my	 own	internal	values.	 	At	 times	 the	 irrational	 thoughts	and	 feelings	result	 in	my	hating	the	 PhD	 for	 all	 its	 impact,	 yet	 I	 understand	 at	 some	 level	 this	 is	 splitting	 and	projection	 to	 alleviate	 myself	 of	 anxiety	 at	 the	 demands	 of	 the	 PhD	 on	 me.	 I	oscillate	between	this	and	depressive	accommodation	when	I	realise	the	benefits	of	learning	through	the	PhD.	At	the	February	2015	supervision	I	specifically	asked	for	feedback,	from	Dr	Lucey,	about	my	understanding	of	bravery	and	courage.	 	The	 fact	 that	 I	 asked	 indicates	
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the	level	of	support	I	felt	to	think	the	unthinkable	regarding	learning.		I	did	have	a	safe	 container	 to	hold	my	unknowing	re	 the	data	 in	PhD	supervision	Salzberger-Wittenberg	 1999).	 In	 this	 supervision	 I	 was	 again	 prompted	 to	 think	 about	 my	interpretation	of	the	data.		
Figure	4.	Example	of	Supervision	notes.	




learning	 and	 identifying	what	my	distress	was.	 	 PhD	 supervisors	 felt	 it	was	well	written	 but	 did	 not	 add	 to	 the	 PhD.	 	 The	 second	 time	 I	 wrote	 about	 it	 in	 the	education	chapter,	and	again	analysed	why	I	was	distressed.		Again	I	was	asked	by	my	 supervisor	 to	 think	 again	 as	my	distress	 and	 shock	was	preventing	me	 from	engaging	with	 the	 data.	 	 I	was	writing	 about	me,	 and	not	what	 I	 could	 interpret	from	 the	 data.	 	 It	 was	 on	 the	 third	 attempt	 that	 I	 was	 able	 to	 sit	 with	my	 very	uncomfortable	 and	 distressed	 feelings	 and	 really	 represent	 what	 the	 data	represented	 for	 the	 HCP	 and	 education.	 	 It	 had	 required	 the	 containment	 and	support	 of	 supervision,	 as	 per	 Bion’s	 concept	 of	 containment,	 and	 emotional	containment	of	myself	to	get	my	own	distress	out	of	the	way	in	order	to	really	see	the	data.		The	education	chapter	remains	the	one	I	feel	was	hardest	to	write.	In	this	section	I	have	described	my	experience	of	being	a	psychologically	defended	researcher	 in	 the	 conduct	 of	 this	 research,	 and	 a	 little	 of	 my	 experience	 of	supervision,	 and	 of	 having	my	 defences	 challenged.	 	 It	 is	 supported	 by	 reflexive	diary	exerts.	 	 I	am	also	mindful	 that	conscious	thoughts	and	processes	slip	away,	into	forgetting	and	unconscious	processes	all	the	time	(Doyle	2012).		Additionally	this	is	only	one	side	of	a	supervision	narrative.		Drawing	on	Bibby	(2011)	it	is	clear	that	 the	 time	 and	 psychological	 space	 in	 supervision	 [my	words]	 is	 necessary	 to	think	 the	unthinkable	about	 the	data	and	 the	 researcher,	 and	 for	 that	 thought	 to	find	 a	 resolution,	 if	 only	 a	 temporary	 resolution	 [my	 words],	 for	 communication	about	 that	 thought,	 for	un-thought	 thoughts	 to	be	verbalised	and	considered,	 for	new	connections	to	be	made.		After	supervision	this	learning	is	further	challenged,	developed	 and	 sometimes	 avoided	 through	 the	 reading	 and	 understanding	 of	books	 and	 papers	 and	 re-consideration	 of	 the	 data.	 	 The	 learning	 is	 ultimately	transcribed	into	and	through	text	to	feed	into	the	next	experience	of	supervision.		Alongside	 the	 learning,	 learning	 about	 how	 to	 learn	 is	 painful	 and	 I	 have	 valued	supervision	 of	 my	 learning	 experience.	 Doyle	 says	 that	 reflexivity	 is	 a	 “state	 of	mind	 and	 a	 practice	 in	which	 to	 actively	 engage”	 and	 that	 “theorizing	 reflexivity	raises	 further	 questions	 about	 what	 kinds	 of	 event,	 circumstances	 and	characteristics	 provide	 optimal	 conditions”	 (Doyle	 2012,	 p.251).	 	 I	 would	 argue	that	 understanding	 how	 we	 all	 learn	 is	 a	 mutually	 required	 characteristic	 of	supervision,	 and	 it	would	be	helpful	 to	overtly	 address	 this	 in	 the	 context	of	 the	
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privilege	of	written	text	in	academic	life	(Bell	and	Birch	2007)	at	the	beginning	and	at	strategic	points	 in	 the	PhD	 journey.	 	 	 It	 could	be	helpful	 to	have	a	supervision	contract	that	alongside	such	things	as	 frequency	of	supervision,	and	expectations	and	 rights	 of	 supervisors	 and	 supervisees,	 names	 that	 learning	 is	 an	 emotional	experience	 (Salzberger-Wittenberg	 1999)	 so	 that	 thought	 about	 this	 aspect	 of	learning	is	similarly	addressed	at	strategic	points	in	the	PhD	journey.		
Pen	portraits	The	reader	will	recall	that	the	13	HCPs	that	took	part	in	the	critical	incident	review	(Study	One)	were	asked	to	describe	how	they	made	their	decisions	that	the	patient	was	 dying,	 and	 how	 they	 interacted	 with	 the	 patient	 and	 family.	 	 After	 the	psychosocial	analysis	of	Study	One	and	two	data,	pen	portraits	of	the	six	patients	discussed	by	the	13	HCPs	in	the	critical	 incident	review	(Study	One)	were	drawn	up	and	these	will	be	presented	in	Chapter	Four.	The	purpose	of	these	pen	portraits	is	to	provide	the	reader	with	a	brief	description	of	the	patient	and	their	family,	the	context	of	the	patient’s	clinical	care	and	decision-making	by	HCPs	about	their	care.		The	aim	is	to	bring	the	complexity	and	uniqueness	of	each	patient	care	episode	to	life	 for	 the	 reader	 and	 thus	 foreground	 the	 themed	 results	 chapter,	 psychosocial	analysis	 chapters,	 and	 discussion.	 	 Consistent	 with	 the	 theory	 of	 the	 defended	subject	 -	 	 “I	 have	 not	 ironed	 out	 inconsistencies,	 contradictions	 or	 puzzles”	(Hollway	 &	 Jefferson,	 2013,	 p.65).	 I	 have	 labeled	 the	 patients	 by	 number	 to	preserve	their	identity.		




Confidentiality	 related	 to:	 a)	 confidentiality	 for	 patients	 and	 families.	 	 This	 was	addressed	by	asking	participants	not	to	mention	patient	identifiable	information	in	the	interview	or	PAR	groups.		This	was	screened	for	this	pre-transcription,	and	b)	confidentiality	 for	participants	who	work	in	the	same	setting	as	each	other.	 	This	was	 addressed	 by	 having	 a	 clear	 discussion	 about	 this	 topic	within	 the	working	agreement	for	the	group.		This	agreement	was	written	up	and	displayed	clearly	at	every	 PAR	 group.	 All	 transcripts	 were	 anonymised.	 c)	 confidentiality	 for	participants	 on	 publication.	 	 The	 consent	 for	 the	 study	 highlighted	 that	 direct	quotes	 would	 be	 used,	 and	 that	 I	 would	 anonymize	 them.	 	 There	 is	 always	 the	possibility	the	HCPs	will	identify	themselves.		
Recording	and	Storage	of	data.	The	Research	Data	Policy	of	the	University	of	Bath	was	followed.	
Sensitive	professional	 issues.	 There	was	 potential	 for	 issues	 of	 excellent	 and	 poor	practice	 to	 be	 raised	 within	 the	 discussions.	 	 This	 was	 addressed	 ahead	 of	 any	disclosure	by	clear	discussion	within	the	working	agreement	of	the	group.	If	there	was	 specific	 evidence	 of	 professional	 misconduct	 then	 the	 need	 to	 breach	confidentiality	was	mentioned	in	the	participant	information.	
Potential	for	participant	distress.		All	participants	of	Study	One	and	Two	were	given	information	 on	 where	 to	 gain	 support	 outside	 of	 the	 Trust	 if	 taking	 part	 in	 the	research	 distressed	 them.	 	 I	 was	 available	 after	 the	 PAR	 workshops	 to	 de-brief	participants	had	it	been	needed.	
The	role	of	myself	as	researcher-practitioner.	There	 is	extensive	 literature	both	on	the	researcher	–	practitioner	role	(Rolfe,	1998),	and	the	situated	ethics	of	this	role	(Bell	 and	 Nutt	 2002).	 	 Like	 others	 (Lee-Treweek	 2000)	 this	 study	 has	 required	extensive	 use	 of	 myself	 to	 design	 the	 study,	 mange	 the	 conduct	 of	 the	 study,	manage	my	own	emotions	in	the	PAR	workshops,	and	in	the	analysis	and	write	up.	For	the	purpose	of	this	research,	my	role	was	made	clear	within	the	explanation	of	the	study.	 I	have	kept	a	diary	and	ensured	 the	anonymised	data	and	 themes,	 the	psychosocial	 analysis	 and	 write	 up	 were	 exposed	 to	 regular	 supervision	 by	 the	
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PhD	supervisors	and	also	my	clinical	supervisor	(Seale,	1999).	The	importance	of	this	 supervision	 communication	 with	 others	 is	 highlighted	 by	 Lucey	 where,	 in	analysing	 the	 interview	data	 in	 the	 qualitative	 longitudinal	 data	 of	 girls	 growing	up,	she	with	her	co-researchers	“reflected	as	a	team	on	their	individual	responses	in	 order	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 “unconscious	 to	 unconscious	 communication”	 (Parker	(1995)	 cited	 in	 Lucey,	 Melody,	 &	 Walkerdine,	 2003)	 as	 considered	 in	 the	discussion	of	the	psychologically	defended	researcher	above.	
Summary		In	this	chapter,	the	research	question,	methodology	and	method	has	been	covered.	In	 Study	 One	 thirteen	 senior	 HCPS	 undertook	 a	 critical	 incident	 review.	 These	involved	 the	 ward	 based	 senior	 HCP	 who	 identified	 dying,	 and	 the	 Hospital	Palliative	 Care	Team	 (HPCT)	HCP(s)	 subsequently	 involved	 in	 the	 patient’s	 care.		Interviews	 were	 recorded,	 transcribed	 and	 themed.	 In	 Study	 Two	 senior	 HCPs	across	 the	hospital	were	 invited	 to	 four	 consecutive	PAR	workshops	 to	 critically	reflect	on	the	themed	data	from	Study	One.		Ten	HCPs	took	part	(three	HPCT	HCPs	were	 involved	 in	 both	 studies).	 The	 interviews	 were	 similarly	 recorded,	transcribed	and	themed.	The	themed	analysis	yielded	a	model	for	decision-making	but	did	not	explain	why	dying	was	identified	so	late.	A	psychoanalytically	informed	psychosocial	approach	was	taken	to	examine	anomalies	and	contradictions	in	the	data	that	pointed	to	less	conscious	 undercurrents	 in	 the	 personal,	 professional,	 educational	 and	institutional	dynamics	involved	in	the	care	of	patients	who	are	dying.		The	next	two	chapters	 cover	 the	 pen	 portraits	 of	 the	 patients	 who	 were	 the	 subject	 of	 the	interviews	with	the	HCPs	in	Study	One	and	themed	analysis	of	Study	One	and	Two	data.				
		
 89	
Chapter	 Four	 –	 Pen	 Portraits	 Of	 The	 Patient	 And	 Health	 Care	
Professionals	From	Study	One	(Critical	Incident	Review)		
Introduction	
The	reader	will	recall	that	in	the	Critical	Incident	Review	(study	one)	the	13	HCPs	were	asked	to	describe	how	they	made	their	decisions	that	the	patient	was	dying,	and	 how	 they	 interacted	 with	 the	 patient	 and	 family.	 	 After	 the	 psychosocial	analysis	of	study	one	and	two	data,	pen	portraits	of	 the	six	patients	discussed	by	the	13	HCPs	 in	the	critical	 incident	review	(study	one)	were	drawn	up	and	these	are	presented	here.	 	 The	purpose	of	 these	pen	portraits	 is	 to	provide	 the	 reader	with	a	brief	description	of	the	patient	and	their	family,	the	context	of	the	patient’s	clinical	care	and	decision-making	by	HCPs	about	their	care.		The	aim	is	to	bring	the	complexity	and	uniqueness	of	each	patient	care	episode	to	life	for	the	reader	and	thus	 foreground	 the	 themed	 results	 chapter,	 psychosocial	 analysis	 chapters,	 and	discussion.		Consistent	with	the	theory	of	the	defended	subject	-		“I	have	not	ironed	out	inconsistencies,	contradictions	or	puzzles”	(Hollway	&	Jefferson,	2013,	p.65).	I	have	labeled	the	patients	by	number	to	preserve	their	identity.				
Pen	Portraits	of	patients	and	HCPs	in	Study	One	
Patient	One	
The Patient’s story This	independent	elderly	lady10	had	previously	survived	a	breast	cancer	diagnosis.		She	 was	 admitted	 to	 Intensive	 Care	 for	 management	 of	 breathlessness	 and	drainage	of	pleural	effusions.	She	was	conscious	despite	being	 intubated	and	had	written	 for	 the	 doctors	 that	 she	 wanted	 the	 ventilatory	 tube	 removed.	 	 They	explained	it	meant	she	would	die,	and	she	agreed.		Whilst	the	team	sought	second	opinions,	 and	 communicated	 with	 her	 family,	 her	 condition	 deteriorated,	 she	required	more	sedation,	and	she	attempted	twice	to	pull	the	tube	out	herself.	She	died	in	Intensive	Care;	her	family	had	the	opportunity	to	be	present.																																																									10	The	level	of	detail	about	a	patient	e.g.	their	actual	age	is	variable	and	dependent	on	the	narrative	of	the	HCPs.		
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The HCP’s story (HCP 1 and 4) The	 ITU	 team	suspected	an	underlying	malignancy	when	escalating	management	of	 the	 breathlessness	 did	 not	 improve	 the	 patient’s	 condition.	 	 The	 laboratory	report	of	a	metastatic	cancer	allowed	them	to	plan	 the	patient’s	dying.	 	Once	 the	recognition	of	dying	occurred,	 there	was	 still	 the	process	of	 taking	 things	by	 the	“proper	channels”	which	meant	a	second	opinion	from	the	respiratory	team,	and	to	involve	palliative	care.		These	processes	meant	that	the	patient	remained	intubated	despite	 her	 request	 for	 the	 tube	 to	 be	 removed.	 	 The	 ITU	HCP	was	not	 involved	with	the	family	meeting	as	the	ITU	Consultant	took	over.	
Patient	Two	
The patient’s story This	patient	had	paranoid	schizophrenia,	previously	lived	in	a	care	home,	and	was	admitted	to	a	ward	with	heart	failure	and	sepsis.		He	was	married,	although	he	and	his	 wife	 did	 not	 live	 together.	 The	 patient	 initially	 requested	 the	 chaplain	 to	provide	a	bible	and	prayer	for	him	and	his	wife,	and	was	expressing	concerns	that	the	hospital	was	holding	him	against	his	wishes.		However,	three	days	later,	as	the	patient’s	 condition	 deteriorated,	 the	 chaplain	was	 again	 called.	 	 The	 patient	was	transferred	to	Cardiac	Care	Unit	for	the	management	of	a	pericardial	effusion.		He	died	in	hospital.	
The HCP’s story (HCP 2 and 3) At	 the	 first	 visit	 the	 chaplain	 recognised	 the	 patient’s	 mental	 health	 issues.	 He	offered	 prayer	 and	 reassurance	 to	 the	 patient	 and	 promised	 to	 visit	 again.	 	 The	second	 request	 for	 a	 visit	 came	 because	 the	 patient	was	 distressed	 and	 his	wife	was	asking	for	“some	sort	of	attention”.		On	that	assessment,	the	chaplain	noticed	a	physical	deterioration	and	raised	that	the	patient	might	be	dying.		He	also	noted	he	had	a	look	of	someone	who	had	died	in	the	manner	his	jaw	line	was	set.			Palliative	 Care	 then	 reviewed	 the	 patient	 twice.	 	 Initially	 the	 patient	 appeared	physically	and	psychologically	improved.		However,	on	the	second	assessment	the	patient	had	deteriorated	and	was	transferred	to	coronary	care	for	the	management	
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of	 a	 pericardial	 effusion.	 He	 required	 oxygen,	 intravenous	 therapies	 and	 was	bedbound	and	needed	all	nursing	care.	 	The	palliative	care	HCP	did	not	challenge	the	plan	of	care,	and	felt	 the	dying	was	not	missed	as	retrospectively	other	HCPs	had	 expressed	 surprise	 that	 the	 patient	 had	 died.	 	 He	 described	 the	 patient’s	condition	as	“AMBER”11	–	“will	he	or	won’t	he”	[survive].			The	HCP	understood	the	medic’s	treatment	plan,	and	would	only	consider	a	“more	urgent	need	to	question	the	medics”	if	the	patient	was	unresponsive.	He	felt	he	has	a	tendency	to	“oversee	dying”.			Neither	the	patient’s	wife	nor	the	mental	health	care	worker	was	present	when	the	palliative	care	HCP	visited.	He	did	reflect	that	it	might	have	been	useful	to	contact	the	patient’s	wife.	
Patient	Three	
The patient’s story This	 70-year-old	 gentleman	 had	 lymphoma,	 and	 was	 being	 treated	 with	chemotherapy	with	 curative	 intent.	 	 However,	 he	was	 admitted	 to	 hospital	with	fatigue,	and	to	biopsy	a	lump	that	had	grown	in	his	groin.		There	was	a	ten-day	wait	for	the	results.	 	He,	and	his	wife	wanted	to	know	the	news	“good	or	bad”	and	his	only	wish	was	to	get	home	“to	do	the	patio”.	His	wife	had	a	degree	of	dementia,	and	the	 patient	 wanted	 his	 younger	 brother,	 rather	 than	 his	 son,	 to	 take	 control	 of	things	 financially	 to	 look	 after	 his	wife.	 	 The	 patient	was	 discharged	 home	 from	hospital	for	end	of	life	care,	with	his	brother	as	key	contact.	
The HCP’s story (HCP 5 and 6) There	was	doubt,	four	months	earlier,	at	the	beginning	of	curative	chemotherapy,	whether	 the	 patient	 could	 tolerate	 chemotherapy.	 	 Since	 the	 patient	 wanted	treatment,	the	lead	HCP	felt	“in	her	own	heart”	it	was	right	to	try,	but	this	was	the	limit	 of	 treatment.	 So	 when	 the	 patient	 presented	 with	 a	 lump	 whilst	 having	chemotherapy,	and	the	biopsy	of	 the	 lump	was	confirmed	as	 lymphoma,	 the	 lead																																																									11	AMBER	 is	 the	 name	 of	 a	 care	 bundle,	 developed	 by	 Guys	 and	 St	 Thomas’s	Hospital,	 to	 be	 used	 to	 prompt	 decision-making	 and	 conversations	 when	 a	patient’s	recovery	is	uncertain	and	death	within	six	weeks	is	likely.	
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HCP	 was	 clear	 that	 the	 plan	 of	 care	 was	 “palliative”.	 	 She	 organized	 a	 family	meeting	at	a	weekend	when	she	was	on	call	when	she	knew	she	would	have	time.	The	 ward	 HCP	 whilst	 knowing	 “things	 weren’t	 right”,	 needed	 “solid	 evidence/	proof”	in	order	to	speak	with	the	patient	and	family.			She	did	not	want	to	deny	any	patient	 something	 meaningful	 and	 expressed	 wariness	 of	 “getting	 the	 decision	(about	 dying)	 wrong”.	 However,	 she	 did	 acknowledge	 that	 ward	 nurses	 had	recognized	that	the	chemotherapy	was	becoming	futile	earlier	than	she	did.	The	palliative	care	HCP	knew	the	patient	from	a	previous	admission,	and	found	it	helpful	to	have	a	ward	HCP	who	gave	clear	information,	and	who	was	prepared	to	make	 a	 decision	 and	 not	 maintain	 “false	 hope”.	 	 The	 HCP	 described	 it	 as	 the	“hardest	thing”	when	lead	HCPs	deny	the	dying	when	she	can	“see	it”.		The	HCP	led	the	discharge	planning	meeting	and	negotiated	that	the	brother	would	be	the	key	contact	(she	knew	the	patient’s	wishes)	and	the	son	accepted	this.	
Patient	Four	
The patient’s story The	 patient	 was	 a	 young	 man	 admitted	 under	 the	 gastro-intestinal	 team	 with	vomiting;	 investigations	were	 indicative	of	 an	upper	gastrointestinal	malignancy.		He	 then	 had	 a	 stroke	 and	 went	 to	 the	 stroke	 ward	 for	 care.	 	 He	 did	 not	 have	capacity	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 decision-making,	 was	 unable	 to	 communicate,	 was	vomiting	(as	the	cancer	was	blocking	the	outlet	of	his	stomach),	and	he	was	being	fed	intra-venously.		A	stent	(a	tube	with	an	opening)	had	been	placed	in	his	gastric	outlet	to	try	and	relieve	the	obstruction	and	reduce	the	vomiting.		The	patient	was	jaundiced,	had	no	control	over	his	hygiene	or	any	bodily	motions,	was	restless,	and	had	swollen	legs.		His	brother	was	almost	constantly	present	on	the	ward.	He	was	suspicious	of	the	medic’s	treatment	decisions,	questioning	whether	he	was	being	offered	treatment	that	would	have	been	offered	 to	a	UK	national	as	 initially	 the	patient’s	 residency	status	 had	 been	 questioned12.	 Additionally,	 the	 brother	wanted	 the	 patient	 kept																																																									12	If	he	had	not	been	a	UK	resident	he	would	have	been	required	to	pay	for	his	medical	treatment.			
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alive	 for	 long	enough	 for	his	wife	and	children	 to	visit	 from	abroad.	 	Neither	 the	patient	nor	the	brother’s	first	language	was	English.		The	patient	died	on	the	ward	within	two	days	of	the	medical	recognition	of	dying.	
The HCP’s story (HCP 7,8 and 9) The	ward	HCP	for	the	patient’s	care	empathised	with	the	patient,	as	he	was	young,	but	described	it	as	a	“professional	relationship	with	a	large	degree	of	detachment”.	The	 gastro-team,	whose	ward	 the	 patient	was	 admitted	 to,	were	 responsible	 for	discussing	 the	 cancer	 diagnosis	 in	 the	 Multi-Disciplinary-Team	 meeting	 and	securing	 a	 treatment	 plan.	 	 The	 ward	 HCP	 was	 happy	 to	 take	 a	 “palliative	approach”,	 when	 the	 patient	 transferred	 to	 his	 ward,	 but	 wanted	 a	 “cast-iron”	decision	that	all	 treatment	options	were	not	 in	his	best	 interests.	 	The	ward	HCP	described	how	his	 first	 instinct	 that	 the	patient	was	dying	was	 the	weight	 loss	 -	“the	first	big	alarm	bell	was	just	the	quantity	weight	 loss	after	a	three	week	time	period”.	It	 was	 on	 a	 routine	 ward	 round,	 seeing	 that	 the	 patient	 was	 deteriorating	 and	hoping	 for	 a	plan	 in	 the	medical	notes	 from	 the	Gastro	 team,	 that	 the	ward	HCP	saw	an	entry	which	said	“re	x-ray	to	see	if	the	stent	is	in	place”.		The	HCP	who	had	wanted	 to	 know	 whether	 the	 patient	 was	 a	 candidate	 for	 surgery	 or	 palliative	measures,	and	understood	this	entry	to	mean,	“I	can’t	do	anything	here”.		The	HCP	seized	the	moment	to	speak	to	the	brother	who	was	“hovering”	to	leave	him	in	“no	doubt”	 that	 this	 was	 an	 “aggressive	 malignancy	 without	 hope	 of	 cure”.	 	 He	introduced	the	options	of	hospice	and	palliative	care	management	for	the	nausea	and	vomiting.		The	 first	palliative	care	HCP	to	review	the	patient	 immediately	had	a	gut	 instinct	that	he	was	“very	very	sick	and	not	far	off	starting	to	die”.	She	felt	out	of	her	depth	and	called	for	back	up.	On	reflection,	she	felt	 it	 is	a	nursing	culture,	 to	trust	your	gut	instinct	and	to	think	and	plan.			The	second	palliative	care	HCP	never	saw	the	patient	but	looked	at	the	scans	and	test	 results,	 and	 then	 rang	 every	 consultant	 involved	 in	 the	 care	 to	 secure	 that	there	 was	 nothing	 more	 they	 could	 do.	 	 Without	 an	 oral	 route	 for	 feeding,	 this	
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patient	was	 facing	his	 end	of	 life.	 	 The	 first	 palliative	 care	 team	HCP	 could	 then,	with	 this	 knowledge,	 continue	 to	 care	 for	 the	 patient	 and	 hold	 on-going	conversations	with	the	brother.		
Patient	Five	
Patient’s Story This	elderly	gentleman	(with	dementia	and	Type	2	diabetes)	was	admitted	from	a	care	home	with	a	gangrenous	foot,	and	sepsis.	His	admission	to	the	care	home	was	very	 recent	 (his	 wife	 had	 previously	 cared	 for	 him	 at	 home),	 and	 on	 hospital	admission	 he	 was	 bedbound	 with	 a	 reduced	 dietary	 intake,	 and	 did	 not	 have	capacity	 to	 take	 part	 in	 decision-making.	 	 He	 was	 described	 as	 having	 a	 large,	odorous	 and	 painful	 leg	 wound,	 for	 which	 antibiotics	 were	 not	 helping,	 and	 for	which	an	amputation	was	the	only	option.		Movement	caused	him	great	discomfort.		He	had	a	wife,	who	wanted	him	cared	for	on	the	ward,	a	daughter	and	a	son	who	lived	 abroad,	who	 returned	 for	his	 father’s	dying.	 	 The	patient	died	on	 the	ward	within	a	week	of	medical	recognition	of	dying.	
HCP’s story (HCP 10 and 11) The	HCP	 reviewing	 the	patient	was	not	 the	ward	HCP	 (surgical)	 but	 a	HCP	on	 a	multi-disciplinary	 foot	 round	 (consisting	 of	 a	 vascular	 surgeon,	 endocrinologist,	and	foot	specialist)	as	the	ward	HCP	was	not	the	person	with	expertise	to	make	a	decision	 about	 amputation.	 The	HCP	 reviewing	 the	 patient	 described	 how	 being	part	of	a	MDT	foot	team	made	for	a	much	more	robust	discussion	than	making	this	decision	 as	 a	 lone	 worker	 (if	 she	 had	 been	 alone	 she	 would	 have	 asked	 an	anaesthetist	 if	 the	patient	was	likely	to	survive	the	anaesthetic,	 rather	than	make	the	decision	alone).			The	 lead	HCP	 reviewed	 the	 patient	with	 the	 surgical	ward	 junior	 doctor;	 it	was	identified	 that	 the	patient	was	 too	 frail	 to	survive	surgery	and	 the	approach	was	going	to	be	palliative	and	comfort	focused.		What	had	informed	her	decision	to	take	a	 palliative	 approach	 was	 witnessing	 the	 nurse	 taking	 the	 dressing	 down.	 	 She	described	how	“you	could	smell	 the	amount	of	pus	 in	 the	 legs,	and	 if	he	had	any	awareness,	 you	 can	 imagine,	 no	 one	 wants	 to	 be	 in	 such	 pain	 or	 smell	 with	 a	
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wound	and	be	in	so	much	pain”.		She	did	not	engage	with	the	family,	and	assumed	that	once	palliative	care	were	involved	the	ward	team	would	speak	to	the	family.	She	described	feeling	sad	when	an	end	of	life	decision	is	made	and	a	moral	duty	to	make	sure	she	has	done	everything	possible.		She	described	how	she	teaches	junior	doctors	 that	 if	 they	are	worrying,	 they	have	made	 the	wrong	decision,	because	 if	they	had	made	the	right	one	they	would	have	argued	the	justification	in	their	head.		She	recognises	that	some	decisions	are	more	difficult	than	others,	but	in	that	case	you	treat	and	go	back	and	check.	The	palliative	care	HCP	was	involved	subsequent	to	this	decision	with	the	meeting	with	the	family	having	already	been	set	up	by	the	junior	ward	doctor.	She	met	with	the	junior	medical	team	beforehand	to	agree	an	approach	and	the	only	decision	to	be	 made	 was	 whether	 antibiotics	 were	 to	 continue.	 	 The	 palliative	 care	 HCP	encouraged	the	family	to	talk	to	the	son	abroad.	 	When	she	made	a	bereavement	call	the	son	said	how	much	he	valued	her	input.	
Patient	Six		
Patient’s Story This	 92	 year	 old	 gentleman	 had	 a	 past	 medical	 history	 of	 dementia.	 He	 had	 a	laparotomy	 the	previous	week	 for	 a	 tumour	 in	 the	 right	 side	of	his	 colon,	which	had	been	surgically	bypassed	to	prevent	obstruction.		The	cancer	multidisciplinary	meeting	 could	 not	 offer	 other	 cancer	 treatment	 options	 and	 a	 prognosis	 was	expected	of	months	 at	 best.	 	 	He	was	described	 as	being	 very	happy	 reading	his	books	 about	 aeroplanes,	 talking	 about	 the	 past.	 	 He	 had	 a	 very	 poor	 short-term	memory	and	he	didn’t	understand	that	he	had	cancer.		The	patient	had	a	supportive	wife.	Having	nursed	her	first	husband	until	his	death	from	 a	 progressive	 neurological	 condition,	 she	 wanted	 this	 husband	 to	 have	 a	“good	death”	at	home.	From	her	first	marriage,	there	were	two	daughters	and	from	his	 first	 marriage	 there	 were	 two	 sons.	 	 The	 sons	 and	 their	 families	 were	 not	speaking	to	the	daughters,	and	they	felt	that	their	father’s	wife	was	hastening	his	death,	and	felt	that	more	should	be	done	to	prolong	his	life.	
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On	 the	Friday,	he	was	discharged	home	 for	 end	of	 life	 care,	he	was	described	as	sitting	 up	 in	 the	 chair,	 drinking	 a	 cup	 of	 tea,	 and	 eating	 cake.	 The	 patient	 was	readmitted	on	the	Monday	with	symptoms	of	either	intra-abdominal	collection	or	obstruction.		He	was	barely	conscious	in	the	bed,	his	wound	was	leaking	profusely;	he	had	not	been	eating	and	drinking	well,	he	had	vomited	and	had	diarrhoea	and	had	fallen	at	home.		On	re-admission	he	looked	pale,	grey,	agitated	in	the	bed	and	very	unwell.	 	 	His	wound	was	swabbed,	 intravenous	fluids	were	commenced,	but	antibiotics	were	not	started	until	the	infection	was	proven	as	there	was	no	pyrexia.		He	was	cared	for	in	hospital	for	a	week,	whilst	the	discharge	package	of	care	was	worked	up,	and	 family	concerns	were	addressed.	He	was	discharged	home	again	for	end	of	life	care,	and	died	within	a	day.	
HCP’s Story (HCP 12 and 13) On	 the	 second	 admission,	 the	ward	HCP	was	 immediately	 clear	 that	 this	 patient	was	 “terminal”	 -	 the	 reasons	 given	 for	 futility	 were	 age,	 extent	 of	 the	 tumour	(known	from	examination	of	the	laparotomy	the	previous	week)	and	septic	shock.	He	has	a	personal	philosophy	of	believing	that	we	all	die	and	since	this	patient	was	elderly	he	could	accommodate	this	without	too	much	distress.	The	ward	HCP	could	not	remember	the	family	at	all,	but	felt	they	were	“probably	expecting	 it	 and	 understanding”.	 	 He	 spoke	 about	 what	 he	 usually	 does	 in	 such	circumstances.	 	 If	 the	 patient	 is	 terminal	 then	 he	 would	 involve	 the	 family	beforehand,	 take	 the	patient	and/or	 the	 family	 into	a	side	room	with	nurses	and	other	 staff	 and	 explain	 the	 plan	 of	 giving	 fluids,	 painkillers	 and	 whatever	 other	conservative	treatment	(other	than	surgery)	 is	possible.	He	couldn’t	remember	 if	he	had	reviewed	the	patient	again,	but	he	described	how	dying	patients	would	be	in	a	side	room,	he	would	prescribe	fluid	and	analgesia,	and	how	he	tries	to	avoid	to	take	 a	 group	 of	 doctors	 to	 do	 a	 formal	 ward	 round	 when	 their	 input	 is	 very	minimal.		The	intention	would	be	to	let	the	patient	have	a	peaceful	death.	The	 palliative	 care	 HCP	 went	 straight	 to	 the	 ward,	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 referral	 was	received	the	day	after	admission.	 	She	found	a	son,	his	wife	and	a	granddaughter	waiting	to	speak	to	the	doctors.		The	son	wanted	all	active	treatment	continued	for	as	long	as	possible.		The	meeting	involved	addressing	his	concerns	and	explaining	
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the	rationale	for	decision-making.		She	thought	the	son	understood	by	the	end	of	it.	The	HCP	tried	to	address	with	the	son	how	information	would	be	shared	with	all	family	 members	 and	 he	 explained	 it	 would	 be	 difficult	 for	 all	 the	 family	 to	 be	together.		The	palliative	care	HCP	asked	palliative	care	 team	member	 to	review	the	patient	the	next	day,	to	ensure	that	she	hadn’t	missed	anything.		Due	to	the	complexity	of	the	family	she	felt	a	complaint	was	on	its	way.	
Summary	
These	composite	pen	portraits	are	summaries	of	the	critical	incident	reviews	that	were	 used	 in	 interviews	 with	 HCPs	 in	 Study	 One.	 They	 set	 the	 context	 for	 the	reader	for	the	themed	analysis	which	was	presented	to	the	Study	Two	workshop	participants	 for	their	consideration	and	discussion,	and	which	is	described	in	the	next	chapter.			The	themed	analysis	of	 the	Study	Two	transcripts	 is	also	contained	 in	Chapter	5,	ahead	of	progressing	 to	 the	psychosocial	analysis	of	Study	One	 (Chapter	6	–	The	Task	of	the	NHS)	and	Study	Two	(Chapter	7	–	Families	and	Chapter	8	–	How	senior	HCPs	learn	to	care	for	the	dying	patient	and	family).							
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Chapter	 Five	 -	 Themed	 Results	 of	 Critical	 Incident	 Reviews	
(Study	 One),	 and	 Participatory	 Action	 Research	 Workshops	
(Study	Two).	
Introduction		
This	 chapter	will	 document	 the	 themed	 analysis	 of	 the	 thirteen	 Critical	 Incident	Reviews	(Study	One),	as	was	presented	to	the	Participatory	Action	Research	(PAR)	workshop	 participants.	 	 This	 thematic	 analysis	 identified	 a	 four-stage	 model	 of	decision-making,	albeit	in	rudimentary	form,	subsequent	to	HCPs’	responses	to	the	Critical	 Incident	 Reviews.	 	 The	 stages	 consisted	 of:	 1)	 a	 “gut	 instinct”	 that	 the	patient	was	dying;	2)	evidencing	this	through	four	techniques;	3)	engagement	with	the	 patient	 and	 family;	 4)	 and	managing	 the	 fall	 out	 of	 decision-making.	 I	 asked	HCPs	about	their	personal	response	to	recognising	dying	and	this	is	included.	The	 analysis	 of	 the	 four	 PAR	workshops	 (Study	Two)	 gave	 depth	 to	 the	 themed	analysis	of	the	Critical	Incident	Review	(Study	One),	and	added	detail	to	the	model	of	decision-making.	By	reflecting	specifically	on	the	themed	data,	HCPs	were	able	to	point	out	what	 the	analysis	of	study	one	had	not	captured,	when	compared	to	their	experience	of	clinical	practice.		They	highlighted	that	all	patients	in	Study	One	had	died,	and	they	described	the	very	significant	experience	of	a	patient	surviving	the	 prognosis	 of	 dying,	 and	 the	 impact	 that	 had	 on	 the	 HCP,	 patient	 and	 family	relationships.	 	Analysis	of	the	PAR	workshops	(Study	Two)	allowed	evaluation	of	PAR	 as	 a	 route	 to	 develop	 this	 aspect	 of	 clinical	 practice.	 It	 also	 facilitated	 the	addition	of	a	 fifth-stage	to	the	decision	making	model.	 	 I	have	called	this	“clinical	supervision”	because	the	HCPs	highly	valued	the	opportunity	to	reflect	and	discuss	clinical	practice,	through	skilled	facilitation	of	the	PAR	workshops.	Part	of	the	rationale	for	this	research,	argued	in	Chapter	2,	is	that	identifying	dying	earlier	than	the	last	few	days	of	life	is	resistant	to	change.		This	clinical	work	takes	place	in	a	complex	organisation	where	there	are	high	numbers	of	patients	treated	every	week,	and	where	the	organisation	is	focused	on	“no	needless	deaths”	and	a	political	 context	 of	much	media	 controversy	 about	 end	 of	 life	 care.	 	 The	 Critical	Incident	Review	(Study	One),	and	the	PAR	workshops	(Study	Two)	gave	a	voice	to	
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individual	HCPs,	and	what	really	stood	out	from	the	PAR	workshops,	was	the	depth	of	 responsibility	HCPs	 felt	 to	make	 the	 right	decision	 that	 the	patient	was	dying,	and	not	to	deny	the	patient	any	meaningful	quality	of	life,	the	very	strong	emotions	HCPs	felt,	the	impact	of	the	family	on	the	HCP	and	patient	relationship,	and	the	lack	of	formal	educational	preparation	for	this	aspect	of	clinical	care.		The	level	of	anger	at	other	HCPs	who	were	perceived	as	avoiding	this	work	also	stood	out	strongly.		The	chapter	concludes	by	re-iterating	why	a	psychosocial	approach	was	needed	to	help	 illuminate	whether	 there	were	unconscious,	 less	 than	 rational	 processes,	 in	decision-making	about	recognising	dying	and	engaging	with	patients	and	families,	that	might	explain	why	the	model	of	decision-making	might	or	might	not	be	used.	The	psychosocial	analysis	is	presented	in	the	following	chapters;	Chapter	6	–	The	Task	of	the	NHS;	Chapter	7	–	Families;	Chapter	8	–	How	senior	HCPs	learn	to	care	for	 dying	 patients	 and	 families.	 I	 recognise	 this	 iterative	 and	 pragmatic	methodology	 can	 require	 understanding	 by	 the	 reader	 and	 a	 flowchart	 to	 guide	you	to	the	process	is	located	in	Appendix	9.		
Themed	Analysis	of	Critical	Incident	Reviews	(Study	One)		
I	thematically	analysed	the	data	from	study	One,	ahead	of	the	presentation	to	the	workshops	 of	 Study	 Two	 for	 the	 participants’	 consideration	 and	 discussion.	 An	example	of	one	of	the	PowerPoint	presentations	used	in	the	four	PAR	workshops	is	located	in	Appendix	7.			




HCP	3)	or	 the	 “look	of	the	patient”	 (Patient	5,	HCP	10	and	11)	or	 an	 “alarm	bell”	about	weight	 loss	 (Patient	 Four,	 HCP	 7)	 or	 a	 “gut	 instinct”	based	 on	 the	 level	 of	patient	 distress	 (Patient	 Four,	 HCP	 9).	 	 One	 HCP	 had	 developed	 vigilance	 for	 a	particular	 cue	 “you	start	to	identify	signs…one	of	my	favourite	signs	now	is	 looking	
out	 for	 temporalis	 wasting”	 (Patient	 Four,	 HCP	 7).	 	 One	 HCP	 identified	 that	 the	patient	looked	as	others	looked	after	death.		
I	 have	 seen	 patients	who	 have	 just	 died	 or	 are	 just	 a	 couple	 of	 hours	 from	
death	&	something	about	their	facial	experience	sometimes;	their	jawline,	you	
know,	the	fixed	nature	of	that	jaw	&	when	I	looked	at	him	I	kinda	almost	got	
one	of	those	 images	&	gosh	I	can	almost	 imagine	how	you	are	going	to	 look	
when	 you	 die,	 which	 I	 hadn’t	 even	 thought	 on	 the	 Friday	 (HCP	 3,	 L71-77	Study	One).	Not	all	HCPs	described	a	gut	instinct	but	had	a	general	recognition	that	the	patient	was	 not	 improving	 despite	 treatment	 escalation	 (Patient	 One,	 Patient	 Three),	 or	the	 recognition	 that	 there	were	no	 further	 treatment	options	 (Patient	Three	and	Patient	Six).			
Evidencing the gut instinct  	HCPs	 then	 denied	 or	 evidenced	 this	 gut	 instinct	 through	 four	 techniques,	which	involved	 combinations	 of	 “treatment	 escalation”	 and	 “staging”	 (See	 below	 for	explanation).			I	identified	treatment	escalation	and	staging	as:		






“Treatment	 escalation”	 is	 expected	 medical	 practice,	 such	 that	 when	 there	 is	deterioration	 in	 the	 patient’s	 clinical	 condition,	 another	 treatment	 is	 added	 in	 a	“can	I	cure	this	symptom	approach?”	in	an	attempt	to	prolong	life.		It	assumes	that	death	 is	 not	 imminent,	 and	 that	 all	 side	 effects	 of	 treatments	 are	worthwhile	 to	attain	a	cure.	 	This	approach	is	so	routine,	and	expected	by	patients	and	families,	that	 neither	 patients	 or	 families	 are	 consulted	 when	 this	 approach	 is	 taken	(Kryworuchko	et	al.,	2012).		“Staging”	 is	an	attempt	 to	prognosticate	how	 long	a	patient	could	be	expected	 to	live	in	an	attempt	to	work	out	what	treatments	are	in	the	patient’s	best	interests,	and	 does	 not	 assume	 that	 all	medical	 treatments	 are	 tolerable	 to	 the	 patient,	 or	that	 they	 will	 live	 long	 enough	 to	 appreciate	 the	 benefit.	 Oncologists	 and	haematologists	have	long	had	to	assess	whether	a	cancer	patient	will	survive	to	see	the	benefit	of	chemotherapy	or	radiotherapy,	and	make	a	decision	to	stop	curative	treatment	(not	care)	in	a	patient’s	best	interests.	This	is	seen	in	the	care	of	Patient	Three,	where	the	HCP,	knew	“in	her	heart”	that	it	was	the	right	thing	to	do	to	give	first	 line	 chemotherapy,	 but	 that	 the	 patient	 would	 never	 be	 fit	 for	 “salvage	
chemotherapy”	if	the	disease	progressed	through	the	treatment.		Indeed	thirty	day	mortality	 is	now	a	 clinical	 indicator	of	 avoidable	harm,	as	 the	patient	 is	 likely	 to	have	died	despite	treatment	and	with	the	burdens	of	treatment	(Wallington,	Saxon,	Bomb,	 &	 Smittenaar,	 2016).	 	 There	 is	 also	 evidence	 that	 early	 palliative	 care	prolongs	survival	in	patients	with	lung	cancer	(Irwin,	Greer,	Khatib,	Temel,	&	Pirl,	2013;	Temel	et	al.,	2010).	In	situations	where	the	dying	is	due	to	a	non-malignant	condition,	 the	 situation	 is	 different	 as	 the	 treatments	 offered	may	 be	 fluids,	 and	antibiotics,	 and	 have	 a	 different	 risk/benefit	 profile	 to	 chemotherapy	 or	radiotherapy.	










Coping with the fall out of the engagement with the patient and family 	Once	 the	 HCP	 had	 engaged	 with	 the	 patient	 and	 family,	 I	 could	 describe	 two	outcomes	after	breaking	the	news	about	the	recognition	of	dying	that	I	described	as	“managing	the	fall-out”.	Where	the	dying	was	accepted	(Patient	Three	and	Five)	then	 onward	 care	 planning	 could	 occur.	 	 Where	 there	 was	 no	 psychological	acceptance	of	dying	(on	the	part	of	the	family),	then	the	meeting	was	taken	up	with	helping	 the	 family	 accommodate	 the	 news	 and	 negotiating	 ceilings	 of	 treatment	that	 could	 be	 tolerated	 by	 both	 HCP	 and	 family	 (Patients	 Four	 and	 Six).	 These	meetings	were	fraught	and	made	the	HCP	feel	anxious	and	frustrated.		I	 generated	a	model	of	 conversation	 (Appendix	10)	where	 the	conversation	with	the	patient	and	family	was	viewed,	not	as	a	route	to	advance	care	plan,	but	a	space	in	which	there	was	assessment	of	the	patient	and	family’s	psychological	readiness	to	 accept	 dying,	 to	 understand	 what	 psychological	 work	 was	 needed,	 and	 to	mutually	understand	what	treatments	were	in	the	patient’s	best	interests.		
Personal responses to identifying dying 	At	the	point	of	recognising	the	dying,	HCPs	described	a	variable	personal	response	to	this.		For	the	workshops	I	did	not	analyse	this	further,	than	describing	this.	





• Some	felt	recognising	dying	had	an	impact	on	them	personally,	particularly	 if	 the	patient	was	younger	(HCPs	associated	with	Patient	One,	Four	and	Six)	
Educational	preparation	for	clinical	practice	I	then	presented	the	analysis	of	education	preparation	for	this	work	in	Workshop	Four.	 This	 was	 not	 possible	 to	 theme	 as	 the	 responses	 were	 so	 variable.	 	 The	importance	of	this	is	that	I	either	did	not	sample	enough	HCPs	to	reach	saturation	point	 (bearing	 in	mind	 that	 thirteen	 interviews	was	 determined	 as	 the	 point	 to	reach	 saturation	 (Guest	 et	 al.,	 2006))	 or	 there	 has	 been	 a	 very	 individual	experience	 of	 learning	 to	 care	 for	 the	 dying	 via	 clinical	 practice.	 	 It	 can	 be	 seen	from	the	literature	that	this	is	a	very	likely	explanation	(Dickinson,	Clark,	&	Sque,	2008;	Walker	et	al.,	2016),	and	especially	because	the	HCPs	had	trained	between	3	and	 31	 years	 ago	 and	 there	 have	 been	many	 changes	 in	medical	 (Greenaway	 &	Greenaway,	2013)	and	nursing	education	(Willis	Commission,	2012).		I	divided	the	results	into	medical	education	and	nursing	and	chaplaincy	education.	
Learning	about	dying:	Doctor’s	medical	education.	HCP’s	 educational	 preparation	was	 in	part	 dependent	 on	 the	 age	 of	 the	 clinician	and	their	specialty.	Older	doctors	could	not	remember	specific	teaching	but	could	remember	being	taught	to	set	up	a	room	for	a	consultation.		They	felt	that	medical	tests,	 drug	 treatments,	 and	 technical	 interventions	 (medical	 treatments)	 were	taught,	but	how	and	when	to	give	the	treatment	was	learnt	in	clinical	practice.		I	think	the	treatments	are	taught…the	softer	bits	about	what	you	can	actually	
achieve	in	the	real	world,	with	a	real	patient	in	front	of	you…are	more	learned	
through	experience	(HCP	6,	L57-62,	Study	One).		Younger	doctors	 identified	that	topics	such	as	assessment	of	mental	capacity	and	breaking	bad	news	were	taught	at	medical	school	now,	and	could	take	transferable	learning	 skills	 into	 the	 clinical	 situation.	 Identifying	 dying	 was	 not	 taught.	 They	recognised	 they	 had	 more	 opportunities	 for	 rehearsing	 conversations	 in	 the	undergraduate	curriculum,	but	 this	stopped	post	registration.	Palliative	medicine	specialists	 identified	 that	 the	 care	of	 the	dying	was	part	of	 the	 specialty	 training	
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curriculum	 to	 become	 a	 consultant,	 and	 breaking	 bad	 news	 was	 specifically	observed	 and	 assessed.	 	 However,	 they	were	 self-taught	 to	 recognise	 dying.	 The	palliative	 medicine	 specialist	 used	 teaching	 as	 a	 time	 to	 reflect	 and	 process	learning	for	others.	
When	I	teach,	that	is	when	I	sort	it	out	as	a	model	in	my	head;	so	the	teaching	
is	 a	 really	 good	 way	 of	 using	 that	 on-going	 reflection	 …to	 put	 it	 in	 to	
something	workable	and	usable	(HCP	8,	L282-285,	Study	One).	The	 care	 of	 the	 dying	 patient	 was	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 elderly	 care	 specialty	curriculum,	 and	 one	 deanery13	had	 a	 specific	 module	 where	 the	 training	 grade	doctor	had	time	with	the	palliative	care	team.	The	surgeon	interviewed	could	not	really	describe	how	he	had	learnt	to	recognise	dying.		He	attributed	it	to	reading	the	literature	and	NICE	guidance.		He	had	learnt	from	the	experience	of	taking	patients	to	surgery,	without	there	being	a	survivable	outcome,	and	learning	from	the	clinical	situation	and	from	colleagues.	
I	have	seen	similar	patients	before…when	I	was	like	quite	junior	registrar	…I	
jump	on	like	we	need	to	do	something,	then	obviously	then	as	a	junior	surgeon	
you	are	more	 like	a	 sort	of,	 your	approach	 is	 slightly	aggressive	and	 I	don’t	
know,	 I	 guess	 it	 is	 the	 proper	 word	 or	 not	 but	 more	 prompt	 to	 do	




are	 next	 to	me	 am	 I	 missing	 anything	 or	 am	 I	 giving	 extra	 information	 or	
anything	extra	I	should	have	done	(HCP	13,	L159-162,	Study	One).	One	HCP	reported	valuing	ad	hoc	study	days	provided	by	palliative	care.																																																									13 	A	 deanery	is	 a	 regional	 organisation	 responsible	 for	 postgraduate	medical	training,	within	the	structure	of	the	National	Health	Service	(NHS)	 	
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I	do	 think	every	 time	 that	 someone	does	 the	Monday	meeting,	 the	palliative	
care	team	or	academic	half	day	all	those	kind	of	things	do	make	a	difference.		
Keeps	people	smart	(HCP	11,	L275-278,	Study	One).	
Learning	about	dying:	Nursing	and	chaplaincy	education.	No	 nurse	 could	 describe	 specific	 pre-registration	 training	 to	 identify	 dying,	 and	associated	 care.	 	 One	 nurse	 had	 found	 the	 psychiatry	 placement	 helpful	 for	learning	 about	 therapeutic	 relationships.	 Two	 could	 describe	 inspirational	 role	models	in	their	training.		
When	 I	 trained…it	 was	 considered	 …legitimate	 at	 that	 time	 that	 a	 family	
might	say	please	don’t	tell	the	patient	and	the	patient	wasn’t	told	…and	was	
moved	to	the	side	room;	interestingly	one	of	my	first	very	positive	experiences	
of	 how	 this	might	 be	managed	 differently	was	 the	Macmillan	 nurse	when	 I	
was	 training	 as	 a	 nurse	 came	 in	…and	 she	was	 very	much	 promoting	 open	
communication	 talking	 to	 the	 patient,	 involving	 them	 in	 decision-making	
which	instantly	impressed	me”	(HCP	2,	L108-120,	Study	One).			Younger	 nurses	 could	 describe	 how	 pre-registration	 nurse	 training	 included	 the	care	 of	 the	 family,	 but	 not	 specifically	 about	 dying	 or	 communication	 regarding	ceilings	of	 treatment.	Some	HCPs	described	preparing	 to	 teach	others,	and	 found	this	to	be	helpful	for	their	own	learning.		
I	 have	 also	 taught	 at	 X	 University	 on	 end	 of	 life	modules	 and	 done	 further	
looking	at	the	papers	myself	to	know	the	evidence	(HCP	1,	 L121-122,	 Study	One).	Experienced	palliative	care	nurses	identified	that	experience	and	post	basic	study	in	communication	skills	and	bereavement	allowed	 transferrable	skills	 for	clinical	practice	in	recognising	dying.		





of	 its	 all	 of	 the	 things…that	 go	 into	 feeling	 confident	 to	 sit	 in	 the	 room	and	
have	that	conversation	with	the	family	(HCP	10,	L291-302	Study	One).	Most,	 senior	 palliative	 care	 nurses,	 had	 undertaken	 post	 registration	 training,	although	 even	 a	 palliative	 care	 degree	 had	 not	 covered	 recognition	 of	 dying.	Palliative	care	nurses	had	worked	hard	to	gain	the	skills	required.		
I	did	the	diploma	in	counselling	which	I	think	is	helpful	but	I	didn’t	do	group	
therapy	 or	 anything	 like	 that	 so	 again	 it	 is	 –	 I	 have	 done	 the	 advance	
communication	skills	–	that	type	of	training	so	I	think	…there	is	a	foundation	
of	training	of	theory	which	experience	probably	magnifies	hugely	(Interview	5,	L223-227,	Study	One).	Most	 had	 learnt	 from	 role	 models,	 although	 it	 was	 identified	 as	 harder	 as	 they	became	more	senior,	and	practiced	skills	in	supervision.		
I	 don’t	 get	much	 opportunity	 now	 to	watch	 others	 you	 know	who	 can	 role	





care	 training	 and	 in	 communication…throughout	my	 parish	 based	ministry	
over	25	years	and	two	churches…I	haven’t	had	any	specific	training	in	the	last	
year	since	I	have	been	here	about	that	particular	thing…but	I	have	some	good	
tutors	 on	 the	 palliative	 care	 team	 and	 I	 notice	what	 they	 do	 and	 how	 they	
communicate	(HCP	3,	L208-213,	Study	One).	
Analysis	of	Four	PAR	Workshops	(Study	Two)	















Evidencing	the	gut	instinct	HCPs	 found	 looking	 at	 how	 dying	 was	 staged	 interesting	 and	 it	 provoked	discussion	 amongst	 the	 PAR	 workshop	 participants.	 	 They	 had	 not	 considered	staging	dying	previously.			
I	 have	 not	 previously	 considered	 the	 different	 pathways	 as	 we	 did	 today.		
However,	 I	 found	it	useful	to	do	so	I	as	 I	require	several	of	 these.	 Identifying	
dying	 remains	 a	 challenge	 and	 an	 individually	 responsible	 task!	 A	 useful	
session	(HCP	7,	Workshop	One,	Study	Two).	





PART	8	A	 little	bit	 of	 seize	 the	moment	and	a	 little	bit	 of	patient	 initiated	 I	
guess	
INT	JW	How	does	it	get	to	be	mostly	planned	for	you?	
PART	8	Because	we	can	 see	 it	 coming.	 	Most	of	our	patients	aren’t	well	one	
day	and	dying	the	next	(L478-486,	Workshop	Two,	Study	Two).	HCPs	also	identified	a	clinical	scenario	that	was	missed	in	Study	One	and	described	how	the	patient	or	the	family	could	test	whether	it	was	safe	to	engage.		They	would	do	this	by	not	mentioning	the	topic	of	dying	until	the	end	of	the	conversation	when	there	was	not	time	to	discuss	their	concerns	fully,	and	it	would	need	to	be	returned	to.	
Sometimes	patients	 you	will	 have	half	 an	hour	 consultation	 in	 clinic	and	 its	
not	until	after	twenty	minutes	and	you	think	that	things	are	OK	and	you	don’t	
have	any	immediate	concerns	and	they	will	say	to	you	“I	am	really	concerned	
about	dying”	it	just	comes	out	and	you	are	not	expecting	it	at	all…that’s	tricky	(L629-636,	Workshop	Two,	Study	Two).	HCPs	 did	 discuss	 planned	 non-engagement	 with	 the	 patient	 and	 family	 due	 to	clinical	 reasons.	 	 They	 expressed	 discomfort	 at	 the	 other	 reasons	 found	 in	 the	Critical	Incident	Review	(Study	One)	for	non-engagement.	
PART	5	I	find	it	quite	hard	to	associate	with	any	of	them	[non-engagement].	
INT	JW	OK	




Coping with the fall out of the engagement with the patient and family In	Workshop	Three,	I	presented	the	model	of	conversation	I	had	generated	where	the	conversation	with	the	patient	and	family	was	viewed	as	a	space	in	which	there	was	assessment	of	the	patient	and	family’s	psychological	readiness	to	accept	dying,	
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to	 understand	 what	 psychological	 work	 needed	 to	 go	 on,	 and	 to	 mutually	understand	 what	 treatments	 were	 in	 the	 patient’s	 best	 interests.	 It	 was	 well	received.			
Interesting	to	see	that	the	psychological	assessment	of	patients	and	families	is	
a	 stage	 /	 important	 as	 although	 I	 may	 have	 subconsciously	 realised	 this	 I	
hadn’t	thought	about	it	and	it	makes	sense.		To	look	at	this	&	think	more	when	
talking	 to	 pts	 &	 families	 about	 where	 they	 are	 in	 the	 acceptance	 journey	(Feedback	from	HCP	5,	Workshop	Three).	In	this	PAR	workshop	participants	discussed	their	experiences	of	patient’s	families.			It	became	clear	that	caring	for	patients	and	their	families	is	really	difficult	clinical	work.	 	 Just	 how	 challenging	 HCPs	 find	 the	 pleading	 of	 families	 for	 anything	 to	extend	the	patients	life	is	detailed	in	the	quote	below.		HCP	1	had	had	32	years	of	clinical	practice	and	described	themselves	as	“at	ease	with	dying”.	
Because	everyone,	is	difficult.	 	When	it	is	difficult	it	really	is	difficult.	You	try	
and	 keep	 consistent,	 say	 the	 same	 thing	 but	 when	 they	 are	 demanding	
things…and	sometimes	we	had	somebody	the	other	day	–	she	was	young,	she	
was	dying,	knew	she	was	dying,	she	was	actively	dying	and	the	daughter	was	







they	 can	get	diarrhoea	and	afterwards	 the	daughter	 said	 I	understand	now	
you	 are	 right;	 but	 if	 it	 had	 been	 left	 to	 me	 I	 was	 wavering	 (L424-435,	Workshop	Three,	Study	Two).	They	 discussed	 how	 easy	 care	 of	 the	 patient	 was	when	 the	 family	 accepted	 the	dying,	and	the	accusatory	impact	of	families	of	patients	who	survive	a	prognosis	of	dying.	
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But	we	have	had	problems	with	 this	 this	week	as	we	have	had	 two	patients	
who	have	got	better,	 and	 the	 family	are	 saying	you	 told	us	 they	were	dying	
and	we	are	ready	for	them	to	die,	we	wanted	them	to	die,	and	now	they	are	
getting	 better	 we	 have	 to	 change	 our	 plans	 (L329-333	 Workshop	 Three,	Study	Two).	They	discussed	the	appearance	of	previously	unknown	relatives,	families	who	are	angry	and	force	doctors	to	overturn	decisions,	and	families	they	see	as	guilty	and	demanding.		All	of	this	is	considered	in	detail	in	Chapter	7.			










things	(L241-244,	Workshop	Two	Study	One).	HCPs	expressed	anger	and	frustration	at	colleagues	who	avoided	dealing	with	the	care	of	the	dying	patient	and	their	family	–	HCPs	described	colleagues	who	wrote	in	 the	 clinical	 notes	 “consider	 Do	 Not	 Attempt	 Cardio	 Pulmonary	 Resuscitation	(DNACPR)”	 to	avoid	conversations	with	patients	and	families	and	 leave	the	work	with	 others.	 They	 described	 colleagues,	who	 denigrated	 their	 clinical	work	with	older	adults	as	easy.	
The	same	colleague	once	 told	me	 -	your	 job	must	be	very	easy	because	 they	
are	all	old,	who	cares	if	they	die	(L485-486,	Workshop	Four,	Study	Two).			They	described	other	 colleagues	who	used	written	 referral	 processes	 for	 second	opinions,	and	so	avoided	honest	conversations	with	the	patient	and	family,	and	as	importantly	left	the	second	opinion	HCP	to	deal	with	the	patient	and	family	anger.	
You	know	if	you	are	on	old	school	consultant	then	you’re	used	to	waiting.		Put	
in	 the	yellow	 form,	doesn’t	matter	 if	you	wait	 five	days…It	means	 they	don’t	
have	to	face	those	rellies	because	they	can	blame	it	on	the	haematologists	or	
whoever	 they	 are	 waiting	 for,	 when	 they	 could	 have	 made	 those	 decisions	(L522-533,	Workshop	One,	Study	Two).		HCPs	questioned	whether	changes	in	clinical	practice	over	the	last	thirty	years	of	their	careers	were	all	helpful.	They	discussed	how	early	on	in	their	careers,	whilst	a	 DNACPR	 decision	 might	 have	 been	 recorded	 in	 the	 medical	 notes,	 it	 was	 not	discussed	routinely	with	patients	and	their	families.		Neither	was	there	any	form	of	“care	 of	 the	 dying	 pathway”	 (whilst	 the	 Liverpool	 Care	 Pathway	 has	 been	withdrawn,	care	planning	for	the	dying	patient	hasn’t	and	HCPs	still	use	the	older	language).	 	 HCPs	 felt	 that	 since	 these	 topics	 are	 now	 enshrined	 in	 national	guidance	they	have	to	be	introduced	to	the	patient	and	family,	which	both	conveys	a	 false	 certainty	 around	 prognostication,	 which	 then	 means	 relatives	 want	certainty	about	when	patients	will	die.		
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Educational	preparation	for	clinical	practice	HCPs	recognised	 the	 themed	data	 from	the	Critical	 Incident	Review	(Study	One),	about	how	HCPs	learn.	
Yeah	 that	 very	much	 strikes	 chords	with	 how	 I	 recognise;	 your	 taught	 very	
factual	stuff	on	how	to	do	this	and	processes;	the	softer	aspects	–	and	I	think	
that	is	quite	a	nice	term	–	are	learnt	from	seeing	people	do	it	poorly,	badly	but	
also	 recognising	 people	who	 are	 skilled	 (L177-180,	Workshop	 Four,	 Study	Two).	They	discussed	changes	in	medical	and	nursing	education	over	their	careers.		They	recognised	an	 isolation	and	 loneliness	 in	clinical	practice	with	regard	to	 families.	Whilst	they	are	“expert”	in	their	clinical	field,	receive	on-going	training	for	this,	and	train	others,	 they	 rarely	have	opportunity	 to	watch	others	who	 are	more	 skilled	with	patient	and	family	conversations.		
As	you	are	more	 senior	 you	 lose	 the	 chance	 to	be	with	others…sometimes	 it	
happens	 for	 some	 reason	 that	 you	 are	 with	 someone,	 maybe	 they	 have	 a	
similar	 role	 or	 experience	 …is	 totally	 precious,	 and	 it’s	 not	 formalised,	 it	
happens	now	and	then	by	chance,	or	sometimes	you	can	share	a	conversation	
–	for	me	this	is	really	really	valuable	to	see	things	I	can	see	in	others	 (L457-464,	Workshop	Three,	Study	Two).			Apart	 from	 Palliative	 Care	 professionals,	 HCPs	 described	 a	 lack	 of	 clinical	supervision,	 an	 increased	 awareness	 of	 general	 “aloneness”	 in	 clinical	 practice	with	 regard	 to	 recognising	 dying,	 and	 that	 they	 utilised	 peer	 support	 to	manage	emotional	 distress.	 	 There	 was	 discussion	 of	 how	 HCPs	 learn	 and	 how	 junior	clinicians	 could	 be	 encouraged	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 the	 care	 of	 the	 dying.	 This	 is	discussed	in	detail	in	Chapter	Eight.	
Evaluation	of	the	PAR	Workshops	as	a	Means	to	Develop	Clinical	Practice		A	 clear	 aim	 of	 this	 PhD	 was	 to	 evaluate	 what	 HCPs	 thought	 of	 PAR	 and	 the	workshops	 as	 a	means	 to	 develop	 clinical	 practice.	 	 	 HCPs	who	 took	 part	 in	 the	workshops	 valued	 the	 content	 and	 form	 of	 the	 workshop	 highly	 and	 evaluated	
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my	 sort	 of	 case,	 that	 sometimes	 you	 may	 find	 a	 group	 where	 someone	 is	
completely	off	the	page	and	very	well	meaning...I	think	so	I	think	it’s	down	to	












how	 to	 recognise	 dying	 itself.	 	 Workshop	 2	 taught	 regarding	 processes	 for	





to	 reflect	 on	 how	we	 deal	with	 dying/	 delivering	 bad	 news/planning	 etc.	 I	 suppose	
that	 like	most	people	I	never	really	take	time	to	think	about	these	things	specifically	
and	although	we	may	chat	as	a	team	about	whether	we	could	have	helped	plan	with	a	






and	 think	 the	workshop	has	prompted	me	 to	 identify	a	deteriorating	patient	earlier	
and	 consider	 having	 the	 conversation	 earlier.	 I	 hope	 this	 is	 what	 you	 needed,	
apologies	again	I	couldn’t	make	the	last	one”.	[Was	not	able	to	attend	4th	workshop	but	fed	back	via	email]			
6	 “Taking	 part	 in	 this	 workshop	 has	 been	 invaluable.	 Each	 workshop	 allowed	 for	
sharing	 of	 practice	 good/bad	 and	 looked	 at	 relevant	 and	 key	 areas	 of	 care	 of	 the	
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dying	 in	clinical	practice	that	 I	may	not	have	considered.	 	Meeting	monthly,	allowed	
reflection	on	the	 learning	(through	discussion)	within	the	group	and	to	try	and	take	
this	 into	 my	 own	 clinical	 practice.	 The	 group	 felt	 safe	 and	 was	 well	 balanced	 in	
experience.	The	emotional	impact	this	can	have	on	a	HCP	and	how	we	deal	with	this	
became	 very	 evident.	 Reminded	me	 of	 the	 need	 to	 continue	 to	 seek	 out	 supervision	
with	peer	groups	especially	when	working	autonomously.		Thankyou”.								




pleased	 that	more	 focus	 is	 given	 to	 this	and	other	 communication	 skills.	 I	 think	 you	
can	 guide	 and	 advise	 someone	who	wants	 to	 improve	 their	 skills	 but	 remain	 to	 be	
convinced	that	it	can	be	truly	taught	especially	if	the	learner	is	lacking	in	insight”.	
9	 “Thank	you	for	the	chance	to	follow	this	PhD.	Great	possibility	of	sharing	experiences	
across	 different	 specialities.	 Importance	 of	 experience	 /	 role	 modelling	 and	
contribution	of	personality	 to	be	 considered.	 Importance	of	 sharing	experiences	and	
feelings”.					
10	 “Continuous	learning.		Keep	role	modelling	and	challenging	practice”.							The	purpose	of	co-operative	 inquiry	 is	the	“mutual	creation	of	owned	and	usable	knowledge”	 (Baldwin,	 2006).	 	 Unlike	 the	 knowledge	 from	 the	 Critical	 Incident	Review	 interviews	which	was	 shared	 only	 between	 the	 individual	 HCP	 in	 Study	One	 and	 myself,	 the	 knowledge	 from	 the	 PAR	 groups	 held	 meaning	 for	 all	 the	participants	including	myself,	which	we	are	able	to	own	/	adopt	in	clinical	practice.			One	could	ask	whether	these	PAR	workshops	will	result	in	sustainable	change,	and	this	will	be	critically	reflected	on	 in	Chapter	Eight	–	 “How	HCPs	 learn	to	care	 for	the	dying	patient	and	their	family”.		Individuals	stated	that	they	valued	being	able	to	 reflect,	 and	 did	 identify	 that	 they	would	 seek	 out	 peers	 to	 reflect	with	 in	 the	future.	There	were	two	significant	aspects	that	I	noticed	across	the	four	workshops	that	 indicated	learning	had	taken	place.	 	There	was	a	move	from	anger	at	others,	
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most	notably	towards	surgeons	in	the	early	workshops,	to	a	move	to	tolerance	of	others	in	the	last	workshop,	and	recognition	of	their	specific	skills.		I	 know	 I	 have	 been	 a	 bit	 mean	 to	 surgeons,	 but	 for	 them	 dying	 is	
failure…Playing	 devil’s	 advocate	 though,	 I	 couldn’t	 do	 a	 hip	 replacement,	
either	physically	or	mentally,	and	therefore	are	we	almost	asking	too	much	to	
expect	 that	everyone	can	have	 the	 same	 level	of	 [skills	 to	 identify	dying	and	
communicate	 this]	 skills.	 	 I	 am	 not	 saying	 that	 people	 should	 avoid	 it	
completely…but	 then	 I	 suppose	 everyone	 dies	 (L495-499,	 Workshop	 Four,	Study	Two).	The	second	significant	aspect	was	that	during	the	course	of	the	workshops	one	of	the	HCPs	had	moved	from	psychological	action	to	a	change	in	clinical	practice.		She	had	started	a	reflective	group	on	the	ward	to	consider	any	patient	death.	
It	 has	 just	 started	 on	 our	 ward	 to	 do…it’s	 a	 way	 of	 reflection	 formally	 to	
analyse	every	death;	we	…fill	a	form	and	they	say	what	went	well,	what	could	
have	 done	 better	 that	 kind	 of	 process	 of	 speaking	 between	 all	 of	 us	 nurses,	
doctors	and	 saying	was	 it	 preventable	and	any	 teaching	points,	 and	usually	
also	my	juniors	(L656-660	Workshop	Three,	Study	Two).			In	 this	manner	 –	 and	 similarly	 to	 Baldwin’s	work	with	 social	workers	 (Baldwin,	2006)	–	one	can	see	that	PAR	can	produce	an	outcome	consistent	with	the	policy	intention	to	deliver	good	end	of	life	care	.		
Summary	of	the	thematic	analysis	of	Study	One	and	Study	Two		The	 themed	 analysis	 of	 the	 Critical	 Incident	 Review	 (Study	 One)	 facilitated	articulation	of	 a	 four-stage	model	 for	 recognising	dying	 and	negotiating	decision	making	 with	 patients	 and	 families.	 It	 also	 allowed	 description	 of	 the	 emotional	impact	 of	 this	 work,	 and	 how	 HCPs	 have	 learnt	 to	 deliver	 this	 aspect	 of	 care.	Presenting	this	themed	analysis	to	HCPs	in	the	four	PAR	workshops	(Study	Two)	kept	them	focused	on	these	specific	aspects	of	clinical	care,	and	allowed	surprising	insights	–	namely	 the	 impact	of	 the	patient	who	survives	 the	prognosis	of	dying,	the	 significant	 impact	of	 the	 family	on	 the	HCP	and	patient	 relationship,	 and	 the	
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emotional	 intensity	 of	 the	 clinical	 work.	 	 There	 was	 positive	 evaluation	 of	 PAR	workshops	 as	 a	 means	 to	 facilitate	 practice	 development.	 Thus,	 a	 fifth	 stage	 of	“clinical	 supervision”	 was	 added	 to	 the	 model	 for	 recognising	 dying	 and	negotiating	decision	making	with	patients	and	families.	What	 the	 themed	 analysis	 did	 not	 facilitate	 was	 to	 explain	 why	 the	 five-stage	model	 was	 not	 always	 used,	 why	 “recognising	 dying”	 could	 be	 avoided,	 or	 why	there	 was	 “blending”	 between	 stages	 or	 unawareness	 of	 stages.	 	 Through	 the	analysis	of	Study	One	and	Study	Two	data	 I	have	become	more	acutely	aware	of	the	 anxiety	 –	my	own	and	others	 –	 engendered	by	 caring	 for	dying	patients	 and	their	 families.	 	 I	 have	 been	 introduced	 to	 psychosocial	 studies	 (Frost	&	McClean	2014),	 and	 psychoanalytically	 psychosocially	 informed	 ways	 of	 thinking	 about	research	 and	 research	 data	 (Clarke	 &	 Hoggett,	 2009;	 Frost,	 2015;	 Hollway	 &	Jefferson,	 2013;	 Walkerdine	 et	 al.,	 2001).	 	 Through	 this	 I	 have	 become	 more	attuned	to	 the	 individual	HCP	 functioning	as	part	of	 their	professional	and	social	group,	and	as	part	of	an	institution,	and	have	been	able	to	observe	the	“psychic	in	the	 social”	 (Redman,	 2016)	 e.g.	 PAR	participants	 described	how	policy,	 however	well	intentioned,	has	not	always	been	helpful	for	their	own	clinical	practice	as	they	perceive	it	strengthens	an	unrealistic	desire	on	the	part	of	families	for	certainty.		With	 this	 is	 mind	 a	 psychosocial	 analysis	 was	 undertaken	 of	 the	 workshop	transcripts,	 and	 two	aspects	of	 this	–	 families,	 and	education	–	are	considered	 in	Chapters	 Seven	 and	 Eight.	 	 I	 then	 considered	 study	 one	 transcripts	 and	 this	 is	presented	in	Chapter	Six	–	The	task	of	the	NHS.							
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Chapter	 Six	 –	 The	 Primary	 Task	 Of	 The	 NHS,	 And	 Social	
Defences	
Introduction			This	chapter	is	the	re-evaluation	of	the	thirteen	critical	incidents	(Study	One)	data.	The	psychosocial	analysis	is	based	on	the	concepts	previously	detailed	in	Chapter	Three	-	the	methodology	and	method	chapter	-	but	as	a	reminder	here:		
• Caring	 for	 the	 dying	 is	 extremely	 anxiety	 provoking	 both	 consciously	 or	unconsciously.	
• We	possess	a	dynamic	unconscious	that	we	can	never	access	or	know	completely	(that	protects	us	from	what	is	harmful	and	leads	us	towards	what	is	exciting	to	us	and	away	from	what	is	harmful).	
• Our	unconscious	affects	us	and	others	around	us;	and	similarly	we	are	affected	by	others	–	we	are	relational	beings	
• Unconscious	defence	mechanisms	are	constructed	and	operate	at	 the	 level	of	 the	individual,	 the	 group,	 the	 institutional	 and	 the	 societal	 –	 we	 are	 psychosocial	beings	
• As	 psychosocial	 beings	 we	 co-make	 and	 co-use	 socially	 constructed	 defence	mechanisms.		As	a	reminder	a	socially	constructed	defence	mechanism	is	a	way	by	which	we	emotionally	(usually	unconsciously)	place	part	of	our	emotional	life	into	the	 context	 of	 the	 group	 in	 a	 collaboration	 to	 reduce	 anxieties.	 	 However	 social	defence	mechanisms	can	be	“bittersweet”	if	they	are	counter	to	how	the	individual	manages	 their	 anxiety,	 and	 are	 forced	 to	 “swallow”	 the	 culture	 in	 order	 to	work	there	(Auestad,	2011).		The	reader	is	also	reminded	that	Chapter	4	–	pen	portraits	–	were	written	to	offer	a	“whole”	against	which	 this	 analysis	 can	be	 set	 (Hollway	&	 Jefferson,	2013,	p.65).	The	 aim	of	 the	psychosocial	 analysis	 is	 to	 see	 if	 there	 are	 explanations	 from	 the	data	that	may	illuminate	why	the	differing	stages	of	the	model	for	identifying	dying	and	negotiating	decision-making	may	or	may	not	be	used,	and	 to	 illuminate	why	aspects	of	clinical	practice	may	be	resistant	to	change.		
		
 119	
This	 chapter	 draws	 on	 Menzies-Lyth’s	 study	 of	 social	 defences	 in	 a	 teaching	hospital	(Menzies,	1970)	and	extends	her	work	in	a	contemporary	setting	and	with	reference	 to	 contemporary	 psychosocial	 work.	 	 This	 chapter	 demonstrates	 how	emotionally	impactful,	and	anxiety	provoking,	caring	for	the	dying	is,	and	proceeds	to	discuss	the	social	defences	seen	in	today’s	NHS	about	the	identification	of	dying.		These	are	represented	 in	1)	 the	need	 for	a	cast	 iron	decision	2)	second	opinions	and	 checking	 3)	 making	 sure	 the	 family	 are	 on	 board	 4)	 avoiding	 the	 work.		Avoidance	of	 the	 clinical	work	 is	 seen	 in	 the	 social	defences	of	5)	not	 seeing	 the	dying	 6)	 dressing	 up	 dying	 as	 a	 treatment	 7)	 leaving	 the	 emotional	 work	 to	someone	else	8)	redistribution	of	the	emotional	work.		Those	HCPs	who	undertake	the	clinical	work	can	evidence	9)	detachment	and	denial	of	feelings	10)	break	bad	news	in	a	ritualistic	way.	 	This	chapter	considers	that	the	Hospital	Palliative	Care	Team	 (HPCT)	 are	 the	 new	 social	 defence	 of	 the	 modern	 NHS	 hospital,	 that	alleviates	others	conscious	and	unconscious	anxieties	about	the	care	of	the	dying.		Whilst	exhibiting	a	greater	tolerance	to	recognising	and	caring	for	the	dying,	HPCT	HCPs	 are	 not	 immune	 to	 conscious	 and	 unconscious	 anxiety.	 	 In	 this	 chapter	parallels	 are	 drawn	with	 social	 work	 and	 child	 protection.	 	 Specifically	 Rustin’s	“moment	 of	 respectful	 uncertainty”	 (Rustin,	 2005)	 is	 used	 to	 understand	 what	might	 unsettle	 the	 recognition	 of	 dying,	 and	 enable	 social	 defences	 to	 be	 seen	within	social	defences.	It	is	necessary	at	this	stage	to	explain	that	some	of	the	socially	constructed	defence	mechanisms	that	can	be	seen	in	the	critical	incident	reviews	(Study	One)	are	only	illuminated	 by	 the	 psychosocial	 analysis	 of	 the	 PAR	workshops	 (Study	 Two).	 	 A	little	of	relevant	Study	Two	data	is	included	where	it	specifically	assists	in	this	role.	
The	impact	on	the	HCP	of	caring	for	the	dying		





don’t	 battle	with	 it	&	 I	 think	 you	 know	 very	 occasionally	 it’s	 shocking,	 very	
occasionally	you	get	it	wrong,	on	some	occasions	you	get	it	wrong	&	you	judge	
it	badly,	um	but	you	know	I	very	rarely	am	personally	affected	by	the	patients	






the	 job;	 and	 if	 it	 is	 a	 child	 or	 a	 young	patient	 that	 is	 having	 some	 terminal	
disease	that	 is	really	serious	and	really	sad	and	it	makes	me	sad;	but	 if	a	90	
plus	obviously	(pause)	I	believe	we	all	have	to	go	one	day…So	90	plus	probably	




in	 fact	&	the	older	 I	get	 the	more	that	 it	 shocks	me	when	I	 see	patients	of	a	
similar	 age	 dying	 because	 it	 brings	 your	 own	 mortality	 into	 perspective	
doesn’t	it?"	(HCP7,	L73-76,	Study	One).		Other	HCPs	described,	“forgetting”	aspects	of	clinical	care.		This	may	be	physically	due	to	the	volume	of	clinical	care,	or	the	distance	in	time	from	the	event.		Yet	one	HCP,	who	 could	 remember	 the	detail	 of	 the	operation	and	 the	patient,	 could	not	remember	the	family.	
I	 can’t	 remember,	 but	 it’s	 something	normally	 I	 take	…the	 relative	 to	a	 side	
room	and	then	gradually	 talk	to	them	in	the	presence	of	a	nurses	and	other	
staff…I	can’t	remember	I	think	maybe	it’s	one	of	the	side	room	of	the	X	ward	
and	 the	 family	 was	 quite	 understanding	 I	 would	 say	 (HCP	 13,	 L103-107,	Study	One).			One	wonders	 if	 forgetting	 is	 purposeful	 to	 “enjoy	 a	 place	 to	 breathe”	 (Trustram,	2016),	or	as	Bion	says	in	trying	to	remember	there	is	an	“anxious	shameful	rush”	cited	in	(Trustram,	2016),	where	maybe	avoidance	lies?	Just	one	HCP	found	there	was	satisfaction	to	be	gained	from	this	aspect	of	clinical	care	going	well.	
It	was	nice	because	I	also	met	the	son,	and	then	telephoned	after	the	patient	
had	died	and	he	was	very	grateful	for	that	support	(HCP	10,	L282-283	Study	One).			So	in	this	section	we	have	evidence	of	individuals	unused	to	being	asked	about	the	impact	 of	 care	 on	 themselves;	 of	 rationalising	 the	 care	 of	 the	 dying	 patient	 as	something	that	 is	expected	of	them	as	part	of	their	 job;	of	becoming	desensitized	due	to	the	volume	of	dying	that	they	witness;	and	forgetting.		Yet	HCPs	also	identify	twice	that	the	care	of	 the	dying	patient	 is	 impactful	when	the	person	is	the	same	age	 or	 younger	 than	 them.	 	 Psychosocially	 one	 can	 postulate	 that	 the	 younger	patient	strikes	resonances	with	the	HCP	undermining	their	psychological	defences.		The	 phantasy	 of	 delaying	 death	 through	 medical	 and	 nursing	 care	 is	 rudely	shattered	in	such	circumstances,	causing	HCPs	to	consider	their	own	mortality,	or	reflect	 on	 their	 own	 belief	 systems.	 	 As	 we	 proceed	 through	 this	 chapter	 I	 will	
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highlight	 the	 wider	 psychosocial	 influences	 –	 policy,	 education,	 culturally	embedded	 expectations	 of	 professional	 practice	 -	 on	 these	 seemingly	 individual	responses.	
Social	defences	
The	“cast	iron”	decision	Senior	 HCPs,	 notably	 consultants	 as	 in	 Patient	 Three	 pen	 portrait,	 expressed	 a	wariness	of	getting	the	“diagnosis	of	dying”	wrong.		Making	the	diagnosis	of	dying,	and	changing	the	orientation	of	care	is	a	risk.		Firstly,	HCPs	described	how	they	did	not	want	to	deny	a	patient	meaningful	quality	of	life.	
I	 think	 doctors	 are	 very	 very	 wary	 about	 getting	 that	 decision	 wrong	 and	
about	potentially	denying	something	that	is	meaningful	and	–	pause	-	missing	
something	 that	 is	 reversible;	 and	 in	 a	 way	 that	 conflict	 is	 I	 don’t	 know	
whether	 you	 can	 get	 over	 that	 because	 it	 is	 the	 doctors	 duty	 to	 identify	
whether	something	is	reversible	or	not	(HCP6,	L282-288	Study	One).	So	 identifying	dying	runs	alongside	a	constant	vigilance	 for	potentially	reversible	causes.	 	 	 One	 consultant	 described	 a	 strategy	 of	 listening	 to	 the	 “tone”	 of	 the	handover	from	nurses	about	the	patient	(HCP	Seven,	Study	One)	to	prompt	them	to	search	for	evidence	for	reversible	causes	rather	than	asking	where	they	are	going	with	the	direction	of	care	(staging).		It	is	therefore	not	hard	to	see	how	treatments	are	continued	so	late	into	the	patient’s	dying	trajectory.	
Specific	to	this	chap	[Patient	Four]…there	would	have	been	comments	on	the	
morning	handover	like	he	had	a	really	bad	night	and	he	is	not	doing	well…and	
the	tone	of	 the	handover	 is	one	of	pay	attention	doctor	this	 is	getting	worse	
not	 better…I	 often	 rely	 on	 those	 morning	 MDTs	 [multidisciplinary	 team	
meetings]	to	get	the	signals	from	the	nurses	about	which	patients	I	really	need	
to	focus	on	in	case	there	is	something	reversible	because	they	are	doing	poorly	(HCP	7,	L337-346,	Study	One).	Secondly,	HCPs	want	to	be	right.	 	The	HCP	and	patient	relationship	is	founded	on	the	 premise	 of	 beneficence	 and	 “doing	 good”	 (General	 Medical	 Council,	 2013).		
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Thus	the	risk	of	getting	the	prognosis	of	dying	“wrong”	and	the	patient	surviving	the	 prognosis	 of	 dying,	 rattles	 HCP	 psychological	 defences	 and	 their	 strong	protective	phantasy	of	“being	right”,	 it	reminds	them	of	their	humanness.	 	Risk	is	anxiety	provoking	and	causes	HCPs	to	abandon	more	mature	methods	to	deal	with	anxiety	and	regress	to	more	primitive	methods	(Fraher,	2013),	and	this	is	reflected	in	the	“cast	iron”	decision.		
My	first	role	was	to	make	sure	that	that	decision	[that	the	patient	was	dying]	
was	cast	 iron	 so	 I	wanted	 to	make	 sure	we	had	all	 the	people	 involved	who	
would	have	had	an	opinion	as	to	whether	there	was	anything	that	could	do	-	
that	 being	 oncologists	 and	 GI	 [gastro-intestinal]	 specialists	 basically;	 and	
once	I	got	the	nod	from	those	who	said	there	is	nothing	we	can	do	here	then	at	
that	 stage	 my	 focus	 was	 very	 much	 on	 symptom	 relief	 and	 keeping	 him	
comfortable	(HCP	P7	about	Patient	4,	L79-85,	Study	One).		These	 second	 opinions	 are	 a	 “must	 do”	 as	 part	 of	 the	 route	 for	 good	 decision-making	 at	 end	 of	 life	 (General	 Medical	 Council,	 2010)	 but	 second	 opinions	 and	tests	take	time,	and	HCPs	in	these	interviews	were	prepared	to	endure	a	period	of	uncertainty	whilst	the	evidence	was	found.		 	In	the	case	of	Patient	One	and	Three	the	evidence	sought	was	a	malignancy.		Getting	a	malignant	diagnosis	is	helpful	to	decision	making	 regarding	 dying	 as	 it	 is	 so	 defining.	 	 The	 patient	 has	 to	 be	well	enough	 to	 sustain	 treatment,	 and	 policy	 frowns	 on	 patients	 dying	 within	 thirty	days	 of	 chemotherapy	 (Wallington,	 Saxon,	 Bomb	&	 Smittenaar,	 2016).	 	 There	 is	thus	 support	 for	 recognising	 dying,	 not	 offering	 chemotherapy	 treatment,	 but	offering	care.	HCP	7	in	Patient	Four’s	care,	described	in	the	quote	above,	did	not	though	directly	undertake	 the	 work	 to	 gain	 the	 second	 opinions	 from	 the	 oncologists	 and	 GI	specialists:	 the	 second	 HPCT	 HCP	 was	 involved	 and	 reduced	 the	 period	 of	uncertainty	 by	 directly	 phoning	 the	 oncologist	 and	 GI	 specialists.	 	 The	 palliative	care	HCP	 identified	 that	 they	 thought	 the	 patient	was	 dying,	 and	were	 checking	there	was	 nothing	more	 the	 specialists	 could	 do.	When	phrased	 in	 this	way,	 the	specialists	 admitted	 they	had	no	more	 treatments	 to	 offer	 and	 expressed	 regret.	Thus	there	was	not	a	pressure,	except	from	palliative	care,	at	this	time	for	the	GI	
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specialists,	 to	 recognise	 they	were	 offering	 futile	 treatments,	 and	 to	 take	 a	 step	back	from	care,	in	order	that	end	of	life	care	can	be	managed.	Without	the	resource	of	the	HPCT,	HPC	7	would	have	been	left	managing	a	symptomatic	and	ultimately	dying	patient	with	 futile	and	 ineffective	 interventions	whilst	 the	second	opinions	took	time.		This	may	start	to	explain	how	dying	can	be	identified	so	near	to	death.	It	 is	 likely	that	nursing	colleagues	add	to	the	“anxiety”	of	the	situation,	whilst	the	“cast	 iron	 decision”	 is	 being	worked	 up,	 in	 their	 desire	 to	 do	 and	 act.	 	 The	 first	HPCT	HCP,	in	Patient	Four’s	care	recognised	the	culture	of	nursing	is	to	trust	your	gut	 feeling,	 and	 immediately	 start	 to	 think	and	plan.	 	Nurses	want	 a	decision,	 so	they	 can	 care	 appropriately.	 However,	 giving	 interventional	 nursing	 care,	 which	causes	discomfort	and	may	be	futile	when	a	patient	is	dying	is	distressing.		
What	impacts	on	me	much	more	dramatically	emotionally	is	when	I	am	faced	
with	situations	where	I	am	can’t	see	the	justification	for	the	treatment	that	is	
being	 done;	 often	 the	 people	 are	 being	 over	 treated	 and	 subjected	 to	
interventions	 that	 feel	 to	 me	 to	 be	 to	 be	 possibly	 promoting	 suffering	 as	
opposed	to	alleviating	it	(HCP	2,	L204-208,	Study	One).		
Second	opinions	and	checking	As	 discussed	 above,	 HCPs	 do	 use	 second	 opinions	 as	 informed	 diligent	 practice	because	 it	 brings	 appropriate	 expertise	 to	 the	 patient’s	 care	 e.g.	 in	 the	 case	 of	Patient	Five	 the	 “foot	 team”	brought	expertise	 to	 the	general	 surgeon’s	ability	 to	care	 for	 the	patient.	 	However,	 the	HCP	articulated	how,	 if	 she	had	been	 the	sole	clinician	 (rather	 than	part	of	a	 team)	she	would	have	come	 to	 the	same	decision	but	 referred	 the	 patient	 to	 an	 anaesthetist,	 and	 if	 they	 had	 been	 able	 to	 say	 the	patient	would	not	survive	surgery	then	she	would	have	found	that	helpful.		In	this	manner,	 the	seeking	of	second	opinions	 is	 routinized	and	minimises	anxiety,	and	prolongs	the	period	of	time	before	dying	is	formally	recognised.	In	the	case	of	Patient	One,	even	though	the	patient	had	requested	extubation,	and	she	was	not	improving	despite	being	maximally	ventilated,	when	the	diagnosis	of	lung	malignancy	arrived,	 the	ITU	team	agreed	to	take	things	through	the	“proper	channels”	i.e.	a	referral	to	the	respiratory	team	to	confirm	the	“dying	decision”,	and	
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made	 a	 referral	 to	 palliative	 care.	 	 The	 patient	 experienced	 at	 least	 another	 24	hours	 on	 the	 ventilator,	 and	 lost	 consciousness,	 whilst	 second	 opinions	 and	 the	family	were	bought	on	board.		I	would	suggest	that	her	wishes	were	not	acted	on	soon	 enough,	 and	 procedural	 containment	 of	 HCP	 anxieties	 prevented	 this.	 One	also	has	to	ask	if	the	referral	to	the	respiratory	team	and	the	palliative	care	team	was	a	good	use	of	resources.	As	in	Menzies-Lyth	observations	there	is	avoidance	of	a	single	committing	decision	by	 checking	 and	 counter-checking.	 Senior	 HCPs	 were	 able	 to	 explain	 how	 they	taught	junior	doctors	not	to	worry	by	making	a	decision	and	then	to	returning	to	the	patient	to	check.	In	Patient	One’s	case	the	palliative	care	HCP	was	called	after	the	 ITU	team	recognised	dying,	 the	respiratory	 team	were	called,	and	then	when	the	nurse	arrived	she	described	how	she	checked	the	blood	results,	 talked	to	the	doctors,	and	checked	herself	to	ensure	she	wasn’t	writing	the	patient	off.	
So	 it	 is	 a	 combination	 of	 the	 blood	 results,	 talking	 to	 all	 the	 other	










very	easy	man	(HCP	5,	L52-55,	Study	One).		And	 the	 complicated	 families	 I	 take	 to	 supervision	 to	 try	 and	 work	 out	
strategies	of	how	to	cope	with	them;	with	the	psychologist”	(HCP	5	L252-254,	Study	One).			The	impact	of	the	family	will	be	covered	in	detail	in	Chapter	X.	 	At	this	stage,	it	is	important	to	highlight	that	the	family	are	a	major	source	of	anxiety	in	this	decision-making	 process,	 and	 teams	 work	 very	 hard	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 family	 are	 in	agreement	with	the	decision-making.	When	families	are	in	disagreement	amongst	themselves	 this	 is	 very	 challenging	 to	HCPs	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Patient	 6.	 	 HCP	 13	asked	 for	 another	 member	 of	 the	 team	 to	 be	 involved,	 not	 because	 there	 was	unhappiness	at	the	clinical	care	or	decision-making,	but	because	a	complaint	was	anticipated	from	one	portion	of	the	family	who	wanted	the	patient	to	have	end	of	life	 care	 and	 die	 at	 home,	 whilst	 other	 members	 of	 the	 family	 wanted	 active	treatment	and	life	prolongation.		After-death	complaints	have	to	be	dealt	with,	and	these	are	demoralising	 to	HCPs	 (Menzies-Lyth,	1999)	and	use	valuable	 time	 that	can	 be	 given	 to	 other	 patients.	 In	 addition,	 on	 a	 personal	 level,	 they	 have	 a	significant	impact	on	HCPs	professional	 lives.	 	Sharing	the	burden	of	this	reduces	anxiety.	
Avoiding	the	work		











but	it	cannot	be	false	hope	(HCP	5,	L268-275,	Study	one).	However,	HCPs	in	this	study	identified	that	some	HCPs	choose	not	to	see	dying	and	continue	 to	 offer	 treatments	 -	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	 “can	 I	 cure	 this	 problem	approach?”	 -	 that	 to	others	are	therefore	seen	as	 futile	and	causing	suffering	and	distress.	 	This	might	constitute	 ‘denial’,	 that	 is,	an	attempt	 to	avoid	psychological	pain	and	to	refuse	 to	know	something	because	the	anticipated	knowledge	of	 it	 is	feared	to	be	devastating.	Nurses	agreed	that	caring	for	a	patient	where	the	others	involved	in	the	care	could	not	“see	the	dying”	was	“the	hardest	thing”.	
So	it	is	the	hardest	thing	…when	you	do	not	have	somebody	who	will;	you	can	
see	somebody	in	front	of	you	and	you	say,	and	you	can	see	they	are	dying,	and	
you	have	a	 senior	medical	practitioner	who	 is	not	 seeing	 it….	 they	will	have	
symptoms	–	they	have	lost	weight,	they	are	rarely	wakeful,	they	have	a	poor	
swallow,	 they	 will,	 they	 may	 have	 erratic	 breathing,	 they	 are	 bed	 bound,	
different	pallor,	you	know	the	skin	tone	-	you	touch	them	and	you	look,	their	




restless,	…he	 had	 no	 control	 over	 anything;	 unfortunately	 over	 his	 personal	
hygiene...which	was	quite	offensive	so	as	soon	as	you	walked	into	the	bay	that	
was	 quite	 offensive…and	 just	 him	 not	 being	 able	 to	 keep	 still	 which	 was	
almost	really	disturbing	to	see	(HCP	9,	L7-19	Study	One).			It	 is	possible	that	sometimes	nurses	collude	with	doctors	in	their	hopefulness	for	life	 through	 medical	 treatment,	 but	 doctors	 recognised	 that	 nurse’s	 frequently	recognised	 the	 futility	 of	 treatments	more	 quickly,	 and	 as	 a	 result	 identified	 the	need	to	change	the	focus	of	care	before	they	did.	
I	suspect	some	of	the	nursing	staff	felt	earlier	on	that	this	was	becoming	futile	(HCP	6,	L90-91,	Study	One).	It	isn’t	only	ward	HCPs	who	do	not	see	the	dying;	a	HPCT	HCP	also	“didn’t	see”	the	dying	 (Patient	 Two)	 and	 trusted	 the	 ward	 doctor’s	 decisions	 to	 continue	 active	treatment.	 	 This	 nurse	 used	 the	 Amber	 Care	 Bundle14	as	 an	 explanation	 for	 the	patient	 being	 in	 a	 “will	 he	 /	won’t	 he	 die”	 clinical	 condition;	 yet	 did	 not	 use	 the	bundle	to	prompt	others	to	engage	with	the	patient	and	his	wife	about	their	wishes	and	 preferences.	 	 This	 hopeful	 trusting	 of	 recovery,	 when	 there	 is	 a	 gut	 feeling	about	 the	potential	 for	 dying	means	 suffering	 is	 accommodated	within	 the	ward	nurses’,	and	ward	doctors’	daily	vision	of	care.	 	Specifically,	 in	the	case	of	Patient	Two,	 he	 felt	 he	 was	 being	 held	 in	 hospital	 against	 his	 wishes,	 was	 expressing	spiritual	 distress,	 was	 physically	 unwell	 enough	 to	 have	 his	 care	 escalated	 to	Coronary	 Care	 Unit,	 and	 all	 this	was	 tolerated	 for	 a	 “will	 he	 /	won’t	 he	 recover	approach”,	without	the	uncertainty	of	recovery	being	named.		Nurses	in	this	period	will	have	been	required	 to	wash	and	assist	 this	patient	with	care,	ensure	he	was	connected	 to	 a	 cardiac	 monitor,	 and	 administer	 clinical	 treatments	 despite	 his	clinical	deterioration.	As	a	HCP	it	is	extremely	hard	to	undertake	clinical	care	that	causes	the	patient	pain	(even	if	it	is	transient	pain),	and	it	is	easier	to	tolerate	this	if	 the	 patient	 survives	 and	 gets	 better	 because	 of	 the	 treatment.	 	 I	 wonder	 if																																																									14	The	Amber	Care	Bundle	is	a	paper-based	tool,	designed	to	prompt	clinicians	to	communicate	well	with	patients	and	families,	when	they	recognize	that	a	patient	could	die	in	the	next	six	weeks,	and	whose	current	clinical	condition	has	an	uncertain	recovery.		The	aim	is	prioritize	patient’s	wishes	for	care.	
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routinely	being	expected	 to	administer	clinical	 care	 in	 the	hope	of	cure,	and	 if	 in	addition	 nurses’	 views	 about	 suffering	 and	 recognition	 of	 dying	 are	 ignored	 by	doctors,	this	blunts	nurse’s	sensitivity	to	suffering.	Their	ability	to	recognise	“their	own	gut	instinct”	and	“seeing	dying”	and	to	act	on	it	may	thus	be	impaired.			The	concept	of	“respectful	uncertainty”	(Rustin,	2005)	is	used	in	child	protection	to	describe	both	the	ability	 to	work	with	 families	with	compassion,	but	 to	retain	an	open	 and	 questioning	mind	 set	 about	 their	motivations	 and	 narratives.	 This	 has	parallels	with	the	moment	(s)	of	“gut	recognition	of	dying”	and	“seeing	the	dying”.		I	have	found	it	helpful	to	note	that	others	(Rustin,	2005)	explain	that	at	this		point	of	 respectful	 uncertainty,	 it	 is	 the	 time	 most	 vulnerable	 to	 professional	 anxiety	(inadequate	resources	to	do	the	work,	blame,	challenging	other	professionals)	and	anxieties	arising	from	the	interactions	from	the	patient	and	family.	 	That	patients	and	 families	 project	 their	 suffering	 and	 anxieties	 (sometimes	 consciously,	sometimes	 unconsciously),	 and	 that	 to	 work	 in	 this	 scenario	 requires	 careful	clinical	supervision	(Munro,	2011).		This	is	psychologically	very	skilled	work.	If	one	considers	in	the	case	of	Patient	Two,	that	the	palliative	care	HCPs	gut	instinct	about	dying,	equates	to	the	moment	of	“respectful	uncertainty”	(Rustin,	2005)	then	it	 allows	 contemplation	 of	 what	 factors	 might	 unsettle	 this	 moment.	 	 The	 HCP	highlighted	he	had	seen	others	in	this	position	before	and	they	had	recovered,	and	we	appreciate	that	cardiology	deaths	can	appear	unpredictable	and	sudden.			This	has	to	be	weighed	up	alongside	the	unsettling	factors	mentioned	by	Rustin.	These	could	be	such	things	as	the	pressure	of	the	HCP’s	caseload,	the	need	to	challenge	a	cardiology	consultant	about	their	decision-making,	the	need	to	engage	with	a	wife	with	mental	health	concerns,	or	their	key	worker,	the	need	to	get	home	and	put	the	work	off.		These	may	all	play	a	part	in	preferring	to	live	hopefully	and	not	inject	a	“respectful	 uncertainty”	 into	 the	 assessment	 and	 communication.	 	 However,	similarly	 to	 the	wait	 for	 the	 “cast	 iron”	decision,	ahead	of	 recognising	dying,	 it	 is	helpful	if	the	uncertainty	is	named	and	worked	with	(Krawczyk	&	Gallagher,	2016).	
Dressing up dying as a treatment It	 is	apparent	 that	some	of	 the	HCPs	offering	a	second	opinion	e.g.	 in	 the	case	of	Patient	Five,	commit	to	the	decision	that	the	patient	is	dying,	and	identify	that	the	
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focus	of	care	should	be	comfort,	and	document	this	for	the	ward	team	to	work	with	the	 patient	 and	 family.	 	 However,	 some	 HCPs	 are	 avoiding	 both	 the	 decision-making	and	the	patient	and	family	work	around	breaking	the	news	about	dying	by	dressing	the	deterioration	up	as	requiring	yet	another	treatment	and	only	writing	this	in	the	notes	rather	than	calling	the	ward	team.		In	the	case	of	Patient	Four	this	occurred	when	the	stent	that	had	been	put	in	place	to	open	the	blockage	in	his	stomach	outlet	had	become	blocked	again.	 	The	ward	HCP	in	charge	of	his	care	asked	for	an	opinion	from	the	gastro-intestinal	specialists	about	whether	they	could	assist	with	this.		Instead	of	saying	“no,	there	was	nothing	more	they	could	do”,	it	was	dressed	up	as	“re-x-ray	to	see	if	the	stent	is	in	place”.		The	gastro-intestinal	specialists	could	only	admit	that	the	patient	was	dying	when	the	palliative	care	team	rang	and	re-framed	the	care	for	them.	Dressing	up	dying	as	a	treatment	both	links	to	avoidance	of	dying	and	avoidance	of	a	single	committing	decision.			
Leaving the emotional work to someone else HCPs	in	Study	Two	could	highlight	ways	in	which	the	emotional	work	around	the	care	 of	 the	 dying	was	 avoided	 by	 HCPs.	 	 One	 example	 given	was	 for	 doctors	 to	write,	 “Consider	Do	Not	Attempt	Cardio	Pulmonary	Resuscitation”	 in	 the	medical	notes,	 leaving	 this	 work	 for	 the	 following	 doctor	 to	 pick	 up	 at	 the	 next	 patient	review.	 	 In	 Study	 One,	 avoidance	 of	 emotional	 work	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 case	 of	Patient	 Two.	When	 the	 possibility	 for	 dying	was	 not	 introduced,	 and	 dying	was	missed,	 then	 the	 emotional	work	of	 preparing	 the	wife,	which	 should	have	been	undertaken	by	a	senior	HCP,	was	transformed	into	the	responsibility	of	ward	staff	at	 the	 time	of	death.	 	Bearing	 in	mind	 this	patient’s	wife	had	a	history	of	mental	illness,	 then	 the	 least	 qualified	 clinical	 staff,	 and	 at	 a	weekend,	will	 have	 had	 to	break	 bad	 news	 and	 cope	 with	 her	 grief	 at	 his	 death.	 From	 there	 on,	 once	 the	deceased	 patient	 transferred	 to	 the	 mortuary	 no	 one	 on	 the	 ward	 would	 be	exposed	to	her	emotion,	and	hence	any	emotional	work	 is	 left	with	 the	bereaved	and	to	others	in	the	community	who	come	into	contact	with	her.		
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Re-Distribution of the emotional work How	the	emotional	work	was	re-distributed	was	not	predictable.		For	example,	in	the	case	of	Patient	One	 the	consultant	undertook	all	of	 the	 family	work	after	 the	decision	was	made	 that	 the	 patient	 was	 dying.	 	 HCP	 4	 until	 this	 time	 had	 been	caring	 daily	 for	 the	 patient	 and	 knew	 the	 family,	 opened	 the	 test	 results	 on	 the	computer	 and	 knew	 she	 had	 a	malignancy	 and	was	 dying,	 and	 yet	 accepted	 this	Consultant	 take	 over	 of	 the	 breaking	 bad	 news	 to	 the	 family	 without	 question.		There	are	consequences	for	core	and	specialty	training	grade	doctors	not	routinely	going	 with	 consultants	 to	 family	 meetings	 such	 as	 these,	 as	 it	 limits	 their	opportunities	for	learning	(the	learning	opportunity	will	specifically	be	addressed	within	 Chapter	 Eight	 –	How	 senior	HCPs	 learn	 to	 care	 for	 the	 dying	 patient	 and	family).		However,	 in	 Patient	 Five’s	 case	 the	 surgical	 consultant	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 patient’s	care	avoided	the	patient	and	family	work.	 	Once	the	second	opinion	was	sourced	from	 the	multi-disciplinary	 foot	 team,	 and	 the	 dying	 was	 recognised,	 the	 junior	ward	 doctor	 was	 left	 to	 set	 up	 and	 conduct	 the	 family	 meeting.	 	 They	 asked	palliative	care	for	assistance	with	this.	
Detachment and denial of feelings Detachment	has	two	meanings	in	psychology.		It	can	be	a	positive	behaviour,	which	allows	 a	 person	 to	 react	 calmly	 to	 highly	 emotional	 circumstances,	 whilst	 still	being	 empathetic.	 	 In	 this	 circumstance	 it	 is	 a	 decision	 to	 avoid	 engaging	 in	emotional	 connections.	 	 It	 can	also	be	used	 to	describe,	 “emotional	numbing”	 i.e.	dissociation	 and	 depersonalization,	 when	 faced	 with	 too	 much	 anxiety	 and	distress.	Mental	states	are	opaque,	and	thus	we	have	to	imagine	what	lies	behind	behaviour	 (Fonagy,	 2014)	 and	 thus	 it’s	 challenging	 to	 separate	 what	 is	 an	individual	defence,	and	what	might	be	part	of	the	culture	of	the	NHS.	Some	HCPs	in	Study	One	did	describe	feeling	sad;	some	denied	that	caring	for	the	dying	had	an	impact	and	took	it	as	part	of	their	job;	others	though	could	describe	the	impact	and	the	detachment.	
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Personally	 it	 is	 a	 bit	 sad	 as	 he	 is	 only	 young	 this	 chap…	 But	 it	 was	 a	 very	
professional	relationship	with	a	large	degree	of	detachment	 (HCP	7,	L73-77,	Study	One).		Looking	at	Study	One	data	with	the	lens	of	Study	Two	does	indicate	that	there	may	be	a	cultural	narrative	and	social	defence	of	HCPs	emotions	being	shut	down,	and	encouragement	of	dissociation	from	their	 feelings.	One	of	 the	HCPs	 in	Study	Two	felt	the	anger	of	a	family	very	strongly,	took	it	very	personally,	and	thus	expressed	a	feeling	that	she	hadn’t	cared	for	the	patient	and	family	well.	Rather	than	explore	her	emotions,	or	help	her	reflect,	another	senior	HCP	encouraged	her	to	build	her	defences.	
If	you	let	every	single	death	affect	you,	particularly	in	the	specialties	we	work	
in,	 you	would	 be	 a	 basket	 case	wouldn’t	 you...You	 have	 to	 build	 that	 suit	 of	
armour	(L196-200,	Workshop	One,	Study	Two).			The	 comment	was	meant	 kindly	 but	 the	HCP	was	 effectively	 silenced.	 This	 is	 an	example	 of	 where	 the	 social	 defence	 is	 constructed	 beyond	 the	 individual,	 into	professional	narratives.	No	attention	is	paid	to	the	emotional	impact	of	clinical	care	in	either	medical	(General	Medical	Council,	2013)	or	nursing	practice	(Nursing	and	Midwifery	Council,	2015),	they	are	completely	focused		on	how	the	HCP	must	and	should	 behave.	 	 This	 is	 embedded	 into	 training	 and	 then	 clinical	 practice,	 and	perpetuated.	 HCPs	 in	 Study	 Two	 though,	 discussed	 how	 they	 relied	 on	 informal	debriefs	with	colleagues.	
Yeah	we	have	some	informal	debriefs,	definitely	all	the	time…Its	when	we	are	
sitting	around	on	a	Friday	night	 in	 the	 office,	 its	 nothing	more	 formal	 than	
that	is	it…but	if	someone	has	had	a	particularly	difficult	case	then	just	sort	of	
diluting	it	out	(L221-225,	Workshop	Two,	Study	Two).	This	study	has	not	looked	at	humour	or	informal	relationships	and	resilience	and	this	 would	 be	 worthy	 of	 study	 in	 the	 future	 (Frost,	 Höjer,	 Campanini,	 Sicora,	 &	Kullburg,	2017).	
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Breaking Bad news as a ritual Despite	 much	 communication	 skills	 training	 occurring	 to	 ensure	 that	 HCPs	 can	undertake	 breaking	 bad	 news	 with	 kindness	 and	 empathy	 (Moore,	 Mercado,	Artigues,	 &	 Lawrie,	 2013),	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 breaking	 bad	 news	 is	 seen	 as	another	“task”	in	the	clinical	situation.	 	For	example	HCP	13	could	not	remember	the	family	but	knew	what	he	would	do	in	the	circumstance	of	recognising	a	patient	as	“terminal”.	
He	was	in	my	opinion	at	that	time	terminal,	and	any	patient	who	is	terminal	it	
is	 advised	decision	 to	 involve	 the	 family	 beforehand;	 that	 this	 patient	 is	 not	
doing	 well	 and	 this	 is	 a	 possible	 expected	 outcome…normally	 I	 take	 the	
patient,	not	the	patient,	the	relative	to	a	side	room	and	then	gradually	talk	to	
them	in	the	presence	of	a	nurse	and	other	staff	(HCP	13,	L96-105,	Study	One).	Doctors	who	do	not	undertake	this	aspect	of	clinical	care	regularly	have	still	learnt	models	of	communication	from	medical	school	teaching,	and	are	endeavouring	to	follow	this,	and	have	even	rote	learnt	where	they	should	pause.		
It’s	 the	 similar	 conversation	 you	 have	 when	 you	 are	 trying	 to	 explain	 that	
patient’s	already	died...I	am	trying	 to	remember	 the	 term	…you	have	 to	 find	
the	right	you	have	 to	prepare	 the	 situation,	…you	have	 to	 find	out	what	 the	
relatives	already	knows	about	the	situation	…(pause)	provide	them	with	any	
additional	 information	 pause	 explain	 to	 them	 that	 you	 know	 things	 aren’t	
good,	give	 them	a	 few	warning	 shots	before	hand	and	…	but	ultimately	 you	
have	to	say,	you	know,	explicitly	that	this	person	is	dying	and	use	those	words	
not	 avoiding	 those	 words	 because	 if	 you	 avoid	 those	 words	 then	 it	 won’t	
register	…people	hear	what	they	want	to	hear	…pause	and	just	–	pause	-		see	
what	their	thoughts	are	on	that	(HCP	4,	L156-167,	Study	One).	Yet,	 due	 to	 the	 fluctuant	 condition	with	patients	with	 long-term	 conditions,	 they	can	regularly	present	to	hospital	 looking	as	if	they	are	dying.	 	HCPs	who	are	only	meeting	 the	 patient	 for	 the	 first	 time	 may	 well	 “break	 bad	 news”	 because	 the	clinical	 situation	warrants	 this.	 	 However,	 patients	 can	 survive	 and	 HCPs	 in	 the	workshops	described	families	who	didn’t	want	to	hear	the	news	again.	
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They	 say	we	have	had	 this	 conversation	 so	many	 times	 that	 they	might	 not	
recover	 this	 time;	 I	 don’t	 want	 to	 talk	 about	 it	 anymore	 (Workshop	 Two,	L143-145	Study	Two).		I	 am	suggesting	 that	HCPs	have	 linked	 recognising	dying	with	 the	need	 to	break	bad	 news	 and	 have	 honest	 conversations	 to	 give	 good	 end	 of	 life	 care	 (National	Palliative	 and	 End	 of	 Life	 Care	 Partnership,	 2015).	 However	 the	 conscious	 and	unconscious	anxieties	surrounding	this	process	means	it	is	being	undertaken	in	a	ritualistic	manner,	and	possibly	without	assessment	of	the	capacity	of	the	patient	(Kobayashi,	Kato,	&	Takeuchi,	2014)	and	meaningful	engagement	about	what	the	perceived	 “bad	 news”	will	mean	 (Tuffrey-Wijne,	 2012).	 	 There	 is	 nothing	 in	 the	literature,	 but	 relatives	 now	 are	 expressing	 dis-engagement	 from	 hearing	 bad	news	when	 it	 is	repeatedly	given,	and	this	would	warrant	a	research	study	of	 its	own.	However,	the	social	defence	of	breaking	bad	news	in	a	ritualistic	way,	despite	the	 good	 intentions	 that	motivate	 it,	may	make	 the	 breaking	 of	 bad	 news	 at	 the	actual	time	of	recognising	dying	very	challenging.	
	Hospital	Palliative	Care	Team	–	the	new	social	defence	








In	 this	 example,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 see	 how	 engagement	 with	 families	 may	 be	unconsciously	avoided,	and	palliative	care	are	seen	as	the	route	for	ward	teams	to	be	able	to	offer	care.	 	Palliative	Medicine	emerged	as	a	medical	speciality	in	1987	and	 in	 the	 words	 of	 sociologist	 Dr	 David	 Clark	 has	 “seized	 hold	 of	 the	 field	 of	caring”,	and	hospital	palliative	care	(Clark,	2014).		Without	attending	to	the	politics	of	 the	 recent	 dominance	 of	 the	 medical	 discourse,	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 since	Menzies-Lyth	 undertook	 the	 psychoanalytic	 study	 of	 nurses	 in	 the	 1950’s,	 the	introduction	of	medically	led	palliative	care	services	has	occurred	in	hospitals,	as	has	 the	 introduction	 of	 standards	 for	 the	 organisation	 of	 clinical	 practice	 in	 the	specialty	(NICE,	2004).	My	argument	is	that	the	HPCT	is	the	social	defence	of	the	modern	NHS	 hospital	 that	 alleviates	 others	 conscious	 and	 unconscious	 anxieties	about	the	care	of	the	dying.	
Hospital	Palliative	Care	Teams	are	not	an	infallible	social	defence.	
When	I	look	at	the	data,	despite	the	confessed	acceptance	of	dying,	and	recognising	the	 range	of	 social	defence	mechanisms,	 I	have	 found	 it	 especially	 challenging	 to	explain	how	a	Palliative	Care	HCP	“missed”	the	recognition	of	dying	in	the	case	of	patient	Two.	Menzies-Lyth	felt	it	was	best	to	understand	an	organisation	with	the	distance	of	an	outsider	(Menzies,	1970).	 I	have	found	it	helpful	to	use	the	 lens	of	research	from	social	 work	 about	 the	 dynamics	 of	 social	 workers	 and	 child	 protection	 to	understand	what	might	be	going	on	as	HCPs	work	with	dying	patients	and	families.		Death,	like	sexual	abuse,	has	such	a	powerful	effect	on	internal	boundaries,	that	it	is	usually	split	off	and	repressed	(Harvey,	2010),	and	I	can	see	how	this	 is	“split-off”	in	the	hospital	setting		in	the	form	of	a	palliative	care	team	which	requires	peer	review	structures,	 time	and	psychological	 supervision	 to	process	 the	work	about	the	 care	 of	 the	 dying	 and	 their	 family.	 	 The	 palliative	 care	 team	 is	 the	organisational	 system	 (the	 social	 defence	 mechanism	 of	 the	 organisation)	 that	allows	others	to	be	protected	from	their	anxiety.		However,	individuals	in	the	palliative	care	team	become	ever	increasingly	exposed	to	 a	 volume	 of	 dying,	 which	 increases	 their	 expertise,	 but	 does	 not	 make	 them	personally	 or	 systematically	 infallible.	 Palliative	 care	 as	 a	 discipline	 has	
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endeavoured	to	anticipate	the	anxiety	of	its	practitioners	and	others	in	caring	for	the	dying	and	to	organise	a	pathway	or	plan	of	care,	which	others	can	follow.		They	have	 constructed	 professional	 and	 institutional	 systems	 e.g.	 the	 Liverpool	 Care	Pathway	 for	 the	 imminently	 dying	 patient,	 and	 the	 AMBER	 Care	 Bundle	 for	 the	patient	 likely	 to	 die	 in	 the	 next	 six	 weeks	 that	 others	 can	 legitimately	 use	 to	prompt	 them	 to	 care	well	 for	 the	dying	patient	and	defend	against	 their	anxiety.		However,	these	tools	were	never	developed	to	negate	uncertainty	but	to	help	other	HCPs15	negotiate	it,	and	prompt	standards	of	clinical	care	and	communication	with	the	patient	and	family.			If	other	HCPs	find	the	care	of	the	dying	patient	and	family	hard,	and	use	these	tools	as	a	 recipe	 i.e.	a	 “social	defence”	against	 the	anxiety	of	caring	 for	 the	dying,	 then	this	becomes	a	very	risky	procedure.		As	was	seen	with	the	disestablishment	of	the	Liverpool	 Care	 Pathway,	 due	 to	 some	 patients	 experiencing	 less	 than	 individual	care,	 the	 defence	mechanism	was	 blamed	 (Regnard,	 2013).	 	 Palliative	 care	 then	becomes	 organisationally	 vulnerable	 in	 promoting	 these	 tools.	 They	 are	 also	 left	with	a	responsibility	for	recognising	dying.		HCPs	 in	 Study	 Two	 wondered	 about	 the	 abnormality	 of	 carrying	 the	 weight	 of	looking	out	for	the	dying	period	to	prepare	patients	and	families.	





Thus	it	is	possible	that	palliative	care	professionals,	trained	and	skilled	enough	to	care	 for	 the	 sick	 and	 dying	 all	 day,	 (and	 thus	 be	 employed	 as	 part	 of	 the	organisational	 defence	mechanism),	 using	 social	 defence	mechanisms	 their	 own	specialty	 have	 developed,	 to	 still	 be	 vulnerable	 to	 professional	 and	 personal	anxieties	at	the	time	of	experiencing	a	“gut	instinct	about	the	potential	for	dying”	and	their	own	 ‘moment	of	respectful	uncertainty”.	 	This	helps	give	a	voice	 to	 the	complexities	 of	 explanation	 that	 have	 paralysed	 me	 in	 this	 analysis	 –	 there	 are	social	defences	within	social	defences.	
Summary	and	Commentary	on	the	Task	of	the	NHS	and	Social	Defences	
Menzies-Lyth	noted	that	the	primary	task	of	the	NHS	in	the	1950s	was	to	care	for	ill	 people	 who	 could	 not	 be	 cared	 for	 in	 their	 own	 homes.	 She	 specifically	recognised	that	nurses	in	the	1950’s	cared	for	the	“physically	ill,	often	seriously	ill,	and	when	recovery	is	uncertain	or	incomplete,	and	that	nurses	face	the	reality	of	suffering	 and	 death	 as	 few	 people	 do”	 (Menzies,	 1970,	 p.440).	 	 She	 argued	 that	nurses’	 experience	 of	 caring	 for	 the	 sick	 and	 the	 vulnerable	 evoked	 anxieties	(conscious	and	unconscious)	which	related	to	the	experience	of	having	been	taken	care	of	as	a	vulnerable	infant	(Menzies,	1970).	Later	researchers	have	considered	that	Menzies-Lyth’s	 definition	 of	 the	 “task”	 was	 limited.	 Hoggett	 highlighted	 the	lack	of	attention	paid	to	the	social	construction	of	the	task	(how	society	affects	the	definition	and	interpretation	of	the	task),	and	the	gendered	nature	of	nursing	and	medicine	at	the	time	(Hoggett	2015).	 	Others	have	identified	how	anxieties	about	“the	 task”	 can	 be	 affected	 by	 such	 factors	 as	 organisational	 leadership	(Papodopoulos	 2015),	 the	 volume	 of	 patient	 care	 (Tutton	 and	 Langstaff	 (2015),	against	 a	 background	 of	 “doing	more	 for	 less”	 (Evan	 2015),	 and	 it	 is	 noted	 that	Menzies-Lyth	though	does	not	specifically	discuss	the	impact	for	nurses	of	caring	for	the	dying.			We	know	that	since	the	1970s	the	rate	of	people	dying	at	home	has	decreased,	and	the	rate	of	dying	 in	hospital	has	been	 increasing	(Gomes	&	Higginson,	2008)	and	has	 only	 just	 started	 to	 stabilise	 (Gomes,	 Calanzani,	 &	 Higginson,	 2012).	 	 In	 the	Trust	where	 the	 study	 took	 place	 they	 experienced	 22	 deaths	 /	week.	 Since	 the	time	of	Menzies-Lyth’s	study	the	provision	of	care	to	the	dying	patient	has	become	
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a	clinical	priority.		The	care	of	the	dying	patient	has	its	own	clinical	guidelines	that	differ	from	those	used	in	the	management	of	the	patient	who	has	the	potential	for	recovery	 (NICE,	 2017),	 expectations	 of	 standards	 of	 clinical	 practice	 (General	Medical	Council,	2010)	(Nursing	and	Midwifery	Council,	2015),	and	national	audits	of	clinical	indicators	of	care	(Marie	Care	Cancer	Care,	Royal	College	of	Physicians,	2014).	 	Families	are	 formally	being	surveyed	 for	 their	experience	of	support	and	care	(Department	of	Health,	2012).	 	The	care	of	 the	dying	patient	 in	hospital	has	also	 been	 subject	 to	 external	 scrutiny	 (Neuberger	 2012);	 the	 very	 public	withdrawal	 of	 previously	 agreed	 NICE	 guidelines	 for	 the	 care	 of	 the	 dying	 has	caused	distress	 to	clinicians	who	 felt	 it	was	 the	equivalent	of	 the	 “Highway	Code	being	banned	because	of	poor	drivers”	 (Regnard	2013);	my	own	experience	was	that	the	withdrawal	of	the	NICE	guidelines,	and	media	attention	to	this,	also	caused	patients	 and	 relatives	 to	 distrust	medical	 and	 nursing	 decisions	 that	 the	 patient	was	dying.	I	argue	today	that	a	parallel	and	primary	task	of	the	NHS,	alongside	caring	for	the	sick,	is	to	identify	and	care	appropriately	for	the	dying.		It	must	also	encompass	the	care	 of	 the	 patient’s	 family	 (General	Medical	 Council,	 2010)	 	 (National	 Palliative	and	End	of	Life	Care	Partnership,	2015)	(Nursing	and	Midwifery	Council,	2015).		In	 this	 chapter	 I	 argue	 that	 caring	 for	 dying	 patients	 and	 their	 families	 causes	individual	HCPs	as	part	of	their	ward	team,	and	within	their	professional	hierarchy	and	 as	 part	 of	 the	 hospital	 team,	 to	 struggle	 with	 and	 psychologically	 defend	against	conscious	and	conscious	anxieties	that	are	brought	up	as	they	try	to	carry	out	 clinical	 care,	 and	 this	 is	 manifested	 in	 co-constructed	 social	 defence	mechanisms	specific	to	the	recognition	of	dying.		These	social	defence	mechanisms	have	the	potential	to	get	in	the	way	of	and	delay	the	identification	of	dying	to	the	detriment	of	the	care	of	the	patient.	 	The	social	defence	mechanisms	identified	in	this	study	specific	to	dying	are	represented	in	1)	the	need	for	a	cast	iron	decision	2)	second	opinions	and	checking	and	3)	making	sure	the	family	are	on	board.		All	of	these,	while	required	for	good	practice,	can	take	too	much	time,	and	can	result	in	the	patient’s	voice	being	lost	and	delay	the	actual	recognition	of	dying.	
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Introduction		The	 previous	 chapter	 discussed	 the	 psychosocial	 analysis	 of	 Study	 One	 and	presented	how	the	“task	of	the	NHS”	is	not	only	to	care	for	the	sick,	but	also	to	care	for	 the	 dying.	 Drawing	 on	 the	 work	 of	 Menzies-Lyth	 it	 postulated	 that	 HCPs	experienced	conscious	and	unconscious	anxieties	 from	providing	care	to	patients	who	 are	 sick,	 suffering	 and	 dying,	 and	 that	 these	 anxieties	 resonated	 with	 the	HCPs’	 earliest	 experiences	 of	 vulnerability	 or	 care,	 and	 terror	 of	 death.	 There	 is	strong	evidence	that	at	the	point	where	dying	is	recognised,	the	very	sick	patient’s	care	provokes	much	anxiety	for	the	HCP	and	for	the	institution,	and	so	in	response	to	 this	 there	 is	 a	 co-creation	 of	 social	 defence	 mechanisms	 specifically	 about	recognising	 dying.	 	 It	 is	 asserted	 that	 palliative	 care	 teams	 are	 the	 new	 social	defence	against	anxiety	about	the	care	of	the	dying	in	the	NHS.			There	was	evidence	 from	Study	One	that	 the	actual	death	of	 the	patient	was	 less	anxiety	provoking	than	recognising	that	death	was	likely.	 	Recognising	that	death	was	likely	brought	a	responsibility	for	decision-making	about	a	potential	change	in	the	 priorities	 for	 treatment	 and	 care	 from	 life	 prolongation	 to	 comfort,	 and	 for	preparing	the	family	for	bereavement.		Doctors	are	responsible	for	the	decision	to	change	the	treatment	plan,	and	nurses	for	delivering	the	care.	 	The	recognition	of	dying	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 become	 an	 “emotional	 and	 ethical	 hot	 potato”	 being	passed	between	HCPs.	 	If	the	doctor	recognises	dying	ahead	of	or	with	the	senior	nurse,	then	the	nurse	can	feel	relief.		If	the	senior	nurse	recognises	dying	ahead	of	the	 doctor,	 there	 is	 a	 level	 of	 ethical	 distress	 for	 the	 nurse	 as	 life-prolonging	treatments,	which	nurses	have	to	administer,	usually	involve	a	level	of	discomfort	or	pain	 for	 the	patient.	 	Even	having	a	blood	pressure	measurement	 taken	 is	not	without	discomfort.	The	patient	is	not	a	neutral	bystander:	they	may	recognise	that	they	 are	 dying,	 may	 want	 life-prolonging	 treatment	 stopped	 and	 pass	 the	emotional	work	 to	 the	HCP	 to	 prepare	 their	 family.	 The	patient	 could	die	whilst	receiving	all	 life-prolonging	treatment	and	before	HCPs	could	or	would	recognise	dying	and	prepare	 the	 family.	 	 In	 this	 situation	 it	 is	possible	 that	 the	grief	of	 the	family	is	likely	to	be	felt	most	intensely	by	the	HCPs	on	the	ward	at	the	time.		These	
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Liminality	is	a	concept	initially	described	by	anthropologists	(Szakolczai	2009).		It	refers	to	something	universal	and	simple	–	“the	experience	of	finding	oneself	at	a	boundary	or	an	in-between	position,	either	spatially	or	temporarily…	and	is	about	how	human	beings	in	their	various	social	and	cultural	contexts	deal	with	change”	(Thomassen	 2015,	 p.	 40).	 Individual’s	 personal	 and	 community	 life	 is	 made	 of	routines	 and	 repetitions,	 yet	 life	 presents	us	with	 situations	outside	our	normal.		Death	 is	 recognised	 as	 one	 of	 those	 situations	 outside	 of	 our	 normal	 and	 is	described	 as	 a	 liminal	 situation	 (Thomassen	 2015).	 	 In	 liminal	 situations	 we	require	different	tools	to	navigate	that	moment(s)	and	as	such	human	beings	tend	to	 ritualise	 and	 symbolise	 such	 moments.	 	 It	 is	 this	 repetition	 of	 ritual	 and	symbolisation	 in	memory	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 liminal	 event	 that	 lies	 at	 the	heart	 of	 community	 formation	 (Szakolczai	 2009).	 	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	“ritual	does	not	decorate	reality;	it	is	about	that	reality”	(Thomassen	2015,	p.41).	It	also	brings	resource	 in	terms	of	skilled	personnel	 familiar	with	the	experience	of	that	transition	to	help	people	navigate	the	liminal	situation.			Arnold	Van	Gennep	is	credited	with	the	identification	of	the	concept	of	the	liminal,	in	 his	 1909	book	Rites	de	Passage	 and	his	 observation	of	 ritual	 passages	 as	 they	unfold	in	life	from	birth	to	death.			The	detail	of	these	is	described	below:	
• “First	 there	 are	 rites	 of	 separation	 in	 which	 the	 previous	 state	 or	 social	position	is,	as	it	were,	broken	down.			
• Then	there	is	a	middle	phase	of	passage,	which	might	often	involve	a	trial	or	test	that	must	be	successfully	completed.			
• The	passage	then	ends	with	the	rites	of	incorporation	during	which	the	new	status,	position	or	identity	is	established	and	recognized”	(Stenner	2012,	p.	5)		The	 use	 of	 liminality	 as	 a	 methodological	 tool	 to	 provide	 explanatory	 and	interpretative	 accounts	 in	 health	 care	 has	 been	 present	 since	 the	 late	 1980s.		Anthropologists	 first	 used	 the	 concept	 of	 liminality	 to	 consider	 patients’	
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experience	 of	 disability	 (Murphy,	 Scheer,	 Murphy	 &	Mack	 1988).	 	 Murphy	 et	 al	found	 the	 deviancy	 /	 stigma	 frameworks	 (previously	 used	 by	 sociological	researchers)	 limiting,	 and	 used	 liminality	 to	 re-frame	 the	 experience	 of	 the	disabled	so	that	it	was	viewed	as	historically	and	culturally	malleable,	rather	than	fixed	by	biology.		Using,	the	concept	of	liminality,	Murphy	argued	that	the	purpose	of	rehabilitation	units	for	physically	disabled	people,	was	to	reconcile	the	disabled	person	 to	 their	 social	 condition,	 rather	 than	 to	 help	 them	 recognize	 that	 their	disability	was	an	arrestment	in	their	life	history.	 	The	authors	dramatize	this	as	a	rite	of	passage	frozen	in	its	liminal	stage.			They	argued	that	the	disabled	should	be	liberated	 to	 fight,	 rather	 than	accept	 their	outsider	status,	and	 in	 that	 fight	 there	could	be	transition	to	full	community	membership.	 	In	line	with	current	thinkers,	such	 as	 Horvath	 et	 al	 (2015),	 liminality	 was	 used	 as	 a	 concept	 to	 both	 to	understand	the	situation	and	to	transform	it.	Over	 recent	 years	 liminality	 has	 been	 drawn	 on	 by	 palliative	 care	 specialists	 to	illuminate	such	topics	as	the	experience	of	hospice	as	compared	to	home	(Broom	&	Cavenagh	2011).	 	Nicholson	 and	 colleagues	 (Nicholson	 et	 al	 2012)	 consider	 that	frail	older	people	live	in	persistent	liminality,	caught	between	living	and	dying.		She	argues	that	frail	older	adults	exhibit	agency,	through	their	work	to	remain	secure	in	 their	 homes	 via	 daily	 routines	 and	 social	 interactions.	 Her	 transformation	recommendation	 is	 that	society	could	alter	 the	experience	of	 the	 frail	older	adult	by	recognizing	their	agency	and	social	relationships,	rather	than	focusing	on	their	physically	frail	bodies.		In	this	paper	there	is	nothing	about	the	“middle	passage	or	ritual(s)”	that	negotiate	this	transition.	More	 recent	 authors	 have	 critiqued	 other’s	 use	 of	 liminality	 as	 a	 “notion	 of	liminality”	 (MacArtney	 et	 al	 2015,	 p2).	 	 Utilizing	 the	 experience	 of	 patients	attending	 palliative	 care	 outpatient	 departments,	 MacArtney	 et	 al	 (2015)	considered	 that	 palliative	 care	 patients’	 abilities	 to	 carry	 on	 with	 their	 lives	 as	normally	 as	 possible,	whilst	 considering	 a	 future	 that	 included	 death,	was	more	reflective	of	parallax.	 	Parallax	 is	a	positive	state	 that	acknowledges	participants’	attempt	to	retain	a	sense	of	control	and	agency	and,	MacArtney	et	al	argue,	useful	in	thinking	about	how	liminal	situations	are	psychologically	and	socially	managed.	I	would	though	argue	that	patients	that	are	well	enough	to	transport	themselves	to	
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a	 palliative	 care	 outpatients	 department	 (MacArtney	 et	 al	 2015),	 or	 maintain	themselves	at	home	(Nicholson	et	al	2012),	may	on	some	 level	have	a	sense	that	death	may	be	approaching,	but	may	well	utilize	their	own	agency	to	focus	on	living.			Frommer	(2005),	a	psychoanalyst,	describes	those	moments	of	living	when,	rather	than	 unconsciously	 defending	 against	 the	 knowledge	 of	 our	 own	 death,	 the	moment	contains	a	sense	of	knowledge	 that	we	will	also	die.	Frommer	describes	how	 those	 moments	 can	 be	 lit	 with	 “dark,	 disturbing	 hues”	 (Frommer	 2015,	 p.	482).	 	Yet	he	argues	 that	 the	 test	 is	 to	 find	 the	 “liberating	potential	of	mortality”	which	 enables	 individuals	 to	 “savor	 life,	 order	 priorities	 and	 tolerate	 losses	 and	limitations”	(Yalom	(1980)	cited	in	Frommer,	2015,	p.	482).		He	concludes	that	this	liberation	 is	 “an	 unstable	 achievement	 not	 easily	won”	 (Frommer	 2015,	 p.	 482).		He	 suggests	 that	 how	 the	 knowledge	 of	 death	 is	 bought	 to	 conscious	 thought	 is	often	through	personal	 loss	of	someone	dear	to	a	person,	and	the	containment	of	this	experience	by	a	psychoanalyst.	Again,	in	this	paper	there	is	nothing	about	the	“middle	passage	or	ritual(s)”	that	negotiate	this	transition.	I	argue	that	recognizing	that	dying	is	imminent	brings	the	liminal	period	of	death	much	 closer	 both	 physically	 and	 psychologically,	 than	 the	 “living	 whilst	contemplating	dying	situation”	of	the	MacArtney,	Nicholson,	and	Frommer	studies.		Whilst	these	authors	use	liminality	to	describe	the	“betwixt	/	between”	situation,	and	 can	 make	 transformation	 recommendations,	 none	 of	 these	 recent	 authors	consider	 the	 concept	of	 ritual,	 skilled	negotiation	of	 the	 ritual	with	 those	new	 to	the	liminal	situation,	or	the	building	of	community.	I	 have	 found	 it	 helpful	 to	 consider	 Stenner’s	 paper	 that	 links	 liminality	 and	affectivity	as	part	of	a	psychosocial	process	(Stenner	2012),	as	Stenner	includes	the	importance	 of	 ritual	 to	 contain	 the	 strong	 emotions	 experienced	 in	 a	 liminal	period.		Stenner	views	affect	and	liminality	as	a	way	for	careful,	conscious	thought	to	 illuminate	 space	 and	 transition	 between	 organised	 structures	 and	 in	 this	manner	his	reflections	on	affect	and	liminality	help	illuminate	the	HCP	and	family	relationship	as	the	patient	transitions	from	living	to	dying.			Affect	has	been	understood	to	refer	to	the	communication	of	emotions	or	feelings	(Woodward,	2015)	such	as	joy,	fear,	shame,	excitement,	hatred	and	love	(Stenner,	
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Firstly,	 the	patient	 is	not	a	passive	bystander	 to	 the	HCP	and	 family	relationship,	but	plays	a	definite	(if	unconscious)	role	in	this.		The	patient	is	entering	a	period	of	liminality	as	they	transition	from	living	to	imminently	dying	and	then	to	death,	but	patients	often	fail	to	introduce	their	families	into	conversation	with	HCPs.	
I	 think	 I	 have	 had	 three	 patients	who	 have	 said	 “I	would	 really	 like	 to	 talk	
about	 this	with	my	 family	 and	 can	we	make	 a	 date	 and	 time	 and	 have	 the	
whole	 lot	 round”,	 and	 I	 have	 had	 to	 go	 and	 do	 the	whole	 thing,	 but	 two	 or	
three	at	the	most	(L	460-463	Workshop	Two,	Study	Two).	They	can	keep	their	family	away	despite	the	HCP’s	best	attempt	to	help	the	patient	involve	their	family.	
I	often	ask	the	patients	when	they	come	on	their	own	again	and	again,	have	
you	 told	 your	 children,	 do	 they	 know?	 	 And	 they	 say	 yes,	 but	 I	 have	 the	
impression	 that	 they	 don’t	 come	 because	 they	 don’t	 really	 know	 what’s	
happening	(L353-355	Workshop	Three,	Study	Two).	Patients	 and	 families	 may	 not	 have	 close	 relationships	 in	 life,	 but	 as	 death	approaches	family	still	want	to	understand	what	is	happening	to	the	patient.	
We	see	that	quite	a	lot	actually	because	a	lot	of	our	patients	don’t	have	family	
nearby;	 you	 nurse	 and	 nurse	 and	 nurse	 and	 nurse	 them,	 you	 get	 them	
prepared	 and	 they	 deteriorate	 and	 you	make	 plans	with	 them	and	 you	 say,	
you	have	discussed	and	they	say	yes;	so	then	a	relative	turns	up	–	they	are	not	
far	away	really	usually	–	but	they	want	to	know	why	you	are	not	doing	x,	y,	
and	z	(L365-369,	Workshop	Three,	Study	Two).	It	may	be	that	patients	are	unconsciously	defending	against	considering	their	own	death.	 	 It	may	be	that	they	are	protecting	their	 families	from	being	in	a	period	of	uncertainty	and	a	liminal	period	for	an	extended	period	of	time	–	this	has	echoes	of	the	previously	described	concept	of	parallax,	where	patients	use	their	own	agency	to	reframe	their	current	uncertain	clinical	situation	(MacArtney	2015,	Nicholson	et	
		
 147	




this	 time	 and	 now	 “that’s	 it”	 “they’ve	 thrown	 the	 towel	 in”	 (L407-410	Workshop	One,	Study	Two).	In	law,	the	responsibility	of	the	HCP	to	the	patient	with	mental	capacity	is	a	clearly	defined	 one	 (Sandman	&	Munthe,	 2009),	 as	 is	 their	 responsibility	 to	 the	 patient	who	has	lost	capacity	(British	Medical	Association,	2008)	–	the	HCP	is	required	to	make	a	“best	interests”	decision	(a	best	interests	decision	is	where	the	consultant	makes	 a	 decision	 in	 the	 best	 interests	 of	 the	 patient	 after	 consulting	 family	 or	friends	who	could	articulate	what	the	patient’s	wishes	and	preferences	would	be	if	they	could	articulate	this).		The	responsibility	of	the	HCP	to	the	family	is	much	less	well	defined,	and	there	can	be	a	tension	between	the	responsibility	to	the	patient	and	their	family.	 	The	question	raised	through	analysis	of	the	workshop	data	was	“who	actually	is	the	family?”	to	whom	HCPs	have	a	duty	of	care.		
Family’s	contribution	to	the	HCP	and	family	relationship	
Who	is	the	family?		
HCPs	 used	 the	 term	 “family”,	 “relatives”,	 “rellies”	 (Workshop	 One)	 or	 “significant	
others”	 (Workshop	 Two)	 as	 the	 “generic	 term”	 for	 the	 patient’s	 key	 contact.		However,	listening	to	HCPs’	descriptions	of	episodes	of	care	indicates	the	range	of	people	HCPs	relate	to	at	the	point	of	recognising	dying.	HCPs	recalled	“patient	and	
carer	 “(Workshop	 One),	 “young	 adult	 children”	 (Workshop	 One),	 “daughters”	
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(Workshop	 Two),	 “son,	 grandson”	 (Workshop	 two),	 “Children”	 (Workshop	 Three),	









for	 in	 terms	 of	 relatives,	 and	 I	 think	 that	 is	 often	 because,	 before	 you	 leave	
that	room	you	want	to	make	sure	that	everyone	is	on	board...and	so	therefore	
you’re	almost	addressing	everyone	in	that,	you	know,	they	don’t	look	so	happy,	
they’re	not,	 they	are	not	engaging…why’re	 they	not.	 	You	try	and	address	 to	
them	and	so	the	more	people	there	are	there	you	are	trying	to	deal	with	more	
expectations	and	concerns	etc.	(L786-797,	Workshop	Two,	Study	Two).			Families	 understandably	 hear	what	 is	 conveyed	 slightly	 differently.	 HCPs	 in	 this	study	wanted	to	talk	with	others	about	their	experiences	of	working	with	families.		
Do	 you	 not	 find	 that	 the	more	 people	 that	 are	 there	 the	 different	messages	
they	hear	as	well?	(L798-799,	Workshop	Two,	Study	Two).			This	 is	 not	 easy	 clinical	 work	 for	 HCPs.	 	 I	 suggest	 that	 HCP’s	 burden	 of	 care	 to	communicate	with	all	who	are	present	at	the	bedside,	such	that	all	understand,	is	extremely	unrealistic	and	anxiety	provoking.	This	 is	simultaneously	compounded	by	 the	 broad	 range	 of	 people	 identified	 in	 the	 to	 national	 guidance	 documents	about	 to	 whom	 the	 duty	 of	 care	 extends	 to.	 	 I	 would	 also	 suggest	 that	 national	documents	articulating	 that	HCPs	give	 the	care	 to	others	 that	 they	would	give	 to	their	 own	 family,	 without	 critically	 under-pinning	 this	 in	 HCP	 education	 and	offering	a	space	in	clinical	practice	to	discuss	the	impact	of	decision-making	with	the	patient’s	family,	is	likely	to	agitate	and	aggravate	disagreements	in	care.			In	all	dimensions	of	life	HCPs,	patients	and	families	can	have	very	different	values.			
Families	have	rights	HCPs	expressed	that	families,	as	well	as	patients,	had	“rights”	to	information	that	the	patient	was	likely	dying.	
You	know	when	you	make	a	decision…the	patient	has	a	right	to	know	it	and	if	
they	 cannot	 then	 the	 family	 have	 a	 right	 to	 know	 as	 well	 (L293-295	Workshop	One,	Study	Two).			
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When	 families	 recognised	 that	 the	patient	was	dying,	 the	HCP	 found	 this	a	much	easier	conversation	than	when	the	family	had	no	recognition	of	this	themselves.		






Echoes	of	HCP’s	own	family		HCPs	repeatedly	discussed	how	caring	for	families	is	never	easy.		The	experience	is	multifaceted.	When	 they	did	not	know	 the	 family,	 for	 example,	when	 the	patient	had	only	been	in	hospital	for	one	or	two	days,	then	it	was	easier	to	break	bad	news	about	 dying	 as	 the	HCP	was	not	 emotionally	 involved	with	 the	 family.	 	 The	 skill	was	 rapidly	 building	 the	 trust	 with	 the	 family	 in	 order	 for	 them	 to	 believe	 the	news.	When	HCPs	knew	 the	 family	 and	had	worked	with	 the	patient	 and	 family,	they	 identified	that	they	could	tailor	the	 information	and	pace	 it	more	accurately	for	 the	 family’s	 benefit.	 	 Yet	 this	 work	 is	 enormously	 emotionally	 impactful	 for	HCPs,	both	 in	 the	run	up	to	death	and	at	 the	 time	of	death.	 	There	 is	evidence	of	identification	with	likenesses	of	the	patient	and	their	family	with	the	HCP’s	family,	and	HCPs	being	conscious	at	a	level	of	the	additional	emotional	impact	this	has.	
I	 don’t	 think	 you	 could	 prepare	 anyone	 for	 that	 role	 [long	 term	 condition]	
because	 you	 get	 so	 involved	 professionally	 with	 the	 family	 and	 that	
association	with	the	same	age,	young	adult	children,	and	you	work	with	them	








relative	of	your	own	dying		(L66-69	Workshop	One,	Study	Two).			In	 this	 manner	 one	 can	 begin	 to	 see	 how	 the	 HCP	 may	 consciously	 and	unconsciously	 project	 and	 receive	 affect,	 which	 changes	 the	 experience	 of	 the	liminal	 space.	 Recognising	 dying	 and	 introducing	 this	 to	 patients	 and	 families	rattles	 the	 psychological	 defence	 of	 the	 phantasy	 that	medicine	 can	 delay	 death.	The	 HCP	 is	 left	 facing	 the	 family	 in	 a	 human-being	 to	 human-being	 relationship	with	no	more	treatment	options	to	offer.		It	is	“hard”	as	the	HCP	says	in	the	quote	below	to	have	no	solutions	and	physically	face	the	family	as	they	face	the	future.	
I	 think	 when	 you	 are	 dealing	 with	 long	 term	 conditions	 there	 is	 this	
expectation	 that	 you	 know	 you	 have	 worked	 with	 that	 patient	 and	 their	
family	 for	many	 years	 and	 you	 have	 always	 been	 able	 to	 tweak	 things	 and	
make	 things	 right	 and	 they	 are	 looking	 at	 you	 “can’t	 you	 do	 anything	 else”	
and	 it’s	 quite	 hard	 to	 actually	 have	 to	 say	we	 cannot	 do	 anything	 else	 now	(L84-88,	Workshop	One,	Study	Two).			
HCP’s	own	psychological	defences		HCPs	regularly	described	a	psychological	defence	mechanism:	a	phantasy	of	“being	in	control”.	 	Families	have	the	potential	to	undermine	this.	 	In	the	example	below	the	 family	 had	 demanded	 twice-daily	 updates	 regarding	 the	 patient’s	 condition	and	then	checked	this	information	out	with	another	specialist.			Whilst	the	HCP	at	the	time	did	not	know	this	was	occurring,	she	found	out	later	and	explained	why	the	action	of	checking	with	another	HCP	made	that	situation	worse.	
It	 challenges	 our…sense	 of	 control	 in	 the	 communication	 and	 that	 sounds	
wrong,	 but	 these	 are	 difficult	 enough	 conversation….	 conversations	 to	 have	
with	 families	 if	 we	 do	 feel	 in	 control.	 	 If	 we	 don’t	 it	 makes	 it	 even	 harder.	(L769-771	Workshop	Two,	Study	Two).			In	 this	example,	 there	are	also	echoes	of	 the	HCP’s	protective	phantasy	of	 “being	right”.		This	is	why	the	situation	was	worse	-	because	the	HCP	now	knew	that	the	family	could	have	challenged	 the	HCP’s	decision-making,	 informed	by	 the	second	
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specialist	 they	 were	 in	 contact	 with.	 Unsurprisingly	 then,	 HCPs	 said	 they	 had	colleagues	who	would	avoid	family	meetings.			
Most	 of	 my	 team	…find	 that	 quite	 threatening	 to	 go	 into	 a	 planned	 family	
presence…because	we	 know	 the	 patients	well	 and	 don’t	 know	 the	 family	 so	
well	 sometimes,	 so	 you	 know,	 your	 relationship	 with	 the	 patient	 is	 very	
different	to	the	family.	They	come	and	start	chipping	in	(L	84-88	Workshop	Two,	Study	Two).	Whilst	the	HCP	could	have	a	good	relationship	with	the	patient,	the	introduction	of	the	 family	 and	 their	 questions	 and	 comments	was	 perceived	 to	 be	 of	 a	 different	nature.		The	family	appear	to	unsettle	the	HCP’s	sense	of	control	in	the	relationship	they	have	with	the	patient.	
HCP’s	own	emotions		HCPs	 recognised	 that	 they	 picked	 up	 the	 family’s	 emotions	 about	 the	 clinical	situation	and	 felt	 really	disappointed	when	 their	best	care	cannot	ameliorate	 the	family’s	deeply	felt	bleak	emotion.	




can	even	 remember	at	 the	 time	and	 sometimes	 the	 level	of	 that	 feeling	 is	 “I	





like	a	 law,	a	 lot	of	 states	 like	Holland”	(L	 577-589	Workshop	Three,	 Study	Two).			
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It	 is	 possible	 that	 HCPs	 unconsciously	 communicate	 their	 feelings	 and	 they	 did	identify	 that	 sometimes	 they	were	 not	 alone	 in	 finding	 suffering	 intolerable	 and	that	 families	 had,	 on	 occasion,	 asked	 if	 HCPs	 could	 kill	 the	 patient.	 	 HCPs	 could	identify	what	they	did	to	help	themselves.		These	were	such	strategies	as	not	being	alone	when	breaking	bad	news,	allowing	time	for	family	meetings,	giving	families	warning	shots	if	recovery	was	uncertain,	using	supportive	clinicians	to	give	second	opinions,	thinking	through	ahead	of	the	meeting	how	far	they	would	be	prepared	to	let	the	family	push	their	decision-making,	accessing	palliative	care	to	work	with	families,	debriefing	with	colleagues	and	learning	communication	strategies.	
I	 always	 talk	 to	patients,	 families	 both	 in	 terms	of	 bands	 of	 time	 so	days	 to	
weeks,	weeks	 to	months,	months	 to	years	and	 that	 leaves	enough	vagueness	
to…live	with	your	own	uncertainty	and	the	uncertainty	that	 inevitably	exists	
but	 clearly	 if	 you	 tell	 someone	 they	 have	 got	 days	 to	weeks	 they	 do	 get	 the	
rellies	 over	 from	 abroad	 or	 something	 that	 they	 desperately	 want	 to	 do	(L407-411,	Workshop	Two,	Study	Two).	In	the	previous	sections	we	have	used	the	concept	of	liminality	to	shine	a	light	on	the	transition	of	patient	from	dying	to	death,	the	transition	of	the	family	towards	bereavement	 and	 the	 transition	 of	 the	 HCP	 to	 a	 relationship	 with	 the	 family	independent	of	the	patient.	 	Simultaneously	the	HCP	might	deeply	feel	the	loss	of	that	patient	and	 feel	 a	personal	 challenge	 to	 their	own	psychological	defences	of	control	and	mastery,	both	by	death	and	the	family.		In	the	next	section	we	consider	the	situations	that	the	PAR	workshop	participants	found	additionally	challenging.		
Challenging	situations	and	the	HCP	and	family	relationship	








nearest	 and	 dearest	 has	 died	 even	 though	 you	might	 have	 seen	 them	 for	 a	








Families	and	doctors	may	not	agree	about	what	is	in	the	patient’s	best	interests	It	 is	very	unusual	 for	patients	 to	remain	with	 full	mental	capacity	 to	 take	part	 in	decisions	 until	 they	 die.	 	 	 Thus	HCPs	 are	 required	 to	 consult	 family,	 friends	 and	carers	as	the	way	of	understanding	the	patient’s	wishes.	The	family	as	described	in	the	 Mental	 Capacity	 Act	 2005	 (British	 Medical	 Association	 2008)	 is	 primarily	identified	 as	 facilitative	 and	 equal	 to	 the	 patient.	 In	 this	 manner	 HCPs	 are	dependent	on	families,	carers	and	friends	to	enable	clinical	decision-making	in	the	patient’s	best	interests.		HCPs	 in	 this	 study	 reported	 being	 asked	 to	 collude	with	 relatives	 regarding	 not	telling	a	patient	their	diagnosis.	
I	 had	 quite	 an	 interesting	 consultation	 in	 the	 week…it	 was	 going	 to	 be	 a	
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planned	 meeting	 and	 I	 met	 the	 relatives	 because	 the	 patient	 actually	 was	
unresponsive	and	wasn’t	well	and	it	left	with	them	saying	“I	don’t	want	you	to	




seen	 and	 he	 laid	 there	 and	 he	 opened	 his	 eye	 and	 he	 said	 so	 I	 have	 got	
leukaemia	have	I?......	it	was	a	really	useful	consultation	(L654-663	Workshop	Two,	Study	Two).	It	is	notable	that	the	HCP’s	duty	of	care	is	to	the	patient	and	when	the	patient	was	conscious	 he	 both	 knew	what	was	wrong	with	 him	 and	wanted	 to	 talk	with	 the	HCP	about	it.		Yet	when	the	patient	did	not	have	capacity	the	family	had	a	different	perception	of	 the	situation.	 	One	could	ask	 if	 they	were	protecting	themselves	by	asking	 for	 the	 patient	 not	 to	 be	 told	 as	 they	 would	 not	 have	 to	 cope	 with	 the	patient’s	 grief,	 or	 whether	 they	 were	 protecting	 the	 patient.	 Families	 may	 (and	often	do)	hold	different	views	 to	patients	 about	 the	 same	 topic	 e.g.	place	of	 care	(Brazil	et	al.,	2005).	In	addition	they	may	not	always	accurately	represent	patients’	views	 (Winter	 &	 Parks,	 2012);	 they	 may	 override	 them	 as	 the	 patient	 loses	capacity	 or	 as	 they	 find	 it	 difficult	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 patient	 dying	(Gomes	et	al.,	2013).	 	The	reality	of	best	 interests	decision-making	as	the	patient	loses	capacity	 is	 that	another	 liminal	dimension	occurs	as	 the	patient	 transitions	out	of	the	HCP	and	patient	and	family	relationship	ahead	of	death	and	the	HCP	is	left	alone	with	the	family.			Even	when	these	meetings	are	highly	charged,	misunderstandings	can	be	resolved	through	explanations.	 	 In	 the	example	below,	HCPs	described	how	relatives	used	emotive	 language	 and	 accused	 them	 of	 “killing	 the	 patient”	 or	 “starving	 the	patient”.	
This	 is	what	they	say	to	us	“you	are	killing	them”;	“you	are	killing	them”	cos	
you’re	not	giving	 them	that	 fluid;	 the	 fact	 is	 that	 they	are	dying,	we	are	not	
killing	but	it	is	very	difficult	(L570-572	Workshop	Three,	Study	Two).			The	ability	 to	manage	 the	polarity	of	 “letting	die	rather	 than	killing”	 is	described	
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(Curtis	et	al.,	2005)	(Royal	College	of	Physicians	2010)	and	it	is	a	skill	to	be	able	to	reframe	such	strong	 language	and	contain	 the	distress	of	 the	 family.	 	Some	HCPs	had	 learnt	 this	 skill	 and	 were	 able	 to	 describe	 this	 process	 and	 how	 relatives’	distress	got	in	the	way	of	them	hearing	and	understanding.	
It	 is	 about	 education	 and	 explaining	 to	 them	 what	 it	 means	 you	 know;	
terminal	 dehydration,	 because	 they	 just	 don’t	 know	do	 they….	 and	 it’s…they	





HCP	5	Oxygen’s	natural;	 (group	 laughs)…the	situation,	 the	relatives	were	 so	
angry,	they	want	two	hours	about	the	problem,	questioning	me	and	Dr	X	and	
we	 reversed	 the	 plan	 and	 it	 was	 just	 not	 right	 for	 the	 patient,	 regarding	
this...three	hours	with	the	relatives.	(L577-586	Workshop	Three,	Study	Two).			It	 is	striking	that	 the	medical	 team	gave	three	hours	to	 the	 family	meeting;	 there	will	have	been	the	pressure	of	the	need	to	attend	to	other	patients	(and	indeed	the	patient	related	to	the	family)	and	it	is	perhaps	this	that	allowed	the	overturning	of	
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the	decision	to	end	the	meeting.	 	 It	may,	 though,	have	been	that	 the	 family	had	a	different	 faith	 and	 culture	 (Calanzani	 et	 al.,	 2013)	 and	 this	 felt	 an	 impossible	situation	to	mediate.	 	The	timescales	for	the	management	of	conflict	between	the	family’s	 opinion	 and	 the	medics’	 are	 affected	 by	 the	 rate	 of	 deterioration	 of	 the	patient	 and	 the	 length	 of	 time	 dying	 takes.	 	 When	 there	 is	 time,	 then	 the	disagreement	can	be	resolved	either	locally	by	understanding	the	underpinning	of	the	conflict	or	by	a	second	medical	opinion	and	legal	advice.		In	the	case	of	a	dying	patient,	clinical	teams	would	always	seek,	if	possible,	to	work	with	the	family	as	it	would	 lead	 to	 improved	 bereavement	 outcomes	 for	 the	 family	 and	 a	 better	outcome	for	the	HCP,	in	terms	of	not	dealing	with	an	on-going	complaint.		Without	the	patient’s	voice	the	management	of	 the	ethics	of	 the	dying	period	are	really	challenging.	 	Engagement	with	families	 is	not	routine	for	escalation	of	care	(Kryworuchko	et	al.,	2012)	and	escalation	of	care	until	death	can	be	very	helpful	for	families	whose	culture	is	non-western	(Calanzani	et	al.,	2013).		In	this	manner,	though,	 families	 can	 be	 avoided.	 	 	 I	 suggest	 that	 complexity	 surrounding	 the	engagement	with	families	may	be	a	reason	that	the	recognition	of	dying	is	delayed	until	very	near	death.	It	reduces	that	time	needed	to	engage	with	the	family.	














family	 have	 and	 their	 guilt,	 their	 relationship	 in	 such	 an	 alien	 environment	
really	 in	 an	 acute	 setting,	 for	 everybody.	 	 And	 then	 it’s	 very	 hard	when	 you	
don’t	 know	 the	 family	 or	 the	 patient	 and	 all	 the	 dynamics	 –	 but	 you	 can’t	
move	on	and	reach	that	acceptance	until	 that	 is	all	dealt	with	can	you?	But	
you	can	do	a	quick	fix	and	try	and	get	them	on	board	and	understanding.		So	a	
lot	 of	 it	 is	 their	 misunderstanding	 …of	 their	 whole	 situation	 isn’t	 it,	 if	 they	
have	not	been	that	close	to	the	family	member		/	patient?	 	It	 is	very	difficult	
isn’t	 it	 to	 deal	 with	 that	 in	 a	 short	 space	 of	 time?	 (L388-405,	 Workshop	Three,	Study	Two).	In	this	excerpt,	 there	are	 large	assumptions	about	 families	and	their	motivations,	judgment	and	blame	by	the	doctor	(HCP	9)	and	nurse	(HCP	1),	with	 the	 fault	 for	the	situation	laid	firmly	at	the	door	of	the	family.		In	this	scenario	one	can	see	that	consequent	 to	 the	 doctor	 perceiving	 the	 relative	 as	 demanding,	 psychological	defenses	 come	 into	 play	 and	 there	 is	 splitting	 and	 projection	 and	 guilt	 used	 to	describe	 as	 the	 underpinning	 motivators	 for	 the	 relatives’	 demands.	 There	 is	judgment	too	about	the	relative	and	their	previous	role	in	the	patient’s	care.		In	the	workshop	the	nurse	(HCP	6)	offers	containment	and	an	alternative	viewpoint	on	the	 situation.	HCP6	also	discusses	how	much	emotional	work	 there	 is	 to	do	 in	 a	hospital	when	 the	 family	 has	 not	 caught	 up	with	 the	 patient’s	 narrative	 and	 the	clinical	 situation	 requires	 rapid	 decision-making;	HCP6	highlights	 that	 time	 is	 of	the	essence.	HCP6	alludes	 to	a	 “quick	 fix”	 to	gain	understanding;	whilst	 this	was	not	 explored	 I	 would	 suggest	 that	 the	 ability	 to	 therapeutically	 work	 in	 this	compressed	 and	pressured	 space	 is	 very	 skilled.	 	 In	 this	 circumstance	 it	may	 be	
		
 159	
that	the	level	of	work	the	family	requires	is	not	resourced	within	the	hospital	and	the	doctor	takes	the	brunt	of	this,	without	either	the	skill	to	assist	the	family	or	the	time	 or	 space	 to	 undertake	 this	 work	 without	 compromising	 other	 aspects	 of	patient	care.		
Families	can	be	mistrusting	HCPs	 identified	very	strongly	 in	Study	Two	 that	what	 they	 found	extraordinarily	challenging	 were	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 patient	 taking	 longer	 to	 die	 than	expected	or	 the	patient	 surviving	 the	prognosis.	This	 caused	 the	 family	 to	doubt	the	HCP.		Some	HCPs	have	learnt	strategies	to	manage	this.	
So	when	 the	dying	 takes	 longer	 than	expected,	 it	 is	difficult…	 for	 the	 family,	
it’s	difficult	for	us	going	in	everyday	because	they	start	to	question	you	and	I	
do	 say	 to	 them	sometimes	and	you	know	they	are	going	 to	die	but	 they	 just	
aren’t	dying	as	quickly	as	you	anticipated	and	I	do	say	to	them	“I	expect	you	
are	now	doubting	what	we	are	saying,	that	you	are	thinking	that	maybe	we	
have	got	 it	wrong”…and	 they	 say	 ”yes”.	 	 (L165-171,	Workshop	 Two,	 Study	Two).	HCPs	 also	 identified	 the	 consequences	 for	 themselves	 and	 families	 when	 the	patient	survived	the	prognosis	of	dying,	especially	when	the	family	felt	that	death	is	preferable	to	the	patient’s	suffering.	
But	we	have	had	problems	with	 this	 this	week	as	we	have	had	 two	patients	
who	have	got	better,	 and	 the	 family	are	 saying	you	 told	us	 they	were	dying	
and	 we	 ready	 for	 them	 to	 die,	 we	 wanted	 them	 to	 die,	 and	 now	 they	 are	









takes	me	a	 lot	of	hours	of	 conversation	with	 them	to	gain	confidence	again.		(L234-243	Workshop	Two,	Study	Two).			There	 is	 little	 in	 the	 medical	 and	 nursing	 literature	 about	 relationship	 repair	within	the	therapeutic	relationship	following	such	experiences	of	a	patient	having	survived	a	prognosis.		When	families	have	had	repeated	experiences	of	having	bad	news	 broken,	 it	 can	 make	 them	 resistant	 to	 HCPs	 trying	 to	 communicate	 with	them.	
They	 say	we	have	had	 this	 conversation	 so	many	 times	 that	 they	might	 not	
recover	this	time;	I	don’t	want	to	talk	about	it	anymore.	(Workshop	Two).			This	 links	 with	 Szakolcazai’s	 request	 that	 a	 liminal	 situation	 should	 only	 be	provoked	if	"one	has	a	proper	form	to	impose	on	the	soul	of	whose	emotions	are	stimulated	by	being	put	on	 the	 limit”	 (Szakolcazai	2009),	and	MacArtney’s	paper	that	indicates	how	people	resist	entering	a	liminal	period	(MacArtney	et	al	2015).		These	families,	who	have	repeatedly	been	told	their	loved	one	is	about	to	die,	take	their	 part	 in	 resisting	 engagement	 in	 the	 HCP	 and	 family	 relationship	 about	 a	situation	 they	 have	 repeatedly	 had	 experience	 of	 without	 the	 transition	 to	bereavement	 occurring.	 Breaking	 bad	 news	 about	 recognising	 dying	 has	 no	relevance	to	them.		A	patient’s	family	can	be	in	denial	that	the	patient	will	die	and	carrying	on	with	life,	or	so	used	to	living	with	uncertainty	and	managing	their	own	lives	around	this	that	the	predicted	death	of	their	 family	member	is	not	a	 liminal	experience.		It	has	become	their	daily	norm.	





and	 think	 that	 you	 have	 had	 a	 consultation	 and	 you	 tried	 to	 communicate	
everything	and	then	ten	minutes	later	he	is	following	you	round	the	door	and	
you’re	thinking	did	we	not	have	this	conversation	a	minute	ago.		That’s	quite	
difficult,	 but	 they	 do,	 they	 can	 follow	 you	 …it	 instils	 a	 doubt	 in	 your	





the	 simple	 stuff	as	well	as	 the	actually	addressing	 the	needs	 for	 the	patient,	
and	this	brings	to	light	the	needs	for	the	patient	often	differ	from	the	needs	of	
the	relative	and	family	and	I	am	not	sure	which	you	are	addressing	 (L690	–	676	Workshop	Two,	Study	Two).			The	 doctor	 in	 this	 scenario	 finds	 themself	 stuck	 and	 unable	 to	 address	 patient	needs	 or	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 family.	 	 There	 may	 be	 many	 reasons	 why	 this	 has	occurred.	 	Whilst	some	might	think	the	patient	has	not	heard	the	news,	it	may	be	that	 the	news	 is	so	awful	 that	when	the	doctor	 leaves	the	relative	alone	with	the	sick	patient	that	 it	 is	unbearable	 for	the	relative	to	be	alone	with	the	patient	and	their	own	thoughts.			They	might	not	be	able	to	bear	to	move	into	that	liminal	space	and	consider	their	future	losses	and	how	their	life	will	change.		In	the	next	chapter	we	 consider	 Bion’s	 theory	 of	 how	 thought,	 thinking	 and	 a	move	 to	 learning	 can	only	 occur	 when	 the	 emotional	 needs	 are	 addressed	 and	 the	 situation	 safely	contained	(Bibby,	2011).	 	The	doctor	may	have	given	 information	to	 the	relative,	but	not	allowed	for	emotional	containment	or	the	need	for	comfort.	 	Additionally,	there	 is	 no	 structure	 and	 ritual	 here,	 as	 per	 Szakolcazai’s	 request,	 or	 additional	skilled	resource,	and	thus	the	family	member	is	left	seeking	comfort	out.			
Managing	care	at	a	“clinical	crisis	point”	
Earlier	 in	 this	 chapter	 it	 was	 discussed	 that	 time	 could	 be	 pressured,	 even	 in	 a	
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ward	 situation,	 to	 help	 the	 extended	 family	 understand	 and	 psychologically	accommodate	 the	 clinical	 decision-making	 about	 the	 recognition	 of	 dying.	 	 In	emergency	 clinical	 situations	 –	 in	 the	 Emergency	 Department	 -	 time	 may	 be	extremely	pressured	with	the	patient	requiring	treatment	if	the	appropriateness	of	end	of	life	care	was	not	previously	determined.		Clinical	crisis	points	can	occur	any	time	of	the	day	or	night,	seven	days	a	week.	
	Lack	of	written	information	about	the	patient’s	care	and	wishes	HCPs	in	this	study	found	it	both	anxiety-producing	when	patients	were	admitted	to	the	 Emergency	 Department	 without	 any	 accompanying	 written	 information	 and	frustrating	when	 it	was	 their	 patient	who	was	 transferred	 in	 from	 a	 community	setting	and	treated,	when	they	had	been	prepared	for	end	of	life	care.	
What	 I	 find	 very	 hard	 from	 a	 nursing	 point	 of	 view	 is	 sometimes	 you	 have	
spent	a	 lot	of	 time	with	 these	patients	and	then	come	 into	hospital,	and	our	
patients	 come	 into	 hospital	 so	 infrequently	 now	 that	 they	 are	 not	 very	well	
known	in	hospital	and	so	this	whole	approach	from	the	medical	team	is	“let’s	
do	this,	 let’s	do	the	other”	and	you’re	thinking	“well	we’ve	 just	spent	the	last	
twelve	months	 actually	 talking	 about	we	 don’t	want	 this	 and	we	 don’t	 that	
and	we	don’t	the	other	and	we	are	dying	 	 (L450-456	Workshop	One,	 Study	Two).	Electronic	 co-ordination	 systems	 are	 being	 worked	 on	 nationally	 (Millington-Sanders	&	Nadicksbernd,	2013).		The	aim	of	these	is	that	advanced	treatment	and	care	plans,	and	patients’	wishes	and	preferences	are	available	 to	all	–	ambulance	services,	out-of-hours	services	and	Emergency	Departments	–	at	a	point	of	clinical	deterioration.	HCPs	 in	 this	 study	 did	 not	 discuss	 them.	 	 This	 raises	 the	 question	about	 whether	 electronic	 care	 plans	 are	 not	 yet	 available	 or	 not	 embedded	 in	routine	 clinical	 practice.	 Thus,	 for	 this	 hospital	 there	 still	 remains	 a	 lack	 of	information	 available	 electronically,	 from	 the	 home	 setting,	 at	 the	 clinical	 crisis	point	in	the	Emergency	Department.			In	 some	 situations,	 the	 family	 can	 accompany	 the	 patient	 into	 hospital	 and	 be	 a	source	of	advice.	 	When	the	patient	travels	alone	and	does	not	have	capacity,	 the	
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Mental	Capacity	Act	advises	that	an	Independent	Mental	Capacity	Advocate	(IMCA)	must	be	sought.		An	IMCA	is	a	safeguard	for	the	patient	and	the	HCP	and	assesses	the	 patient	 and	 their	 clinical	 records,	 and	 can	 challenge	 HCPs	 about	 decision-making.	 Since	 the	 IMCA	 service	 is	 only	 available	 Monday	 to	 Friday	 9-5pm,	experience	dictates	that	a	response	is	never	achieved	in	time	for	decision-	making	around	dying	in	the	Emergency	Department.		This	means	that	HCPs	take	personal	responsibility	 for	all	clinical	decisions.	 	 If	a	 family	appears	after	 the	decision	that	the	patient	is	dying	they	can	challenge	the	decision-making	of	the	HCP.		Whilst	the	Mental	Capacity	Act	offers	the	HCP	protection	-	“An	action	or	intervention	will	be	lawful	 –	 i.e.	 health	 professionals	will	 enjoy	 protection	 from	 liability	 –	where	 the	decision-maker	has	a	reasonable	belief	that	individual	lacks	capacity	to	consent	to	what	 is	 proposed”	 (British	Medical	 Association,	 2008,	 p.15),	 the	 suggestion	 that	any	 of	 this	 is	 “enjoyable”	 highlights	 the	 lack	 of	 understanding	 of	 the	 level	 of	underpinning	anxiety	in	this	clinical	situation.	
Lack	of	organisational	resources	for	care	HCPs	identified	a	lack	of	time	and	space	for	significant	conversations	with	families	and	were	personally	creative	about	how	they	undertook	this	aspect	of	clinical	care.	
Can	 I	 say	 something	 about	 the	 environment?	 	 I	 couldn’t	 have	 that	 type	 of	
conversation	in	clinic	generally;	I	would	bring	them	up	outside	of	clinic	hours	
and	I	could	bring	them	to	the	day	unit,	where	we	have	got	private,	quiet	space	
there.	 	 Often	 with	 Advanced	 Nurse	 Practitioner	 or	 a	 Registrar,	 rather	 than	
trying,	 that	pressure	of	 feeling	 that	 this	might	 take	 fifteen	minutes,	 it	might	
take	three	quarters	of	an	hour	and	there	is	a	whole	clinic	backing	up	behind	
you…which	 is	 not	 nice	 for	 you	 or	 the	 patient	 (L919-924,	 Workshop	 Two,	Study	Two).	In	this	quote	it	 is	notable	that	the	outpatient	clinic	setting	is	 ill	equipped,	both	in	terms	of	private	space	to	break	bad	news	and	skilled	multi-professional	resource	with	capacity	to	manage	the	patient	and	family	distress	such	that	others	patients	in	the	clinic	are	not	affected.	The	poor	experience	of	patients	and	families	in	hearing	bad	 news	 in	 an	 outpatient	 setting	 has	 long	 been	 noted	 and	 whilst	 this	 can	 be	consequent	to	the	HCP’s	skills,	it	is	also	due	to	the	lack	of	private	space	(McCulloch,	
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2004).	 	 I	suggest	that	the	 lack	of	physical	space	for	breaking	bad	news	in	a	clinic	area	 represents	 something	 the	 NHS	 organisation	 cannot	 bear	 to	 consider	 and,	whilst	 this	may	be	unconscious	 and	wrapped	up	 as	 a	 lack	 of	 finance	 or	 physical	space,	it	does	suggest	a	link	to	the	defended	and	less	rational	aspects	of	HCPs	who	design	hospitals.		In	this	quote	the	day	unit	has	private	and	quiet	space.		Whilst	not	discussed	by	 the	HCPs,	Macmillan,	 a	 cancer	 charity	 that	 has	 done	much	work	 to	improve	the	patient	experience,	funded	this	unit.				Families	 were	 also	 creative	 and	 initiated	 conversations,	 and	 took	 advantage	 of	transitional	 (liminal)	 spaces.	 In	 the	 example	 below	 the	 HCP	 was	 just	 returning	from	leave	and	met	the	family	in	the	car	park.			
I	can	remember	coming	back	from	a	week’s	holiday	and	walking	in	the	front	




am	just	back	from	holiday	I	will	find	out	and	come	and	see	you	later.		(L747-753	Workshop	Two,	Study	Two).	“Pussy	 footing”	 and	 acting	 cautiously	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 been	 additionally	 anxiety-	provoking	 for	 an	HCP	whose	 preference	 is	 to	 be	 in	 control.	 	 Additionally,	 at	 the	beginning	of	a	return	to	work	to	promise	a	family	a	meeting	is	also	a	burden	when	the	clinical	demands	of	the	day	are	unknown.	
What	do	HCPs	trade	when	the	family	is	emotionally	struggling	to	accept	the	
diagnosis	of	dying?	
The	patient’s	dying	trajectory	HCPs	were	compassionate	 to	 families	who	were	emotionally	 struggling	 to	accept	that	 the	 patient	 was	 dying	 and	 there	 is	 repeated	 evidence	 of	 a	 point	 in	 some	patient’s	care	where	the	care	to	the	family	is	prioritised	over	the	patient.		HCPs	use	medical	 interventions	 to	 “buy”	 time	 for	 families	 to	 accommodate	 the	news,	 even	though	 they	 know	 the	 ultimate	 outcome	 of	 death	 is	 unchanged	 for	 the	 patient	(Abadir	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 	 In	 this	 study	 HCPs	 (nurses)	 recognised	 when	 they	 are	
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they	need	that	 time	to	adjust	 to	 that	person	dying.	 	So	 they	need	that	space	
and	you	are	giving	them	that	space	in	that	acute	type	thing,	to	be	able	to	say	
we	did	everything	we	could	and	accept“	(L498-503	Workshop	Three,	 Study	Two).			They	 are	 clear	 that	 if	 the	 intervention	 harms	 the	 patient	 e.g.	 they	 become	overloaded	with	 fluid	 from	infusions,	 then	the	patient’s	comfort	 is	not	 traded	 for	the	family,	but	there	is	a	space,	while	the	patient	is	comfortable,	where	the	family	is	willingly	prioritised	over	the	preferred	treatment	plan	for	the	patient.			








Got	 a	 colleague	 recently	 worked	 in	 care	 of	 the	 elderly,	 but	 on	 every	 single	
elderly	 patient	 he	 writes	 “please	 consider	 DNACPR	 discussion”,	 do	 it	
(emphasized)….in	every	single	note,	every	single	note,	I	followed	him,	I	will	do	
an	 audit,	 in	 every	 single	 note,	 please	 consider	 DNACPR	 decision	 (L466-470	
Workshop	Four,	Study	Two).	Some	HCPs	feel	 they	bear	a	bigger	burden	of	 the	 family	work	because	colleagues	avoid	it.	This	links	to	the	analogy	of	recognising	dying	being	passed	around	like	a	“hot	potato”,	as	was	seen	in	Study	One.	 	It	also	leads	to	anger	with	the	colleagues	avoiding	dying	patients	and	families.			Clinicians	who	cannot	or	will	not	emotionally	engage	with	the	patient	and	family	to	acknowledge	 the	 impending	 death	 and	 help	 the	 family	 navigate	 the	 uncertain	period	 to	 the	patient’s	death	and	 their	 impending	bereavement,	 instead	offer	 the	promise	of	certainty	through	continuing	medical	treatment.	In	reality	though,	this	strategy,	shortens	the	period	between	the	recognition	of	dying	and	death	and	can	leave	 the	 family	 with	 few	 tools	 to	 negotiate	 the	 liminal	 period,	 and	 the	preparations	 that	 can	 be	 made	 that	 may	 allow	 a	 smoother	 transition	 to	bereavement.	.	To	 complicate	 this	 though,	 at	 the	 point	where	 dying	 is	 recognised	 I	 suggest	 the	organisation	 devolves	 its	 responsibilities	 to	 the	 individual	 HCP	 through	 lack	 of	current	 information	 at	 the	 time	 of	 transfer	 across	 care	 boundaries	 into	 the	Emergency	 Department	 (although	 HCPs	 may	 play	 a	 part	 in	 not	 accessing	 this);	through	a	lack	of	resources	to	offer	families	and	a	lack	of	places	for	conversations;	and	through	the	lack	of	formal	emotional	support	for	HCPs.		Thus,	at	the	time	of	a	clinical	crisis	point,	 in	order	to	communicate	with	families	and	give	them	time	to	accommodate	the	news,	there	is	evidence	that	HCPs	are	trading	the	patient’s	dying	trajectory	and	lengthening	it	with	treatments	that	are	ultimately	futile.	 	Some	are	
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trading	relationships	with	their	peers	by	avoiding	making	a	decision	about	dying	and	 communicating	with	 the	 patient	 and	 families.	 	Whilst	 this	might	 protect	 the	individual	HCP	it	leaves	other	clinicians	to	pick	up	the	work,	leading	to	anger	and	resentment.	
Conclusion	Drawing	 on	 the	 concepts	 of	 liminality	 and	 affectivity	 has	 opened	 a	 space	 to	consider	the	dynamics	of	 the	HCP	and	patient	and	family	relationship	as	dying	 is	recognised	and	communicated.	This	chapter	proposes	that	recognising	dying	and	engaging	with	the	family	about	this	has	the	potential	to	jettison	the	family	into	an	experience	 of	 liminality	 where	 the	 reality	 of	 death	 of	 their	 family	 member	 and	possible	personal	impact	becomes	a	reality.	It	also	changes	the	focus	from	the	HCP	–	patient	relationship	to	include	the	family.		HCPs	do	not	discuss	national	guidance	and	its	broad	remit	of	people	to	whom	care	 is	owed,	but	care	for	whoever	of	 the	family	 that	 is	 present	 at	 the	 bedside	 (until	 other	 relations	 and	 /	 or	 conflict	 get	introduced).	 	 It	 is	 suggested	 that	 the	 broad	 range	 of	 people	 cited	 in	 national	guidance	documents	 about	whom	HCPs	owe	a	duty	of	 care	 to	makes	 the	 clinical	task	challenging,	and	the	suggestion	that	families	are	cared	for	as	HCPs	would	like	their	own	families	cared	for	is	unhelpful	in	terms	of	raising	the	emotional	tone	and	promoting	the	chance	of	conflict.	Dying	is	a	liminal	experience	for	the	patient,	but	the	loss	of	mental	capacity	to	take	part	 in	decision-making	can	and	 is	 likely	 to	occur	ahead	of	death	and	withdraws	the	 patient	 from	 the	 decision	 making	 process.	 	 The	 formal	 introduction	 of	 the	family,	 in	a	best	 interests	decision-making	scenario,	 is	additionally	challenging.	 	 I	suggest	the	HCP	continues	to	seek	out	the	voice	of	the	patient	even	when	they	have	lost	capacity,	as	the	HCP	is	left	in	a	HCP	and	family	relationship,	where	there	was	evidence	in	this	study	as	with	others	that	families	do	not	accurately	represent	the	views	 of	 patients.	 	 This	 situation	 is	 ethically	 challenging	 for	HCPs	 for	whom	 the	duty	 of	 care	 is	 to	 the	 patient.	 	 However,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 HCP	 and	family	relationship	has	the	ability	to	go	beyond	the	death	of	the	patient,	which	is	experienced	negatively	by	HCPs	when	families	are	angry	and	complaining.	
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The	engagement	with	the	 family	may	also	be	a	 liminal	experience	 for	 the	HCP	as	they	can	recognise	similarities	with	their	own	families	or	experience	the	death	of	a	patient	as	they	would	a	family	or	friend.		Additionally,	HCPs’	protective	phantasies	of	being	right	and	in	control	can	be	undermined	in	a	situation	where	their	skills	to	cure	or	make	better	have	 reached	an	 end	and	 they	meet	 the	 family	 in	 a	human-being	 to	human-being	 relationship.	HCPs	 in	 this	 study	were	 committed	 to	 caring	well	 for	 families,	 but	 experienced	 families	 who	 were	 angry,	 disbelieving,	demanding	and	unable	to	accept	the	news.		These	families	had	the	ability	through	their	demands	and	anger	to	force	HCPs	to	overturn	decisions	they	had	made	in	the	patient’s	best	interests.		This	study	was	not	focused	strongly	on	cultural	issues,	but	this	chapter	highlighted	how	different	people	perceived	a	“natural”	death.	Anthropological	 researchers	have	 suggested	 that	 liminal	 events	be	 structured	by	ritual	for	the	emotional	safety	and	containment	of	strong	emotions	and	for	people	to	understand	the	behaviours	of	the	role.		I	am	suggesting	there	is	no	ritual	or	clue	for	 families	 to	 know	 what	 to	 expect	 in	 the	 process	 of	 receiving	 bad	 news	 of	imminent	death	of	a	family	member.			There	is	no	ritual	or	role	to	support	HCPs	as	their	psychological	defences	of	mastery	and	cure	are	stripped	away	and	they	meet	the	family	in	a	human-being	to	human-being	relationship.		This	 chapter	 proposes	 that	 the	 organisation	devolves	 all	 its	 responsibility	 to	 the	HCP	at	the	time	of	breaking	news	and	that,	 in	order	to	accommodate	the	family’s	distress,	 the	 patient	 may	 be	 subjected	 to	 futile	 treatments.	 In	 addition,	relationships	 with	 nurses	 are	 traded	 by	 senior	 HCPs,	 as	 are	 relationships	 with	colleagues.	 It	 is	 suggested	 that	 the	 presence	 and	 involvement	 of	 families	 is	extremely	anxiety-provoking	and	likely	to	contribute	to	HCPs’	defences,	including	processes	 of	 denial	 about	 recognising	 dying.	 HCPs	 discussed	 feeling	 poorly	prepared	 educationally	 for	 the	 clinical	 work	 with	 families.	 	 Educational	preparation	for	clinical	practice	in	covered	in	the	next	chapter.				
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Chapter	 Eight	 –	How	HCPs	 Learn	To	Care	 For	The	Dying	
Patient	And	Their	Family		
Introduction			Over	 the	 course	of	 the	previous	 two	chapters,	 the	psychosocial	 analysis	of	 Study	One	and	Study	Two	data	has	been	developed.	 	In	Chapter	6,	drawing	on	Menzies-Lyth’s	 study	of	 social	defences	 in	a	 teaching	hospital	 (Menzies,	1970)	 I	 extended	her	 work	 in	 a	 contemporary	 setting	 and	 with	 reference	 to	 contemporary	psychosocial	 work.	 	 The	 chapter	 demonstrated	 how	 emotionally	 impactful,	 and	anxiety	 provoking,	 caring	 for	 the	 dying	 patient	 is,	 and	 proceeded	 to	 discuss	 the	social	 defences	 seen	 in	 today’s	NHS	 about	 the	 identification	 of	 dying.	 	 These	 are	represented	 in	 1)	 the	 need	 for	 a	 cast	 iron	 decision,	 2)	 second	 opinions	 and	checking,	3)	making	sure	the	family	are	on	board,	4)	avoiding	the	work.		Avoidance	of	 the	 clinical	work	 is	 seen	 in	 the	 social	 defences	 of	 5)	 not	 seeing	 the	 dying,	 6)	dressing	up	dying	as	a	treatment,	7)	leaving	the	emotional	work	to	someone	else,	8)	 redistribution	of	 the	emotional	work.	 	Those	HCPs	who	undertake	 the	clinical	work	can	evidence	9)	detachment	and	denial	of	feelings	and	10)	break	bad	news	in	a	 ritualistic	way.	 	This	 chapter	considered	 that	 the	Hospital	Palliative	Care	Team	(HPCT)	are	the	new	social	defence	of	the	modern	NHS	hospital.	In	Chapter	7,	drawing	on	the	concepts	of	liminality	and	affectivity,	I	considered	the	impact	 of	 the	 family	 in	 the	 HCP	 and	 patient	 relationship.	 Dying	 is	 a	 liminal	experience	for	the	patient,	but	the	loss	of	mental	capacity	to	take	part	in	decision-making	 can	 and	 is	 likely	 to	 occur	 ahead	 of	 death,	 which	 means	 the	 family	 are	formally	 introduced	 to	 the	 HCP	 and	 patient	 relationship	 in	 a	 best	 interests	decision-making	 scenario.	 	 I	 proposed	 that	 recognising	 dying	 and	 engaging	with	the	 family	about	 the	patient	dying	has	 the	potential	 to	 jettison	the	 family	 into	an	experience	 of	 liminality	 where	 the	 reality	 of	 death	 of	 their	 family	member,	 and	possible	personal	impact	becomes	a	reality.		HCPs	in	this	study	were	committed	to	caring	 well	 for	 families,	 but	 experienced	 families	 who	 were	 angry,	 disbelieving,	demanding,	and	unable	to	accept	the	news	that	the	patient	is	dying.		I	 also	 considered	 that	 the	 recognition	 of	 dying	 and	 engagement	with	 the	 family	may	 also	 be	 a	 liminal	 and	 affective	 experience	 for	 the	 HCP,	 as	 some	 HCPs	
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experienced	 the	 death	 of	 a	 long	 term	 patient	 as	 they	 would	 a	 family	 or	 friend.			They	could	also	identify	with	similarities	with	their	own	families.	At	the	same	time	the	HCP’s	protective	phantasies	of	 “being	right”	and	“in	control”	are	undermined	by	 death;	 their	 skills	 to	 cure	 or	make	 better	 have	 reached	 an	 end;	 and	 they	 can	meet	 the	 family	 in	 a	 human-being	 to	 human-being	 relationship.	 Thus	 it	 is	suggested	 that	 alongside	 the	 recognition	 of	 dying,	 that	 the	 presence	 and	involvement	of	families	is	extremely	anxiety	provoking	and	likely	to	contribute	to	HCP’s	defences	including	processes	of	denial	about	recognising	dying.	The	current	lack	of	ritual,	and	thus	resource,	alongside	the	communication	of	the	recognition	of	dying,	 is	 recognised	 as	 problematic	 for	 the	 emotional	 containment	 of	 strong	emotions.	The	focus	of	this	chapter	is	on	how	medical	and	nursing	HCPs	learn	to	care	for	the	dying	 patient	 and	 their	 family.	 	 It	 comes	 from	 the	 psychosocial	 analysis	 of	 the	Study	 Two	Workshops,	 as	 participants	 considered	 the	 themed	 results	 from	 the	Critical	Incident	Review	(Study	One).	 	HCPs	who	took	part	in	the	PAR	workshops	discussed	 feeling	 very	 poorly	 prepared	 educationally	 for	 identifying	 dying	 and	working	 with	 families,	 and	 that	 they	 learnt	 mainly	 from	 direct	 clinical	 practice.		This	chapter	examines	the	structure	of	current	medical	and	nursing	education.		It	examines	 the	 education	 literature	 that	 shows	 that	 despite	 the	 national	commitment	to	providing	education	about	the	care	of	the	dying,	setting	standards	for	 education	 and	 educational	 supervision,	 and	 evaluating	 novel	 methods	 of	teaching,	 there	 is	a	 tension	about	what	 is	achieved,	and	 it	 is	expressed	 in	several	absences,	 gaps	 and	 disjunctions.	 	 I	 have	 turned	 to	 psychoanalytic	 psychosocial	theory	to	consider	the	possibility	of	the	irrational,	unconsciously	defended	subject.		I	 have	 considered	 Bion’s	 theories	 of	 learning	 to	 critically	 examine	 how	 the	 PAR	workshop	 participants	 discussed	 the	 supervised	 learning	 event.	 Outside	 of	 the	supervised	 learning	 event	 I	 considered	 how	HCPs	manage	 their	 anxiety	 to	 “see”	and	 to	 learn,	 the	 contributions	 of	 the	 PAR	 workshops	 to	 learning	 and	 the	organisation’s	contribution	to	learning.			
Current	medical	and	nursing	education		Current	medical	and	nursing	education,	whilst	of	differing	lengths,	is	based	on	an	“apprentice”	 type	 model	 of	 learning.	 	 	 In	 this	 approach	 teaching	 occurs	 in	 a	
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university	and	higher	education	setting	for	both	medical	and	nursing	students,	and	is	underpinned	by	time	spent	observing	clinical	practice,	and	taking	part	in	clinical	care.	 	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 changing	 age	 and	 health	 demographics,	where	many	patients	 now	 are	 elderly	 and	 have	 multiple	 co-morbidities,	 post	 registration	medical	 training	 has	 recently	 undergone	 six	 reviews	 (Greenaway	 &	 Greenaway,	2013),	to	ensure	that	patient	care	is	improved.	In	essence	these	reviews	found	that	medical	 education	 was	 slow	 to	 adapt	 to	 patient	 and	 service	 needs.	 In	 the	 past	doctors	 tended	 to	 specialise	 in	 one	 clinical	 area,	 but	 now	 need	 a	much	 broader	range	 of	 skills	 to	 manage	 multiple	 illnesses	 occurring	 simultaneously,	 in	 the	context	 of	 the	 patient’s	 social,	 financial	 and	 family	 resources.	 	 Additionally	 the	training	 structure	 has	 previously	 prevented	 doctors	 changing	 specialties	 mid	career,	or	developing	knowledge	and	skills	outside	of	 their	specialty,	or,	with	the	introduction	of	 the	doctor’s	own	 family	commitments	and	children,	 to	move	 into	and	out	of	training	(Greenaway,	2013).		Similarly,	pre-registration	nurses’	training	has	 also	undergone	 a	 review	 titled	 “The	Willis	 Commission”	 (Willis	 Commission,	2012)	 to	 ensure	 nurses	 are	 able	 to	 care	 for	 patients	 in	 hospital,	 but	 also	 in	community	settings.		These	locations	may	be	the	patient’s	own	home,	in	residential	and	 care	 homes,	 in	 general	 practice	 and	 out-patient	 settings.	 	 Despite	 recent	reviews	of	medical	training,	the	notion	of	‘seeing’,	in	the	sense	of	observing	others	and	role	modelling,	continue	to	be	seen	as	critical	to	the	development	of	competent	HCPs	at	the	time	of	qualification	(Kopelman,	2014)	(Willis	Commission,	2012).			Typically,	 a	 medical	 course	 comprises	 a	 preclinical	 core	 science	 component	 in	years	one	to	three,	and	a	clinical	component	 in	years	four	to	six.	 	The	care	of	the	dying	patient	 is	pre-dominantly	covered	 in	the	clinical	component	(Barclay	et	al.,	2015).	 	 The	 nursing	 curriculum	 is	 orientated	 to	 a	 life-course	 perspective	 that	includes	 experience	 of	 death	 and	 the	 social	 context	 of	 dying	 (Cavaye	 &	 Watts,	2012)	 and	 exposure	 to	 the	 care	 of	 the	 dying	 is	 more	 variably	 experienced	depending	 on	 the	 kind	 of	 clinical	 placements	 undertaken.	 A	 few	 students	 can	receive	a	direct	clinical	placement	with	a	palliative	care	team	(Bassah,	Seymour,	&	Cox,	 2014).	 There	 is	 evidence	 from	 the	 literature	 that	 Institutes	 of	 Higher	Education	–	both	nursing	and	medicine	-	are	endeavouring	to	use	and	evaluate	a	range	 of	 teaching	 methods	 to	 enhance	 learning	 about	 the	 care	 of	 the	 dying,	
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including	e-learning	(Gibbins,	Williams,	Cooke,	Alder,	&	Forbes,	2012),	simulation	(Kopp	 &	 Hanson,	 2012)	 (Gillan,	 Jeong,	 &	 van	 der	 Riet,	 2014)	 and	 group	 work	(Poultney,	Berridge,	&	Malkin,	2014).		
The	learning	opportunity	-	part	one	Medical	 and	 nursing	 education	 curriculums	 are	 focused	 around	 “learning	opportunities”	 in	 clinical	 practice.	 	 These	 are	 recognised	 to	 occur	 wherever	 the	student	practices.	Whilst	each	clinical	experience	has	the	potential	to	be	a	learning	opportunity	 (Academy	 of	Medical	 Royal	 Colleges,	 2012)	 (Nursing	 and	Midwifery	Council,	2010a),	there	are	pre-set	expected	experiences	mapped	onto	assessment	procedures	 so	 that	 the	 student	 can	 be	 evaluated	 as	 being	 able	 to	 practice	competently.	 	 This	means	 that	 in	 clinical	 practice	 a	 student	 needs	 to	 be	 able	 to	seize	opportunities	to	learn,	and	reflect	on	them	with	a	more	experienced	clinician.			These	learning	opportunities	have	been	formalised	in	the	junior	doctor	curriculum	and	 called	 “supervised	 learning	 events”.	 	 These	 opportunities	 are	 also	 linked	 to	assessment	for	competence	for	registered	practice.	Standards	have	been	set	for	medical	education	throughout	a	medical	‘career’,	from	medical	 student	 through	 to	 consultant,	 in	 order	 to	 access	 these	 learning	opportunities.	 	The	learning	opportunity	 is	to	be	safe	for	patients	and	supportive	for	 learners	and	educators,	occurring	within	a	caring,	compassionate	culture	and	providing	 a	 good	 standard	 of	 clinical	 care.	 The	 institution	 offering	 the	 place	 of	training	 must	 visibly	 value	 and	 support	 education	 and	 training	 so	 learners	 can	demonstrate	 what	 is	 expected	 in	 “Good	 Medical	 Practice”	 and	 to	 achieve	 the	learning	 outcomes	 required	 by	 their	 curriculum	 (General	Medical	 Council,	 2016,	p.9).		A	junior	doctor’s	post-gradate	medical	education	is	supported	by	educational	supervisors	 –	 recognised	 by	 the	 medical	 deanery	 -	 who	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	overall	 supervision	 and	management	 of	 a	 specific	 doctor’s	 education	 (or	 part	 of	their	 education)	 (General	 Medical	 Council,	 2016).	 	 In	 clinical	 practice	 all	 senior	clinicians	supervise	junior	doctors’	care,	as	they	do	not	necessarily	work	with	their	educational	supervisor.	Standards	are	set	for	the	education	of	student	nurses,	but	they	do	not	exist	for	the	continued	professional	development	post	qualification.	With	regard	to	the	learning	
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opportunity,	 the	 Nursing	 and	 Midwifery	 Council	 (NMC)	 says	 “practice	 learning	opportunities	 must	 be	 safe,	 effective	 and	 integral	 to	 the	 programme	 outcome”	(Nursing	and	Midwifery	Council,	2010a).		The	mentor	and	“sign	off	mentor”	is	key	to	 student	 nurse	 assessment	 of	 competence,	 and	 as	 well	 as	 “selecting	 and	supporting	 a	 range	 of	 learning	 opportunities”,	 they	 have	 to	 be	 able	 to	 make	judgements	about	competence	and	proficiency	of	NMC	students	on	the	same	part	of	 the	 register	 and	 same	 field	of	practice	 and	be	 accountable	 for	 such	decisions”		(Nursing	and	Midwifery	Council,	2010a,	p.24).	Reflection	 is	 seen	 as	 key	 to	medical	 and	 nursing	 development,	 and	 the	 route	 to	make	sense	of	learning,	and	is	directly	linked	to	a	change	in	practice	or	behaviour	–	“doctors	 must	 understand	 their	 strengths	 and	 weakness,	 their	 personal	 style,	assumptions	and	beliefs.	 	This	 requires	doctors	 to	be	open	 to	 feedback	and	with	reflection	and	guidance,	to	be	able	to	modify	their	behaviour”	(The	UK	Foundation	Programme	 Curriculum,	 2016).	 	 Reflective	 based	 nursing	 curriculums	 based	 on	Gibb’s	 single	 loop	 of	 learning,	 and	 Kolb’s	 double	 reflective	 learning	 cycle	 were	introduced	in	the	early	1990s	(Murphy	&	Atkins,	1994)	as	a	method	to	stimulate	nurses	to	learn	from	clinical	practice	as	it	was	deemed	that	practitioners	who	have	“learned	 to	 learn…may	 be	 more	 effective	 in	 meeting	 client	 needs”	 (Murphy	 &	Atkins,	 1994,	 p.17).	 	 In	 these	 cycles,	 nurses	 were	 asked	 to	 reflect	 on	 “what	happened	 in	 clinical	 practice,	 how	 they	 felt	 about	 it,	 what	 the	 evidence	 base	indicates	and	 to	 formulate	a	new	plan	of	action	 for	 the	 future”	 (single	 loop),	and	then	what	they	learnt	about	trialling	this	process	(double	loop)	to	engender	“deep	learning”.			The	learning	theories	that	broadly	underpin	the	current	education	curriculum	pre-suppose	that	learning	is	mainly	a	rational	and	cognitive	process,	and	are	informed	by	 behaviourism,	 cognitive	 constructivism	 and	 social	 constructivism.	 They	 also	assume	 that	 learning	 can	 be	 straightforwardly	 assessed.	 	 Behaviourism	 pre-supposes	a	passive	absorption	of	a	body	of	knowledge,	promoted	by	repetition	and	positive	 reinforcement	 as	 exemplified	 by	 taught	 lectures,	 feedback	 and	examinations.	 	 Cognitive	 constructivism	 assumes	 that	 new	 information	 is	discovered	by	learners	with	the	teacher’s	facilitation	and	is	able	to	be	assimilated	and	 accommodated,	 as	 exemplified	 by	 watching	 and	 being	 involved	 in	 clinical	
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practice	and	discussing	learning	from	this	with	role	models	and	mentors	and	in	the	classroom.	Social	constructivism	assumes	 that	new	 information	 is	collaboratively	assimilated	 and	 accommodated	 and	 integrates	 students	 into	 a	 community	 of	knowledge	 and	 practice	 through	 group	 learning.	 	 This	 would	 be	 exemplified	 by	HCPs	 learning	 from	 role	 models	 and	 contributing	 to	 care	 in	 the	 clinical	 area.		Reflection	as	it	is	currently	articulated	is	a	rational	and	cognitive	process.	However,	 despite	 the	 commitment	 to	 providing	 education	 about	 the	 care	 of	 the	dying,	setting	standards	for	education	and	educational	supervision,	and	evaluating	novel	 methods	 of	 teaching,	 there	 is	 a	 tension	 about	 what	 is	 achieved,	 and	 it	 is	expressed	 in	 several	 absences,	 gaps	 and	 disjunctions.	 	 Firstly,	 there	 is	 evidence	that	the	amount	of	time	given	to	palliative	care	and	care	of	the	dying	patient	on	the	UK	medical	curriculum	can	vary	from	as	little	as	7	to	as	much	as	98	hours,	and	it	is	notable	 that	 there	 is	 still	 “a	 trend	 towards	 patient	 contact”	 (Walker	 et	 al.,	 2016,	p.1)	 rather	 than	 actual	 patient	 contact.	 	 There	 is	 evidence	 that	 student	 nurses	exposure	to	education	about	the	care	of	the	dying,	was	on	average	forty-five	hours	in	the	UK.		The	attention	to	the	care	of	the	dying	varied	according	to	place	of	study.		A	 quarter	 of	 nursing	 programmes	 offered	 a	 full	 semester	 course	 (76%	 students	took	the	course,	and	62%	spent	time	in	a	hospice	or	palliative	care	team),	and	over	a	half	of	nursing	programmes	offered	a	lecture	(s)	in	various	courses	(Dickinson	et	al.,	 2008).	 	 This	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 leave	 a	 gap	 in	 the	 ability	 to	 utilise	 fully	 the	“apprenticeship”	model	of	seeing	and	learning	in	relation	to	care	of	the	dying.			Secondly,	 senior	 medical	 educators	 have	 recorded	 that	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 produce	sustained	positive	attitudinal	change	of	medical	students	 to	 the	care	of	 the	dying	over	 the	 course	 of	medical	 training,	 and	 have	 linked	 this	 to	 the	 attitude	 of	 core	clinical	 science	 educators.	 	 They	 found	 negative	 attitudinal	 changes	 occurring	during	the	core	science	colleagues	delivering	years	one	to	three,	which	contrasted	with	the	positive	attitude	generated	by	clinical	colleagues	delivering	years	four	to	six	(Barclay	et	al.,	2015).				Thirdly,	 there	 is	 also	 a	 disjuncture	 between	 what	 skills	 educators	 think	 junior	doctors	require	in	order	for	them	to	care	for	the	dying	patient;	what	clinical	care	consultants	believe	 junior	doctors	can	provide;	and	what	 junior	doctors	 feel	 they	
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can	 provide.	 	 This	 is	 exemplified	 in	 Bowden’s	 research	 where	 surveyed	 junior	doctors	 found	 themselves	 prepared	 to	 speak	 with	 patients	 and	 families,	 and	manage	the	patient’s	pain,	but	 ill	equipped	to	manage	the	psychological,	spiritual	and	social	distress	of	dying	patients	and	families	that	are	expressed	consequent	to	the	 conversations	 (Bowden	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 	 Over	 half	 of	 junior	 doctors	 reported	significant	emotional	distress	consequent	to	this	clinical	work,	yet	few	felt	they	had	anyone	 they	 could	 seek	 help	 from.	 	 The	 majority	 of	 consultants	 felt	 that	 junior	doctors	 were	 equipped	 for	 medical	 practice,	 felt	 confident	 that	 junior	 doctors	would	ask	for	help,	yet	few	had	provided	help	(Bowden	et	al.,	2013).		Student	nurses	 are	 experiencing	 the	 care	of	 their	 first	dying	patient	within	 their	training	 (Costello,	 2013)	 and	 some	 feel	 very	 unprepared	 for	 the	 level	 of	communication	 skills	 required	of	 them	when	 caring	 for	 dying	patients	 (Okoye	&	Arber,	 2014).	 	 They	 are	 learning	 to	 emotionally	 care	 for	 and	 be	 alongside	 the	patient	 unsupervised	 whilst	 undertaking	 general	 nursing	 care	 tasks.	 They	 value	hospice	 placements	 as	 a	 learning	 experience	 (Okoye	 &	 Arber,	 2014),	 in	 part	because	they	felt	that	they	could	be	themselves	whilst	caring	for	the	dying	patient,	and	not	find	the	care	of	the	patient	at	odds	with	their	natural	disposition.	 	 In	the	hospice	 scenario	 there	 was	 humour	 and	 the	 student	 nurses	 found	 this	 helpful.		Students	are	learning	about	themselves,	as	they	learn	to	care	for	the	dying.	 	They	also	recognise	there	is	a	skill	in	being	able	to	sit	with	the	patient	and	tolerate	a	high	level	of	emotional	distress,	and	they	want	more	education	on	this	topic	both	in	the	university	and	 in	 the	clinical	area.	 	 	However,	whilst	some	students	 frame	caring	for	dying	patients	in	a	positive	light,	others	find	that	caring	for	the	dying	can	have	significant	 negative	 emotional	 impact	 (Kent,	 Anderson,	 &	 Owens,	 2012)	 and	actively	avoid	caring	for	these	patients	(Okoye	&	Arber,	2014).	Fourthly,	 in	 both	 the	 medical	 and	 nursing	 literature,	 the	 role	 of	 palliative	 care	teams	 in	 supporting	 learning	 in	 clinical	 practice	 is	 recognised	 as	 helpful	 as	 a	support	to	 junior	clinicians	with	 limited	teaching	from	senior	colleagues	(Price	&	Schofield,	2015)	and	to	debriefing	clinicians	after	the	death	of	a	patient	(Hockley,	2014).	 	Thus	specialist	 support	 is	 required	 to	attain	 the	maximum	 learning	 from	the	clinical	situations,	rather	than	this	being	delivered	by	generalists.		So	education	
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of	nurses	and	doctors	about	how	to	care	 for	the	dying	patient	and	their	 family	 is	proving	resistant	to	easy	improvement	without	specialist	palliative	care	support.			
The	possibility	of	the	irrational	defended	subject…psychoanalytic	learning	theory	Psychoanalytic	approaches	turn	cognitive	and	rational	approaches	to	education	on	their	head	-	“the	thoughts	come	first,	and	thinking	may	follow”	(Bibby,	2011,	p.98	).		Bibby	 says	 a	 “difficult	 thought	 to	 bear	 is	 that	 thought	 and	 thinking	 are	uncontrollable,	 radical	and	subversive”	 (Bibby,	2011,	p.114).	 	An	equally	difficult	thought	 to	 bear	 is	 that	 reflection	 subsequent	 to	 thinking	 may	 not	 proceed	 to	learning	due	to	our	unconscious	defences	blocking	this	(Doyle,	2012)	–	learning	is	painful	(Salzberger-Wittenberg,	1999).	It	 is	 helpful	 to	 site	Wilfred	Bion’s	work	 as	 key	here	 as	he	 articulated	 theories	 of	how	we	think	and	learn.			He	returned	to	the	earliest	development	of	this	capacity	as	 it	 develops	 between	 mother	 and	 child.	 	 As	 a	 baby	 cannot	 make	 sense	 of	experiences	such	as	pain	and	hunger,	these	are	projected	into	the	parent	(through	crying,	physical	distress),	so	the	parent	can	feel	something	of	them	–	contain	and	hold	 them	 -	 and	 understand	 the	 baby’s	 experience.	 	 The	 parent	 can	 then	 think	about	 the	 baby’s	 distress	 and	 transform	 it	 into	 something	 that	 the	 baby	 is	more	easily	able	to	‘digest’.		Through	the	parent’s	thinking	the	baby	is	able	to	develop	the	capacity	 to	 think	 in	 relation	 with	 another	 and	 gradually	 learns	 to	 self-sooth	independently.	“Being	able	to	think	has	its	roots	in	the	meeting	of	minds	between	mother	and	baby”	(Doyle,	2012).		If	the	mother	cannot	contain	the	baby’s	distress	and	“think”	about	the	baby	to	make	the	experience	safe	for	him/her,	then	the	baby	is	 left	with	 its	own	difficult	 feelings,	and	also	perhaps	 its	mother’s	overwhelming	emotions	 to	 endure.	 Feelings	 of	 vulnerability	 and	 terror	 can	 “re-ignite	 in	relationships	 in	 later	 life”	 (Frost	 &	 McClean,	 2014,	 p.144),	 including	 in	relationships	of	learning.	Thought,	 thinking	 and	 emotion	 then	 are	 linked	 and	 as	 Bibby	 says	 they	 are	“anchored	fast	in	the	unconscious”	(Bibby,	2011,	p.98).		Doyle	says	the	importance	of	the	early	parent	–	child	interaction	in	adulthood	is	three	fold.		Firstly,	these	early	experiences	shape	the	individual’s	sense	of	self,	and	help	to	frame	ways	of	relating	to	others	and	the	wider	social	world.	A	representation	of	the	world	is	formed	that	
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can	be	reworked	and	modified	according	to	subsequent	experiences,	but	that	over	time	 is	 likely	 to	 become	 a	 kind	 of	 template	 for	 interpersonal	 engagement.		Secondly,	the	process	of	parent-child	relationship	prepares	the	individual	to	retain	thoughtfulness,	and	curiosity	even	when	feelings	of	discomfort	overwhelm.	Thirdly	in	the	face	of	unsettling	feelings	and	experience,	individuals	can	potentially	return	to	 earlier	 patterns	 of	 communication.	 	 By	 this	 I	mean	 they	may	 only	 be	 able	 to	tolerate	a	situation	which	is	comfortable	and	manageable	and	may	need	to	avoid	a	situation	that	unsettles	(Doyle,	2012).	
What	 does	 psychoanalytic	 learning	 theory	mean	 for	 those	 learning	 to	 care	 for	 the	
dying?	What	 might	 this	 mean	 for	 nurses	 and	 doctors	 who	 are	 learning	 to	 care	 for	 the	dying	and	 their	 families?	 In	 this	 context,	 there	are	parallels	with	 the	educational	context,	where	part	of	 the	 teacher’s	 role,	 like	 the	mother’s,	 is	 to	hold	 the	anxiety	and	 frustration	of	 students	 “not	knowing”,	 thereby	helping	 students	 to	 approach	unknown	 and	 potentially	 devastating	 knowledge.	 In	 the	 process	 teachers	 learn	both	 about	 the	 student,	 the	 situation	 and	 themselves	 (Salzberger-Wittenberg,	1999).	We	have	already	discussed	that	caring	for	the	dying	evokes	such	powerful	feelings	 that	 it	 challenges	our	 internal	psychological	 boundaries.	 	 It	 is	 likely	 that	educators	will	need	to	hold	the	strong	emotions	of	our	novice	doctors	and	nurses,	to	be	thoughtful	about	the	person	(s)	and	situation,	to	transform	the	encounter	in	a	helpful	way	so	the	novice	can	learn.		Whilst	 recognising	 the	 “good	 enough”	 concept	 (Winnicott	 cited	 in	 Bibby,	 2011,	p.145),	it	is	helpful	at	this	point	to	think	about	some	of	the	work	that	may	go	on	in	the	supervised	learning	opportunity	with	a	senior	HCP	about	breaking	bad	news	to	a	patient	and	 family.	 	 It	would	be	helpful	 for	 the	HCP	 to	1)	hold	and	contain	 the	patient	 and	 family’s	 immediate	 anxieties	 and	 distress,	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	decision-making	that	is	meaningful	to	the	patient	and	family,	and	help	them	to	tell	a	cogent	narrative	of	care	(so	important	to	bereavement	outcomes).	2)	Convey	to	the	 family	 a	 sense	 that	 this	 potentially	 devastating	 experience	 is	 survivable,	 and	that	 this	 level	 of	 distress	 will	 pass	 and	 help	 them	 identify	 their	 own	 emotional	support	(where	this	is	a	gap	in	support	a	referral	to	other	agencies	can	be	offered).	3)	Convey	to	the	patient	a	sense	of	comfort	and	care	until	death	(knowing	that	this	
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is	an	uncertain	journey	we	will	undergo	and	is	fundamentally	unknowable	by	us	in	advance).	 	 4)	 Contain	 the	 emotional	 impact	 for	 junior	 doctors	 witnessing	 the	impact	 of	 negotiated	 ethical	 decision-making,	 distress	 of	 the	 patient	 and	 family,	and	 anticipating	 what	 the	 expected	 psychological,	 physical,	 financial,	 social,	 and	spiritual	losses	might	be	for	the	patient	and	family,	in	order	that	the	junior	doctor	can	 begin	 to	 hold	 a	 “thinking	 state	 of	mind”	 and	 learn	 about	 the	 patient,	 family,	professional	interaction.	However,	 if	 the	 senior	 doctor	 is	 unable	 to	 contain,	 and	 retain	 a	 “moment	 by	moment	 -	 thinking	 state”	 (Doyle,	 2012)	 about	 	 the	 family’s	 grief,	 and	 it	 reignites	their	own,	so	that	the	HCPs	grief	is	projected	into	the	families,	then	the	family	are	left	not	only	with	 their	own	grief	but	 the	HCPs	as	well.	 In	circumstances	such	as	this	the	family	may	be	so	distressed	that	they	are	unable	to	understand	their	role	in	decision-making,	or	contribute	to	any	decision.		If	the	senior	doctor	is	unable	to	tolerate,	 and	contain	 the	grief,	 such	 that	bad	news	 is	given	with	 the	 clinical	plan	and	the	doctor	walks	away,	then	again	the	family	are	left	alone	with	unmanageable	anxiety	and	grief,	and	the	senior	doctor	may	be	left	unwise	as	to	the	family’s	views	(so	important	in	best	interests	decision-making).	What	is	also	at	stake	is	the	junior	HCP	 in	 the	 consultation	 learning	 to	 undertake	 this	 work.	 	 If	 the	 senior	 HCP	 is	observed	 as	 not	 being	 able	 to	 contain	 the	 distress	 of	 patients	 and	 families	 and	work	 with	 this,	 others	 in	 the	 consultation	 may	 find	 themselves	 absorbing	 the	emotional	 impact.	 If	 those	 others	 are	 not	 in	 a	 position	 to	 transform	 the	consultation	(a	palliative	care	specialist	would	attend	to	this),	then	they	can	be	left	feeling	the	weight	of	the	family’s	grief	and	their	own.		Without	the	opportunity	to	express	their	thoughts	and	to	talk	about	their	feelings	and	to	have	them	held	and	contained	 safely	 then	unconscious	 defences	 can	 block	 the	 ability	 to	 be	 reflective	(Doyle,	 2012)	and	 learn.	Psychoanalytic	 theories	would	hold	 that	 re-engagement	with	 dying	 patients	 and	 families	 might	 engender	 such	 feelings	 of	 anxiety	 that	avoidance	(conscious	and	unconscious)	may	occur.	
Discussing	the	un-discussable	Psychoanalytic	 theory	 may	 also	 yield	 a	 radical	 perspective	 on	 assessment	 for	competence	 in	 the	 care	 of	 the	 dying.	 Learning	 comes	 from	 thought,	 thinking,	tolerating	difficult	 feelings,	and	considering	 fresh	perspectives.	 	What	 though	are	
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clinicians	learning?	What	is	being	assessed?	Let’s	examine	two	examples	from	the	workshops	in	Study	Two,	where	consultants	discussed	their	experiences	of	caring	for	 the	 dying.	 	 These	 same	 consultants	will	 be	 responsible	 for	 sourcing	 learning	opportunities	and	assessment	of	competence	for	junior	clinicians.			In	the	first	extract	taken	from	Workshop	Three	(Study	Two)	a	consultant	discussed	their	 experience	 of	 caring	 for	 patients	whose	 dying	 is	 drawn	 out	 over	 days	 and	weeks.		
HCP	9	I	see	this	in	a	lot	of	cases,	and	honestly	I’m	not	really…(sigh)…distressed	
and	sad	to	see	people	stay	stuck	in	the	bed	for	4,5,6,7,8,9,10	days.		Just	waiting	
for	 that	moment	 there,	 our	patients	 suffer.	 	 I	 get	 very	 frustrated	and	would	
really	like	to	be	able	to	kill	them	(nervous	laugh);	it	would,	can’t	really	explain	
it,	 its	 a	when	 you	 know	 there	 is	 nothing	 else	 to	 do	 and	 you	 see	 just	 all	 the	













just	to	be	stuck	there	for	days	and	you	really	feel	(sighs)	un-useful	Caring	 for	 a	 dying	 patient,	where	 there	 are	 no	more	 curative	 treatment	 options,	and	“nothing	to	do”,	engenders	strong	feelings	of	uselessness	in	the	HCP.			Feeling	“un-useful”	 is	 fundamentally	 challenging	 for	 this	 doctor,	 and	 even	 offering	
		
 180	
palliation	and	symptom	management,	does	not	relieve	the	impact	of	the	emotions	felt.	 	 This	medical	HCP	describes	 being	 “very	 frustrated”	 at	 reaching	 the	 limit	 of	their	 skills,	 and	 an	 inability	 to	 contain	 and	 personally	 tolerate	 the	 impact	 of	observing	the	 level	of	patient	and	 family	distress.	 	She	 identifies	 this	as	a	 “pretty	uncomfortable”	situation.	She	describes	how	she	puts	on	an	empathetic	response	to	the	patient	and	family,	but	internally	feels	something	completely	different.	This	is	emotional	labour	(Hochschild,	2012).	The	relentlessness	of	this	situation	when	a	patient’s	dying	takes	a	 long	time	increases	the	distress	of	the	HCP	beyond	a	level	that	is	tolerable.	She	experiences	phantasies	of	killing	the	source	of	their	distress	–	the	 patient.	 She	 also	 identifies	 that	 families	 sometimes	 ask	 if	 she	 can	 kill	 the	patient.		Linking	this	to	educational	theory,	it	can	be	seen	that	the	wish	to	kill	the	patient	 is	 evidence	 of	 the	 opposite	 of	 being	 able	 to	 stay	 with	 a	 very	 difficult	situation	and	help	others	think	about	what	might	be	going	on	and	what	might	be	done	 to	 manage	 the	 situation.	 The	 thought	 about	 killing	 the	 patient	 effectively	prevents	all	other	options.	In	effect,	it’s	a	thought	that	stops	her	thinking.	Using	Kleinian	thinking,	 it	 is	postulated	that	 it	 isn’t	only	the	distress	of	 the	dying	patient	 and	 their	 family	 that	 challenges	 the	 emotional	 integrity	 of	 the	HCP.	 	Her	professional	defence	of	being	useful	and	able	 to	distract	herself	 is	 fundamentally	challenged.	One	wonders	if	the	family	pick	up	the	HCP’s	projection	of	uselessness	and	 express	 the	 longing	 for	 death	 to	 occur,	 or	 whether	 the	 HCP	 absorbs	 the	family’s	projection,	as	they	similarly	have	to	watch	the	patient	die.		It	appears	that	staring	dying	and	death	in	the	face	can	be	intolerable	and	is	passed	around	like	a	hot	potato.	At	 the	same	time,	killing	 the	patient	 in	 this	country	 is	 illegal	and	unethical	and	a	total	breakdown	in	the	ethical	principles	under-pinning	clinical	practice	of	“do	no	harm”.		Unethical	and	unprofessional	thoughts	bubbling	up	will	likely	increase	the	HCP’s	 level	 of	 conscious	 and	unconscious	 anxiety.	 The	 sweetener	 to	 this	 terrible	phantasy	of	wishing	the	patient	was	dead	is	that	the	killing	would	be	a	merciful	act	to	alleviate	suffering.		The	question	is	whose	suffering?	It’s	not	just	the	patient	and	family	 that	 are	 suffering.	 	 The	 dying	 patient	 connects	 the	 HCP	 to	 her	 own	vulnerability	and	her	own	emotional,	physical	and	social	upbringing,	and	takes	her	to	a	place	where	she	contemplates	her	own	mother’s	death	i.e.	her	own	loss.	In	a	
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case	such	as	this,	the	lead	HCP	is	barely	containing	her	own	emotional	response,	let	alone	building	this	into	a	‘learning	opportunity’.		In	the	second	example	taken	from	Workshop	Two	(Study	Two)	a	doctor	described	the	on-going	emotional	effect	 for	him,	of	a	patient	who	survived	the	prognosis	of	dying	 and	 transfer	 to	 a	 hospice,	 and	 presented	 herself	 back	 in	 his	 hospital	 out-patient	clinic	for	further	active	treatment.		He	found	this	situation	very	challenging,	despite	 the	 patient’s	 forgiveness,	 and	 desire	 for	 him	 to	 remain	 her	 doctor.	 	 He	described	how	since	then,	every	time	he	has	to	recognise	that	a	patient	is	dying,	he	has	thoughts	about	this	particular	patient’s	case.	 	He	also	challenged	the	fact	that	reflection	is	helpful	as	it	had	not	helped	him	in	this	specific	case.	
HCP	7	And	it	is	difficult	and	you	do,	you	say	we	are	supposed	to	reflect	more,	
that	 case	 I	 reflected	 more,	 and	 still	 reflect	 on	 her	 and	 in	 a	 way	 it	 sort	 of	
bubbles	up	with	every	end	of	life,	still	in	the	back	of	your	mind,	with	every	end	
of	 life	conversation	 that	you	have	 its	always	 that	moment	of	doubt,	because	
you	think	actually	I	have	had	it	not	be	right	in	the	past.	
HCP	8	Isn’t	that	about	physician	confidence	and	we	like	to	be	right?		
HCP	7	yes	exactly.		Its	true.		In	 this	 quote	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 the	 HCP	 is	 bouncing	 between	 thought	 and	thinking	without	coming	to	a	resolution	and	learning.	 	 	His	psychological	defence	was	 the	 phantasy	 of	 mastery	 and	 of	 being	 known	 as	 a	 clinician	 “to	 be	 right”	consequent	 to	 professional	 qualification.	 	 This	 was	 undermined	 by	 the	unpredictability	of	death,	such	that	he	could	not	contain	his	own	distress	and	learn.		This	 links	 to	 Bion’s	 thinking	 that	 learning	 is	 painful.	 Or	 as	 Bibby	 describes	 it	“reason,	 thinking	 and	 learning	 are	 inevitably	 and	 constitutively	 difficult;	psychoanalytically	 thinking	 and	 learning	 are	 tied	 to	 difficult	 feelings	 and	frustrations.	 	There	 is	no	way	out	of	 this	bind:	 it	 is	 the	human	condition”	(Bibby,	2011,	 p.106).	 	 	 The	 group	 then	 appeared	 to	 do	 what	 he	 was	 unable	 to	 do	 for	himself,	and	name	the	psychological	defence	of	“being	right”,	and	the	consequence	of	“being	wrong”.	
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HCP	8	We	cant	always	be	 right,	but	 that	 sometimes	destroys	 the	 confidence	
that	patients	and	families	have	in	you,	because	you	might	have	been	right	for	





HCP	8	in	you.	The	 consequences	 then	 of	 “getting	 it	 wrong”	 are	 a	 patient	 and	 family	 loss	 of	confidence.		The	group’s	containment	offered	the	HCP	something	he	could	not	offer	himself	internally	to	contain	his	distress	and	learn	from	his	thinking.		In	this	study	there	was	no	indication	that	the	HCP	had	moved	to	a	position	of	learning,	but	the	“erm”	 indicated	 a	 thoughtfulness	 that	 stopped	 the	 ricocheting	 between	 thought	and	 thinking	 and	 in	 the	 future	 might	 have	 produced	 further	 discussion	 and	learning.	However,	 this	HCP’s	professional	narrative	of	“needing	to	be	right”,	and	his	 own	 inability	 to	 forgive	 himself	 could	 undermine	 the	 ability	 for	 the	 HCP	 to	build	safe	 learning	opportunities	 for	 junior	doctors,	and	facilitate	their	reflection.		The	need	to	be	right	silences	the	discussion	about	learning	from	getting	it	wrong.		
The	learning	opportunity	-	part	two		We	saw	in	part	one	that	the	clinical	learning	opportunity	and	reflecting	on	this	is	a	key	part	 of	 learning	how	 to	become	a	 clinician.	 	 	 Endeavouring	 to	 seize	 learning	opportunities	for	students	and	junior	staff	 is	a	key	part	of	senior	HCP	work.	 	 	Yet	we	can	see	from	the	above	two	examples	that	creating	learning	opportunities	from	caring	for	the	dying	is	particularly	challenging	work.		Let’s	examine	what	HCPs	in	this	 study	 said	 about	 their	 experience	 of	 learning	 from	 “supervised	 learning	events”,	and	how	they	offer	them	to	others.	




few	interactions	before	(L226-227,	Workshop	Four,	Study	Two).	At	 this	 point	 in	 the	 workshops	 HCPs	 were	 discussing	 how	 junior	 doctors	 could	learn	to	lead	patient	and	family	meetings.	Consultants	felt	it	was	essential	to	have	watched	some	family	meetings	take	place	before	being	responsible	as	a	consultant	for	the	meeting.		They	described	the	experience	of	medical	education	as	“didactic,	tick	 box,	 examination”.	 	 Thus,	 they	 offered	 learning	 opportunities	 for	 junior	doctors	 to	 join	 them	for	significant	 family	meetings	 to	 increase	 the	chance	of	 the	opportunity	to	have	witnessed	this.	
We	try	and	take	the	juniors	with	you	as	well,	because	we	expect	them	to	have	
didactic	 learning,	 tick	 box,	 do	 their	 exam,	 and	 all	 of	 a	 sudden	 they	 are	 a	
consultant	having	to	do	that;	they	haven’t	done	it	before	and	haven’t	seen	it	
done,	because	inevitably	you	do	not	do	this	sort	of	thing	on	a	big	ward	round	
and	 everybody	 crowding	 round	 the	 end	of	 the	bed…or	 shouldn’t…yes	 so	 you	
know	sometimes	you	say	to	the	registrar	join	me	at	2pm	we	are	going	to	have	
this	difficult	conversation,	do	you	want	to	come?	(L219-225,	Workshop	Four,	
Study	Two).	In	this	manner	the	creation	of	the	“learning	opportunity”,	means	that	consultants	have	used	their	experience	to	 improve	the	experience	for	 junior	doctors	they	are	responsible	 for.	 This	 is	 a	 caring,	 generous	 and	 reparative	 position	 to	 take,	 and	possibly	 an	 attempt	 to	 repair	 the	 “chaos”	 of	 their	 own	 experience.	 In	psychodynamic	 thinking,	 the	 consultant	 is	 taking	 the	 role	 of	 “helpful,	 tolerant,	understanding	 parent”	 to	 expose	 the	 junior	 doctor	 to	 a	 situation,	 which	 they	themselves	 recognise,	 is	 under	 represented	 in	 formal	 medical	 training.	 	 In	 the	workshop	 HCPs	 expressed	 anxieties	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 a	 junior	 doctor	 at	 the	meeting,	and	managing	the	additional	dynamics	of	this.		







Study	Two).	The	 presence	 of	 a	 junior	 doctor	 was	 described	 as	 a	 feeling	 in	 the	 back	 of	 the	consultant’s	 minds	 –	 and	 “lurking”.	 	 The	 presence	 isn’t	 reassuring,	 and	 it	 is	recognised	as	a	 threat.	Whether	 this	has	conscious	or	unconscious	resonances	of	the	 consultant’s	 own	 learning	 experiences	 of	 clinical	 care	 and	 perhaps	 the	unspeakable,	 untellable	 experiences	 of	 clinical	 practice	 (as	 expressed	 in	 extract	one),	or	there	is	a	worry	that	the	junior	doctor	might	be	upset,	or	intervene	in	an	unhelpful	way,	it	is	impossible	to	tell.		It	links	with	the	gratefulness	for	their	clinical	education	experience	so	far.		We	are	very	fortunate	with	the	junior	doctors	who	are	very	good	(L232-233	
Workshop	four,	Study	Two).		What	 consultants	 did	 not	 discuss	 at	 all	 was	 debriefing	 the	 junior	 doctor	afterwards.	There	is	a	power	differential	between	consultants	and	junior	doctors.	With	the	level	of	anxiety	and	vulnerability	consultants	are	expressing	about	family	meetings	 and	 having	 a	 junior	 doctor	 present,	 the	 impact	 of	 discussing	 “how	 the	meeting	 went”	 with	 a	 view	 to	 each	 person	 having	 capacity	 to	 learn	 seems	emotionally	risky.		Perhaps	it	is	enough	to	let	juniors	observe.		




were	 not	 accepting	 that	 their	 relative	was	 actively	 dying	and	 spent	 a	 lot	 of	




they	really	changed	 then	and	 they	really	 trusted	what	 I	was	 suggesting	and	
what	 I	was	 trying	 to	 get	 them	 to	 see”	 (L469-474,	 Workshop	 Three,	 Study	Two).	I	asked	this	HCP	how	she	had	learnt	to	stay	in	the	room	and	not	avoid	the	family	or	the	topic	of	dying.	 	In	the	quote	below,	there	is	evidence	that	she	knew	she	could	not	avoid	 it,	because	 if	 the	patient	died	and	the	 family	were	still	unprepared,	 the	nurses	would	be	 left	with	 a	worse	 emotional	 situation	 to	 contain	 –	 the	 situation	would	be	“catastrophic”.	
I	could	see	how	ill	 this	person	was	and	I	 thought	I	cant	 leave	until	 they	[the	
family]	have	at	least	started	to	get	it,	because	I	felt	that	the	person	was	very	
close	to	dying,	and	there	were	so	many	of	them	it	would	be	just	catastrophic	if	
we	didn’t	get	this	sorted	now.	 	I	didn’t	think	we	had	the	time.	 	 It	might	have	
been	different	 if	 I	 thought	we	had	the	time,	 I	would	have	gone	away	and	 let	











don’t	mind	either	way	really,	 I	am	quite	easy	going	but	 they	quite	often	 say	
“you	do	that”	(L535-577,	Workshop	Two,	Study	Two).	In	 this	manner,	 certain	 nurses	 gain	 the	 experience	 to	 reflect	 on	 and	 learn	 from,	patient	 and	 family	 meetings	 and	 to	 develop	 their	 expertise,	 whilst	 others	 avoid	gaining	these	skills.		
Palliative	care	nurses	providing	doctors	with	safe	learning	opportunities	A	palliative	care	nurse	captured	the	following	situation	as	a	learning	situation.	

















have	just	seen	(L180-190	Workshop	Four,	Study	Two).			This	watching	 is	 really	 “watching	without	 responsibility	 for	 the	 clinical	decision-making”.	 	 Using	 psychoanalytic	 thinking	 allows	 a	 safe	 exposure	 to	 a	 level	 of	conscious	 or	 unconscious	 anxiety	 that	 might	 make	 what	 is	 to	 be	 learned	 about	death	 and	 dying	 easier	 to	 approach	 and	 even	 prompt	 an	 interest	 to	 learn	more	about	 it.	 	 	 It	 does	 though	 rely	 on	 the	 HCP	 being	 prepared	 to	 allow	 thought	 and	thinking	 and	 a	 willingness	 to	 process	 their	 own	 learning	 about	 this	 clinical	encounter.	 	We	have	seen	that	 there	are	aspects	of	 the	care	of	 the	dying	that	are	discussable,	and	understand	 that	our	unconscious	defences	protect	us	 from	truly	knowing	(Doyle,	2012)	when	the	knowledge	can	be	devastating.		It	is	notable	that	the	HCP	in	the	above	extract	cannot	articulate	the	detail	of	what	made	the	breaking	of	bad	news	better,	and	without	skilled	debrief,	 it	 is	challenging	to	know	how	he	will	change	his	own	modus	operandi,	or	give	feedback	to	others,	or	teach	this	topic.	




you	 [Jo	Wilson]	 have	made	 a	 palliative	 care	 nurse	 out	 of	me…there	was	 no	
dying…In	surgery…I	guess…with	the	saying	about	the	empathy	when	a	patient	
went	 for	 surgery,	 I	 used	 to	 think	 how	 I	 would	 feel	 going	 to	 surgery,	 and	 I	
would	 be	 absolutely	 scared	 out	 of	 my	 mind	 really	 and	 you’ve	 often	 gone	
through	a	trauma	to	go	to	surgery,	so	I	think	of	the	fear	of	going	through	that	
and	the	empathy	that	I	would	try	and	care	for	people	with	has	translated	into	
palliative	care	(L634-641	Workshop	Four,	Study	Two).	What	 this	 means	 is	 that	 instead	 of	 the	 care	 of	 the	 dying	 being	 seen	 as	 entirely	negative,	that	with	support	to	care	for	the	dying,	the	rewards	and	pleasures	of	this	aspect	of	care	get	experienced.	
Doing	without	senior	support	




there	 are	 all	 those	 questions	 about	 fear;	 and	 then	 it’s	 almost	 like	 playing	 a	
game	 of	 putting	 on	 a	mask	 and	 trying	 to	 do	 that	 until	 you	 can	 learn	 from	
someone,	 or	 you	 choose	 to	 learn	 from	 someone	 else	 (L538-543	 Workshop	
Four,	Study	Two).	Here	we	have	an	example	of	a	consciously	employed	defence	of	doctors	to	hide	and	conceal	 from	 patients	 and	 families	 their	 own	 anxieties	 about	 not	 knowing	 and	feeling	 incompetent.	 In	 this	 manner	 the	 aim	 is	 that	 the	 patient	 and	 family	 are	unburdened	by	doctors’	emotional	states.		However,	the	management	of	the	mask	is	 likely	 to	 be	 effortful	 and	 consciously	 and	 unconsciously	 anxiety	 provoking;	resulting	 in	 the	 junior	 doctor	 either	 withdrawing	 without	 gaining	 all	 the	knowledge	of	the	patient	and	family	that	they	could;	giving	information	in	a	clinical	
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way	without	emotion;	or	over-empathising	and	the	family	feeling	the	burden.	This	method	 of	 learning	 from	direct	 clinical	 care	 can	 come	 at	 a	 cost	 to	 the	 patient	 in	terms	of	their	experience	of	compassionate	care	as	the	quote	below	demonstrates.	
I	have	had	patients	and	some	stay	in	your	mind	don’t	they	and	somebody	said	
to	me	‘I	was	in	A	and	E	–	they	leaned	over	the	cot	sides	and	they	told	me	“you	
are	dying”’.	 	Those	 things	 I	 think	 they	 can’t	 forgive	 those.	 	They	will	 forgive	
you	if	you	say	I	am	not	sure	how	to	do	this,	I	can	ask	a	colleague	and	they	are	
more	experienced.		They	don’t	expect	you	to	know	everything…that	then	again	
requires	 a	 level	 of	 insight	 to	 say	 –	 whether	 it’s	 junior	 F1	 or	 you’re	 some	
surgeon	 you	 have	 got	 to	 admit	 that	 you	 can’t	 do	 it.	 	 You	 are	 not	 the	 right	
person	(L556-563	Workshop	Four,	Study	Two).		There	was	recognition	that	patients	did	not	expect	HCPs	to	know	everything,	but	to	know	when	to	seek	further	help.		However,	that	requires	personal	insight	into	the	HCPs	 own	 skills.	 Speaking	 to	 the	 patient	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 however	 well	intentioned,	 causes	 distress	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 further	 distress	 the	 HCP	 that	provided	the	care,	and	limit	the	learning.		Without	reflection	there	is	evidence	that	HCPs	 bounce	 between	 thought	 and	 thinking,	 when	 unable	 to	 discuss	 the	 un-discussable	or	when	they	are	not	offered	an	opportunity	to	reflective.		It	is	unlikely	that	 a	 clinician	will	 offer	 this	 encounter	 up	 as	 an	 assessed	 learning	 opportunity	with	their	assessing	educator,	and	so	the	experience	gets	stuck.		In	this	manner	it	has	 the	 potential	 to	 consciously	 and	 unconsciously	 affect	 future	 decisions	 and	clinical	encounters.	
Nurses	as	a	route	for	doctors	to	learn.	Many	doctors	in	the	study	described	having	a	nurse	in	the	consultation.		This	is	not	unusual,	and	from	a	nursing	point	of	view	it	is	helpful	to	know	what	has	been	said,	and	 how	 the	 family	 have	 reacted,	 to	 continue	 the	 need	 for	 clarification	 of	information	or	emotional	care.			In	 the	quote	below,	 the	patient	had	 improved	 clinically	 from	 the	day	previously,	when	he	had	been	unresponsive,	 and	 the	 family	had	asked	 that	 the	diagnosis	be	withheld	 from	 the	patient.	 	 This	 is	 an	 ethically	 challenging	 situation	and	doctors	
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would	 usually	 tell	 families	 that	 if	 patients	 asked	 directly	 they	 would	 honestly	inform	them.	The	consultant	had	returned	to	the	ward,	the	family	were	not	present	and	the	patient	had	improved	and	confronted	the	doctor	with	his	own	diagnosis.		It	became	a	“wooo”	moment	for	the	doctor	as	it	relieved	him	of	an	ethical	dilemma,	but	would	have	left	him	with	dealing	with	the	family	and	the	difference	of	opinion	as	to	the	clinical	information	they	felt	was	in	the	patient’s	best	interests.		He	went	to	look	for	a	nurse.		What	is	noticeable	is	how	long	a	senior	doctor	will	wait	to	have	a	nurse	present.	
The	patient	was	brighter	and	I	walked	into	the	room…and	he	laid	there	and	
he	opened	his	eye	and	he	said	so	I	have	got	leukaemia	have	I?...And	I	was	like,	




	Whilst	the	HCP	in	this	quote	did	not	illuminate	the	benefit	of	the	nurse,	the	time	it	took	 to	 find	 an	 available	 one	 shows	 how	 important	 it	 was	 to	 him.	 	 He	 then	describes	 the	 consultation	 as	 “really	 useful”	 –	 likely	 meaning	 that	 the	 patient	understood	his	clinical	situation	and	an	onward	care	plan	was	mutually	negotiated.		It	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 nurse	 both	 emotionally	 contains	 the	 clinical	 scenario,	 which	allows	the	doctor	to	remain	in	the	room	and	break	bad	news;	that	the	nurse	adds	to	the	emotional	security	of	undertaking	this	clinical	work	by	acting	as	a	witness	for	 the	 doctor	 in	 defending	 that	 the	 patient	wanted	 to	 know	his	 diagnosis	 if	 the	family	challenged	 this.	 	Additionally,	having	a	nurse	present	allows	 the	doctor	 to	leave	 the	 consultation	 if	 it	 becomes	 intolerable	 for	 the	 doctor	 and	 the	 doctor	knows	the	patient	will	have	emotional	support	and	does	not	have	to	manage	this	themselves.	 	 Doctors	 regularly	 debrief	 with	 nurses	 after	 significant	 patient	 and	family	interactions.	 	In	this	manner,	we	might	say	that	the	nurse	is	the	emotional	container	 (Salzberger-Wittenberg,	 1999),	 enabling	 and	 allowing	 the	 doctor	 to	remain	 in	 the	 clinical	 situation,	 providing	 an	 escape	 route	 if	 they	 cannot	bear	 to	remain,	 and	 providing	 an	 emotional	 debrief	 on	 what	 has	 happened	 or	 what	 is	happening,	so	that	the	doctor	can	think	and	learn	(Doyle,	2012).		Additionally,	it	is	likely	 that	 this	 consultant	 avoided	 discussing	 with	 the	 family	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
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patient	 now	 knew	 his	 diagnosis,	 and	 either	 the	 patient	 or	 the	 nurse	 will	 have	undertaken	this	work.	The	need	of	doctors	to	have	a	nurse	present	is	often	the	reason	nurses	have	built	expertise	about	managing	family	distress,	and	possibly	the	reason	nurses	put	their	learning	down	to	experience	(Warnock,	Tod,	Foster,	&	Soreny,	2010).		Additionally	the	dual	medical	and	nursing	presence	can	be	seen	as	a	social	defence	as	neither	doctor	nor	nurse	has	to	take	full	responsibility	for	the	clinical	encounter.		However,	 whilst	 there	 has	 been	 long	 been	 exploration	 of	 senior	 nurses	 being	 a	route	 for	 junior	doctors	 to	 learn	about	clinical	practice	and	communication	skills	(Vallis,	Hesketh,	&	Macpherson,	2004),	the	idea	that	they	emotionally	contain	the	clinical	 situation	 for	 consultants	 to	 learn	 has	 not	 been	 explored.	 	 In	 this	 study	senior	HCPs	described	how	they	became	increasingly	isolated	in	clinical	practice	as	the	 career	 structure	 left	 them	 to	 independently	 manage	 patients	 and	 families.		Whilst	they	continue	to	receive	professional	development	with	respect	to	disease	management,	 the	professional	development	of	 their	 ability	 to	 care	 for	 families	 is	not	similarly	attended	to.	This	 leaves	 them	short	of	 learning	opportunities	 to	see	others’	 skills	 and	 develop	 their	 skills	with	 families,	 and	 they	 really	 valued	 being	able	watch	skilled	colleagues.	











The	time	to	safely	allow	difficult	thought,	and	thinking	about	it,	so	some	processing	and	 learning	can	occur	seems	critical	and	an	organisational	 responsibility.	 	HCPs	regularly	report	that	the	volume	of	patient	care	can	prevent	thinking:		
I	think	certainly	with	our	job	because	we	are	going	constantly	from	one	to	the	
other	 you	 don’t	 always	 certainly	 have	 time	 to	 reflect	 in	 between	 patients	(L196-197,	Workshop	three,	Study	Two).			Busyness	 could	 be	 a	 personal	 defence	mechanism,	 but	 with	 the	 pressure	 of	 the	clinical	caseload	it	is	personally	hard	to	seek	time	out	to	think	and	reflect.		Also	the	lack	of	time	to	think	and	process	patient	care	in	work	hours	means	that	HCPs	are	waking	in	the	early	hours	of	the	morning.		They	describe	patients	as	“in	my	head”	and	 this	 is	 additionally	 disturbing	 for	 them.	 	 Whether	 the	 HCP	 is	 dreaming	 of	patients,	or	whether	they	are	waking	and	thinking	of	patients	is	difficult	to	tell.	
At	 the	 moment	 we	 are	 very	 busy	 and	 I	 am	 waking	 three	 o’clock,	 (group	murmurs	acknowledgement).		They	[patients]	are	in	my	head.		But	normally,	
actually,	 it’s	 just	 that	 we	 are	 so	 busy,	 they	 are	 just	 there	 (L183-187,	Workshop	Two,	Study	Two).	HCPs	did	not	describe	supported	reflection	at	the	time	of	a	“learning	opportunity”;	they	described	how	 they	personally	 reflected,	 for	 example	 in	 the	 car	on	 the	way	home,	 or	 used	 informal	 networks	 to	 debrief	 after	 very	 challenging	 situations.		HPCT	HCPs	were	able	to	utilise	multi-disciplinary	meetings	for	emotional	support	and	 clinical	 supervision.	 	 However,	 there	 was	 a	 difference	 in	 funding	 between	cancer	 and	 palliative	 care	 HCPs	 and	 those	 HCPs	 caring	 for	 patients	 with	 non-malignant	 diseases.	 HCPs	 caring	 for	 patients	 with	 non-malignant	 diseases	 have	much	poorer	access	to	readily	available	emotional	support.	There	is	evidence	that	the	organisationally	mandated	reflection	demanded	as	part	of	nurses’	and	doctors’	appraisals	and	revalidation	processes	is	likely	to	involve	a	superficial	and	guarded	response	to	reflection	and	learning.		No	HCP	identified	that	they	 had	 the	 care	 of	 the	 dying	 patient	 or	 their	 family	 raised	 and	 discussed	 at	
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appraisal	unless	they	themselves	raised	it.			It	might	not	be	that	HCPs	don’t	want	to	learn;	 it	 might	 be	 that	 they	 cannot	 learn	 in	 such	 an	 environment	 (Bibby,	 2011,	p.106).	
Contribution	of	workshops	to	learning.	
We	saw	 in	Chapter	5	 (Table	8)	 that	HCPs	highly	valued	 the	workshops	 that	 they	participated	in	as	part	of	this	research.	It	is	clear	that	the	workshops	offered	time	and	space,	in	the	midst	of	pressured	clinical	caseloads	that	usually	deny	HCPs	this	space,	 for	 people	 to	 pause	 and	 allow	 thoughts,	 and	 thinking	 about	 dying,	 to	 feel	contained,	to	allow	“not	knowing”	long	enough	to	move	to	learning.		The	fact	they	are	a	“nice	way	of	learning”	seems	to	tame	the	chaos	of	clinical	practice	a	little.		What	 was	 really	 important	 about	 having	 the	 themed	 analysis	 of	 Study	 One	 to	present	to	participants	in	the	subsequent	workshops	is	that	it	focused	HCPs	on	the	very	 specific	 areas	 of	 recognising	 dying,	 initiating	 contact	 with	 the	 patient	 and	family,	 communication	with	 the	 patient	 and	 family;	 and	 these	 areas	 couldn’t	 be	avoided.		Please	note	that	not	a	single	HCP	had	had	training	for	this	aspect	of	care,	and	even	palliative	care	degrees	avoided	this	topic.		By	having	data	to	consider,	it	engaged	 the	HCPs	 in	a	way	 that	allowed	space	 for	 them	to	engage	with	 the	data,	have	 an	 emotional	 response	 and	 be	 able	 to	 reflect	 in	 an	 emotionally	 safe	environment	 on	 their	 practice	 with	 other	 colleagues.	 I	 think	 if	 they	 had	 had	 to	bring	 examples	 from	 their	 own	 caseload,	 then	 there	 may	 have	 been	 an	 initial	psychological	defensive	hurdle	to	overcome.			
I	have	not	previously	considered	the	different	pathways	(to	 identify	 dying	 –	my	words)	as	we	did	today.		However,	I	found	it	useful	to	do	so	I	as	I	require	
several	 of	 these.	 Identifying	 dying	 remains	 a	 challenge	 and	 an	 individually	
responsible	task!	A	useful	session	(HCP7,	Workshop	One	Feedback).	There	was	 recognition	 from	HCP	5	 that	 she	experienced	 that	breaking	bad	news	and	 caring	 for	 families	 is	 hard	 to	 teach,	 and	 she	 recognised	 that	 HCPs’	 skills	develop	 over	 time	 and	with	 experience.	 HCPs	 in	 the	workshops	 valued	 learning	from	others,	and	particularly	words	and	phrases	that	they	use.		You	will	note	that	the	HCP	5	missed	the	last	workshop.		Whilst	this	may	well	have	been	the	busyness	
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of	 the	 caseload,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 the	 “forgetting”	 is	 not	 conscious,	 but	 an	unconscious	reflection	of	anxiety.	 	In	Workshop	Three,	HCP	5	had	reflected	about	how	 she	 had	 missed	 the	 dying	 of	 a	 patient	 in	 the	 intervening	 weeks.	 	 The	discussion	took	a	significant	proportion	of	the	early	part	of	the	workshop	and	she	wondered	whether	she	had	done	the	patient	a	dis-service.		She	had	also	started	to	wonder	 whether	 initiating	 these	 conversations	 could	 take	 away	 hope	 and	 had	really	contributed	to	discussions	throughout	the	workshop.		I	did	wonder	whether	really	 thinking	 this	 deeply	 about	 existential	 issues	 such	 as	 hope,	 was	 just	 too	challenging	to	face	again,	and	whether	forgetting	allows	“a	space	to	breathe	again”	(Trustram,	2016).		Had	the	workshops	continued	I	would	have	been	able	to	quietly	observe	 attendance	 and	 gently	 challenge,	 and	 reflect	myself.	 	 This	 is	 part	 of	 the	learning	process	–	it	is	intimate	and	relevant	for	the	facilitator	and	facilitated.	The	workshops	revealed	to	HCPs	the	amount	of	emotional	work	that	they	manage	independently,	and	have	perhaps	lost	conscious	awareness	of.		One	senior	nursing	HCP	in	the	study	who	was	caring	for	patients	with	a	long-term	condition	said:	
Working	 as	 a	 standalone	 service	 I	 have	 very	 little	 supervision.	 	 It’s	 the	 first	
place	I	have	been	in	that	I	have	had	no	supervision,	I’ve	had	supervision	in	all	
other	 roles;	 and	 its	 it	 just	 brings	 it	 home	 to	me	 the	 enormity	 of	what	 I	 am	
dealing	with	every	day,	I’m	just	getting	on	really	it	brings	it	back	to	me	that	I	
need	 to	 seek	 out	 support	 of	 others,	 you	 know	my	 own	 peer	 group	 (L40-45	
Workshop	Four,	Study	Two).	The	workshops	also	reminded	her	at	what	 level	she	 is	 functioning	(“getting	on”).		This	has	echoes	of	feelings	of	 low	personal	achievement	which	is	a	component	of	“burn	out”	(Ramirez	et	al.,	1995),	and	we	know	that	poor	mental	health	can	lead	to	poorer	 standards	 of	 patient	 care	 (Taylor	 et	 al.,	 2007),	 in	 a	 cycle	 that	 is	 self	defeating	for	HCPs	who	want	to	do	a	good	job.		Through	expressing	her	thoughts,	and	 thinking	on	 this	 she	 is	 able	 to	move	herself	 to	where	 she	can	contemplate	a	different	course	of	action	–	“learning”.	In	Chapter	5	there	was	evidence	of	a	workshop	assisting	a	physical	clinical	practice	change.	 	 I	won’t	 discuss	 this	 again	here,	 but	 also	notable	was	 a	 change	 from	 the	workshop	 of	 HCPs	 viewing	 orthopaedic	 surgeons	 as	 poor	 at	 caring	 for	 dying	
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patients,	to	beginning	to	understand	that	they	could	not	undertake	an	orthopaedic	surgeon’s	job,	and	that	different	skills	were	required	for	different	clinical	areas	of	care.	Returning	back	to	the	description	of	Kleinian	thinking	(described	in	Chapter	3),	initially	splitting	and	projection,	allows	the	“good	person	narrative”	to	stay	with	the	workshop	HCPs,	and	the	“bad	person	narrative”	to	be	lodge	with	others	and	in	this	case	orthopaedic	surgeons.	This	is	the	paranoid-schizoid	position,	and	in	this	space	 the	 workshop	 HCPs	 have	 conjured	 up	 “objects”	 to	 defend	 their	 fragile	psychological	defences.	 	 	Through	safe	containment	of	 these	HCP’s	 thoughts	over	the	four	workshops	the	workshops	HCPs	started	to	take	back	and	own	some	of	the	projected	feelings,	and	realise	that	they	could	not	to	do	the	surgeon’s	job.		This	is	a	move	to	the	depressive	position.		Thought	and	thinking	has	occurred	and	the	move	from	 the	 paranoid-schizoid	 position	 to	 the	 depressive	 position	 is	 described	 as	learning	(Bibby,	2011).	With	time	one	could	see	how,	if	this	move	to	learning	was	continued,	that	might	be	different	ways	for	workshops	HCPs	to	 jointly	work	with	orthopaedic	surgeons	about	the	care	of	the	dying	patient.	Thinking	 about	 the	 factors	 around	 a	 dying	 patient	 and	 their	 care	 can	 be	 very	difficult,	and	HCPs	in	this	study	both	expressed	that	this	method	of	learning	would	not	 suit	 everyone,	 and	 described	 how	 they	 had	 observed	 psychological	 dis-engagement	when	they	had	been	teaching	about	the	care	of	the	dying.	
The	 trouble	 is	 that	 those	people	who	 find	 it	 very	uncomfortable,	 you	can	 sit	
them	 there	 and	 they	 don’t	 engage;	we’ve	 all	 taught	 things	 and	 you	 can	 see	
them,	they’re	just	not	engaged,	it	is	not	there;	don’t	know	what	you	are	talking	
about.		It’s	very	difficult	(L671-674,	Workshop	Four,	Study	Two).	Again	 from	a	psychoanalytic	point	of	 view	one	 can	postulate	 that	 thinking	about	the	care	of	dying	patients,	even	in	a	teaching	scenario	away	from	clinical	practice,	is	 so	 anxiety	 provoking	 that	 HCPs	 dis-engage	with	 thought.	 	 John	 Steiner	would	describe	 this	 withdrawal	 as	 a	 psychic	 retreat	 –	 this	 withdrawal	 is	 from	 both	paranoid-schizoid	 and	 depressive	 anxieties,	 and	 in	 such	 a	 psychological	 place	individuals	 are	 spared	 from	 unbearable	 guilt	 (Steiner	 &	 Schafer,	 1993).	 	 The	learning	is	just	too	dangerous.		Participants	identified	that	if	these	workshops	were	
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offered	 to	all	 that	 they	would	need	 to	be	 carefully	 crafted	around	a	 specific	 case	review,	and	carefully	facilitated	to	prevent	splitting,	projection	and	blame.		For	 those	 HCPs,	 however,	 who	 want	 to	 take	 part,	 these	 workshops	 were	 an	affordable	and	sustainable	method	of	practice	development.		Considering	Rustin’s	“moments	of	respectful	uncertainty”	and	the	ability	to	truly	create	a	space	to	“think	the	 unthinkable”	 (Harvey,	 2010),	 and	 “discuss	 the	 un-discussable”,	 it	 was	important	 that	 the	 workshops	 took	 place	 at	 a	 time	 and	 place	 that	 was	 easily	convenient	 for	HCPs,	 that	 they	 included	nourishment	and	refreshment	and	space	after	the	workshop	if	anyone	wanted	to	speak	(Salzberger-Wittenberg,	1999).	The	evidencing	 of	 reflective	 learning	 for	 appraisal	 was	 an	 important	 part	 in	 helping	HCPs	 value	 their	 learning	 and	 also	 not	 adding	 to	 the	 burden	 of	 defending	 their	practice	(Wittenberg	&	Klein,	1973).			
Conclusion	
In	 this	 chapter,	 the	 context	 was	 set	 for	 current	 medical	 and	 nursing	 education.		Both	 of	 these	 careers	 follow	 an	 apprenticeship	 type	 learning,	 with	 time	 in	 a	university	 setting,	 followed	 by	 learning	 in	 clinical	 practice.	 We	 considered	 the	“learning	opportunity”	as	espoused	in	the	national	guidance	documents,	 that	sets	the	 standards	 for	 learning	 experience,	 reflective	 debrief	 and	 assessment	 of	competence.		We	considered	the	current	literature	that	indicated	that,	despite	the	intention	of	policy	makers,	junior	doctors	and	nurses	feel	poorly	equipped	to	care	well	for	dying	patients	and	their	family.	In	order	to	make	sense	of	this	conundrum,	I	turned	to	psychoanalytic	psychosocial	theory	to	consider	the	possibility	of	the	irrational,	unconsciously	defended	subject.		I	 considered	 Bion’s	 theories	 of	 learning	 where	 thought,	 and	 thinking,	 if	 safely	contained,	 can	 lead	 to	 learning.	 	 The	 need	 for	 safety	 is	 because	 learning	 is	dangerous,	and	we	have	to	deconstruct	what	is	known	in	order	to	learn	new	ways	of	thinking.		In	the	care	of	the	dying	we	do	not	just	learn	about	others	or	a	task,	we	constantly	learn	about	ourselves,	and	the	unpredictability	of	death,	and	its	ability	to	reduce	us	completely	to	our	humanness.	
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From	 the	 workshop	 data,	 there	 was	 evidence	 that	 senior	 doctors,	 once	 in	 a	psychologically	safe	environment	“speak	the	unspeakable”.		Instead	of	the	answers	from	the	 interviews	 in	Study	One,	where	 they	expressed	 the	 impact	of	caring	 for	the	 dying	 as	 “part	 of	 the	 job”;	 they	 expressed	 feelings	 of	 uselessness	 and	frustration	when	faced	with	the	reality	of	a	patient	whose	dying	takes	time.	They	thought	of	their	families	and	imagined	their	own	loss.	They	expressed	phantasies	of	“killing	patients”	in	a	merciful	and	lawful	way,	and	these	unethical	thoughts	are	likely	 to	 further	 increase	 the	 level	 of	 anxiety	 of	 the	 clinician.	 	 They	 expressed	phantasies	 of	 “wanting	 to	 be	 right”,	 such	 that	 when	 death	 defied	 this	 they	experience	such	on-going	distress,	 they	ricocheted	between	thought	and	thinking	without	 challenging	 the	 assumption	 that	 they	 are	 always	 right.	 	 These	 senior	clinicians	are	the	educators	of	junior	clinicians	of	the	future.	It	is	little	wonder	that	no	opportunity	was	given	for	reflective	debrief	of	the	junior	afterwards,	when	the	learning	might	 be	 of	 such	 unspeakable	 emotions	 and	 feelings.	 	 Yet	 it	 is	 only	 by	letting	 these	 emotions	 and	 feelings	 have	 their	 space	 that	 both	 educational	supervisor	and	supervisee	will	learn	together.	Nurses	described	learning	from	direct	clinical	care,	and	doing	the	care.		The	ward	environment	 physically	 contained	 the	 nurse	 for	 the	 shift	 and	 so	 the	 nurse	 had	learnt	from	previous	experience,	that	avoiding	the	work	of	preparing	the	family	for	the	impending	death	had	worse	consequences	later	on.			The	family	distress	at	an	unprepared	 for	death	was	anticipated	as	 “catastrophic”	and	 this	was	a	motivator	for	 the	 nurse	 remaining	 in	 the	 room	 and	 continuing	 to	 work	 with	 the	 family.		Nurses	also	have	opportunity	to	learn	and	to	gain	expertise	from	watching	doctors	break	 bad	 news,	 such	 they	 have	 opportunity	 to	 gain	 real	 expertise	 in	 such	emotional	 containment	 in	 these	 meetings.	 	 Not	 all	 nurses	 though	 want	 to	undertake	this	aspect	of	clinical	care	and	there	is	evidence	they	ask	others	who	can	tolerate	 this	 to	undertake	 this	work.	 	 Skills	 for	 family	work	 can	be	 invested	 in	 a	selected	group	of	nurses	(the	palliative	care	nurses	of	 the	 future)	and	by	gaining	expertise	 these	 nurses	 can	 help	 provide	 emotional	 containment	 and	 safety	 such	that	 senior	 doctors	 can	 learn.	 	 The	 importance	 of	 this	 is	 that	 doctors	 as	 they	become	more	senior,	practice	more	in	isolation	and	so	have	limited	opportunities	to	learn	from	others.	
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This	 research	 has	 examined	 how	 senior	 HCPs	 recognise	 dying	 and	 negotiate	decision	making	with	patients	and	families	in	one	hospital.	From	clinical	practice	I	had	realised	that	managing	sustainable	practice	change	 in	this	key	aspect	of	care	was	challenging,	without	constant	on-going	leadership	and	support	at	the	time	of	decision-making	 from	palliative	 care,	but	 could	not	explain	why.	From	audit	 it	 is	clear	 that	HCPs	 in	hospitals	are	only	 identifying	deaths	days	before	 this	happens	(Marie	Care	Cancer	Care,	Royal	College	of	Physicians,	2014).	This	PhD	has	sought	to	ask	HCPs	how	they	recognise	dying	and	negotiate	decision-making	with	patients	and	 their	 families.	This	chapter	discusses	 the	novel	contributions	 to	practice	 this	research	 has	 made,	 and	 each	 of	 the	 sections	 below	 considers	 the	 detail	 of	 this	contribution.	
Nine	novel	contributions	to	clinical	practice	
Introduction	 of	 the	 psychoanalytic	 psychosocial	 gives	 a	 language	 to	 discuss	 new	
insights	in	the	care	of	the	dying	and	a	space	to	consider	novel	solutions	
It	 is	 clear	 from	 considering	 the	 trends	 in	 end	 of	 life	 care	 research,	contemporaneous	to	this	study,	that	other	researchers	are	interested	in	the	same	question	(Kennedy	et	al.,	2014),	and	are	using	similar	methodologies	(McConnell	et	al.,	2014).	The	approach	taken	by	Kennedy,	McConnell	and	initially	by	myself	with	the	 themed	 analysis	 took	 as	 “taken	 for	 granted”	 that	 HCPs	 are	 conscious	 of	 all	factors	 involved	 in	 how	 they	 make	 a	 decision	 that	 a	 patient	 is	 dying;	 and	 that	caring	 for	 those	 who	 are	 dying	 is	 another	 dimension	 of	 clinical	 work,	 without	significant	emotional	impact.		It	also	presupposes	that	rational	clinical	actions	will	solve	the	conundrum	about	how	to	help	HCPs	recognise	dying	more	regularly	and	earlier	 in	 the	 disease	 trajectory	 than	 the	 last	 few	 days.	 	 This	 conscious	 and	cognitive	approach	to	the	research	question	keeps	HCPs	where	they	currently	are,	resulting	 in	 them	undertaking	more	of	 the	same	solutions.	 	These	are	generating	more	models	 about	how	 to	 care	 for	 the	dying	patient	 and	 their	 family,	 and	 then	teaching	 this,	 requesting	more	 integration	 of	 palliative	 care	with	 generalist	 care	
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(with	 limited	palliative	 care	 resource),	 and	delineating	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	(reductionist	approach).		The	first	novel	contribution	of	my	research,	is	to	keep	the	subject	of	the	HCP	at	the	centre	of	the	research	question	(Frost,	2015),	and	to	introduce	the	language	of	the	psychoanalytic	 psychosocial	 into	 the	 care	 of	 the	 dying.	 The	 concept	 of	 a	psychosocial	analysis	needed	to	be	formally	introduced	by	an	expert	–	Dr	Lucey	-	(Walkerdine	et	al.,	2001),	after	we	had	discussed	the	transcripts	of	the	Study	Two	workshops.		It	should	be	highlighted	that	general	medical	and	nursing	curriculums	consider	 that	 they	 attend	 to	 helping	 students	 consider	 psychological	 and	 social	aspects	of	patient	care	(Nursing	and	Midwifery	Council,	2014)	(The	UK	Foundation	Programme	Curriculum,	2016).		They	do	not	though	take	a	psychosocial	approach	to	 patient	 and	 family	 care	 that	 includes	 the	 HCP,	 their	 profession,	 team	 and	institution,	in	the	dynamics	of	what	is	achieved	in	relationship	with	the	patient	and	family.	 	 Over	 the	 past	 two	 years	 I	 have	 learnt	 an	 entirely	 new	 language	 and	knowledge	base	in	order	to	re-examine	my	data	and	have	developed	a	systematic	framework	for	analysis	based	on	experts	in	psychosocial	studies	(Clarke	&	Hoggett,	2009)	(Hollway	&	Jefferson,	2013)	(Walkerdine	et	al.,	2001).	This	analysis	allows	the	 consideration	 of	 an	 individual	 and	 collective	 psychological	 tenor,	 about	identification	of	dying,	the	care	of	the	dying,	and	the	interaction	with	their	family,	framed	with	 anxiety	 as	 the	 currency	 (Hoggett,	 2009).	 	 It	 allows	 consideration	 of	mutually	 affective	 unconscious,	 psychologically	 defensive	 practices	 at	 an	individual,	 professional,	 group,	 and	 institutional	 level	 in	 the	 NHS	 and	 in	 Higher	Education	Institutes	preparing	junior	doctors	and	nurses.		Using	this	language	and	framework,	I	propose	it	is	helpful	to	name	that	death	and	caring	 for	 the	 dying	 is	 extremely	 anxiety	 provoking	 and	 that	 we	 should	 stop	repeating	the	national	rhetoric	that	“end	of	life	care	is	everyone’s	business”	(NHS	England,	 2016).	 I	 think	 it	 is	 helpful	 to	 say	 that	 whilst	 this	 clinical	 work	 can	 be	rewarding,	it	is	also	hard	work.	There	are	some	HCPs	who	do	not	like	this	clinical	work,	feel	unprepared	for	this	work,	and	may	not	be	even	conscious	of	their	dislike	for	 it	 and	 their	 attitude	 towards	 it.	 I	 think	 it	 is	 helpful	 to	 name	 that	 thought,	thinking	 and	 learning	 are	 intimately	 linked	 and	 that	 thoughts	 are	 linked	 to	 our	unconscious,	and	thus	our	own	personal	narrative	(Bibby,	2011).			
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The	 purpose	 of	 this	 naming	 would	 allow	 us	 to	 pause	 and	 stop	 passing	 the	“emotional	hot	potato”	round	long	enough	to	think	creatively	together	about	how	we	might	 progress	 this	 clinical	 aspect	 of	 care	 in	 a	 humane	 and	 kind	way	 that	 is	respectful	 of	 HCP’s	 personal	 histories,	 professional	 development,	 the	organisational	 resource	 and	 complexity,	 and	 the	 contribution	 our	 educators	 can	make.	Pausing,	thinking	and	considering	all	of	the	relationships	involved	in	end	of	life	 care	 such	 as,	 the	 “patient	 and	 HCP	 relationship”,	 the	 “patient	 and	 the	relationship	 they	 have	 with	 their	 family”,	 the	 “patient	 and	 family	 and	 HCP	relationship”,	and	personal,	professional,	educational	and	organisational	resources	will	allow	thought	about	inter-professional	consequences	of	decisions	made	by	one	profession	or	institution	on	another.				My	 second	 contribution	 is	 that	 proposed	 solutions	 that	 are	 respectful	 of	 HCPs,	patients	and	families	are	likely	to	be	creative	and	socially	important,	and	because	they	include	and	respect	the	HCP’s	humanness,	they	have	potential	to	sustain	HCPs	in	 clinical	 practice	 (Frost	 et	 al.,	 2017;	 Wren,	 2016).	 	 For	 example,	 taking	 a	psychosocial	approach	has	already	led	me	to	thinking	with	colleagues	of	innovative	solutions	 for	 clinical	 practice.	 	 I	 am	 now	 employed	 in	 a	 new	 Trust.	 	 In	 clinical	practice	 a	weekly	Multi-Disciplinary	Team	meeting	has	 been	 set	 up	on	 the	 renal	ward	where	all	HCPs	can	discuss	patients	and	families	they	are	worried	about.		The	MDT	data	 has	 been	 analysed	 and	 the	 data	 is	 going	 to	 conference	 (See	Appendix	11),	but	 it	 is	 important	 to	 say	 that	only	65%	of	patients	discussed	had	palliative	care	needs	and	only	24%	died	 that	admission.	As	Menzies-Lyth	 identified,	 illness	and	suffering	is	anxiety	provoking	(Menzies,	1970).	Frailty,	patients’	illnesses,	and	family	dynamics	and	capabilities	underpinned	by	poverty	played	an	important	part	of	the	complexity	in	the	patients	who	were	discussed,	and	the	anxiety	of	the	HCP.	As	HCPs	we	are	realising	 together	where	our	clinical	 challenges	are	and	 to	 think	creatively	about	resources.		
Recognising	dying	is	complex	–	a	five	staged	model	is	proposed	
From	the	literature	review	the	reader	will	recall	that	decision	–	making	about	end	of	life	care	is	complicated,	underpinned	by	the	mental	capacity	act	(British	Medical	Association,	 2008)	 and	 ethical	 guidance	 (General	 Medical	 Council,	 2010).	 	 In	
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clinical	practice	the	law	effectively	divides	patients	into	three	groups.		Firstly,	there	are	 those	patients	who	have	capacity	 to	 take	part	 in	decision-making	about	 their	end	 of	 life	 care,	 and	 the	 evidence	 pointed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 patients	 preferred	 to	focus	on	living,	rather	than	advance	planning	the	process	of	dying	(Nicholson	et	al.,	2012).	 	 There	 was	 though	 evidence	 that	 at	 the	 point	 of	 significant	 sustained	 ill	health,	and	with	skilled	professional	and	family	support,	that	some	patients	could	make	 very	 difficult	 decisions	 to	 plan	 their	 dying	 (Clinch	&	 Le,	 2011).	 	 Secondly,	there	 are	 those	 patients	who	have	 lost	mental	 capacity	 to	 take	 part	 in	 decisions	subsequent	 to	 a	 long-term	 condition.	 The	 evidence	 pointed	 to	 families	 having	 a	significant	role	in	the	decision-making	and	management	of	the	care	for	the	patients	(Livingston	et	al.,	2010).		This	could	be	formalised	in	law	under	the	mental	capacity	act,	 as	 a	 power	 of	 attorney	 for	 health	 and	 /	 or	 finance.	 	 Finally,	 there	 are	 those	patients	who	have	lost	capacity	to	take	part	in	decisions	in	an	acute	condition.		The	family	 in	these	circumstances	were	consulted	as	part	of	a	best	 interests	decision.		In	these	circumstances	there	was	evidence	that	decision-making	took	time	as	there	was	need	 for	psychological	adjustment	(Kryworuchko	et	al.,	2012)	and	there	 is	a	perceived	“turning	point”	that	requires	“time,	work	and	energy”	(Hiltunen	cited	in	Limerick,	 2007,	 p.129).	 	 The	 fact	 that	 doctors	 and	 families	 disagree	 is	acknowledged	(Abadir	et	al.,	2011),	and	that	doctors	can	prioritise	 family	wishes	over	 the	 patient’s	 previously	 expressed	 wishes,	 if	 the	 patient	 has	 lost	 mental	capacity	(Abadir	et	al.,	2011).			Recognising	 that	 someone	 is	 approaching	 the	 end	 of	 his	 or	 her	 life	 requires	 the	skill	of	prognostication.	 	Research	 identifies	 that	part	of	prognosticating	 is	a	 two	stage	 process	 of	 “fore-telling”	 of	 the	 dying	 	 -	 the	 authors	 describe	 this	 as	 an	“inward	 cognition	 that	 the	 patient	 is	 dying”,	 and	 a	 “fore-telling”	 	 -	 the	“communicating	 of	 this	 estimate	 [prognosis]	 to	 the	 patient	 and	 family”	 (Lamont	and	Christaskis	cited	in	Krawczyk	&	Gallagher,	2016	-	p6).	Using	the	data	from	the	themed	analysis	of	Study	One	and	Study	Two	I	propose	a	five-staged,	rather	than	two-staged,	model	to	recognising	dying,	and	then	communicate	this	to	the	patient	and	family.			The	stages	are	a	“gut	instinct	that	the	patient	is	dying”,	“evidencing	the	gut	instinct”,	“engaging	with	the	patient	and	family”,	“coping	with	the	fall	out	of	the	meeting”,	and	“clinical	supervision”	of	this	aspect	of	care.		Details	of	the	stages	will	
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be	covered	below.	This	is	my	third	novel	contribution.	HCPs	in	this	study	had	not	previously	considered	the	detail	of	 the	process	of	recognising	dying,	and	found	it	helpful	 to	 consider	 each	 stage.	 Giving	 the	 process	 of	 recognising	 dying	 and	negotiating	 decision	 making	 a	 framework,	 means	 HCPs	 attention	 in	 clinical	practice	and	teaching	can	be	focused	on	the	detail	of	each	of	the	stages	in	a	timely	rather	 than	 rushed	manner,	 and	 there	 can	 be	 pacing	 of	 each	 stage,	 with	 spaces	open	for	thought,	both	for	the	patient,	their	family	and	the	HCP,	dependent	on	the	clinical	situation.			The	first	stage	HCPs	in	this	study	described,	with	respect	to	recognising	dying,	was	an	awareness	of	a	“gut	instinct”	that	a	patient	might	be	dying.		HCPs	described	how	they	noticed	“a	look”,	or	“a	smell”,	or	had	particular	signs	they	looked	out	for,	for	example	“temporalis	wasting”	(hollow	temples).		HCPs	in	this	study	then	described	how	 they	 “evidenced	 their	 gut	 instincts”	 –	 the	 second	 stage.	Palliative	 care	HCPs	particularly,	but	other	HCPs	too,	described	how	they	undertook	this	confirmatory	process,	such	that	they	could	explain,	to	other	HCPs	or	patients	and	their	families,	where	the	patient	was	in	the	disease	trajectory	and	why	they	believed	the	patient	was	dying.		This	confirmatory	process,	of	the	initial	“gut	instinct”,	was	underpinned	by	 clinical	 work	 to	 establish	 where	 the	 patient	most	 likely	 was	 in	 their	 disease	trajectory	and	thus	decide	what	treatments	were	likely	to	help	the	patient.	At	this	stage,	there	may	be	a	comprehensive	review	of	the	detail	of	the	clinical	notes	and	tests,	 more	 tests	 may	 be	 sought	 out,	 or	 second	 opinions	 sought.	 	 This	 stage	 is	extremely	skilled	clinical	work.	 	When	undertaken	in	a	timely	manner,	then	there	can	be	 time	 to	 set	up	 conversations	with	patients	 and	 their	 families	 and	achieve	some	of	their	goals.	Please	see	Pen	Portraits	–	Patient	Three,	Five	and	Six.	Patient	Three	and	Six	were	discharged	home	for	end	of	life	care,	and	Patient	Five	had	his	care	provided	in	hospital	(his	wife’s	preference),	but	his	son	was	able	to	fly	home	to	be	present	for	his	father’s	death.		It	should	be	noted	that	there	were	two	other	strategies	 that	 HCPs	 used	 in	 this	 study.	 	 The	 first	 was	 continuing	 to	 escalate	treatment	but	 simultaneously	 listen	out	 for	patient’s	 cues	 that	 they	 thought	 they	were	dying	and	respond	to	this.	 	The	second	was	to	listen	out	for	other	HCP	cues	that	they	thought	the	patient	was	dying,	and	then	respond	to	this.		These	resulted	in	dying	being	recognised	very	near	the	point	of	death.	
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If	the	patient	was	recognised	as	dying,	then	the	third	stage	was	about	engagement	with	 the	 patient	 and	 their	 family	 to	 discuss	 the	 recognition	 of	 dying,	 clinical	management	options,	and	patient’s	wishes	and	preferences.	 	This	study	identified	three	 routes	 to	 engaging	 with	 the	 patient	 and	 family.	 	 These	 were	 “patient	initiated”,	 “HCPs	 seizing	 the	moment	 on	ward	 round”,	 and	 a	 “planned	meeting”.	The	 study	 identified	 four	 routes	 to	 non-engagement.	 	 These	 were	 “an	 informed	clinical	decision	not	 to	engage	at	 that	 time”,	 “being	blocked	 from	engagement	by	other	 HCPs”,	 a	 “routine	 decision	 not	 to	 engage”	 as	 that	 would	 not	 be	 clinically	expected,	and	“prioritising	hope	of	recovery	which	allows	non-engagement”.	HCPs	in	 the	 workshops	 had	 not	 previously	 considered	 how	 they	 engage	 or	 delay	engagement	or	avoid	engaging	with	patients	and	 families.	 	They	had	not	 thought	about	 their	 response	when	 families	 proactively	 seek	 the	HCP	 out	 in	 transitional	spaces	 such	 as	 hospital	 car	 parks,	 and	 their	 psychological	 defence	 of	 “being	 in	control”	 was	 challenged.	 	 How	 patients	 and	 families	 are	 engaged	 with,	 and	 the	setting	up	of	this	meeting,	is	a	key	area	to	influence	both	the	experience	of	care	for	the	 patient	 and	 family,	 and	 to	 manage	 the	 clinical	 workload	 and	 teaching	experience	for	junior	HCPs.		The	fourth	stage	was	how	HCPs	worked	with	the	“fall	out”	 emotions	 of	 the	 family	 and	 consequences	 for	 decision-making	 of	 these	meetings.	 	 When	 families	 recognised	 the	 patient	 was	 dying	 then	 onward	 care	planning	 could	 ensue.	 	When	 families	 did	 not	 accept	 the	HCP’s	 decision	 that	 the	patient	was	dying,	 the	meeting	was	 taken	up	with	 explanations,	 and	helping	 the	family	accommodate	the	news.		The	fifth	and	final	stage	of	this	model	is	the	clinical	supervision	of	this	work.		This	study	has	identified	that	medical	and	surgical	senior	HCPs	value	both	nursing	presence	at	the	meeting	with	patients	and	families,	both	for	 emotional	 containment	 and	 debrief.	 	 Palliative	 Care	 HCPs	 value	 clinical	supervision	 to	 rehearse	 conversations	 ahead	 of	 encounters	 that	 might	 be	challenging.		Senior	nurses,	whose	clinical	work	involves	the	care	of	dying	patients	and	 families	are	expressing	 feelings	of	burnout,	 and	have	 recognised	 they	would	value	supervision.			This	 study	 articulates	 a	 need	 for	 organisational	 support	 of	 this	 clinical	 work	through	the	funding	and	provision	of	skilled	psychological	support.		Despite	recent	national	 guidance	 –	 “the	 national	 framework	 for	 identifying,	 reporting,	
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investigating	 and	 learning	 from	 deaths	 in	 care”	 (National	 Quality	 Board	 2017)	 -	there	is	only	a	call	for	staff	to	“engage	in	retrospective	case	record	review	to	help	identify	 if	 a	 death	 was	 more	 likely	 than	 not	 to	 have	 been	 contributed	 to	 by	problems	of	care”	(National	Quality	Board	2017,	p.11).		There	is	no	mention	in	this	report	of	clinical	supervision	of	the	care	of	the	dying	whilst	the	person	is	alive.	This	could	though	be	approached	in	a	multi-factorial	way.		The	first	would	be	to	include	the	 education	 of	 student	 nurses	 and	 medical	 students	 in	 both	 communication	skills,	and	how	to	facilitate,	and	receive	debrief.		The	second	would	be	to	introduce	regular	monthly	ward	/	team	based	clinical	supervision.	The	third	is	direct	clinical	supervision	 of	 the	 patients	 and	 families	whose	 care	 is	most	 psychologically	 and	emotionally	 complicated.	 	 This	 is	 partly	 resourced	 already	 in	 palliative	 care,	 but	from	 this	 research	 does	 not	 exist	 in	 other	 services	 (this	 may	 not	 reflect	psychological	 resource	 in	 other	 trusts	 who	 may	 have	 more	 funded	 clinical	psychology	 posts).	 	 The	 multi-factorial	 approach	 is	 necessary	 to	 counteract	 the	thinking	 that	 individual	 change	 on	 its	 own	 will	 change	 organisations	(Papadopoulos	(2015),	when	there	is	a	weight	of	NHS	strategy	and	culture,	which	include	 financial	cuts	and	 target	setting	which	means	 that	managers	do	not	have	the	ability	to	provide	containment	and	reverie	for	staff	(Evans	2015).		However,	it	does	not	mean	that	clinical	staff	have	the	resources	to	contain	themselves	through	reflective	debrief.		In	this	study,	HCP	9	had	set	up	a	weekly	ward	reflective	session.		The	 question	 was	 not	 asked,	 but	 this	 process	 did	 not	 necessarily	 include	 a	psychologist.	 	 This	 uncertainty	 is	 not	 raised	 to	 negate	 HCP’s	 skills	 to	 facilitate	reflection.		However,	it	is	known	that	HCP’s	experience	of	debrief	can	be	very	short	and	focused	on	the	improvement	of	clinical	procedures,	rather	than	the	emotional	impact	on	the	HCP	(Couper	et	al.,	2016).	The	fact	that	one	HCP	in	this	study	had	set	up	 multi-disciplinary	 reflective	 practices	 does	 indicate	 that	 the	 initiative	 and	resource	 to	 start	 this	 reflective	 work	 is	 possible	 within	 ward	 capacity	 and	capability.			At	 the	 start	of	 this	PhD	 I	had	hoped	 that	 I	might	 find	 something	 that	makes	 this	topic	 teachable.	 At	 one	 level,	 like	 Kennedy,	 without	 the	 psychosocial	 analysis	 I	would	have	been	left	recommending	a	model,	(albeit	a	more	detailed	model)	as	she	did	 of	 	 “the	 potential	 [of	 the	 framework]	 for	 discussion	 in	 clinical	 teams	 around	
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strategies	for	improvement	in	diagnosing	dying”	(Kennedy	et	al.,	2014,	p.269).		The	detail	 of	 the	 psychosocial	 analysis	 is	 so	 important	 because	 it	 considers	why	 this	model	may	or	may	not	be	used,	and	why	different	HCPs	might	find	different	parts	of	the	model	open	to	conscious	and	unconscious	anxiety.	
Individual	and	social	defence	mechanisms	related	to	identifying	dying	
At	a	cognitive	 level,	HCPs	 in	 this	study	recognised	 that	providing	end	of	 life	care	was	 really	 important	 and	 recognising	 dying	 as	 part	 of	 that.	 	 This	 study	 though	highlighted	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 HCP	 responsible	 for	 decision-making	 and	providing	 the	 care.	 	 In	 this	 study	 once	 a	 patient	 was	 recognised	 as	 dying,	 and	especially	 if	 the	dying	 took	many	days	 to	occur,	witnessing	 the	dying	provided	a	very	 real	 emotional	 challenge	 for	 some	 HCPs.	 	 One	 HCP	 described	 how	 she	 felt	useless,	 and	 frustrated,	 when	 she	watched	 the	 process	 of	 the	 patient	 dying	 and	their	suffering,	and	even	offering	symptom	management	and	comfort	did	not	help	relieve	 those	 feelings.	 	 She	 experienced	 unethical	 thoughts,	 for	 example	wishing	she	 could	 kill	 the	 patient,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 thought	 of	 her	 own	 family	relationships	to	justify	this	as	a	merciful	act.		Yet	just	having	unethical	thoughts	is	likely	to	be	distressing.		Recognising	dying	has	the	potential	to	be	really	unsettling,	and	 challenge	 HCPs	 usual	 defence	 mechanisms	 –	 the	 protective	 phantasies	 of	“mastery	of	impending	death”	and	of	“being	right”.			Despite	the	work	of	Menzies-Lyth	(Menzies,	1970)	there	is	still	no	language	in	the	NHS	 for	 the	 consideration	 of	 co-constructed	 social	 defence	 mechanisms.	 	 She	herself	 lamented	 that	 her	 work	 on	 social	 defences	 had	 not	 had	 more	 effect	(Dartington,	 2008).	 This	 PhD	 has	 named	 social	 defence	 mechanisms	 associated	with	 the	 care	 of	 the	 dying	 –	 this	 is	my	 fourth	 novel	 contribution.	 	 The	 very	 real	impact	of	 the	awfulness	of	 this	 situation	 for	 the	HCP	may	 lead	 them	 to	deny	 the	recognition	 of	 dying	 and	 continue	 to	 treat	 in	 the	 hope	 that	 they	 can	 be	 useful.	However,	apart	from	denial	of	dying,	there	was	evidence	in	this	study	that	the	gut	recognition	 that	a	patient	 is	dying	was	hugely	vulnerable	 to	unconscious	anxiety	and	socially	embedded	clinical	practices.		The	defence	mechanisms	are	seen	 in	 the	expressions	of	 the	need	 for	a	 “cast	 iron	decision”	 that	 the	 patient	 is	 dying,	 or	 of	 the	 need	 to	 gain	 a	 “second	 opinion	 and	
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check”.		Families	present	a	special	challenge,	and	the	need	to	make	sure	“the	family	are	 on	 board”	 with	 the	 medical	 decision	 is	 another	 co-constructed	 defence	mechanism.	 	The	avoidance	of	 the	work	after	 recognising	dying	was	 seen	by	 the	strategy	of	“not	seeing	the	dying”,	“dressing	up	dying	as	a	treatment”,	“leaving	the	emotional	work	to	someone	else”	and	“re-distributing	the	emotional	work”.	Those	HCPs	who	undertake	the	work	can	evidence	detachment	and	denial	of	feelings	and	break	bad	news	in	a	ritualistic	way.		Naming	these	defence	mechanisms	is	likely	to	be	helpful,	as	they	are	an	external	cue	that	“a	clinical	practice	driven	by	anxiety”	is	likely	taking	place.		Naming	the	practice	allows	thought	and	thinking,	and	with	safe	containment	Bion	cited	in	(Bibby,	2011),	possibly	learning	about	that	cue.		It	 is	 really	 important	 clinically	 that	 we	 recognise	 that	 patients	 with	 long	 term	conditions	 can	 present	 to	 hospital	 looking	 as	 if	 they	 are	 dying,	 but	 can	 radically	improve	with	acute	management,	and	be	discharged	home	(Seamark	et	al.,	2012).		It	will	be	helpful	 if	HCPs	 really	assess	mental	 capacity	ahead	of	 ritually	breaking	bad	news	about	 the	potential	 for	death	 (Krawczyk	&	Gallagher,	2016),	and	 think	with	the	patient	and	family	about	what	this	means	for	them	specifically	(Tuffrey-Wijne,	2012)	as	HCPs	in	this	study	identified	that	families	are	resistant	to	engaging	in	repeated	conversations	about	the	likelihood	of	death	–	this	is	their	daily	life.	
Palliative	Care	–	the	new	social	defence		
Palliative	 Care	 has	 had	 a	 long	 nursing	 history;	 Royal	 Trinity	 Hospice	 opened	 in	1892	(Royal	Trinity	Hospice,	2017),	and	St	Josephs	Hospice	in	Hackney	opened	in	1905	(St	Joseph's	Hospice,	2017)	with	nuns	providing	nursing	care	for	those	who	were	dying.			In	my	current	NHS	trust	the	palliative	care	service	has	been	nurse	led	for	over	thirty	years.	Palliative	Medicine	emerged	as	a	medical	speciality	 in	1987	and	 in	 the	 words	 of	 sociologist	 Dr	 David	 Clark	 has	 “seized	 hold	 of	 the	 field	 of	caring”,	and	hospital	palliative	care	(Clark,	2014).		Without	attending	to	the	politics	of	 the	 recent	 dominance	 of	 the	 medical	 discourse,	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 since	Menzies-Lyth	 undertook	 the	 psychoanalytic	 study	 of	 nurses	 in	 the	 1950’s,	hospitals	 now	 have	 palliative	 care	 teams,	 and	 there	 are	 standards	 for	 palliative	care	clinical	practice	(NICE,	2004)	(NICE,	2017).			
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Menzies-Lyth	felt	it	was	best	to	understand	an	organisation	with	the	distance	of	an	outsider	(Menzies,	1970).	 I	have	found	it	helpful	to	use	the	 lens	of	research	from	social	 work	 about	 the	 dynamics	 of	 social	 workers	 and	 child	 protection	 to	understand	what	might	be	going	on	as	HCPs	work	with	dying	patients	and	families.		Death,	like	sexual	abuse,	has	such	a	powerful	effect	on	internal	boundaries,	that	it	is	usually	split	off	and	repressed	(Harvey,	2010),	and	I	can	see	how	this	 is	“split-off”	in	the	hospital	setting		in	the	form	of	a	palliative	care	team	which	requires	peer	review	structures,	 time	and	psychological	 supervision	 to	process	 the	work	about	the	care	of	the	dying	and	their	family.		My	fifth	novel	contribution	is	to	identify	that	the	palliative	care	team	is	the	organisational	system	(the	social	defence	mechanism	of	 the	organisation)	 that	allows	others	 in	 the	hospital	 to	be	protected	 from	 their	anxiety.	It	is	not	an	infallible	defence	though.	I	could	not	initially	explain	why	palliative	care	teams	“missed”	seeing	the	dying	and	preparing	families	for	the	potential	for	bereavement.		It	has	been	helpful	to	use	the	skills	of	social	work	and	the	considered	professional	psychosocial	reflections	about	why	 child	 abuse	 can	be	missed	despite	 glaring	evidence,	 to	 shine	a	 light	on	why	dying	 might	 be	 missed.	 	 Child	 abuse	 and	 death,	 on	 every	 level,	 conscious	 and	unconscious,	 rattle	 our	 internal	 psychological	 defence	 mechanisms.	 	 Rustin	describes	 a	 moment	 of	 “respectful	 uncertainty”	 (Rustin,	 2005)	 where	 the	 social	worker	sits	and	truly	allows	thought,	however	awful	and	anxiety	provoking,	about	the	child	and	family	such	that	evidence	indicating	child	abuse	can	be	thought	about	and	named.		Rustin	says	this	is	the	area	of	professional	work	most	easily	interfered	with	by	anxiety.	These	anxieties	can	be	both	personal,	related	to	anxieties	arising	from	 close	 contact	 with	 the	 difficulties	 of	 families,	 and	 professional,	 related	 to	inadequate	resources	and	fear	of	blame.			At	 the	 point	 of	 recognizing	 dying	 though,	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 isn’t	 a	 moment	 of	respectful	 uncertainty,	 as	 uncertainty	 is	 the	 underpinning	 dimension	 to	 the	moments	 (s)	 of	 recognizing	potential	 for	 dying.	Uncertainty	 is	 there	because	 the	patient’s	 condition	 is	 deteriorating	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 medical	 and	 nursing	intervention	 remains.	 	 It	 is	 a	 moment	 of	 exquisite	 (not	 pleasurable)	 pressure.		There	is	the	emotional	charge	of	the	patient	and	their	family,	and	the	terror	of	the	HCP	 recognizing	 dying	 wrongly	 for	 them.	 	 There	 is	 also	 the	 need	 for	 on-going	
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support	 in	 the	 face	 of	 uncertainty,	 if	 uncertainty	 is	 introduced,	 and	 this	 is	 un-resourced	in	the	current	NHS.		There	is	the	history,	power,	culture	and	discourse	of	nursing	 and	medicine.	 Nursing	 is	 reliant	 on	medicine	 for	 decisions;	 medicine	 is	reliant	 on	nursing	 for	 care.	 	 If	 a	nurse,	 and	particularly	 a	 senior	nurse	 such	as	 a	Clinical	Nurse	Speciaist,	recognises	dying,	then	they	are	professionally	committed	to	 discussing	 the	 patient’s	 clinical	 care	 and	 possibly	 challenging	 the	 consultant’s	decision-making.	 	 If	 the	nurse,	 or	CNS,	 can	 rationalise	on-going	active	 treatment,	then	 undertaking	 this	 piece	 of	 work	 with	 the	 medical	 team	 can	 be	 left	 and	 the	family	 can	 also	be	 left.	 	 Seeing	 the	dying	 is	 particularly	 exposed	 to	 anxiety,	 both	concious	and	unconcious,	and	is	likely	to	provoke	defences,	rational	and	irrational	desires	and	these	are	expressed	 in	actions,	decisions	and	relationships.	Palliative	care	is	the	route	to	gain	second	opinions	and	resource	to	care	for	the	patient	and	family,	yet	they	too	can	“miss	the	dying”.		I	suggest	this	is	particularly	likely	when	they	are	overwhelmed	with	clinical	work,	or	personally	stretched.		There	are	social	defences	within	social	defences.		
This	 study	has	 identified	 that	 families	are	a	major	 source	of	 clinical	and	emotional	
work,	and	may	be	part	of	the	reason	recognising	dying	is	avoided	
Subsequent	 to	 the	recognition	of	dying,	 there	 is	 the	engagement	with	 the	patient	and	 family	 to	 progress	 decision-making.	 	 There	 is	 evidence	 from	 this	 study	 that	families	 are	 a	 major	 source	 of	 conscious	 and	 unconscious	 anxiety	 to	 HCPs,	independent	of	the	patient,	and	may	be	a	contributing	reason	for	the	conscious	and	unconscious	avoidance	of	 recognising	dying.	 	The	detail	 of	 this	 is	my	 sixth	novel	contribution.	 	 	 Ahead	 of	 discussing	 this	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 patients	 are	 not	neutral	 in	 this	 process.	 	 HCPs	 in	 this	 study	 described	 how	 patients	 can	 actively	keep	their	family	out	of	their	care	when	they	can	independently	get	themselves	to	clinic	 appointments	 and	 out	 patient	 treatments.	 	 Also,	 patients	 and	 families	 can	help	 contain	HCP’s	 conscious	 and	unconscious	 anxieties,	 and	 this	 happens	when	patients	and	families	accept	the	fact	the	patient	is	dying	or	independently	raise	the	topic	with	the	healthcare	team.	However,	 when	 the	 patient	 is	 recognised	 as	 dying	 and	 in	 hospital,	 HCPs	 in	 this	study	(in	line	with	others	(Klager	et	al.,	2008))	indicated	that	the	wider	family	was	
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immediately	introduced	into	the	patients	care.		Doctors	responsibilities	are	defined	as	to	“anyone	who	is	close	to	the	patient”	(General	Medical	Council,	2010),	whilst	nurses	are	to	“families	and	carers”	(Nursing	and	Midwifery	Council,	2015).	 	HCPs	can	be	unsure	who	is	important	to	the	patient,	for	example	(carers	who	may	not	be	legally	 related	 to	 the	 individual	 and	 neighbours	 can	 be	 hugely	 important),	 who	constitutes	“the	 family”,	and	what	roles	 family	members	play	 in	the	patient’s	 life.		This	all	makes	the	introduction	of	the	family	very	challenging.		The	loss	of	mental	capacity	of	the	patient	to	take	part	in	decision-making	can	and	is	likely	to	occur	ahead	of	death,	and	withdraws	the	patient	from	the	decision	making	process.	 	 The	 family	 may	 have	 legal	 rights	 as	 the	 patient’s	 Lasting	 Power	 of	Attorney	 (British	Medical	 Association,	 2008),	 but	 the	 formal	 introduction	 of	 the	family,	 in	 a	 best	 interests	 decision-making	 scenario,	 can	 be	 challenging.	 	 HCPs	described	 how	 what	 is	 heard	 and	 understood	 by	 different	 family	 members	 in	family	meetings	was	different.		I	suggest	the	HCP	sometimes	mourns	the	loss	of	the	patient	and	 their	voice	 in	 their	 care,	 and	 is	 left	 in	a	HCP	and	 family	 relationship,	where	there	was	evidence	in	this	study	as	with	others	(Klager	et	al.,	2008;	Winter	&	Parks,	2012)	that	families	do	not	accurately	represent	the	views	of	patients.		This	is	 ethically	 challenging	 for	 HCPs	 for	 whom	 the	 duty	 of	 care	 is	 to	 the	 patient.		However,	the	relationship	between	the	HCP	and	family	relationship	has	the	ability	to	 go	 beyond	 the	 death	 of	 the	 patient,	which	 is	 experienced	 negatively	 by	HCPs	when	families	are	angry	and	complaining.	HCPs	described	how	these	family	meetings	always	take	time,	sometimes	hours	of	time.	 	The	importance	of	this	is	that	this	time	for	families	is	not	resourced	by	the	organisation,	 nor	 are	 facilities	 provided.	 	 HCPs	 in	 this	 study	 gave	 their	 “on	 call”	time,	or	re-arranged	clinical	time	to	pay	attention	to	this	aspect	of	care,	and	were	inventive	about	where	these	meetings	took	place	to	give	the	family	privacy	and	to	protect	them	and	shield	others	from	distress.	This	 study	 identified	 that	 families	 could	 escalate	 the	 HCP	 anxieties.	 	 Whilst	 the	literature	 mainly	 describes	 families	 who	 are	 helpful	 (Lowson	 et	 al.,	 2013)	(Hanratty	 et	 al.,	 2012),	 this	 study	 identified	 that	 families	 who	 are	 in	 conflict	amongst	them	selves,	who	are	mistrusting,	disbelieving	and	angry,	are	particularly	
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Given	 that	 there	 is	 much	 evidence	 that	 HCPs	 are	 inaccurate	 at	 prognostication	(Christakis	 &	 Lamont,	 2000;	 Gwilliam	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Zibelman,	 Xiang,	 Muchka,	Nickoloff,	&	Marks,	2014),	and	really	interested	in	getting	this	right	(S.	A.	Murphy	et	al.,	2010),	it	should	not	be	surprising	that	patients	who	survive	their	prognosis	can	 hugely	 impact	 the	 HCP.	 	 HCPs	 in	 this	 study	 explained	 how	 when	 they	 had	honestly	prognosticated,	changed	the	treatment	plans	to	focus	end	of	life	care	and	on	comfort,	and	the	patient	either	took	a	long	time	to	die,	or	the	patients	survived	the	 prognosis,	 that	 it	 was	 really	 personally	 and	 professionally	 challenging.	 The	challenge	 was	 to	 the	 doctor’s	 sense	 of	 wanting	 to	 be	 right,	 to	 fear	 of	 having	potentially	denied	a	patient	an	opportunity	for	meaningful	life	and	then	how	to	re-establish	therapeutic	relationships	with	patients	and	/	or	their	family.		For	nurses	it	was	the	constant	challenge	by	families	that	the	decision-making	was	wrong.	In	the	literature,	apart	from	personal	accounts	of	the	experience	of	“being	accused	of	 getting	 it	 wrong”	 –	 which	 likely	 increase	 anxiety	 of	 HCPs,	 (Sara,	 2014),	 and	reports	in	the	risk	management	literature	which	indicate	that	being	responsible	for	a	 mistake	 is	 a	 particularly	 intense	 experience	 (Firth-Cozens,	 Redfern,	 &	 Moss,	2004),	 there	 is	 little	documented	about	how	HCPs	 learn	 from	 their	mistakes	–	 it	has	been	described	as	a	“marginalised	professional	discourse”	(Vetere,	2007).		My	seventh	 novel	 contribution	 is	 to	write	 about	 the	 discourse	 of	 “getting	 it	wrong”,	and	“relationship	repair’”.	 	 	There	is	very	little	in	the	literature	about	relationship	repair	for	HCPs	and	patients	and	families.		Doctors	are	advised	to	refer	a	patient	to	another	doctor	when	the	breakdown	of	trust	prevents	good	medical	care	(General	Medical	 Council,	 2013).	 	Nurses	 are	 instructed	 to	 respond	 “compassionately	 and	politely	to	those	who	are	anxious	and	distressed”	(Nursing	and	Midwifery	Council,	
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2015).		HCPs	in	Drought’s	study	(Drought	&	Koenig,	2002)	avoided	prognosticating	and	 advance	 care	 planning	 as	 they	wanted	 to	 keep	 a	 good	 relationship	with	 the	patient,	and	saw	the	introduction	of	talking	about	end	of	 life	care	as	rocking	this.		In	this	study	HCPs	recalled	hours	of	work	to	get	relationships	with	families	back	on	track	and	for	 families	to	trust	them	when	the	patient	had	survived	the	treatment	change	 subject	 to	 recognition	of	dying.	 	They	also	described	how	 this	 felt	 such	a	personal	 responsibility	 that,	 despite	 reflecting,	 the	 case	 re-occurred	 in	 their	memories.		In	 the	 literature	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 despite	 doctors	 recognising	 dying,	 active	treatment	can	be	continued	until	the	last	twenty	four	hours	(Kennedy	et	al.,	2014).		This	PhD	offers	a	humane	explanation	as	to	why	this	clinical	practice	might	occur:	a	 patient	 surviving	 a	 diagnosis	 of	 dying	 with	 a	 change	 in	 treatment	 plan	 is	 so	impactful	 for	 all	 involved	 that	 it	 can	 be	 preferable	 that	 the	 patient	 dies	 despite	treatment,	or	with	the	treatment	plan	changing	only	hours	prior	to	death.		HCPs	in	this	 study	had	 learnt	 strategies	 to	minimise	 the	occurrence	of	patients	 surviving	their	prognostication.	 	For	example	they	prognosticated	in	bands	of	time	(days	to	weeks;	weeks	 to	months;	months	 to	 years)	which	 is	 known	 to	be	more	 accurate	(Higginson	&	Costantini,	2002),	and	to	introduce	the	concept	of	uncertainty	when	escalating	patients	care	to	intensive	care	so	that	patients	and	families	were	aware	that	 death	 was	 a	 possible	 outcome.	 	 In	 the	 literature	 there	 is	 a	 new	recommendation	 to	 name	 uncertainty	 -	 “sick	 enough	 to	 die”	 (Krawczyk	 &	Gallagher,	2016).		The	point	about	recognising	dying	is	that	it	allows	thought	with	the	patient	 about	 their	wishes	and	preferences	and	what	 treatments	are	 in	 their	best	 interests,	and	consideration	of	treatment	limits	(not	the	limitation	of	care)	–	for	 example	 DNACPR,	 and	 ward	 based	 care	 (rather	 than	 intensive	 care).	 	 The	introduction	of	 the	 term	“sick	enough	 to	die”,	 if	used	alongside	responsibility	 for	clear	clinical	decision-making	may	be	helpful	to	mitigate	the	anxiety	about	“getting	the	prognosis	wrong”.	 	However,	 it	 again	has	 echoes	of	 avoidance	 in	 some	HCPs	hands.		Given	the	demographics	of	an	aging	population	with	multiple	co-morbidities,	 it	 is	going	to	be	increasingly	challenging	to	accurately	predict	dying.	 	Also	responsibly	offering	less	active	treatment,	and	combining	this	with	palliative	care	is	extending	
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people’s	life	expectancy	(Irwin	et	al.,	2013),	negating	the	current	public	conception	that	treatment	equates	with	survival.	 	For	the	future	it	would	be	really	helpful	to	investigate	the	patient	and	families	experience	of	surviving	repeated	prognosis	of	dying,	 and	what	was	helpful	 for	 them	and	unhelpful.	 	 It	would	also	be	helpful	 to	investigate	HCPs	experience	of	patient	and	family	relationship	repair.	Ahead	of	this	it	would	be	helpful	to	have	patient	and	family	information	on	the	fact	that	it	is	challenging	to	predict	dying,	and	also	that	dying	can	take	time	e.g.	it	can	take	 three	weeks	 for	 death	 to	 occur	 subsequent	 to	withdrawal	 of	 dialysis.	 	 This	information	could	then	be	used	to	think	with	patients	and	families	about	how	the	remaining	time	can	be	best	used,	and	what	resources	are	available	to	help	support	them	during	this	time.	
The	 introduction	 of	 the	 psychoanalytic	 psychosocial	 allows	 new	 insights	 about	 the	
“learning	opportunity”.	
The	national	 commitment	 to	 clinicians	who	 can	 care	well	 for	 dying	patients	 and	families	is	well	versed	(National	Palliative	and	End	of	Life	Care	Partnership,	2015).	Yet	 in	 the	 literature	 there	are	anomalies,	gaps	and	disjunctions	 that	 indicate	 that	the	 rhetoric	 is	 much	 harder	 to	 translate	 into	 clinical	 practice.	 	 The	 literature	indicates	that	there	are	differences	in	the	amount	of	time	that	the	pre-registration	medical	 (Walker	 et	 al.,	 2016)	 and	 nursing	 (Dickinson	 et	 al.,	 2008)	 curriculums	devote	to	the	care	of	the	dying;	there	is	a	resistance	to	sustained	positive	change	in	attitude	 towards	 caring	 for	 the	 dying	 (Barclay	 et	 al.,	 2015);	 that	 there	 is	 a	mismatch	between	what	skills	medical	educators	think	junior	doctors	need	to	care	for	the	dying,	what	senior	consultants	think	junior	doctors	can	do	and	what	junior	doctors	feel	they	can	do	(Bowden	et	al.,	2013);	that	student	nurses	are	learning	to	care	for	the	dying	without	supervision	which	can	cause	emotional	distress	(Kent	et	al.,	2012)	and	avoidance	of	such	patients	in	the	future	(Okoye	&	Arber,	2014);	and	that	palliative	care	support	at	the	point	of	care	is	seen	as	helpful	(Price	&	Schofield,	2015),	 as	 is	 skilled	 reflective	 debrief	 (Hockley,	 2014).	 	 This	 study’s	 unique	contribution	 is	 a	perspective	 that	offers	possible	 explanations	as	 to	why,	despite	the	verbalised	and	rational	commitment	to	educating	HCPs	to	be	able	to	offer	end	
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of	life	care,	HCPs	can	feel	ill	–	equipped	and	resistant	to	providing	this	care,	and	it	concentrates	on	the	“learning	opportunity	in	clinical	practice”.			The	“learning	opportunity”	that	takes	place	in	the	clinical	environment	is	seen	as	one	of	the	key	routes	to	learning	and	assessment	for	medical	and	nursing	students.		The	 learning	 opportunity	 as	 described	 in	 national	 documents	 (Nursing	 and	Midwifery	Council,	2010a;	The	UK	Foundation	Programme	Curriculum,	2016)	has	standards	 for	 the	 learning	experience:	 it	 is	 to	be	safe	 for	patients,	 supportive	 for	learners	and	provide	a	good	standard	of	clinical	care.	Reflection	is	seen	as	a	core	skill	 and	 the	 route	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 learning	 and	 to	 underpin	 a	 change	 in	practice	 or	 behaviour.	 The	 learning	 theories	 that	 broadly	 underpin	 the	 current	education	curriculum	pre-suppose	that	learning	is	mainly	a	rational	and	cognitive	process.			In	 this	 study	 senior	HCPs,	 rather	 than	 presenting	 themselves	 as	 an	 unemotional	and	emotionally	unaffected	skilled	resource,	able	to	assess	and	meet	the	needs	of	dying	 patients	 and	 their	 families	 (General	 Medical	 Council,	 2010)	 (Nursing	 and	Midwifery	Council,	2014),	and	able	to	support	 the	 learning	HCP,	did	describe	the	significant	 emotional	 impact	 of	 caring	 for	 the	 dying	 patient,	 and	 a	 personal	commitment	 to	 help	 junior	 HCPs	 	 learn.	 	 What	 the	 psychoanalytic	 psychosocial	framework	brings	is	a	language	and	framework	to	consider	the	HCP’s	voice.		As	we	have	already	discussed	HCPs	voiced	feelings	of	frustration	and	of	being	un-useful	in	 the	 face	 if	 death,	 and	 of	 experiencing	 unethical,	 if	 merciful,	 thoughts.	 	 HCPs	described	how,	even	when	they	had	generously	opened	a	learning	opportunity	for	a	 junior	 doctor	 to	watch	 a	 conversation	with	 a	 dying	 patient’s	 family,	 that	 there	was	a	 sense	 that	 the	 junior	doctor	was	 “lurking”.	 	 Lurking	 is	 the	 language	of	 the	psychosocial,	not	the	cognitive	and	rational,	and	this	study	considers	that	this	may	relate	to	the	conscious	and	unconscious	experiences	of	learning	of	the	senior	HCP	or	a	worry	about	whether	 the	 junior	HCP	might	be	upset,	 intervene	or	challenge	the	senior	HCP.		The	need	for	safety	is	recognised	for	the	patient	in	the	clinical	learning	opportunity	(General	 Medical	 Council,	 2016),	 but	 this	 study	 argues	 that	 the	 learning	opportunity	 needs	 to	 be	 safe	 for	 the	 learner.	 	 This	 is	 my	 seventh	 novel	
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contribution.	 	 Caring	 for	 the	 dying	 patient	 and	 their	 family	 can	 provoke	uncomfortable	emotions,	and	unethical	thoughts	which	are	in	contrast	to	expected	professional	 standards	 (General	Medical	 Council,	 2010)	 (Nursing	 and	Midwifery	Council,	2015).		I	argue	that	this	silences	both	the	teacher	and	learner,	and	has	the	potential	 to	prevent	reflective	debrief.	Psychosocial	 theories	of	 learning	highlight	the	 importance	 of	 safe	 containment	 of	 thoughts	 to	 allow	 thinking	 and	 learning	(Bion	 cited	 in	 Bibby,	 2011)).	 	 Learning	 can	 be	 dangerous,	 as	 HCPs	 have	 to	deconstruct	what	is	known	in	order	to	learn	new	ways	of	knowing.		In	the	care	of	the	dying	patient	and	their	 family,	HCPs	do	not	 just	 learn	about	others	or	a	 task,	they	constantly	 learn	about	themselves,	and	the	unpredictability	of	death,	and	its	ability	 to	 reduce	 HCPs	 completely	 to	 their	 humanness.	 	 The	 importance	 of	 safe	containment	is	seen	in	the	value	placed	on	having	palliative	care	at	the	point	of	the	clinical	encounter	(Price	&	Schofield,	2015).		I	 propose	 that	 after	 a	 clinical	 learning	 encounter	 asking	 the	 HCP	 what	 their	thoughts	 are	 in	 a	 safe	 and	 private	 environment,	 and	 holding	 that	 third	 space	(Benjamin,	2012),	may	enable	the	HCP	to	move	themselves	to	a	different	position	and	 learning,	 and	 re-engage	 with	 clinical	 practice.	 	 This	 level	 of	 reflection	completely	 contrasts	 the	 rational	 and	 cognitive	 demand	 that	 they	 will	 learn	subsequent	 to	 reflection	 (The	UK	 Foundation	 Programme	 Curriculum,	 2016).	 	 It	may	also	engender	partnership	where	the	learner	HCP	can	be	encouraged	to	take	a	lead	 in	 a	 consultation	 with	 support	 rather	 than	 the	 expectation	 voiced	 by	consultants	in	this	study	of	“see	one,	do	one,	teach	one”.		It	puts	the	humanness	of	the	 learner	 HCP	 back	 at	 the	 centre,	where	 they	 can	meet	 the	 humanness	 of	 the	patient	and	family,	with	skilled	support,	and	then	continue	to	learn.	
The	 organisation	 does	 not	 resource	 twenty	 four	 hours	 a	 day,	 seven	 day	 a	 week	
support	for	learning	at	the	clinical	encounter	
In	this	study	nursing	HCPs	described	how	some	nurses	chose	to	avoid	this	clinical	work	 and	 negotiated	 that	 others	 undertake	 it	 –	 thus	 we	 can	 observe	 both	“avoidance”	as	a	protective	mechanism,	and	how	others	gain	 increased	exposure.		The	impact	of	the	psychological	defence	of	avoidance	appears	an	exponential	one,	
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when	considered	looking	from	the	perspective	of	experienced	practice	to	the	start	of	practice	in	the	undergraduate	curriculum.		In	clinical	practice	there	is	evidence	that	dying	is	now	mainly	segregated	in	certain	specialties,	 particularly	 care	 of	 the	 elderly,	 and	 palliative	 care,	 and	 so	 HCPs	 can	choose	 to	 practice	 in	 areas	 where	 there	 is	 less	 dying	 or	 more	 dying	 and	 thus	minimise	 or	 maximise	 their	 opportunities	 for	 learning	 both	 pre	 and	 post	registration.		In	this	study	HCPs	discussed	how	they	were	able	to	spot	the	palliative	care	nurses	of	the	future	by	those	who	did	not	avoid	families	and	went	“the	extra	mile”,	and	those	nurses	who	avoided	the	care	of	the	dying	by	nursing	in	areas	such	as	theatres	where	they	“are	all	asleep”.		There	is	evidence	that	doctors	have	made	their	 career	 choice	 as	 early	 as	 year	 one	 after	 qualification	 and	 certainly	 by	 year	three	(Surman,	Lambert,	&	Goldacre,	2013).		It	would	appear	that	some	HCPs	can	lean	 into	 the	 care	 of	 the	 dying	 patient	 and	 learn	 on	 a	 level	 to	 manage	 their	anxieties,	and	others	can	avoid	this.	The	 challenge	 though	 currently	 is	 that	due	 to	 the	 increasing	demographics	of	 an	aging,	 co-morbid	 population,	 and	 hospitals	 under	 increasing	 pressure	 due	 to	increasing	 activity,	 dying	 is	 occurring	 in	 many	 areas.	 	 This	 has	 the	 potential	 to	cause	extreme	distress	 to	HCPs	whose	conscious	and	unconscious	defences	have	led	 both	 to	 avoidance	 of	 the	 care	 of	 the	 dying,	 professional	 clinical	 skill	 in	 life	prolongation,	and	 lack	of	 “skill	honing”	 in	 the	care	of	 the	dying	patient	and	 their	family.	 	 	 The	 arrival	 of	 a	 potentially	 dying	 patient	 and	 distressed	 family	 in	 the	emergency	department	presents	as	“dirty	and	polluting”	(Bailey	&	Murphy,	2011),	and	 in	areas	such	as	 theatres	where	organ	donation	occurs	nurses	describe	such	extreme	distress	that	they	“split	their	mind	up”	(Gao,	Plummer,	&	Williams,	2017)	in	order	to	cope	with	the	clinical	work.			Seeing	and	doing	without	senior	support	can	be	extremely	anxiety	provoking	 for	the	 individual	 and	 relies	 on	 the	HCPs	 own	 ability	 to	 contain	 their	 distress.	 	 The	ability	to	reflect	such	that	thoughts,	thinking	and	learning	occurs,	will	be	affected	by	the	individuals	unconscious	defences	(Doyle,	2012),	and	the	ability	of	informal	support	to	help	find	alternative	perspectives.		It	is	suggested	that	in	contrast	to	the	GMC	rhetoric	(General	Medical	Council,	2016)	that	organisations	should	provide	a	
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good	learning	environment,	that	the	organisation	contributes	to	a	lack	of	learning	by	 lack	 of	 time	 for	 reflection,	 lack	 of	 resources,	 and	 mandating	 reflection	 for	judgement	and	assessment	through	appraisal	and	revalidation.	 	In	this	manner,	it	is	 easy	 to	 see	 how	 troubling	 experiences	 and	 thoughts	 about	 dying	 could	 be	repressed	or	projected	elsewhere,	and	dying	patients	and	families	avoided.	My	eighth	novel	contribution	is	the	articulation	of	a	rationale	for	the	importance	of	a	team	of	HCPs	who	have	expertise	and	can	cope	in	such	areas	as	the	Emergency	Department,	 and	 the	operating	 theatre,	 to	 support	 both	 the	 clinical	 care	 and	 the	ability	 to	 safely	 contain	 the	 distress	 so	 that	 there	 can	 be	 learning	 from	 these	clinical	events	(Price	&	Schofield,	2015).	 	Currently	palliative	care	support	is	only	9-5	Monday-Sunday	and	this	PhD	argues	that	the	organisational	support	required	for	learning	(General	Medical	Council,	2016)	is	not	met	organisationally	in	the	care	of	the	dying	patient	and	their	family.		
Experienced	nurses	as	the	emotional	container	for	doctors	learning	
The	concept	that	breaking	significant	news	is	a	process	(Baile	et	al.,	2000),	and	that	there	is	a	recognised	role	for	the	nurse	has	begun	to	be	identified	(Warnock	et	al.,	2010).		The	requirement	to	have	a	nurse	present	at	the	clinical	encounter	with	the	dying	patient	and	their	family	was	an	oft-repeated	narrative	in	this	study.		From	a	nursing	point	of	view	it	is	helpful	to	know	what	has	been	said	and	how	it	has	been	received	in	order	to	continue	the	care	of	the	patient	and	family.		However,	I	argue	that	without	formal	education,	or	resourced	expectation	that	this	is	the	role	of	the	nurse	(Warnock	et	al.,	2010),	there	is	evidence	that	some	nurses	are	the	emotional	container,	 allowing	 the	 doctor	 to	 feel	 safe	 to	 undertake	 the	 work	 of	 delivering	significant	news,	providing	a	witness	for	the	doctor,	and	emotional	containment	if	patients	and	families	are	angry	or	distressed.		Doctors	in	this	study	regularly	asked	nurses	after	the	meeting	for	their	feedback	and	saw	them	as	a	route	for	the	doctor	to	continue	to	learn	and	improve	their	skills.	That	nurses	are	a	 route	 for	 junior	doctors	 to	 learn	 is	not	new	news	(Vallis	et	al.,	2004),	 but	 what	 this	 study	 adds	 is	 that	 experienced	 nurses	 comfortable	 with	emotional	work	are	the	route	to	reflective	debrief	,	and	allowing	thought,	thinking	and	 thus	 learning	 of	 senior	HCPs.	 	 This	 is	my	 ninth	 novel	 contribution.	 	 Nurse’s	
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formal	education	is	currently	leaving	them	unprepared	for	this	role,	and	this	needs	to	be	included.		Detail	about	models	for	breaking	bad	news,	self	management,	legal	aspects	 of	 decision-making,	 working	 with	 families	 and	 how	 to	 give	 and	 receive	feedback	need	 to	be	covered.	 	This	 is	another	dimension	of	practice	 that	has	 the	potential	 to	be	affected	by	conscious	and	unconscious	anxiety	and	thus	affect	the	willingness	of	nurses	to	be	involved	in	these	meetings.	
Recommendations	for	clinical	practice	
The	recommendations	 for	clinical	practice	are	previously	considered	within	each	section.	They	are	summarised	briefly	below:	There	 is	 currently	 a	 top	 down	 call	 for	 a	 system	 wide	 response	 nationally	(Leadership	Alliance	for	the	care	of	Dying	People,	2014),	but	this	PhD	argues	for	a	clinical	practice	base	upwards	response	that	recognises	that	HCPs	are	humans,	and	unconscious	avoidance	of	 the	dying	 is	on	some	level	 inevitable.	 	We	need	to	stop	repeating	 the	national	 rhetoric	 that	 “dying	 is	everyone’s	business”,	 and	ask	what	we	can	do	to	help	individual	HCPs	in	individual	cases	make	the	best	decisions	with	and	 for	 patients	 and	 families.	 	 This	 is	 at	 an	 individual,	 group,	 institutional	 and	Higher	Education	Institute	provider	level.			It	is	important	that	the	five	-	stage	model	identified	in	this	study	is	used	in	teaching	and	continues	to	be	modified	from	reflections	on	clinical	practice.		Using	the	model	has	the	potential	to	open	spaces	to	consider	whether	the	patient	is	dying,	and	how	to	 evidence	 this;	 it	 allows	 thought	 about	 how	 and	when	 to	 engage,	 and	what	 to	engage	 about	 and	 how	 to	 manage	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 meetings.	 	 	 In	 this	manner	instead	of	compressing	the	recognition	of	dying	into	an	action	plan	there	is	potential	to	pace	the	process,	and	think	also	about	resources	that	will	be	helpful	at	each	 stage.	 	 It	 is	 vital	 that	 clinical	 supervision	 of	 the	 care	 of	 the	 dying	person	 is	resourced	 to	 allow	 reflection	 and	 learning	 that	 can	 affect	 current	 patient	 care,	rather	 than	wait	 to	 demand	 that	HCPs	 reflect	 on	deaths	 caused	by	 a	 problem	 in	care	(National	Quality	Board	2017)	That	 the	 social	 defence	mechanisms	 related	 to	 the	 care	 of	 the	 dying	 are	 named.		These	 give	 a	 cue	 to	 anxiety	 driven	 processes	 and,	 if	 contained	 safely,	 will	 allow	
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thought	 and	 thinking	 about	 what	 is	 happening	 in	 this	 time	 to	 effect	 practice	change.	That	palliative	care	is	effectively	resourced.		Research	indicates	that	palliative	care	is	valued	and	that	joint	consultations	are	a	valuable	way	for	others	to	learn	(Price	&	 Schofield,	 2015).	 	 Palliative	 care	 HCPs	 need	 time	 to	 understand	 the	 learning	needs	 and	 assessment	 processes	 of	 other	 professions	 in	 order	 to	 feedback	effectively.	That	 family	 care	 is	 paid	 attention	 to	 and	 resourced.	 	 There	 are	 basic	 skills	 that	could	 go	 into	 early	 curriculum	 delivery.	 	 For	 example	 mapping	 of	 family	 trees,	understanding	 the	 patient	 and	 family	 relationship,	 family	 commitments	 and	strengths	 and	 challenges.	 	 It	 would	 be	 helpful	 to	 define	 who	 the	 HCPs	responsibility	 is	 to,	 and	 for	 HCPs	 to	 receive	 training	 on	 communicating	 with	families,	 and	 regular	 debrief.	 	 At	 the	 point	 of	 recognising	 dying	 it	 can	 be	 like	turning	 a	 shipping	 tanker	 around.	 	 Family	 meetings	 take	 time	 and	 this	 needs	resourcing	in	order	that	other	clinical	care	is	not	missed.		There	is	opportunity	for	multi-professional	 work	 in	 this	 domain	 of	 care	 and	 for	 involvement	 of	 the	charitable	sector	to	ensure	families	have	access	to	information,	and	places	where	their	needs	can	be	met.	It	 would	 be	 helpful	 to	 re-look	 at	 the	 learning	 opportunity.	 	Whilst	mentors	 and	educational	 supervisors	 can	 look	 out	 for	 opportunities,	 this	 psychosocial	 study	identifies	 how	 opportunities	 can	 be	 unconsciously	missed.	 	 It	 would	 be	 good	 to	give	 all	 students	 a	 placement	 in	 a	 hospital	 palliative	 care	 team	 –	 the	 volume	 of	dying	that	takes	place	 in	a	hospital	means	that	 it	 is	unlikely	that	the	visiting	HCP	will	 not	 see	 a	 dying	 patient	 and	 their	 family.	 	 It	 would	 be	 helpful	 if	 policy	 and	standards	 could	 include	 a	 sense	 of	 the	HCP	 as	 a	 person	with	 emotions,	 and	 that	working	with	 their	 emotions	 can	 give	ways	 to	work	 in	 a	 psychologically	 helpful	way	 with	 the	 family.	 Students	 and	 new	 HCPs	 do	 not	 have	 regular,	 as	 in	 daily,	opportunities	to	work	consistently	with	mentors	and	educational	supervisors,	both	in	clinical	practice	and	in	reflective	supervision,	and	yet	with	respect	to	the	care	of	the	dying	patient	this	is	so	important.			
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The	 workshops	 were	 well	 evaluated	 and	 whilst	 they	 would	 not	 suit	 all,	 and	required	 skilled	 facilitation,	 they	 did	 give	 a	 space	 for	 HCPs	 to	 express	 their	thoughts,	 think,	 be	 contained	 and	 take	both	psychological	 and	physical	 action	 to	improve	care.	It	 is	 important	 to	 equip	 student	nurses	 in	 their	 pre	 registration	 curriculum	with	the	 tools	 and	 experience	 to	 cope	 with	 current	 day	 clinical	 practice.	 	 They	 are	undertaking	much	emotional	work	with	patients	and	families,	and	being	part	of	the	breaking	 bad	 news	 process,	 yet	 have	 less	 communication	 skills	 training	 than	medical	students.		We	need	to	equip	them	to	be	able	to	give	feedback	to	other	HCPs	and	be	able	to	receive	it	themselves.	
Critique	of	the	study,	and	recommendations	for	future	studies	
My	 first	 awareness	 of	 this	 study	 is	 that	 it	 did	 not	 start	 out	 with	 a	 psychosocial	framework,	 or	 intend	 to	 explore	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 individual,	 group,	 and	institutions	on	decision-making	processes	around	identifying	dying.		What	allowed	the	psychosocial	analysis	to	take	place	are	the	skills	I	had	learnt	as	a	facilitator	of	communication	training	to	ask	open	questions	and	to	remain	inquisitive	about	the	responses.	 	 In	 the	 future	 it	 would	 be	 so	 helpful	 to	 start	 with	 a	 psychosocial	ontology	 and	 epistemology	 and	 to	 really	 pick	 up	 on	 cues	 related	 to	 the	psychosocial.	 	 For	 example	 when	 HCPs	 described	 that	 they	 woke	 at	 night	 with	patients	in	their	head,	I	did	not	ask	if	they	were	in	their	dreams,	or	whether	they	had	 forgotten	aspects	of	 their	care	 in	 the	day	unconsciously	or	consciously	 (they	may	 not	 of	 course	 know	 this)	 (Trustram,	 2016),	 and	 then	 woken	 and	 thought	about	the	patient.		In	the	future	I	would	really	like	to	take	a	psychosocial	approach	and	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	 third	 space	 (Benjamin,	 2012),	 rather	 than	 affect	 and	liminality	 (Stenner,	 2012)	 to	 open	 this	 space	 and	 really	 consider	 how,	 with	someone	skilled	in	psychosocial	research,	the	dynamics	of	the	HCP	and	patient	and	family	meeting	can	be	explored.	My	second	critique	is	the	limited	attention	paid	in	the	analysis	to	the	“social”	in	the	psychosocial	 with	 a	 corresponding	 over-emphasis	 on	 links	 between	 individual	anxieties	relating	to	HCP’s	own	psychological	make	up	and	their	response	to	dying	patients	 and	 their	 families,	 e.g.	 the	 distress	 caused	 by	 the	 younger	 person	dying	
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(Chapter	 Six),	 or	 when	 the	 patient’s	 family	 has	 similarities	 to	 the	 HCPs	 family	(Chapter	Seven).		At	times	I	have	more	clearly	drawn	links	with	the	wider	societal	realms	and	processes,	 for	example,	where	HCPs	and	a	 family	disagree	on	what	 is	considered	 a	 “natural	 death”	 (Chapter	 Seven)	 and	where	 HCPs	 in	 the	workshop	discuss	 whether	 the	 move	 from	 a	 paternalistic	 form	 of	 medicine	 that	 they	practiced	 earlier	 in	 their	 careers	 to	 the	 current	 move	 to	 involving	 patients	 in	decision-making	 is	 really	 helpful	 for	 them,	 patients	 and	 families	with	 respect	 to	caring	 for	 the	 dying	 patient	 (Chapter	 Five).	 I	 have	 drawn	 links	 with	 the	organisational	contribution	to	anxiety	e.g.	lack	of	space	for	conversations	(Chapter	Seven)	and	the	lack	of	clinical	supervision	of	this	aspect	of	care	(Chapter	Eight).	I	have	 paid	 attention	 to	 the	 social	 in	 terms	 of	 peer	 relationship	 affecting	 how	decisions	are	made	(Chapter	Seven).	The	premise	of	this	PhD	understood	that	the	volume	 of	 patients	 impacted	 the	 ability	 to	 recognise	 dying,	 which	 is	 absolutely	related	 to	 the	demographics	of	 an	aging	population,	 and	 the	current	 structure	of	the	 NHS.	 	 However,	 the	 design	 set	 up	 and	 analysis	 of	 the	 study	 data	 has	 not	considered	 such	 specific	 factors	 as	 how	 gender,	 ethnicity,	 power,	 and	 class	may	play	a	role	in	either	the	recognition	of	dying	or	the	negotiation	of	decision-making.		I	 have	 also	 not	 paid	 deep	 attention	 to	 cultural	 and	 spiritual	 issues	 within	 this	study,	which	are	well	known	and	recognised	to	affect	decision-making	for	patients	and	families	(Calanzani	et	al.,	2013)	and	for	HCPs	(Sprung	et	al.,	2007).	 	 	 I	would	include	these	factors	up-front	in	future	studies,	and	explore	their	potential	impact	in	supervision	ahead	of	designing	the	study.			My	 third	 critique	 is	 that	 I	 had	 not	 anticipated	 the	 enormous	 contribution	 of	 the	family	to	the	challenges	of	recognising	dying	and	subsequent	work.		For	the	future,	it	would	be	helpful	to	specifically	take	a	psychosocial	approach	to	the	experience	of	HCPS,	patients	and	families	who	survive	a	HCP’s	prognosis	of	dying.	 	 It	would	be	interesting	 to	 investigate	 how	 HCPs	 and	 patients	 and	 families	 have	 repaired	relationships.	My	fourth	critique	is	that	I	have	not	used	the	data	from	the	study	regarding	the	use	of	humour.		The	workshops	were	interspersed	with	humour,	which	covered	shared	knowledge	 of	 the	 challenges	 of	 this	 aspect	 of	 clinical	 care	 (known	 but	 hidden	truths).	 	This	 shared	humour	and	camaraderie	 is	part	of	what	makes	working	 in	
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this	clinical	area	so	rewarding,	and	I	suspect	sustaining,	and	it	would	be	helpful	to	investigate	 what	 sustains	 HCPs	 working	 in	 this	 clinical	 field	 for	 long	 periods	 of	time.	I	would	like	to	write	this	up	as	a	separate	paper.	My	 final	 critique	 is	 that	 the	data	 from	 this	 study	could	usefully	 contribute	 to	 the	current	academic	debate	on	Terror	Management	Theory.	The	data	evidences	that	death	 anxiety,	 rather	 than	 being	 a	 simple	 internal	 thing	 to	 measure,	 is	 highly	contextual	in	healthcare.	I	would	like	to	write	this	up	as	a	separate	paper.	
Conclusion	
The	research	question	focused	on	how	senior	HCPs	identified	dying	and	negotiated	decision-making	with	the	patient	and	family.		This	study	has	identified	a	five-stage	model	for	recognising	dying.		This	is	1)	a	gut	instinct	that	the	patient	is	likely	dying	2)	 evidencing	 this	 gut	 instinct,	 3)	 engagement	 with	 the	 patient	 and	 family	 to	discuss	the	recognition	of	dying,	clinical	management	options,	and	patient’s	wishes	and	preferences	4)	how	HCP’s	work	with	the	“fall	out	emotions	of	the	patient	and	/	or	family	and	consequences	for	decision-making	of	these	meetings,	and	5)	clinical	supervision	of	this	process.	The	 intention	was	 to	 develop	 clinical	 practice	 through	 PAR	workshops,	 and	 the	themed	analysis	identified	that	HCPs	had	valued	taking	part	in	the	workshops,	and	there	was	 evidence	 of	 learning.	 Investigations	 though	 of	 the	 slips,	 and	 trips	 and	anomalies	expressed	in	Study	One	and	Two,	through	the	psychosocial	analysis	has	yielded	introduction	of	a	new	language	and	knowledge	of	how	HCPs	can	be	more	effectively	supported	to	learn.		The	psychosocial	analysis	allows	the	consideration	of	an	individual	and	collective	psychological	 tenor,	 about	 identification	 of	 dying,	 the	 care	 of	 the	 dying,	 and	 the	interaction	with	their	family,	framed	with	anxiety	as	the	currency	(Hoggett,	2009).		It	 allows	 consideration	 of	 mutually	 affective	 unconscious,	 psychologically	defensive	practices	at	an	 individual,	professional,	group,	and	institutional	 level	 in	the	NHS	and	in	Higher	Education	Institutes	preparing	junior	doctors	and	nurses.		
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There	is	a	professional	expectation	and	desire	to	not	deny	any	patient	meaningful	quality	 of	 life,	 and	 so	 the	 recognition	 of	 dying	 is	 particularly	 vulnerable	 to	conscious	 and	 unconscious	 anxieties.	 	 Co-created	 social	 defence	 mechanisms	related	to	the	identification	of	dying	have	been	identified,	and	the	legitimised	use	of	these	through	policy	and	practice,	start	to	explain	why	dying	is	identified	so	near	to	death.		Families	 are	 a	 major	 source	 of	 conscious	 and	 unconscious	 anxiety,	 with	 the	potential	 for	 the	 HCP	 to	 keenly	 feel	 the	 loss	 of	 the	 patient,	 and	 recognise	similarities	 between	 their	 own	 families	 and	 patient’s	 families.	 The	 position	 of	having	 nothing	 more	 that	 is	 “useful”	 to	 offer	 the	 patient	 in	 terms	 of	 life	prolongation,	 and	 the	 recognition	 of	 dying,	 has	 the	 capacity	 to	 transform	 the	relationship	 to	 one	 where	 the	 full	 emotional	 loss	 of	 the	 family	 can	 be	 felt.	 The	formal	 introduction	 of	 the	 family	 via	 best	 interests	 decision-making	 when	 the	patient	 has	 lost	 capacity	 can	 be	 particularly	 challenging	 when	 the	 doctor	 and	family	 disagree	 about	 what	 is	 in	 the	 patient’s	 best	 interests.	 	 Educational	preparation	 for	 family	work,	and	 lack	of	 institutional	 resources	 for	 this	aspect	of	clinical	care,	may	also	be	part	of	the	reason	that	identification	of	dying	is	delayed.		The	 supervised	 learning	opportunity	 is	 the	 route	 in	 clinical	practice	 for	both	 the	learning	and	assessment	of	junior	clinicians.		The	need	for	safety	is	recognised	for	the	patient	 in	 the	 clinical	 learning	opportunity,	 but	 this	 study	demonstrates	 that	the	learning	opportunity	needs	to	be	safe	for	the	senior	and	learning	HCP.		Caring	for	 the	 dying	patient	 and	 their	 family	 can	provoke	uncomfortable	 emotions,	 and	unethical	thoughts,	which	are	in	contrast	to,	expected	professional	standards.		This	silences	both	 the	 teacher	and	 learner,	 and	has	 the	potential	 to	prevent	 reflective	debrief.	 Psychosocial	 theories	 of	 learning	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 safe	containment	of	 thoughts	 to	 allow	 thinking	 and	 learning.	 	 The	 importance	of	 safe	containment	is	seen	in	the	value	placed	on	having	palliative	care	at	the	point	of	the	clinical	encounter	(Price	&	Schofield,	2015).	The	lack	of	emotional	safety	for	HCPs	if	they	are	unsupervised	in	the	care	of	the	dying	patient	and	their	family	may	well	go	 some	way	 to	 explaining	why	 recognising	dying	 can	be	 recognised	 late,	 or	 the	dying	patient	avoided.		Senior	doctors	become	more	isolated	in	clinical	practice	as	they	 specialise	 and	 have	 less	 opportunity	 to	 observe	 others	 manage	 family	
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Appendix	2.	 	 The	consent	 forms,	participant	 information,	 interview	schedule	
for	(Study	One),	and	sample	of	posters	as	they	went	to	the	ethics	department	
	




How do senior healthcare professionals recognise dying and engage 
patients and families to negotiate key decisions?  
 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide, you 
need to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve 
for you. Please take time to read the following information carefully. Talk to 
others about the study if you wish. If there is anything in this letter that is not 
clear, or you would like more information you can ask me about it. Contact 
details are at the top of this information sheet.  
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of this study is to understand how senior healthcare professionals 
recognise dying and engage with patients and families to negotiate decisions at 
end of life.  There are approximately 1500 admissions to XXXHospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust every week and there are around 22 deaths every week.  I 
want to understand what the triggers are for you to engage in conversations 
with patients and families about dying, and then how decision making with 
patients and their families are facilitated. 
 
The second aim of the study (Study 2) is to evaluate Participatory Action 
Research (PAR) groups (which encourage reflective practice) as a means to 
practice development. You will be invited separately to take part in Study 2. 
 
Why am I being invited to take part?    
You are being invited to take part as you are a senior healthcare professional 
who regularly cares for patients on wards where dying occurs. 
 
Do I have to take part?  
It is up to you to decide if you wish to take part in the study. This information 
sheet describes the study. You may keep this information sheet for your 
records. You are free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason.  
 
What would be involved?  
 
The study involves taking part in an individual interview with a researcher that 
will last approximately 30 minutes subsequent to a referral to the hospital 
palliative care team for assistance with end of life care and onward care 
planning.  You will be approached because a) you have identified to the hospital 




of the hospital or b) you are a palliative team healthcare professional who 
facilitated the care of the patient and family subsequent to the referral. 
 
To comply with current regulations governing research, if you are willing to 
participate in the interview, you will need to give written consent to these 
arrangements. I will explain the study before starting the interview and you will 
have the opportunity to ask any questions. You will then be asked to sign a 
consent form agreeing to participate in the study and for the interview material 
to be used for research and teaching purposes under the stated conditions.  
Before the interview begins you will be given a copy of the consent form that 
you signed to keep. 
 
You will be asked to complete a demographic questionnaire and to address how 
frequently you care for the dying.  “Skills for Care” in combination with the 
“National End of Life Care Programme” have drawn up three staff groups based 
on frequency of caring for the dying - Group A (Specialist Palliative Care), 
Group B (those who deal with dying frequently) and Group C (deal with dying 
infrequently) – all are vital to the care of the dying patient but their experiences 
are important to affect how we facilitate learning for all. 
 
The interview will be recorded using an audiotape and will cover topics about 
your experience of identifying that the patients are dying and how you know to 
engage with patients and families to facilitate decision-making and then what 
happens subsequent to that engagement. You will be asked not to use patient 
names or patient identifiable information. 
 
After the interview, the audiotape will be checked to ensure that there is no 
patient identifiable information and it will be fully transcribed so that I have a 
written account of the interview.  I will use this information to conduct the 
analysis that will help me to identify themes that appear to be important to you 
and to other participants in the study. The original recording will be stored in a 
protected electronic file on a password-protected computer in a locked office.  It 
will be kept for three years prior to disposal.  
 
In order to maintain confidentiality I will anonymize the transcripts so that no 
real names are used in any report or subsequent publication of the findings. I 
may use direct quotes from the interviews in our published findings, or for 
educational purposes, but again all details relating to any individual will be 
anonymized so that you cannot be identified.   
 
After the interview I will give you a thank you letter. Finally, if you would like to 
receive a summary of the final report findings please let me know during the 
interview and I will send you a copy once the study has been completed.  	
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
I do not anticipate that there will be major risks involved in this study.  There is 
always the opportunity of learning from reflection that can make us realise we 
could have done things differently for previous patients and families.  The 




In the event that you experience any additional distress due to participation in 
this study, information about staff counselling services will be provided. 
 
You are not obliged to take part and this will have no impact on your work if you 
choose not to participate.   
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
It is hoped that at the same time that we are able to learn and articulate what 
resources, triggers and knowledge senior healthcare professionals use to 
identify dying, that the interviews will give you evidence of reflective practice 
required for portfolios for appraisal and professional re-validation.  
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Yes. I will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will be 
handled in confidence. All information that is collected about clinical practice 
during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential and any 
information involving you that leaves the Trust will have any personal 
identification removed so that you cannot be recognised. Data will be kept in 
locked cabinets and will be access protected when stored on computers.It is not 
anticipated that clinical malpractice will be disclosed, but in the event of this 
occurring, confidentiality will be breached and the event will be reported in line 
with Trust procedures. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
If you withdraw from the study we would like to use the data collected up to the 
point at which you withdraw. Any data you have provided will be anonymized so 
that you cannot be identified from the information in any report or published 
material.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, please contact me 
(contact details can be found at the top). If you remain unhappy and wish to 
complain formally, you can do this through the NHS complaints procedure. 
Details can be obtained from the hospital. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
At the end of the study I will publish the study findings in academic and health 
professional journals.  I will also present the findings at conferences.  
Information may be used for educational purposes with health and social care 
professionals. If you would like a copy of the summary findings please let us 
know and I will send you a copy to you on completion of the study. No individual 
will be identifiable in any published material or in any educational material, 
although direct quotes from the interviews may be used as examples of the 
findings 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
Jo Wilson (PhD student from the University of Bath, Department of Psychology), 
Macmillan Consultant Nurse Practitioner Palliative Care is conducting this 
study. Macmillan funded the recording equipment and may fund a volunteer to 




Who has reviewed this study? 
The research has been reviewed and approved by the Psychology ethics group 
at University of Bath and the research and development team at XXXX 
 
Are expenses paid? 
Unfortunately we are unable to provide payment for participation in the study.  
 
Who can I contact for further information? 
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Jo Wilson, Macmillan 
Consultant Nurse Practitioner Palliative Care  
 






Title of project: How do senior healthcare professionals recognise dying and 
engage patients and families to negotiate key decisions? 
Chief Investigator: Jo Wilson, Macmillan Consultant Nurse Practitioner Palliative 
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opportunity to consider the information, ask questions, and 
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Participant Information Sheet 
Study - 2  
 
  
How do senior healthcare professionals recognise dying and engage patients and 
families to negotiate key decisions?  
 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide, you need to 
understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully. Talk to others about the study if you wish. If 
there is anything in this letter that is not clear, or you would like more information you can 
ask me about it. Contact details are at the top of this information sheet.  
 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of this study is to understand how senior healthcare professionals recognise 
dying and engage with patients and families to negotiate decisions at end of life.  There 
are approximately 1500 admissions to XXX Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust every week 
and there are around 22 deaths every week.   
 
Through a series of Participatory Action Research (PAR) group discussions, I want to 
understand what the triggers are for you to engage in conversations with patients and 
families about dying, and then how decision making with patients and their families are 
facilitated. The second aim of study 2 is to evaluate PAR groups (which encourage 
reflective practice and action) as a means to practice development. 
 
Why am I being invited to take part?    
You are being invited to take part as you are a senior healthcareprofessional who regularly 
cares for patients on wards where dying occurs. 
 
Do I have to take part?  
It is up to you to decide if you wish to take part in the study. This information sheet 
describes the study. You may keep this information sheet for your records. You are free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving a reason.  
 
What would be involved?  
Study 2 involves taking part in four one-hour PAR groups (at 1-2pm) involving 10-15 
people that will occur at monthly intervals from April to July 2014.  Lunch will be provided 
and you will be given six weeks’ notice.  In the first PAR group you will be prompted to 
discuss specific questions about how you know to engage with dying patients and their 
families and then how patient and family discussions are facilitated in order that decision-
making about end of life care issues occurs. It is anticipated that as part of the group you 
will generate an agreed action to take away and put into action / reflect on in the 
intervening month.  Your learning from this action will inform discussions in the next PAR 
 
   
	 	
group.  You will be asked to comment on the process of PAR groups as a method to 
reflect on and develop clinical practice. 
 
At the first PAR group you will be asked to complete a demographic questionnaire and to 
address how frequently you care for the dying.  “Skills for Care” in combination with the 
“National End of Life Care Programme” have drawn up three staff groups based on 
frequency of caring for the dying - Group A (Specialist Palliative Care), Group B (those 
who deal with dying frequently) and Group C (deal with dying infrequently) – all are vital to 
the care of the dying patient but their experiences are important to affect how we facilitate 
learning for all. 
 
To comply with current regulations governing research, if you are willing to participate in 
the PAR group, I will need you to give written consent to these arrangements. I will explain 
the study before starting the PAR group and you will have the opportunity to ask any 
questions. You will then be asked to sign a consent form agreeing to participate in the 
study and for the interview material to be used for research and teaching purposes under 
the stated conditions.  After the first PAR group you will be given a copy of the consent 
form that you signed to keep. 
 
The PAR group will be recorded using an audiotape. 
 
At the start of the first PAR group you will be asked, with the group, to agree a working 
agreement for the four PAR groups, which will clearly identify expectations of group 
behaviour including the opportunity to challenge each others views as you discuss clinical 
practice.  As part of this  - in order to protect patient and family confidentiality - you will be 
asked not to use patient names or patient identifiable information; you will also be asked to 
agree that information about colleague’s practice also kept confidential to the PAR group. 
 
After the PAR group, the audiotape will be checked to ensure that there is no patient 
identifiable information and it will be fully transcribed so that I have a written account of the 
interview.  The original recording will be stored in a protected electronic file on a password-
protected computer in a locked office.  It will be kept for three years prior to disposal. I will 
use the information given to conduct the analysis that will help me to identify themes that 
appear to be important to you and to other participants in the study.  
 
In order to maintain your confidentiality I will anonymize the transcripts so that no real 
names are used in any report or subsequent publication of the findings. I may use direct 
quotes from the PAR group in our published findings, or for educational purposes, but 
again all details relating to any individual will be anonymized so that you cannot be 
identified.   
 
After the interview I will give you a thank you letter. Finally, if you would like to receive a 
summary of the final report findings please let me know during the interview / PAR group 
and I will send you a copy once the study has been completed.  	
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
I do not anticipate that there will be major risks involved in this study.  There is always the 
opportunity of learning from colleagues about ways of caring for patients and families that 
can make us realise we could have tackled things differently for previous patients and 
families.  The PAR groups will be conducted in an appreciative enquiry manner and it is 
intended that they will attend to good examples of practice as well as areas for learning. In 
   
	 	
the event that you experience any additional distress due to participation in this study, 
information about staff counselling services will be provided 
 
You are not obliged to take part and this will have no impact on your work if you choose 
not to participate.   
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
It is hoped that at the same time that we are able to learn and articulate what resources, 
triggers and knowledge senior healthcare professionals use to identify dying, that the 
discussions within the interviews and PAR group will give you evidence of reflective 
practice required for portfolios for appraisal and professional re-validation.  It may well be 
that there is learning for all from participating in discussions with other senior healthcare 
professionals. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Yes. I will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will be handled in 
confidence. All information that is collected about clinical practice during the course of the 
research will be kept strictly confidential and any information involving you that leaves the 
university / Trust will have any personal identification removed so that you cannot be 
recognised. Data will be kept in locked cabinets and will be access protected when stored 
on computers. It is not anticipated that clinical mal-practice will be disclosed, but in the 
event of this occurring, confidentiality will be breached and the event will be reported in 
line with Trust procedures. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
If you withdraw from the study I would like to use the data collected up to the point at 
which you withdraw. Any data you have provided will be anonymized so that you cannot 
be identified from the information in any report or published material.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, please contact me (contact details 
can be found at the top). If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do 
this through the NHS complaints procedure. Details can be obtained from the hospital. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
At the end of the study I will publish the study findings in academic and health professional 
journals.  I will also present the findings at conferences.  Information may be used for 
educational purposes with health and social care professionals. If you would like a copy of 
the summary findings please let me know and I will send you a copy to you on completion 
of the study. No individual will be identifiable in any published material or in any 
educational material, although direct quotes from the interviews may be used as examples 
of the findings.    
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
Jo Wilson (PhD student from the University of Bath, Department of Psychology) Macmillan 
Consultant Nurse Practitioner Palliative Care is conducting the study. Macmillan may fund 
lunch and a volunteer to transcribe the interviews and PAR groups. 
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
The research has been reviewed and approved by the Psychology ethics group at 
University of Bath & the research and development team at XXX Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust. 
   
	 	
 
Are expenses paid? 
Unfortunately we are unable to provide payment for participation in the study.  
 
Who	can	I	contact	for	further	information?	
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Jo Wilson, Macmillan Consultant 
Nurse Practitioner Palliative Care  
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information 




Title of project: How do senior healthcare professionals recognise dying and 
engage patients and families to negotiate key decisions? 
Evaluation of Participatory Action Research (PAR) as a means to 
develop clinical practice 
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CARE OF THE DYING 
PATIENT& FAMILY 
SENIOR HEALTHCARE 
PROFESSIONALS WANTED  
FOR RESEARCH STUDY 
In clinical practice do you identify patients 
who may be dying, and facilitate decision-
making about end of life care? 
If so, you may be approached and asked to participate in 
a participatory action research (PAR) study. 
The study aims to describe how healthcare professionals 
identify the dying patient, in the midst of a busy acute 
trust, in order to facilitate patient and family decision-
making at end of life care and to evaluate PAR groups as 
a means to develop clinical practice. 
The study will involve taking part in a short interview and 
/ or a series of four one-hour PAR groups (over a four 
month period). We would be grateful if you could take 
part, but you have no obligation to do so.  You may say 
no if approached. 
If you have not yet been approached, but would like to 
take part in this study please let us know by contacting Jo 
Wilson (ext XXXX) for further information about the study. 
Thank you for your interest and cooperation 
		
 
 Interview Schedule for Study 1 
 
How do senior healthcare professionals recognise dying and engage patients and 
families to negotiate key decisions? 
 
First of all I would like to thank you for taking the time to talk to me.  As you know I am 
interested in understanding your experience of identifying patients who are dying and 
then how you facilitate patients and families to make decisions about end of life care. I 
have here some topics, which might be useful to discuss, but most important are your 
experiences. 
 
I am going to record the interview so that I can listen to what you have said at a later 
date.  However, if you want to stop the interview or the tape recorder at any time you 
can.  All the information you provide will be strictly confidential. Your name will not be 
mentioned in any reports arising from this study.   
 
I am going to ask you to omit any names of the patient and their family.  Could we agree 
at this stage how you will reference them? 
 







Prompts: What effect did this have on you personally with respect to emotional or 
physical impact?  What effect did this have on you professionally? How did you 



































Section five – your current experience of reflection and co-operative enquiry as a 




Thank you for your participation in this study. 
		
 
How do senior healthcare professionals recognise dying and engage patients and 
families to negotiate key decisions? 
 
Thank you for taking part in our research study.  I really appreciate you taking the time to 
help me to understand your experiences of recognising dying and engaging patients and 
families to negotiate key decisions. 
 
If taking part in this study has raised any personal issues that you would like to discuss 
further, you can make contact with the employee assistance scheme.  This is a 
confidential and free service and is available by phone 365 days of the years.  This can 












Area of clinical practice 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
Length of time since primary qualification 
(years)………………………………………………… 
Frequency of exposure to dying patients:  
Specialist palliative care  
        
Frequently exposed to dying patients 
 
Infrequently exposed to dying patients 
 
Please describe your ease of being with identifying and facilitating patient and 
family decision-making: 
I am at ease with discussions about dying and living with uncertainty 
 
I am moderately at ease with discussions about dying and living with 
uncertainty 
 




































	 1. “By	 asking	 about	 safety	 &	 mentioning	 fear,	 the	 research	 assumes	 a	relationship	 between	 the	 two	 that	 is	 not	 spelled	 out”	 (P8)…look	 at	 my	questions…do	I	link	any	with	emotion?		Do	I	link	any	with	anything?	2. Prefer	discourse	to	language	(P13)…discourse	can	include	imagery.		Look	at	discourses	about	dying;	are	there	any	counter-narratives.		Also	why	do	some	discourses	resonate	with	me?		Why	are	discourses	not	corrected	by	reality	/	clinical	practice?		HCPs	can	construct	their	past	and	their	current	life	within	a	particular	discourse	(P15).		Look	for	this.			3. Klein	 –	we	 spilt	 objects	 into	 good/bad…paranoid/schizoid	 position.	 Can	be	 past	 /present	 (look	 for	 this)…us	 /them	 (look	 for	 this)…look	 for	movement	of	accommodation	of	good/bad…depressive	position	(P18).	4. Are	HCPs	able	to	make	distinctions,	which	do	not	amplify	a	problem	e.g.	escalation	of	fear	(P20).			5. Is	there	evidence	that	HCP	find	anything	threatening	to	contemplate	and	this	 avoid	 it	 /	 thinking	 about	 it	 (P20).	 Look	and	 see	where	 subjects	 are	changed.		6. “There	were	constant	invitations	to	explain	actions	&	feelings,	motivated	by	 our	 pursuit	 of	 contradictions,	 inconsistencies	 and	 the	 “irrational	explanation”	(P25).	 	Look	at	how	I	question…am	I	bothered	by	irrational	explanations…or	my	agenda	/	blind	spots?	7. Look	for	HCP	owning	feelings,	and	the	meaning	HCPs	are	making	(P27).	8. Look	at	my	fallibilities	e.g.	a	clumsily	worded	question	&	unknowable	(at	time)	sensitivities	(P28).	9. Feminist	approaches	(P28).		Who	might	I	have	silenced?	10. “According	to	Polanyi,	the	difference	between	a	story	and	a	report,	is	that	in	 the	 telling	 a	 story,	 the	 narrator	 takes	 responsibility	 for	 “making	 the	relevance	 of	 the	 telling	 clear…this	 approach	 emphasizes	 the	 meanings	created	 in	 the	 research	 pair”…look	 at	 pairs	 of	 meaning	 makers	 in	workshops.	11. “Self	 identity	has	been	 seen	 as	being	 achieved	by	narratives	 of	 the	 self”	(P30).		Look	at	narratives	being	told.	12. Schutze	(1992)	revealed,	“elicited	accounts	such	as	those	of	Nazi	soldiers	will	 be	 highly	 defensive	 ones,	 given	 the	 painful	 subject	 matter”	 (P32).		Consider	 whether	 fact	 that	 HCP	 couldn’t	 recall	 the	 family	 could	 be	 a	defence.	 Authors	 argue	 that	 it	 may	 not	 be	 a	 defended	 subject	 but	 a	“gestalt”	where	 the	whole	 is	 great	 than	 the	 sum	of	 parts,	 about	 order	 /	hidden	agenda”	 (P32).	 	My	 role	 is	 to	 view	 the	 intact	data	not	destroy	 it	with	my	view.	13. The	links	in	my	questions	indicate	my	interests	not	how	HCP	make	links	(P32).	14. Did	my	questions	provoke	anxiety?	
		
	 	 	
15. Look	at	where	participants	go	off	the	question	and	set	their	own	agenda	/	discussion	(P38).	16. They	saw	patterns	where	unpalatable	realities	were	glossed	–	gave	clues	of	 characteristic	 defences	 (P40)…explore	 role	 of	 humour	 and	 when	humour	occurred.	17. Impressions	count	p41.		Need	to	record	my	impressions.	18. “Researchers	do	not	usually	regard	it	as	important	to	record	their	feelings	&	 fantasies	 in	 field	 notes”	 (P42)…”First	 impressions	 contain	 much	 that	eludes	 our	 conscious	 assessment	 of	 another	 person.	 	 Moreover	 these	feelings	 continue	 in	 the	 relationship”	 (P43).	 	 Need	 to	 re-visit	 my	 first	impressions	and	reflect	on	these.		19. Did	I	impose	my	meanings	…check	this.	20. “Concepts	of	recognition	&	containment”	(P45)…also	a	becoming	through	the	process	(p49).		Look	at	evidence	of	becoming.	21. “One	reason	for	in-ordinate	haste	on	behalf	of	participants	is	to	pre-empt	alternative	 suggestions”	 (P53).	 	 When	 do	 participants	 pre-empt	 each	other?		When	do	I	do	this?	22. Look	at	inconsistencies	in	stories.	23. “The	answer	is	to	be	found	in	the	theory	of	the	defended	subject	in	which	the	crucial	motivation	for	investment	in	particular	discourses	is	the	need	to	defend	oneself	against	feelings	of	anxiety”	(P54)…look	at	discourses.	24. People	 split	 good	 from	bad	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 present	 self	 (P55)…look	out	for	this	e.g.	“surgeons	never	do	this”	debate.	25. Investigate	where	I	felt	rapport	(P60).	26. Look	at	where	 I	 felt	 terrified	 and	 shut	up.	 	 Examine	what	was	 going	on	there	for	HCP	/	for	me	27. Look	 at	 use	 if	 subtlety	 and	 intuition	 –	 “we	 believe	 that	 using	 these	capacities	 is	unavoidable	once	the	researcher	has	posited	a	psychosocial	approach”	(P64)	28. Look	at	what	HCP	link	together	with	words	and	consider	if	there	may	be	emotional	links	(P67)	29. Look	 at	 what	 people	 stop	 doing	 /	 any	 sickness...maybe	 a	 clue	 to	 their	vulnerability	(P69).		30. “Clinicians	 interpret	 into	 the	 encounter,	whereas	 researchers	 save	 their	interpretations	 for	 later”	 (P	 72).	 	 Look	 at	 where	 I	 interpreted	 into	 the	interviews	or	workshops.	31. “The	less	possible	it	is	to	be	neutral	in	fact	the	more	crucial	it	is	to	strive	towards	it”	p73.	32. Need	 to	 demonstrate	 reliability…shared	meanings	 (P74).	 	 Look	 at	what	they	recognised	from	my	analysis	and	where	they	critiqued	it.	33. Re	researcher’s	responsibility	re	harm	–	they	suggest	“responsibility	for	a	safe	 context,	 in	 which	 issues	 of	 honesty,	 sympathy	 and	 respect	 are	central”	(P82).		Look	for	where	I	did	this	34. Individuals	 who	 had	 been	 coded	 identically,	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 different	once	biographical	factors	&	personal	meanings	taken	into	account	(P119).	Look	at	study	one	and	two	data.	35. What	 enables	me	 to	 feel	 empathetic	 despite	 any	 differences…Is	 it	 HCPs	ability	to	preparedness	to	consider	their	actions	(P122).	
		
	 	 	
36. “According	to	Kleinian	theory,	the	fear	of	personal	annihilation	is	central	to	 the	 earliest	 experience	 and	 this	 continues	 through	 life	 whenever	anything	unfamiliar	is	encountered”	(P127).		Think	about	survivor	guilt.	37. Others	 can	 contain,	 and	 detoxify	 threats	 (P128).	 	 Look	 at	 where	 this	happened	and	who	did	this.	38. Are	 some	 discourses	 more	 available	 to	 some	 than	 others?	 Nurses	 /	doctors.	39. The	concept	of	anxiety	is	employed	at	individual	level	(P148),	but	it	also	exists	 at	 organisational	 level	 (Menzies-Lyth)	&	 into	 groups	 (Bion).	 Look	for	how	anxiety	is	managed	within	an	organisation.	40. A	way	to	engage	with	my	emotional	response	is	what	are	my	hopes	and	fears	for	this	participant?	(P161).	41. They	talk	of	honesty,	sympathy	and	respect	(P164).		I	am	not	sure	about	sympathy.	 	 I	 feel	 very	 empathetic.	 	 They	 discuss	 dis-liking	 participants	and	how	they	manage	that.	42. Authors	 argue	 that	 people’s	 lives	 are	 characterised	 by	 provisionality,	changeability	 and	 unpredictability	 (P165)	 and	 thus	 should	 characterise	the	 research	 processes	 that	 attempt	 to	 understand	 them.	 	 I	 can’t	 find	 a	meaning	 of	 provisionality	 but	 if	 it	means	 provisional	 then	 it	means	 not	worked	 out	 yet…I	 would	 argue	 that	 peoples	 lives	 are	 characterised	 by	loss.	 	Could	 look	at	how	many	HCPs	 talk	of	 their	own	 loss.	 	Actually	we	don’t	 talk	about	our	 losses	at	work…keep	 it	v	much	to	ourselves.	 	Could	critique	this.	
43. Suggests	 open-ended	 questions,	 eliciting	 narrative,	 avoid	 why,	 using	
respondents	ordering	and	phrasing	(P10).	 	Need	to	 look	at	what	I	did	and	
when	 I	 didn’t	 reflect	words,	 content	 back	 and	why.	 	 Allow	 respondents	 to	
freely	talk	allows	expression	of	unconscious	feelings	and	motivation	(P10).	
44. Look	 out	 for	 identifications	 including	 affective	 attachments	 to	 notions	 of	
community),	nation	and	belonging	(P	10).	
45. Wengraf	and	Chamberlayne…“explore	the	way	in	which	the	“unsaid”	of	the	








48. “Interpretive	 knowledge	 is	 synthetic	&	 integrative,	 rather	 than	 analytic	&	
reductive”	(P36)...it’s	also	transformative.	
49. Relational	knowledge	…is	inherently	communal;	it	emerges	and	flourishes	in	
human	 environments	 saturated	 with	 trust,	 authenticity	 and	 mutuality”	
(P37).		Look	at	what	I	did	to	encourage	these	aspects.	
50. “Reflective	 knowledge	 up-holds	 the	 dignity	 of	 human	 beings	 as	 free	 and	
autonomous	 agents	 who	 can	 act	 effectively	 and	 responsibly	 on	 their	 own	
behalf	in	context	of	their	inter-dependent	relationships”	(P37).	
51. “Human	 beings	 are	 not	 necessarily	 rational,	 especially	 when	 involved	 in	









adapted	 to	 allow	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 visual	 imagery	 as	 a	 form	 of	
communication	 from	 the	 unconscious	 which	 would	 otherwise	 not	 have	
emerged	 and	 been	 lost	 (P87).	 	 Look	 at	 group	 dynamics	 and	 interview	
dynamics.	Look	at	those	who	spoke	up	after	silence.	
54. 	Look	at	emotional	work	I	did	and	emotional	relationship.	






57. Talks	 about	 our	 own	 “empathetic	 resource”…where	 we	 use	 our	 own	
experience	 to	 “explore	 the	 paths	 and	 contours	 of	 the	 reached	 persons	
experience,	but	we	can	be	swept	into	currents	that	are	dangerous	in	the	pull	
they	exert	on	the	researchers	emotions”	(P	112).	




60. Bourdieu	 sees	 interviewing	 as	 a	 social	 relationship	 affected	 by	 distorting	
factors	 which	 the	 interviewer	 must	 try	 to	 minimise	 (P125)	 e.g.	 knowing	






63. Sue	 Jervis	 –	 “unconscious	 awareness	 of	 another’s	 psyche	 precedes	
intellectual	understanding”(P149).	Look	at	where	I	had	a	gut	feeling	
64. SJ	 noticed	 one	 of	 her	 participants	 had	 a	 frequent	 failure	 to	 complete	
sentences	 and	 instead	 trailed	 off,	 and	 used	 indicators.	 	 She	 suggests	 we	
should	 be	 wise	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 something	 important	 was	 left	 being	
unspoken	(P151).	Look	that	the	transcripts	when	participants	didn’t	 finish	
their	sentences	what	I	did.	
65. SJ	 replaced	 one	 of	 her	 participants	 words	 which	 with	 difficult	 instead	 of	










69. “In	 psychoanalysis,	 analysts	 can	 discover	 much	 about	 an	 analysands	 as	
unconscious	 early	 relationship	 by	 considering	 how	 the	 analysands	
unconsciously	 uses	 the	 analysis”	 (P162).	 	 	 Look	 at	 how	 participants	 used	
me?	What	questions	did	they	ask	me?	
70. SJ	 suggests	 that	by	reflecting	on	my	bodily	 sensations	or	emotions	 I	might	
understand	a	deeper	understanding	of	respondents	experiences.	(P163)		
71. She	 suggests,	 “although	potentially	disturbing,	 if	 this	 transient	blurring	of	
the	 boundary	 between	 researchers	 and	 respondent	 psyches	 is	 sensitively	
and	 ethnically	 explored	 it	may	 lead	 to	 the	 discovery	 of	 elements	 that	will	
ordinarily	remain	inaccessible”	(P163).	
72. Lindsey	Nichols	again	talks	about	the	value	of	being	able	 to	check	out	 the	
researchers	 hypothesis	 and	 describes	 this	 as	 ‘a	 selected	 fact	 or	 an	
overvalued	 idea”	 (P180).	 	 The	 researcher	 states	 in	 their	 experience”	 that	
what	 was	 not	 tolerated	 by	 the	 participant	 was	 easily	 dismissed”(P181).		
Look	at	what	is	my	ideas	were	dismissed.	







75. LN	describes	 that	 there	was	“a	sense	of	 something	being	mindfully	held	 in	
suspense”	(P232).	Look	for	this.	
76. Leslie	 Boydell	 analyses	 discourse	 psychosocially.	 	 She	 describes	 Holloway	
and	Jefferson’s	argument	that	“conflict	suffering	and	threats	to	self	operate	
on	the	site	in	ways	that	affect	peoples	positioning	and	investment	in	certain	
discourses	 rather	 than	 others”	 (ibid	 p19)	 (P243).	 	 I	 need	 to	 look	 at	what	
stories	participants	are	telling.	
77. Look	at	metaphors	used	by	participants	(P244).	
78. LB	 realises	 that	 language	 use	 s	 highly	 variable	 and	 cannot	 be	 taken	 as	 a	











80. LB	 suggests	 we	 look	 at	 how	 people	 positioned	 themselves	 in	 relation	 to	
others	(P251).	Look	at	how	people	speak	of	themselves	with	in	the	episodes	
described	
81. LB	 describes	 how	 ‘on	 the	 ground”	 it	was	 a	 term	 commonly	 used.	 Look	 at	
how	practice	is	described	
82. LB	describes	optimism	as	a	defence	(P	260).		I	need	to	consider	is	optimism	
or	Hope	a	defence?	Are	my	models	a	defence?	
		
	 	 	
I	then	split	these	into	questions	to	ask	of	me,	them	and	us	and	placed	in	an	excel	spread	sheet	(see	Chapter	3).				 											
		
	 	 	
Appendix	9	–	Process	and	visual	orientation	to	study	and	write	up		
		
	 	 	
Appendix	10	–	Model	generated	-	psychological	readiness	to	talk	about	dying		
													
		
	 	 	
Appendix	11	–	Abstract	of	clinical	work	going	to	conference	subsequent	to	
PhD	study	insights.	
			
								
		
	 	 	
Appendix	12	–	Mind	map	that	helped	me	identify	the	gap	in	the	literature	to	
focus	the	research	question.			
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